On the Shoulders of Titans: A History of Project Gemini by Hacker, B. C.
ON THE SHOULDERS OF 
TITANS 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19780012208 2020-03-20T13:18:05+00:00Z
The first space rendezvous 
NASA SP-4203 
ON THE SHOULDERS OF 
TITANS 
A History of Project Gemini 
br 
BARTON C. HACKER 
and 
JAMES M. GRIMWOOD 
Scientific and Technical Information Ofjice 1977 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
Washington, D.C. 
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 
Stock Number 033-000-00643-8 
Foreword 
G EMINI was the intermediate manned space flight program be- tween America's first steps into space with Mercury and the amaz- 
ing and un recedented accomplishments achieved during the manned 
lunar expe i' itions of Apollo. Because of its position between these two 
other efforts, Gemini is probably less remembered. Still, it more than 
had its place in man's progress into this new frontier. 
Gemini accomplishments were manyfold. They included many 
,firsts: first astronaut-controlled maneuvering in space; first rendezvous 
in space of one spacecraft with another; first docking of one spacecraft 
with a propulsive stage and use of that stage to transfer man to high 
altitude; first traverse of man into the Earth's radiation belts; first ex- 
tended manned flights of a week or more in duration; first extended 
stays of man outside his spacecraft; first controlled reentry and preci- 
sion landing; and many more. 
These achievements were significant in ways one cannot truly eval- 
uate even today, but two things stand out: (1 ) it was the time when 
America caught up and surpassed the Soviet Union in manned space 
flight, and (2 ) these demonstrations of capability were an absolute 
prerequisite to the phenomenal Apollo accomplishments then yet to 
come. 
America's first manned space flight program, Mercury, involved a 
careful buildup of flight duration to slightly beyond one day with ac- 
companying concerns about man's physiological response to weightless- 
ness and other aspects of his safety and well being. In the meantime, 
the Russian effort had achieved durations of five days, flight of a mul- 
tiple crew shortly after the Mercury Program had terminated, and the 
first extravehicular operation by a cosmonaut shortly before the first 
manned Gemini flight. The question at that time was who would per- 
form the first rendezvous, seen as a very complex operation but abso- 
lutely needed for future space endeavors. 
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About the time Gemini started, the Russian effort slowed down as 
they attempted to develop and flight qualify their second-generation 
manned spacecraft, Soyuz. In the meantime, Gemini, America's sec- 
ond-generation spacecraft, reeled off ten manned flights in less than 
twenty months-a flight rate yet to be surpassed in any space program. 
The last five manned launches were accompanied by nearly simultane- 
ous and precisely timed launches of rendezvous target vehicles. During 
this period, rendezvous demonstrations and many other activities took 
place which were not to be matched by corresponding Soviet accom- 
plishments for years to come, and more than five years passed before 
the two-week long mission of Gemini VI was exceeded by the Russians 
with their Salyut spacecraft. 
However, these Gemini mission spectaculars were not aimed at 
"beating the Russians"; rather, their purpose was to support and dem- 
onstrate needed mission capability for the upcoming Apollo flights to 
the Moon. Apollo needed a reliable rendezvous and docking operation 
if the astronauts were to get back from the Moon. Could this be done? 
Gemini demonstrated such a capability with great success six straight 
times and with many different techniques. The Apollo missions re- 
quired a duration of a week or two. Could this be done? Gemini dem- 
onstrated mission durations of one and two weeks with no major unto- 
ward effects on the astronauts. The Apollo astronauts would spend 
hours outside their spacecraft exploring the lunar surface. Could this 
be done? Of the five EVA missions conducted in Gemini, four of them 
lasted from two to four hours. Tired astronauts returning from the 
Moon would want to land as close as possible to the recovery aircraft 
carrier. Could this be done? Indeed, it was accomplished seven straight 
times during the last two-thirds of the Gemini Program. Apollo need- 
ed to develop advanced reliable systems. Could this be done? Their 
names probably still sound strange to many, but fuel cells, cryogenic 
storage of hydrogen and oxygen, ablative thrusters using hypergolic 
propellants, an onboard digital computer, an inertial guidance sys- 
tem, and a rendezvous radar were developed and demonstrated in 
Gemini. One must admit to considerable difficulty in these develop- 
ments, but, in the end, they provided a high degree of confidence that 
systems embodying high reliability could be obtained. 
Equally important to Apollo was the training provided by the 
Gemini missions to the flight and ground crews. The mission control 
center techniques and the flight control team procedures were largely 
implemented during Gemini. Of the astronaut complement assigned to 
the first four flights to the Moon, ten of the twelve had prior Gemini 
flight experience and the other two had been members of Gemini 
backup crews. In all, over half of the Apollo crew members had direct 
Gemini flight experience. 
Gemini also carried forward a major experiment program in space 
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science and applications. Over 50 such experiments were carried out 
involving astronomy, biology, atmospheric sciences, medicine, radiation 
effects, micrometeoroid investigations, space environmental effects, and 
others. Technical and operational experimentation involved such 
things as low light level TV observations, special photography, special 
communications tests, tethering of two vehicles, and gravity gradient 
stabilization. The hundreds of synoptic weather and Earth terrain col- 
or photographs taken contributed greatly to the development of the 
meteorological and Earth resources programs which are now bringing 
important benefits from rapid global observations of the Earth to peo- 
ple here on the surface. 
Lest one think that the Gemini flights were carried forward with 
great smoothness, be assured that most of them encountered real cliff- 
hanging incidents. On Geniini IV, the astronauts had great difficulty in 
closing the hatch after their EVA which was accomplished only after 
great physical exertion and almost complete exhaustion. Needless to 
say, corrections were made before the next flight. Gemini V, which was 
planned to fly for eight days, was almost called back after a few hours 
because of loss of pressure in the cryogenic tanks supplying fuel for 
the new electrical power devices called fuel cells. But the crew and 
flight controllers nursed the spacecraft along for the full mission dura- 
tion by powering down the spacecraft and using 'ust a few watts of 
electrical power. Their problems were compounde d when some of the 
attitude stabilization rockets failed late in the mission. 
After loss of the first rendezvous target vehicle, caused by an ex- 
plosion during launch, Gemini VI and VII were reconfigured so that 
Gemini VII served as the rendezvous target for Gemini VI in the 
"Spirit of 76" mission just before Christmas in 1965, after which Gemi- 
ni VII continued to struggle along with balky fuel cells for a record 
duration of 14 days in space. Gemini VIII spun out of control just af- 
ter accomplishing the first docking in space. The crew was able to cor- 
rect this condition in spite of rotating nearly one revolution every sec- 
ond. But the spacecraft had to be returned to Earth rapidly and land- 
ed in the western Pacific Ocean. Astronauts became exhausted from 
EVA exertions on Gemini IX and XI. Only the last mission, Gemini XU, 
(and perhaps Gemini X) could be called really smooth, carried out pretty 
much as planned. 
In spite of all these exciting mission events, problems, and accom- 
plishments, the thing that stands out in my own mlnd is the way in which 
the effort and dedication of many individuals and groups coalesced into an 
extremely effective team. This cliche' is often voiced whenever an activity is 
successful, but, in Gemini, the observed capacity for accom lishment 
proved to be well beyond a program manager's most optimistic Ropes. Al- 
though not so visible from a rogram manager's level, this cooperation 
and support had to extend to t Ph e level of the NASA Administrator and his 
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interfaces with the President, congressional leaders, heads of other agen- 
cies, industry, and the public in general. 
Most certainly, this same situation occurred during the Apollo Pro- 
gram and, no doubt, has occurred in connection with most major achieve- 
ments of man. However, Gemini-though a complex undertaking-was 
small enough for this to stand out very clearly. Such an experience leads 
one to believe that man can accomplish almost anything if sufficient dedi- 
cation and cooperation exists between and within the groups involved. 
In Gemini, this esprit de corps was actually enhanced by the mis- 
takes made or the problems encountered because of the positive ap- 
proach to dealing with them. A prime example of this occurred when 
a critical hydraulic system failed on the launch vehicle just at engine 
start prior to liftoff on the first full systems test of Gemini. The re- 
sponse of the people involved was truly outstanding. Even though re- 
covery from this problem involved trying work over the Christmas hol- 
idays, everyone involved put forward a maximum effort, including the 
small job shop that built a new casting, the hydraulic valve contractor, 
the prime contractor, the Air Force, its support contractors, and 
NASA. As a result of such effort, the cause of the failure was isolated, 
a completely new component designed, built, tested, qualified, in- 
stalled, and checked out so that a second attempt could be made only 
six weeks after this major difficulty occurred. There may have been 
evidences of parochialism and vested interests early in the program, 
but after an event and accomplishment such as that, the whole team 
concentrated on the program in the spirit of an elite group. 
I believe that this is a lesson and a legacy that our space programs 
have left to future generations just as other eras of great accomplish- 
ment have done. Admittedly, Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo had very 
clear objectives. But even in more complex and confusing situations an 
integrated and dedicated striving to solutions of problems would seem 
to be an approach well worth taking. In today's world, there seems to 
be an undue degree of second-guessing and lack of cooperation in 
many endeavors. Gemini was far from perfect, but, although its people 
recognized and encountered imperfection, they strove as a group for 
perfection. 
Charles W. Mathews 
Associate Administrator for Applications 
July 1 975 
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Preface 
P ROJECT Gemini is now little remembered, having vanished into that special limbo reserved for the successful intermediate steps in 
a fast-moving technological advance. Conceived and approved in 1961, 
the second major project in the American manned space flight 
gram carried men into orbit in 1965 and 1966. Gemini thus 
Americans in s ace between the path-breaking but limited Earth-or- 
bital missions o P Project Mercury and the far more ambitious Project 
Apollo, which climaxed in 1969 when two men first set foot on the 
Moon. Although keeping the nation in space was one of the motives 
that induced the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) to go ahead with Project Gemini, it was not the overriding 
one. It furnished the setting in which a new project could be ap- 
proved, but the precise character of that project grew out of two dis- 
tinct lines of development that converged during 1961. 
President John F. Kennedy's decision in May 1961 to commit the 
United States to landing on the Moon before the end of the decade 
gave Gemini its central objective. NASA planners had been thinking 
about the Moon, an obvious goal for manned space flight, almost from 
the moment the agency itself was created in 1958. The Moon, how- 
ever, was seen as a target for the 1970s, pending development of a 
huge rocket, called Nova. It would launch a spacecraft that would fly 
directly to the Moon, land there, and then return. This direct ap- 
proach was widely accepted on the grounds that it was almost certaln 
to work. 
Some NASA engineers had advocated an alternative method, in 
which two or more spacecraft might rendezvous in orbit rather than 
proceed directly to the Moon. This approach promised enormous sav- 
ings in fuel and weight; the lunar mission based on rendezvous might 
be launched with much smaller rockets, and therefore much sooner, 
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than the direct mission. The greatest drawback of this approach was its 
novelty. No one knew how hard a rendezvous in space might be. So 
long as time was ample, the direct method offered by far the safer 
rospect. When the President imposed a deadline, however, support 
for rendezvous waxed. It promised a quicker and cheaper road to the 
Moon, if it could be achieved. The "if" was a big one in 1961, big 
enough to justify the expense of a full-fledged manned space flight 
project to resolve it. Gemini was first and foremost a project to devel- 
op and prove equipment and techniques for rendezvous. 
That the project turned out to be Gemini, however, rather than 
something else, resulted from a second distinct chain of causes. Gov- 
ernment and industry engineers who worked in Project Mercury saw 
innumerable ways to improve their roduct. Constrained by the limit- 
ed power of the Atlas rocket that I! aunched Mercury, they had been 
forced to design a spacecraft with integrated systems; the inside of the 
capsule was crammed with layered components, filling every cranny 
and making it hard to build, hard to test, and hard to prepare for 
flight. As a first step it might do, but it could never be much more. 
Throughout 1959 and 1960, while the main effort centered on making 
Mercury work, thinking turned more and more to the kind of space- 
craft that should come next; it should be based on the lessons learned 
in working on the essentially handcrafted, experimental machine that 
was Mercury, but modified to permit something more closely resem- 
bling routine buildin , testing, and operation than Mercury allowed. 
By mid-1961, these i f eas coalesced into a concrete proposal for a new 
spacecraft, just when NASA was casting about for a means of working 
out the problems of rendezvous. Gemini's second taproot was an engi- 
neering concern to improve spacecraft technology beyond the first step 
that was Mercury. 
Project Gemini owed its origins both to its predecessor-it built on 
the technology and experience of Pro'ect Mercury-and to its succes- 
sor-it derived its chief justification irom Project Apollo's concerns. 
The new roject acquired other objectives as well: testing the concept P of control ed landing, determining the effects of lengthy stays in space, 
and training ground and flight crews. The process through which a 
broad range of ideas and concerns came together in a clearly defined 
space flight program is the main theme of this book's first three chap- 
ters. 
By December 1961, when the new project received its formal 
stamp of approval from NASA Headquarters in Washington, much of 
the design work had been done, many of the major decisions had al- 
ready been made. A Gemini Project Office at the Manned Spacecraft 
Center (renamed Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center in February 1973) 
in Houston took charge of overseeing the effort. Just a week after proj- 
ect approval, the first major contract went to McDonnell Aircraft 
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Corporation for the Gemini spacecraft. A separate contract with North 
American Aviation had already initiated work on the paraglider land- 
ing system, that was intended to allow Gemini to alight on land rather 
than water. Other key contracts were soon awarded through the Air 
Force Space Systems Division for the project's several rocket boosters: 
% to Martin Company for the Titan I1 to launch the spacecraft, to Lock- 
heed Missiles & Space Company for the Agena to serve as rendezvous 
target, and to General Dynamics Corporation for the Atlas to boost 
Agena into space. A matter of months sufficed to erect the whole struc- 
ture of contracts and subcontracts that united the efforts of government 
and industry in Project Gemini. 
Gemini thus moved quickly into its development phase, the central 
effort of 1962 and 1963. It was an unsettled period, as such times al- 
ways are for high-technology projects. Although Gemini, perhaps 
more than most such undertakings, rested on already tested technolo- 
gies, it still strained the limits of the known at some points. Inevitably 
this produced problems not always easy to resolve, the more so since 
Gemini was bound by severe time constraints. It could not, whatever 
happened, be allowed to overlap or interfere with Project A 0110. In 
one major instance, the paraglider, answers could not be ound in 
time, and that goal had to be dropped. 
P 
Gemini's difficulties in its first two years were not solely technical, 
nor were technical problems perhaps even the most pressing. Gemini 
labored under a sharply restricted budget. The project faced a severe 
financial crisis during its first year and lesser such crises throughout its 
life. Within NASA and without, Apollo and the trip to the Moon al- 
ways held center stage. Gemini got more than crumbs-its final cost 
exceeded a billion dollars-but the margin remained narrow. More 
than once, lack of funds threatened the loss of one or another of its 
major goals, and money problems played a key role in managerialL 
changes in 1963. That year, however, also saw Gemini's development 
completed, the worst of its technical problems (except the paraglider) 
resolved or clearly on the way to solution. Project Gemini's develop- 
ment troubles and their outcome provide the central thread for Chap- 
ters IV through VII. 
By the end of 1963, Gemini was moving into its qualifying trials, 
which extended into 1965. The road was far from easy, but the worst 
was past, as reflected in the slow decline in the number of workers di- 
rectly assigned to Gemini. Early 1964 saw the first of Gemini's 12 mis- 
sions, an unmanned test of spacecraft and booster that was flawless. 
The long delay that followed was a reflection not on Gemini but on 
the Florida climate, as the launch site was buffeted by hurricanes. The 
second unmanned mission, in January 1965, proved that Gemini was 
ready to carry men aloft. Some two months later, Virgil I. Grissom and 
xvii 
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John W. Young flew Gemini 3 through three circuits of Earth, and 
the project office set out after its planned goals. Gemini's qualification 
is the subject of Chapters VIII through X. 
In striking contrast to the endless difficulties that had frustrated 
attempts to keep Project Mercury on schedule, Project Gemini came 
close to achieving a routine launch every other month throughout 
1965 and 1966. Gemini XII closed out the program in November 
1966. Gemini's operational phase was hardly so free of trouble as such 
a schedule might suggest, but the design that had been geared to eas- 
ier testing and checkout roved its worth when coupled with the expe- 
rience derived from ear F ier efforts. One by one, Gemini achieved its 
objectives, proving that astronauts could leave the shelter of their vehi- 
cle and function in space, that they could closely control spacecraft 
fiight and landing, that they could survive up to two weeks in orbit 
without ill effects, and that they could rendezvous with a target in or- 
bit. This is the story told in Cha ters XI through XV. 
The teams who serviced, iew, directed, and supported Gemini 
missions opened the near-space environment of Earth as a potential 
workshop and stilled some nagging fears about what might happen to 
men on the way to the Moon. They did not do it alone. Just as surely 
as the Gemini spacecraft rested on the shoulders of its Titan I1 launch 
vehicle, those who combined to make Project Gemini succeed stood on 
the shoulders of the giants who preceded them. Isaac Newton, who 
first formulated the laws of motion that Gemini applied in orbit three 
centuries later, wrote, "If I have seen farther, it is by standing on the 
shoulders of giants." So, too, did Project Gemini, not the least on those 
of Newton himself. 
And so, too, did the authors of this history of Project Gemini: 
Barton C. Hacker, who wrote the first ten chapters on deslgn, develop- 
ment, and qualification; and James M. Grimwood, who described oper- 
ations in the last five chapters. Although this book will not be the last 
word on Gemini, we enjoyed an access to its documentary remains and 
to its participants not likely to be duplicated. 
Aid in threading a path through this embarrassment of riches 
came from many sources at the Manned Spacecraft Center, elsewhere 
in NASA, other government agencies (especially the Air Force), the 
Gemini contractors, and others. Their numbers preclude individual 
thanks, but the authors gratefully acknowledge their help. Combing 
the records and interviewing the actors proved an arduous and chal- 
lenging task. The contemporary historian must beware the sensitivities 
of the many people he writes about who are still very much alive. This 
may be especially true of a project so successful as Gemini proved to 
be, since the afterglow of accomplishment tends to dim memories of 
things that went wrong. Yet the advantage of having the counsel of the 
participants in weighing the mass of evidence more than compensates 
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for any concomitant handica s. They cheerfull endured lengthy in- 
mented on drafts. 
P B terviews, cleared up technica points, ransacke their files, and com- 
This help was all the more important because Project Gemini nev- 
er attracted as much attention as either Mercury or Apollo. Having 
neither the novelty of the first nor the enormously exciting goal of the 
second, Gemini prompted relatively little outside description or analy- 
sis. Journalistic interest was largely confined to Gemini's manned mis- 
sions in 1965 and 1966, and even that coverage was slight after the 
first two. Never as high in public consciousness as Mercury or Apollo, 
Gemini now lives mainly in the memories of those who worked on it. 
This in part reflects Gemini's ambiguous status even within NASA- 
important to be sure but somehow outside the mainstream that flowed 
from Mercury to Apollo. Gemini seemed less touched by outside 
events than its brother programs. In writing its history, we have adopt- 
ed what in the history of science is often called an internalist approach. 
The course of Gemini's history was clearly dictated by internal techni- 
cal demands, and the focal point of the story is the work of the Gemini 
Program Office at the Manned Spacecraft Center. Picking out the par- 
ticular individual whose contribution was unique is seldom possible, 
not because such contributions were lacking but because Gemini was so 
much a team effort. Many of those team members, both from govern- 
ment and from industry, have remarked on the sense of unity and 
elan they enjoyed in those days and have suggested that Gemini might 
have achieved a good deal more than it was called upon to do. Howev- 
er true that may be, Project Gemini, in terms of its actual costs, sched- 
ules, and performance, must rank among the most successful research 
and development projects ever conducted by the United States. 
We would like to extend special thanks to those whose efforts in 
behalf of this book significantly lightened our burdens. Sally D. Gates, 
Historical Office Archivist-Editor, served indispensably in a multitude 
of roles: research assistant, editor, coordinator of the comment draft, 
compiler of appendixes, typist, proofreader, and friendly critic. Billie D. 
Rowel1 and Corinne L. Morris, both of the Historical Office, at various 
times organized and managed the office's archives and performed a 
variety of other services. Jewel1 Norsworthy, Center records mana e- K ment officer, helped retrieve documents that had been retired to ho d- 
ing areas. Ivan D. Ertel, former Center assistant historian, and Peter J. 
Vorzimmer, former contract 'historian, conducted a number of inter- 
views on behalf of the Gemini history. This book was written under 
the auspices of the NASA historical program through a contract with 
the History Department of the University of Houston; it has benefited 
from the advice and assistance of NASA historians Monte D. Wright, 
Frank W. Anderson, r., Eugene M. Emme, and William D. Putnam, ! as well as University o Houston professors James A. Tinsley and Loyd 
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S. Swenson, Jr. Although it is officially s onsored, its authors alone 
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NOTE: NASA has placed itself in the forefront of the effort to convert the United States to the 
metric system. In 1973, use of all English weights and measures was prohibited in all NASA pub- 
lications, including historical. This did present certain problems, since NASA engineers during 
the 1960s normally expressed themselves in feet, miles, pounds, etc. In general, where round 
figures are dearly intended, we have substituted round metric figures. Precise figures are convert- 
ed precisely. For the reader's convenience, one metric unit requires a word of explanation. In the 
English system, "pound" is a unit of both mass and force, but the metric system is more rational 
and uses two distinct units: the familiar gram for mass, the less familiar newton for force-thus, 
for example, pounds of weight become grams, but pounds of thrust become newtons. 
Between Mercurv and A~ol lo  
I N Houston, Texas, December temperatures in the low sixties seem ,cool.l And so it must have seemed to Robert R. Gilruth when he 
landed in the city on '7 December 1961, especially in contrast to the 
muggy end-of-summer heat that had greeted him on his first visit -two 
and a half months before. Gilruth's September visit had followed close 
on the heels of the announcement that the Space Task Group (STG) 
he headed was moving to Houston. With several of his colleagues, he 
had come to look over the new site for his fast-growing branch of the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Now he was 
back in Houston to tell the city's business community something about 
his group and its work-putting American astronauts into space and 
eventually landing them on the Moon. The occasion was what the 
Houston Chamber of Commerce billed, with a bit of Texas hyperbole, 
as its 12 1st annual meeting. True, a chamber of commerce had been 
formed in 1840, but it soon vanished without a trace. Seventy years 
later, the 15-year-old Houston Business League voted to rename itself 
the "Chamber of Commerce."2 Whether the 1961 session was the 
121st, the 66th, or the 51st, it was still a big event. Houston "was a 
businessman's town."s 
And it was a booming town, sprawling over more than 480 square 
kilometers (300 square miles) of Texas Gulf Coast "like a bucket of 
spilled water."4 In the same month that Gilruth first visited Houston, 
the city's population had passed the million mark. And that, accord- 
ing to the president of the Chamber of Commerce, was one of the 
"most significant milestones of Houston's progress in 196 1 ."5 Houston 
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and its people blended, not always smoothly, the South and the West. 
Chicanos joined blacks as part of the "problem" that sometimes trou- 
bled the ruling Anglos, who were "conservative, cautious, and business- 
oriented . . . because they reflect community attitudes."6 September 
1961 was also the month when the first black pupils, twelve of them, 
entered Houston's white school system.7 
But Houston's leaders, in a pattern that has marked American 
development at least sime the 19th century, coupled social conserva- 
tism with economic opportunism. Founded as a lucky real-estate ven- 
ture, the city had grown by exploiting the resources of a vast hinter- 
land. Freewheeling promotion was, and remained, the order of the 
day, and nowhere more so than in the multibillion-dollar oil industry 
that Houston head uartered.8 The hotel to which Gilruth repaired was 
a perfect symbol o 9 the city and a fitting site for the "121st" annual 
meeting of the Chamber of Commerce. Brainchild of Glenn Mc- 
Carthy--oil millionaire, land speculator, and all-round promoter-the 
Shamrock Hotel had taken five years to build and cost $21 million. It 
opened grandly on St. Patrick's Day 1949, with 50,000 people gathered 
to eat $42-a-plate dinners. Six shades of green garnished its outer 
walls, a prospect otherwise so dull that Frank Lloyd Wright refused to 
comment on it, though glimpsing the interior did move him to muse, 
"I always wondered what the inside of a juke box looked like." Mc- 
Carthy lost the hotel when his oil empire collapsed five years later, and 
it ended up in the hands of another Texas entrepreneur, Conrad Hil- 
ton. So it was the Shamrock Hilton, with Hilton's portrait gracing the 
lobby instead of McCarthy's, when Gilruth arrived.9 
Gilruth himself symbolized another of the "milestones of Houston's 
progress in 1961." On 19 September, just a day after the city officially 
topped a million, NASA had announced its choice for the site of a new 
multimillion-dollar manned space flight laboratory.10 It was to be near 
Clear Lake, some 32 kilometers southeast of the city on a tract of land 
donated by the Humble Oil and Refining Company. This, too, fit the 
attern of Houston's growth, at least since World War I, as federal 
Rnds had begun to flow into the city like the oil that much of that 
money financed. The president of the Chamber of Commerce wel- 
comed NASA's new move as "one of the Houston's most meaningful 
developments since the opening of the Ship Channel for deep sea 
shipping in 1915." Gilruth directed the new facility, the Manned 
Spacecraft Center (MSC), which came officially into being on 1 Novem- 
ber 1961.11 
The Center was, in fact, merely the renamed Space Task Group a N(STG), created in 1958 to put Americans in space via Project Mercury. 4 So far, STG had managed to loop two astronauts over the fringes of B 
the atmosphere on Redstone boosters and to orbit with an Atlas rocket 
a chimpanzee named Enos. But the much-delayed attempt to orbit a 
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man still receded. On the same day that Gilruth spoke to the Houston 
Chamber of Commerce, he announced that the scheduled 19 Decem- 
ber launch of Mercury-Atlas 6, with John H. Glenn, Jr., aboard, was 
now postponed until 1962. The United States was not going to match, 
at least in the same year, the Soviet Union's feat of sending a man into 
orbit. Nonetheless, optimism prevailed. The causes of the delay were 
minor, and success seemed just around the corner.12 
STG, like Houston, had boomed in 1961. Two largely successful 
manned suborbital flights, followed by Mercury-Atlas 4 with its "me- 
chanical man" and the ape-bearing Mercury-Atlas 5, had eased the 
worries caused by Mercury's technical roblems during 1960. In the B meantime, STG had added the manne lunar landing program, Proj- 
ect Apollo, to its responsibilities. It had outgrown its makeshift facili- 
ties at Langley Research Center in Virginia and its old name as well. 
After a painstaking search, NASA settled on Houston for STG's new 
location and soon furnished the group with a new name to match its 
larger role. 13 
For Houston, it was love at first sight, but the 750 NASA workers 
faced with moving 2400 kilometers from Tidewater Virginia to Gulf 
Coast Texas in the midst of Project Mercury were less enthusiastic. 
Gilruth himself had qualms after his first view of the new site in Sep- 
tember, shortly after it had been swept by Hurricane Carla.14 The de- 
cision had been made, however, and the space fever that promptly 
seized Houston helped smooth the changeover. A crowd of some 900 
greeted Gilruth with a standing ovation when he stepped to the dais at 
the Shamrock Hilton to begin his remarks.15 
What Gilruth had to say turned out to be headline news and 
earned him another standing ovation when he finished. NASA, he 
revealed, planned to launch a third manned space flight pro ram to 
fill the gap between Mercury and Apollo. He outlined a halfbillion- 
dollar project to orbit a two-man Mercury capsule via the Air Force's 
new Titan I1 booster. The key goal was to develop orbital rendezvous, 
a novel technique NASA planned to use in the Apollo mission to the 
Moon. Once in orbit, the crewmen would steer their rocket-powered 
craft to a meeting with an unmanned Agena spacecraft, boosted into 
orbit separately by an Atlas.16 Gilruth had learned only that day of 
NASA Headquarters' approval of the new project.17 
Still something of a puzzle was what to call it. In making it public, 
Gilruth labeled it a "two-man Mercury." Inside NASA, at one Qme or 
another, it had gone by the name of Advanced Mercury, Mercury 
Mark I1 (the one-man capsule being Mark I), or simply Mark 11. With- 
in three months, however, an ad hoc "program-naming" committee in 
NASA Headquarters decided on "Gemini" for the n e w r j e c t .  Recog- 
nition for having picked that name, along with a bot e of scotch as 
prize, went to Alex P. Nagy in NASA Headquarters. Gemini, "The 
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Emblem adopted for Gemini program. 
Twins," was one of the 12 constellations of the zodiac. Nagy thought 
that "'the Twins' seems to carry out the thought nicely, of a two-man 
crew, a rendezvous mission, and its relation to Mercury. Even the as- 
tronomical symbol (11) fits the former Mark 11 designation."ls 
By an unlikely coincidence, since Nagy disclaims any knowledge of 
astrology, Gemini as a sign of the zodiac is controlled by Mercury. Its 
spheres of influence include adaptability and mobility-two features 
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the spacecraft designers had explicitly pursued-and, through its link 
with the third house of the zodiac, all means of communication and 
transportation as well. Astrologically, at least, Gemini was a remarkably 
apt name, the more so since the United States is said to be very much 
under its influence.19 To those with no more than a passing knowledge 
of astrology, however, Gemini must have seemed a most obscure 
choice. To  this day, its proper pronunciation has not been settled in 
NASA. Although an informal survey of astronomical opinion came 
down on the side of a terminal "ee" sound, many still opt for "eye."20 
The new program publicly became Project Gemini on 3 January 
1962.21 
THE BACKGROUND OF RENDEZVOUS 
The project that Gilruth announced on 7 December 1961 had not 
just then sprung into being. A year of planning, work, and advocacy 
had gone before, and more than three years of intense effort lay ahead 
before Gemini carried men into space. Even so, Gemini was something 
of an afterthought in the American manned space flight program. 
Gemini did fly after Mercury had achieved its major goal of putting an 
American into orbit and bringing him back safely and before Apollo 
first bore men aloft on the path that led eventually to the surface of 
the Moon. But that is misleading. One of the reasons for Gemini, in 
fact, was to keep Americans in space during the time when Mercury 
had run its course but Apollo had yet to be launched. 
Gemini took shape after Apollo had begun, in part to answer a 
crucial question for Apollo: Was rendezvous and docking in orbit a 
feasible basis for a manned lunar landing mission? When NASA offi- 
cials appeared before Congress early in 1962 to justify the new pro- 
gram, the heart of the case they argued was the need to develop and 
prove the techniques of orbital rendezvous.22 Project Gemini was in- 
tended to show that a piloted spacecraft could meet an unmanned tar- 
get in space-the orbit of the spacecraft matching that of the target so 
that there was no significant difference in speed and no significant dis- 
tance between the two, in much the same way that two aircraft might 
fly in formation. 
Many aspects of modern space flight were first suggested in the 
sometimes fanciful but often profound s ace-travel writings of the ear- P ly 20th century. One was the value o rendezvous in orbit. It first 
emerged as part of the space-station concept, which can be traced 
through the works of the Russian pioneers of astronautics-K. E. 
Tsiolkovskii, Yu. V. Kondratyuk, and F. A. Tsander-and in the writ- 
ings of their Central European counterparts-Hermann Oberth, Wal- 
ter Hohmann, Guido von Pirquet, and "Hermann Noordung." Their 
goal was flight to the Moon and planets, but their calculations suggest- 
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ed that chemically propelled rockets might lack the power to launch 
such journeys directly from Earth's surface. If a journey were carried 
out in stages, however, the problem might be surmounted. 
They proposed using a space station, a stopover point in orbit. 
Once such a station was built, any number of rockets might be 
launched to meet it, each bearing its cargo of fuel or sup lies to be 
transferred to the station. When enough had been gathered: fuel and 
supplies might then be loaded aboard an interplanetary vessel, perhaps 
itself constructed in orbit, and the real journey to the planets could 
begin. In effect, the trip would be launched from orbit, the greater 
part of the velocity needed to escape Earth's gravitational field having 
been already attained. This concept had been widely accepted in space- 
travel circles by 1929.23 
While rendezvous was clearly a key technique in this scheme, it 
failed to receive any special emphasis. That changed after 1949, when 
two members of the British Interplanetary Society pointed out that 
orbital staging need not depend on first building a space station. The 
new concept was called "orbital technique" or "orbital operations." The 
pieces of an interplanetary vessel might simply be assembled in Earth 
orbit without troubling to construct a space station, or several rockets 
might meet in orbit and transfer their fuel to one of their number, 
which would then embark on the final mission.24 As Wernher von 
Braun, later one of NASA's leading advocates of orbital operations, 
remarked, the space station really amounted to no more than "a space 
rigger's hotel."25 
The rapid spread of this idea brought rendezvous into sharp fo- 
cus. Unlike the space-station concept, to which rendezvous was a some- 
times neglected adjunct, orbital operations moved rendezvous to ten- 
ter stage. The first paper specifically addressed to the problem of "Es- 
tablishing Contact Between Orbiting Vehicles" appeared in 195 1.26 
One result was a renewed attention to orbital mechanics, a topic that 
had languished since the path-breaking work of Walter Hohmann in 
1925. By the end of the 1950s, a theoretical framework for rendezvous 
techniques had been largely erected.27 
When NASA planners began to grapple with the problem of pick- 
ing long-range goals for the American space program, however, they 
tended to overlook the part rendezvous might play except as it related 
to space stations. This may have reflected, as much as anything else, 
the imprint on NASA of the National Advisory Committee for Aero- 
nautics (NACA). When NASA began its career on 1 October 1958, its 
core was the 43-year-old NACA, to which had been added several mili- 
tary and quasi-military space projects. NASA was designed to be, and 
in time became, someth~ng larger, wealthier, and more adventurous 
than NACA had been. But for a time much remained unchanged or 
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changed only slowly. The habits of mind, the viewpoints, the styles, the 
biases fostered by the old setting did not vanish overnight with the old 
name. The same NACA engineers, scientists, managers, and techni- 
cians who left work on 30 September 1958 were back on the job for 
NASA the next morning. Time would bring new faces and fresh view- 
points, thin the ranks of the old NACA hands, and weaken the grip 
of old habits; but NACA left an enduring mark on NASA and its pro- 
grams.28 
NACA had existed to serve-to solve problems for military and 
industrial aircraft programs. Its field, in which it was very good, was 
applied research-solving general engineering and technical problems 
in aeronautics. NACA laboratories had produced many of the techno- 
logical innovations that transformed the post-World War I airplane, a 
slow and inefficient machine of small military and no commercial im- 
portance, into the major weapon and economic giant of mid-century. 
Langley Memorial Laboratory was the first and, until the eve of World 
War 11, the only NACA laboratory; Langley research pioneered many 
prewar innovations in aeronautical design. Lewis Flight Propulsion 
Laboratory and Ames Aeronautical Laboratory went into operation 
early in the Second World War, the Pilotless Aircraft Station in 1945, 
and the High Speed Flight Station in 1947. In 1940, NACA had 650 
employees and a budget of $4.37 million; five years later it employed 
6800 and spent $40.5 million. But NACA still focused its research in 
those areas where lack of knowledge hindered aviation progress, 
spending little effort on basic research--expanding scientific knowl- 
edge-and steering clear of development, which meant seeing a specif- 
ic project through design, building, and testing.29 
During the 1950s, some of the most pressing problems in aero- 
nautics arose from the little studied and poorly understood effects of 
high temperatures on very fast-moving aircraft and rockets. This made 
the focus of NACA research in that decade transonic and hypersonic 
flight, with special stress on aerodynamic heating henomena.30 When 
Sputnik I on 4 October 1957 transformed space ? rom a region of sci- 
entific curiosity to an arena for national rivalry and spurred planning 
for manned space flight, this background stood NACA in good stead. 
A small group of engineers at Langley began working informally 
on a manned orbital satellite. At the start of October 1958, in one of 
his opening moves as NASA's first Administrator, T. Keith Glennan 
approved the project. He formed the Space Task Group to run it and 
announced its name as Mercury two months later. STG started with 45 
people led by Robert Gilruth and they had only one job: the most di- 
i, rect and speedy achievement of manned orbital flights.31 It was a ; complex but straightforward engineering task. Project Mercury "did 
f not require and does not require any major technological break- throughs."32 What it did need was just what a NACA background 
I 7 
Modifications to ballistic missiles 
by 1961 made two vehicles safe 
for adaptation to manned space 
flight. Top left, Redstone and its 
modified versions for unmanned 
and manned space missions. Top 
right, Mercury-Redstone 3 being 
prepared for launch of Astronaut 
Alan Shepard on his suborbital 
space flight. Right, Mercury-A tlas 
4 on pad at Gape Canaveral in 
1961. This unmanned mission 
was to qualify the tracking net- 
work and the spacecraft for the 
upcoming manned orbital mis- 
sion of John Glenn. 
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provided, the skills of applied research and aeronautical engineering 
and particularly experience in the aerodynamics of hypersonic flight. 
Manned space flight beyond Mercury, however, was another mat- 
ter. The crucial role of boosters in setting the limits of what could be 
done in space prompted NASA to its first long-range planning ven- 
ture, "A National Space Vehicle Program," issued in anuary 1959.33 d This report surveyed existing boosters and proposed eveloping a se- 
ries of new ones. It did no more than suggest a range of missions suit- 
ed to each of them. What could be done, however, was one thing; 
what should or would be done was something else. Choosing among 
the possible goals now became NASA's central planning concern. 
This concern produced "The Ten Year Plan of the National Aero- 
nautics and Space Administration" in December 1959. Ultimately 
spacecraft would carry explorers to the Moon and planets, but for the 
1960s, NASA chose the more modest goal of circumlunar flight-a trip 
to the Moon, a few passes in orbit, and a return to Earth. "Manned 
exploration of the moon and the nearer planets must remain as major 
goals for the ensuing decade."34 
NASA planners assumed that a trip to the Moon would be 
launched directly from Earth's surface. That required the giant Nova 
booster, the largest of the four new vehicles proposed in January 1959. 
Nova was a concept built on an engine (the F-1) designed to produce 
6.7 meganewtons (1.5 million pounds of thrust). Air Force contracts 
with Rocketdyne had begun F-1 development in mid-1958. This was 
one of the military projects turned over to NASA when it was formed. 
Four of these engines were planned for Nova's first stage to provide 
27 me anewtons (6 million pounds of thrust) at a time when the most 
power f ul existing American booster required three engines to generate 
1.6 meganewtons C360 000 pounds of thrust).35 The belief expressed 
in the January report that, "with Nova, a manned lunar landing first 
becomes possible,"36 pervaded NASA planning throughout 1959 and 
1960. Even when refueling or assembly in orbit were discussed as al- 
ternatives worthy of study, they were discarded as a basis for planning, 
since "it is assumed that the Nova approach will be followed."37 
The choice was by no means final, but NASA was leaning strongly 
toward direct ascent, perhaps more by default than by decision. To the 
extent that they had been compared at all, the merits of direct ascent 
and orbital operations had been merely asserted rather than studied. 
The question had been cited as a major one, and some of the prob- 
lems involved in "the all-the-way approach versus the assembly-in-orbit 
approach" had been aired at meetings of the Research Steering 
Committee on Manned Space Flight, more commonly known as the 
Goett Committee after its chairman, Harry J. Goett of Ames, during 
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1959.*38 But, as NASA's 10-year plan showed, the question had yet to 
exert much effect on NASA policy. 
Notably absent from NASA's budget request for fiscal year 1961 
was money to study rendezvous, nor did NASA spokesmen mention 
rendezvous when they defended the budget before Congress early in 
1960.39 There was also little talk of space stations. That had not been 
true the year before, when NASA asked for funds to study both a 
small orbiting space laboratory and rendezvous techniques. These were 
closely related. NASA's 1959 choice of lunar landing over a space sta- 
tion as its long-range goal caused rendezvous to fade into the back- 
ground, since the agency had yet to conceive rendezvous for any pur- 
pose other than supporting a space station.40 
CHALLENGE FROM THE FIELD 
Although rendezvous ceased to seem very important to NASA 
Headquarters, 1960 saw that viewpoint challenged in the field. Several 
NASA field centers had begun to look more closely at the possibilities, 
and two, in particular, began to urge strongly an open-minded reas- 
sessment of the merits of rendezvous. One was the George 6. Marshall 
Space Flight Center, in Huntsville, Alabama; the other was Langley. 
Marshall was unique in NASA for its background and outlook. It 
was the former Development Operations Division of the Army Ballis- 
tic Missile Agency, which joined NASA and received its new name in 
March 1960.41 
Marshall's Director, Wernher von Braun, and his chief lieutenants 
had been responsible for the German Army's rocket development pro- 
grams before and during World War 11, coming to the United States 
after the Nazi regime collapsed in 1945.42 They had known the heady 
atmosphere of Weimar Germany's dreams of space travel, and they 
*This phrase became the standard shorthand for the controversy between direct ascent and 
rendezvous for the lunar mission in the minutes of the Goett Committee, which was formed in 
April 1959. The-members were Milton B. Ames, Jr. (NASA Office of Aeronautical and Space 
Research), De E. Beeler (High Speed Flight Station), Alfred J. Eggers, Jr. (Ames), Maxime A. 
Faget (STG), Laurence K. Loftin (Langley), George M. Low (NASA Office of Space Flight Devel- 
opment), Bruce T. Lundin (Lewis), Hams M. Schurmeier (Jet Propulsion Laboratory), and Ralph 
W. May, Jr. (NASA Office of Advanced Research Programs), secretary. The committee intended 
both to "take a reasonably long term look at man-in-space problems leading eventually to recom- 
mendations as to what future mission steps should be" and to recommend appropriate research 
programs to support these steps. This function recalled that of the technical advisory committees 
that had been NACA's instrument for promoting the exchange of information and recommend- 
ing needed research, although unlike them its membership was drawn entirely from within the 
organization. NASA research was to be aligned with NASA development, just as NACA research 
had been aligned with military and industrial development in the past. The Goett Committee was 
chiefly responsible for choosing lunar landing as NASA's appropriate long-term goal. 
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had a long head start on their American colleagues in the hard, practi- 
cal work of making these dreams real. They had studied space stations 
long before they joined NASA. Von Braun had moved on to the no- 
tion of orbital operations. As early as December 1958, he was urging 
NASA to base its lunar mission planning on rendezvous techni ues. In 
a presentation to top-level NASA officials, von Braun dismissel direct 
flight as very difficult, then described four alternative rendezvous 
schemes, two requiring only Earth orbital operations and two calling 
for rendezvous in lunar orbit as well.43 
Von Braun and his colleagues had been working since 1957 on the 
concept of using a cluster of relatively small rocket engines to build a 
booster of 6.7 meganewtons (1.5 million pounds of thrust) as the basis 
for a space flight program leading to manned lunar landing.44 The 
booster project was approved by the Advanced Research Projects 
Agency of the Department of Defense in August 1958.45 Then known 
as Juno V, the vehicle became Saturn in February 1959 and studies 
began on suitable upper stages in a com lete system for a military lu- r nar mission.46 Whether there was any mi itary need for Saturn was the 
question of 1959, and the answer was no. The decision to shift Saturn 
to NASA was behind the transfer of von Braun's group.*47 
Spokesmen for von Braun's group led the defense of the "assem- 
bly-in-orbit approach at Goett Committee meetings during 1959, with 
strong backing from George M. Low, who urged study of "vehicle 
staging so that Saturn could be used for manned lunar landing with- 
out complete reliance on Nova." The committee supported von 
Braun's request for a NASA contract to study orbital operations (his 
group then still belonged to the Army), and Low, who was highly 
placed in the NASA Headquarters Office of Space Flight Development, 
helped push it through.48 Von Braun's group studied Saturn's role in 
lunar landing missions, both manned and unmanned, under NASA 
auspices during the last half of 1959. The new findings confirmed 
what an earlier report had concluded, "that a manned circumlunar 
satellite could be launched from the earth's surface, but some other 
technique will have to be used for a manned lunar landing with the 
present state of the art." Most of the chapter on "Manned Circumlu- 
nar Flights and Lunar Landings" in the 1959 study report was devoted 
to the role of orbital operations in these missions.49 
Joining NASA did nothing to alter this Center's viewpoint. Until 
well into 1960, however, Marshall's leanings toward orbital operations 
produced little work specifically on rendezvous.50 Concerned mainly 
%e clustered-small-engine booster eventually became Saturn I, then Saturn IC. Saturn V, 
which lifted Apollo to the Moon, clustered five of the much larger F-1 engines in its first stage, 
making it a kind of small Nova. 
Saturn I, the first large U.S. 
booster designed expressly for 
ESCAPE sysm Earth-orbital missions. 
SATURN I LAUNCH SUMMARY 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FLIGHTS 
SA-1 I. LAUNCHED-OCT. 27, 1961 
2. S-1 STAGE PROPULSION SYSTEM SATISFACTORY 
SA-2 1. LAUNCHED-APR. 25,1962 
2. PROJECT HIGHWATER RELEASED 22,900GAL. H,O INTO IONOSPHERE 
SA-3 1. LAUNCHED-NOV. 16. 1962 
2. 2NO PHASE PROJ HIGHWATER 
3. FULL PROPELLANT LOADLNG 
SA-4 1. LAUNCHED-MAR. 28,1963 
2. ENGINE OUT CAPABILITY DEMONSTRATED 
SA-5 1. LAUNCHED-JAN. 29,1964 
2. FIRST LIVE S-IV STAGE AND INSTRUMENT UNlT 
SA-6 1. LAUNCHED-MAY 28,1964 
2. FIRST ACTIVE GUIDANCE FLIGHT 
3. FIRST FLIGHT APOLLO BOILERPLATE AND LES 
4. ENGINE OUT (UNPLANNED) 
OPERATIONAL FLIGHTS 
SA-7 1. LAUNCHED-SEPT. 18,1964 
2. COMPLETELY ACTIVE ST.124 GUIDANCE 
SA-9 1. LAUNCHED-FEB. 16,1965 
2 FlRST PEGASUS (METEOROID TECHNOLOGY SATELLITE) ORBITED 
3. FIRST UNPRESSURIZED INSTRUMENT UNlT 
SA-8 1. LAUNCHED-MAY 25, 1965 
2. SECOND PEGASUS SATELLITE ORBITED 
SA-10 1. LAUNCHED-JULY 30.1965 
2 THIRD PEGASUS SATELLITE ORBITED 
3. SATURN I PROGRAM COMPLETED 
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with development programs, especially Saturn, Marshall had few re- 
sources to devote to the kind of research needed to locate and solve 
1 basic problems of technique. Such studies, in any case, more properly 
t fell to one of NASA's research centers, which could focus on rendez- 
vous itself rather than on the missions that the technique might open 
e up. This was where Langley entered the picture, for whatever these 
missions might be, in true space flight "there will undoubtedly be space 
B rendezvous requirements."sl 
Rendezvous research centered on guidance and propulsion at 
Langley, where two groups were working more or less independently 
during 1959. In the Aerospace Mechanics Division, John M. Eggleston 
i and his colleagues were looking at the mechanics of orbital rendez- 
vous. And in the Theoretical Mechanics Division, a group headed by 
John D. Bird was studying launch windows and trajectories for ren- 
dezvous.52 The spokesman for Langley in the Goett Committee 
agreed that lunar landing ought to be "the 'ultimate' manned mission 
i; for present consideration." But he also voiced Langley's belief that 
some form of manned space laboratory was "a necessary intermediate 
step" as a focus for research. That meant a space ferry, and a space 
ferry meant rendezvous.53 
Late in 1959 this concern generated a space station commmittee at 
Langley, with a subcommittee on rendezvous headed by John C. Hou- 
bolt, then assistant chief of the Dynamic Loads Division. Houbolt was 
fresh from a successful attack on the problems that had caused several 
Lockheed Electras to crash. Despite, or perhaps because of, his inexpe- 
rience in spacecraft technology, Houbolt zealously espoused rendez- 
vous. Although his subcommittee had been formed to look at rendez- 
vous in the context of space stations, Houbolt insisted from the start 
that it study rendezvous in the broadest terms, since that technique 
would play a large role in almost any advanced space mission. Loosely 
organized and largely unscheduled, the subcommittee became a meet- 
ing ground for everyone at Langley concerned with any aspect of ren- 
dezvous.*54 
When Langley hosted the Goett Committee in December 1959, 
Houbolt was among the space-station committee members invited to 
describe their work. He concluded by urging a rendezvous-satellite 
experiment "to define and solve the problems more clearly,"55 the first 
of many such pleas Houbolt was to make with as little response. Space- 
station thinking still guided rendezvous work at Langley over the next 
six months. 
In May 1960, Langley was once more host to a meeting, this time 
*This included, among others, John M. Eggleston, John D. Bird, Arthur W. Vogeley, Max C. 
Kurbjun, John A. Dodgen, William C. Mace, W. Hewitt Phillips, and Clinton E. Brown. 
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of lesser scope but greater impact. Bernard Maggin, from the Office of 
Aeronautical and Space Research in NASA Headquarters, had called 
the meetin to discuss space rendezvous and served as its chairman; he 
was the on f y member from Headquarters. Maggin had intended to in- 
vite to the meeting only the NASA research centers-Langley, Ames, 
and Lewis-which his office directed. He soon learned, however, that 
rendezvous had excited wider interest, so he invited the development 
centers-Marshall and Goddard-as well. The meeting was designed to 
give the centers a chance to acquaint each other with current research 
and to exchange thoughts on future prospects.56 
Most of the first day was given over to a series of technical papers 
on propulsion, guidance, and trajectories, which mainly reviewed work 
in progress.57 They revealed two salient facts about NASA rendezvous 
research in mid-1960; work centered on rendezvous between space sta- 
tion and ferry, and Langley was doing most of it. 
All NASA rendezvous research was in-house; NASA had yet to 
provide contract funds for industrial or academic studies. This was one 
of the chief topics at the round-table talks on future rendezvous re- 
quirements that took up the second day of the meeting. Lack of fund- 
ing was ascribed to strong resistance within NASA to any program 
aimed solely at the modest goal of proving a new technique or advanc- 
ing the state of the art. To win funds, a research program on rendez- 
vous needed larger ends. Everyone at the meeting believed that NASA 
ought to begin to develop and prove rendezvous techniques, because 
all were convinced that the need for rendezvous was going to become 
urgent within the next few years. What had to be done, then, was to 
find a context for rendezvous, and the best choice for the task was 
Marshall, since "resistance to . . . rendezvous [was] currently strong" in 
both Goddard Space Flight Center and the Space Task Group, NASA's 
other two development organizations.58 
This may have been the most important by-product of the confer- 
ence-the conclusion that Marshall had both the capacity and the de- 
sire to carry through an orbital operations and rendezvous program. 
In September 1960, Marshall's Future Projects Office was able to tell a 
gathering of industrial representatives that it had $3.1 million in study 
contracts to award during fiscal year 1961, a number of them related 
to rendezvous and orbital operations.59 By the end of the fiscal year, 
the office had issued $817 422 in contracts to ten corporations and 
four universities for studies ranging from the broad problems of satel- 
lite rendezvous to the design of orbital refueling systems for Saturn.60 
Marshall's commitment to the principle of orbital operations began 
to produce in late 1960 specific studies of rendezvous and orbital me- 
chanics, much as the first proposal of the idea in 1949 had done. As 
befitted a development center, Marshall's research was mission orient- 
ed. Its role in the study of rendezvous hinged on how the technique 
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might best be used in manned space missions, in particular a manned 
landing on the Moon. 
The focus of work at Langley also shifted, as Houbolt and his co- 
workers succumbed to the fasc~nation of a novel application of rendez- 
vous technique, rendezvous in lunar orbit. The essence of the idea was 
to leave that part of the equi ment and fuel needed for the return to P Earth in lunar orbit while on y a small landing craft descended to the 
lunar surface, later to rejoin the orbiting mother ship before starting 
the trip home. In one form or another, this idea had appeared in the 
work of Oberth, Kondratyuk, and the British Interplanetary Society, to 
say nothing of later writers. But it reached Langley's rendezvous sub- 
committee via a brief paper by William H. Michael, Jr., little more 
than a week after the rendezvous conference at Langley had ad- 
journed. 
Michael was part of a small group in the Theoretical Mechanics 
Division that had been working on trajectories for lunar and planetary 
missions. The group outlined some of its findings in a pamphlet that 
made the local rounds near the end of May 1960. Michael's contribu- 
tion was a brief calculation of the amount of weight that might be 
saved in a lunar landing mission by parking the return propulsion and 
part of the spacecraft in lunar orbit.61 The idea hit Houbolt like re- 
vealed truth: 
I can still remember the "back of the envelope" type of calculations 
I made to check that the scheme resulted in a very substantial sav- 
ings in earth boost requirements. Almost spontaneously, it became 
clear that lunar orbit rendezvous offered a chain reaction simplifica- 
tion on all back effects: development, testing, manufacturing, erec- 
tion, count-down, flight operations, etc. . . . All would be simplified. 
The thought struck my mind, "This is fantastic. If there is any idea 
we have to push, it is this one!" I vowed to dedicate myself to the 
task.62 
And dedicate himself he did. Houbolt and a band of disciples em- 
barked on a crusade to convert the rest of NASA to the truth that lu- 
nar orbit rendezvous was the quickest and cheapest road to the Moon. 
Rendezvous found an important ally in NASA Headquarters late 
in 1960, when Robert 6.  Seamans, Jr., arrived in Washington to fill the 
post of Associate Administrator. Seamans, whose formal appointment 
dated from 1 September, came to NASA from the Radio Corporation 
of America, where he had been chief engineer of the Missile Electron- 
ics and Controls Division in Burlington, Massachusetts.63 Seamans' di- 
vision had been one of two Air Force contractors to study require- 
ments for an unmanned satellite interceptor (Saint) during 1959. In 1960, 
when Saint moved from study to development, RCA got the Air Force con- 
tract to develop its final stage and inspection payload and to demonstrate 
its rendezvous and inspection capability.64 
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Saint was part of a quiet but far-reaching Air Force program, much 
of it concerned with rendezvous and orbital operations, intended to 
carve out a larger military role in space. Reading the minutes of a 
November 1960 meeting of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, at 
which both the Air Force and Marshall reviewed rendezvous work and 
plans, convinced a Space Task Group observer that Air Force planning 
and progress toward orbital operations "is much further ahead (2 to 3 
years) than the NASA Program at MSFC."65 
Seamans thus came to NASA with a solid background in rendez- 
vous work. He spent most of his first month as Associate Administra- 
tor touring NASA's field centers. At Langley, he talked to Houbolt. 
Seamans was deeply impressed by Houbolt's account of the weight sav- 
ings to be achieved even if only the spacecraft heatshield remained in 
a lunar parking orbit.66 Seamans invited Houbolt to Washington for a ,  
more formal hearing before the Headquarters staff. Houbolt and some 
of his Langley colleagues presented the case for puttin rendezvous 
into the national space program in a mid-December brie ng at NASA 
Headquarters.*67 
!
So by the end of 1960 NASA Headquarters had been exposed to 
the idea of orbital operations, to the potential value of rendezvous 
techniques in manned space missions other than those related to space 
stations. It had also been introduced to the case for lunar orbit rendez- 
vous as a basis for manned fli ht to the Moon. These ideas had 
worked their way up from the fie ? d, chiefly from the von Braun group 
at Marshal1 and-Houboit and his colleagues at Langley. The once un- 
challenged assumption that a lunar mission, if it were to be under- 
taken, would be launched directly from Earth's surface had now been 
called into question; and the questions multiplied in the following 
months. 
Throughout 1959 and 1960, Mercury was the first and only ap- 
proved American manned space flight program. From the very start, 
however, few people expected it to be last. The Mercury ca sule was P essentially experimental, an attempt to master the problems o manned 
space flight. Someday spacecraft would do more than go up, circle 
*Houbolt stressed the general utility of rendezvous in future space missions; John Bird, the 
advantages of orbital operations; Max Kurbjun, the problems of visual rendezvous; and Clinton 
Brown, the lunar-orbit-rendezvous concept. In addition to those who spoke formally, the Langley 
delegation included Eggleston and Phillips. Besides Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Headquarters was 
represented by Ira H. A. Abbott, Milton Ames, Hermann H. Kurzweg, and Bernard Maggin of 
the Office of Advanced Research Programs; Eldon W. Hall, Launch Vehicle Programs; George 
Low, Space Flight Programs; Berg Paraghamian, Program Planning and Evaluation; Alfred M. 
Mayo, Life Sciences Programs; and Donald H. Heaton, Seamans' assistant. 
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Earth a few times, and then come down. They would have to be ma- 
neuverable, both in space and after they returned to the air. They 
should be able to fly to a landing, and preferably on land rather than 
in the water. They should be easy to test and repair, if space flight were. 
ever to be put on something like a routine basis. NASA was ready to 
suggest research along these lines in its first hastily prepared budget 
for fiscal year 1960, submitted to Congress early in 1959. 
Mercury was an engineering project. Its major goal was "to 
achieve at the earliest practicable date orbital flight and successful re- 
covery of a manned satellite."68 This dictated utmost reliance on the 
best-known ,techniques: a ballistic reentry capsule-blunt, cone-shaped, 
with almost no aerodynamic lift, recovered by parachute after it re- 
turned to the atmosphere.69 But it also excluded some promising alter- 
natives, two of which took tentative shape in NASA's 1960 budget. 
One was the so-called environmental satellite, a kind of small tempo- 
rary space station able to sustain one or more men in orbit for several 
weeks or even months. The other was a maneuverable spacecraft, one 
equipped with rocket motors to change its path in orbit and endowed 
with enough aerodynamic lift to alter its flight-path in the atmosphere. 
NASA asked for $300 000 to study design changes that might turn 
Mercury into an orbiting laboratory and for $1 million to study a Mer- 
cury refined to make it maneuverable and flyable. Looking toward a 
real space station, NASA also asked for $3 million to study space ren- 
dezvous techniques.70 These modest sums signalled no great commit- 
ment. When NASA ran into budget problems, this effort was simply 
shelved and the money diverted to more pressing needs.71 
The view from Space Task Croup, the Mercury team, was differ- 
ent. Even during the first hectic months, while Mercury was still mov- 
ing from the drawing boards into the laboratories, some people in 
STC were turning their thoughts to what might come next. Although 
a ballistic capsule might get the job done quickly, it also had patent 
shortcomings, not the least of which was "that it will be very difficult to 
control the landing point within a distance of perhaps the order of a 
hundred miles each way."72 The ballistic capsule had been only one of 
three basic types under study in 1958 for a manned satellite program. 
The others were a winged glider and a lifting body, so shaped that 
even without wings it still had enou h lift to allow the pilot some con- C tro1.73 For later missions, either o ered a clear edge over Mercury. 
The winged glider, which could be flown much like an airplane once it 
was back in the atmosphere, had been preempted by the Air Force in 
its Dyna-Soar program. 
Dyna-Soar was a development project of the Air Research and 
Development Command (ARDC). The project received its name in 
October 1957 and Air Force Headquarters approval in November, 
some four years after study had begun on vehicles boosted into orbit 
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by rocket and gliding back to Earth under pilot control. Much of the 
work had been done under contract by Bell Aircraft Company. NACA 
joined the project in May 1958 to provide technical advice and help to 
the Air Force-directed and -funded program, an arrangement re- 
affirmed by NASA in November 1958. ARDC's consolidated Dyna-Soar 
development plan in October 1958 aimed the project specifically at 
developing a winged glider for return from orbit. Later X-20 replaced 
Dyna-Soar as the project's name.74 Leaving gliders to the Air Force 
was no hardship since many in NASA, especially in the research cen- 
ters, preferred the lifting-body approach.75 As early as June 1959, 
STG could report promising results from studies of building some lift 
into a Mercury capsule.76 
STG was also looking into a more radical approach to controlled 
spacecraft landing. Between 1945 and 1958, a Langley engineer 
named Francis M. Rogallo had been working at home on a flexible 
kite, its lifting surface draped from an inflated fabric frame. In con- 
Dyna-Soar spacecraft shown in artist's drawing separating from second stage 
of its Titan I booster. 
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trast to other flexible aerial devices like parachutes, a load-bearing 
Rogallo wing produced more lift than drag, though not as much as a 
conventional wing. But rigid wings could not be folded neat$ away 
when not in use, and they were inherently far heavier. Rog lo first 
realized what this might mean in 1952, when he chanced across an ar- 
ticle on space travel 
with beautiful illustrations depicting rigid-winged gliders mounted 
on top of huge rockets. I thought that the rigid-winged gliders 
might better be replaced by vehicles with flexible wings that could 
be folded into small packages during the launching.77 
Rogallo's efforts to promote his insight met scant success until late 
1958, when the new American commitment to explore space furnished 
him a willing audience. In December, the Langley Committee on Gen- 
eral Aerodynamics heard him describe his flexible wing and how it 
might be used in "space ship landing."78 The group responded warm- 
ly, and work on the concept moved from Rogallo's home to laborato- 
ries at Langley. 
A few months later, STG asked Rogallo for an informal meeting 
to discuss his research. Some of STG's top people, Manager Gilruth 
among them, showed up on 30 March 1959 to hear what Rogallo had 
to say.79 Gilruth was impressed enough to suggest at a staff meeting 
two months later that some study go into a follow-on Mercury using 
maneuverable capsules for land landing.80 
In the meantime, STG was spreading the news about its "prelimi- 
nary thinking about Project Mercury follow-ups." H. Kurt Strass of 
STG's Flight Systems Division reported to the Goett Committee on 
some ideas for a larger, longer-lived Mercury capsule. STG's thinking 
ranged from an enlarged capsule to carry two men in orbit for three 
days, through adding a three-meter cylinder behind the capsule to 
support a two-week mission, to cabling the combined capsule and cyl- 
inder to a booster's final stage and rotating them to provide artificial 
gravity. This was modest compared to the more sophisticated "environ- 
mental satellite" favored by Langley, "a true orbiting space laboratory 
with crew and equipment exchangeable" via ferry.81 
The Goett Committee divided on just how large the next step 
ought to be but agreed that some such step belonged between Mercury 
and a lunar mission.82 So did the NASA planners, who, during 1959, 
were drawing up a-long-range plan for manned space flight. Although 
NASA's future program was "directed heavily toward manned lunar 
exploration," there was still a place in it for developing maneuverabili- 
ty and a long-life capsule, both based on modifying Mercury.83 
In seeking to explore the possibilities of improving Mercury to fit 
it for more advanced missions, STG was moving beyond the limits of 
its charter. It had been formed for only one purpose: to manage Pro- 
Francis Rogallo of the Langley Research Center adjusts a model of his para- 
glider, often called a "Rogallo wing,"'in the 480-kil0meter-~er-hour wind tun- 
nel. In this 1959 test, the paraglider was being considered as a device to re- 
cover stages of the Saturn booster following launch. 
ject Mercury. By mid-1959, the initial group of 45 had grown eight- 
fold, and Gilruth's title had changed from Manager to Director of Pro- 
ject Mercury. Despite this rapid expansion, STG felt understaffed. An 
STG study in June 1959 concluded that 223 people should be added 
to the 388 authorized, just "to maintain the schedule set for PROJECT 
MERCURY." But simply keeping pace was not enough. 
In addition, . . . some attention should be given to advanced or fol- 
low-on systems to MERCURY. It is estimated that a staff of approxi- 
mately 20 additional professional personnel should be built up dur- 
ing the next year in order that a year or more gap will not occur in 
NASA manned space flight operations at the conclusion of the pres- 
ently planned MERCURY Program.*84 
- -- 
*In 1959, STG comprised three divisions: Flight Systems under Max Faget; Operations, 
Charles W. Mathews; and Engineering and Contract Administration, Charles H. Zimmerman (re- 
placed in August by James A. Chamberlin). 
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Gilruth foresaw a total strength of some 900 by 1 July 1960, less than 
half of them working directly on Project Mercury. The rest would be 
divided among three other projects-a maneuverable manned satellite, 
a manned orb~ting laboratory, and a manned lunar expedition-and a 
supporting program in biotechnology and human factors. The maneu- 
verable manned satellite project accounted for 302 of the 485 new posi- 
tions, showing which goal STG though should be pursued immediate- 
ly after Mercury.85 
During the same month, June 1959, Kurt Strass argued that the 
time had come to stop just thinking about these projects and to start 
actually designing one. He proposed forming a group to work out the 
preliminary design of "a relatively sophisticated space laboratory pro- 
viding living accommodations for two men for two weeks," ready to fly 
by late 1962.86 Strass found a sympathetic ear in the chief of the Flight 
Systems Division (FSD), Maxime A. Faget, who appointed him to head 
a New Projects Panel within the Division." It met for the first time on 
12 August 1959, and Strass told his fellow panelists they were there to 
plan a manned lunar landing through a series of graded steps, the first 
of which was to define "an intermediate practical goal to focus atten- 
tion on problems to be solved, and thus serve to guide new technolog- 
ical developments."87 
The panel floundered a bit, not quite certain of the direction it 
should take, but soon zeroed in on the design of an advanced space- 
craft suited to the lunar mission, the first step on the road that led to 
the Apollo spacecraft. That still left a sizable gap in the manned space 
flight program, which a new engineering report by McDonnell Aircraft 
Corporation, prime contractor for the Mercury capsule, suggested 
some ways to fill. The panel decided to take a close look.88 
The McDonnell report of September 1959, "Follow On Experi- 
ments, Project Mercury Capsules," was the result of a summer's work 
by a small advanced project group."fg It roposed six experiments 
that might be conducted with practical mo 1 ifications of the Mercury 
capsule, to explore some problems of space flight beyond those to be 
attacked in Project Mercury.90 The New Projects Panel found none of 
the McDonnell ideas wholly satisfactory but agreed that parts of the 
*Besides H. Kurt Strass, the panel included Alan B. Kehlet, Head, Aerodynamics Section, 
Performance Branch; Jack Funk, Head, Space Mechanics Section, Dynamics Branch; Harry H. 
Ricker, Jr., Head, On Board Systems Branch; Robert G. Chilton, Head, Dynamics Branch; Stan- 
ley C. White, Head, Life Systems Branch; William S. Augerson, Life Systems Branch; and Cald- 
well C. Johnson, Head, Engineering Branch, Engineering and Contract Administration Division 
(the only non-FSD member of the panel). The meetings of the panel were attended by non- 
members, as well, again largely from FSD. 
?The group, headed by E. M. Flesh, McDonnell engineering manager for Mercury, included 
Fred J. Sanders, Wiiam J. Blatz, Darrell B. Parke, and Walter D. Pittman. 
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first three "could be combined into a new proposal which could offer 
increased performance and an opportunity to evaluate some advanced 
mission concepts at the earliest opportunity."gl 
All three experiments dealt with spacecraft maneuverability and 
guidance. The first sought to achieve some control of landing by add- 
ing an external trim-flap device to the capsule, coupled with a simple 
radar guidance technique or, alternatively, with a more sophisticated 
inertial guidance system to reduce the capsule's dependence on 
ground facilities. The second aimed at maneuvering in orbit by adding 
to the capsule a special adapter to carry a propulsion system, with 
guidance provided by either a Mercury system or an inertial guidance 
system. The third experiment was designed to test the inertial guid- 
ance system that might be used with either of the first two experi- 
ments. The system-inertial platform, computer, and star tracker- 
would allow the capsule to guide itself toward an orbital rendezvous, to 
control its touchdown point more precisely, and to navigate on lunar 
and interplanetary missions. All three experiments used a modified 
one-man Mercury launched by an Atlas, with minimum changes.92 
- 
The panel saw the prospect of a useful test vehicle in joining an 
adapter-borne propulsion system to an inertial guidance system. Ma- 
neuverable in both space and atmosphere, a capsule so equipped 
might then be used to develop advanced system components, such as 
environmental systems for long-term missions, auxiliary power systems, 
and photographic reconnaissance. These were parts of McDonnell's 
suggested fourth and fifth experiments. The fourth was a 14-day,mis- 
sion, using an adapter to carry both a propulsion system and the extra 
supplies and equipment to support the extended time in orbit, with 
fuel cells substituted for batteries to supply electrical power. The fifth 
mainly involved adding a camera to the Mercury periscope system to 
allow the pilot to photograph Earth's surface from orbit.* The panel 
asked for "authority to initiate this program" to "continue with the 
least possible delay" after the Mercury program.93 
The time, however, was not yet ripe. The attractive possibilities of 
experimenting with a modified Mercury capsule paled in comparison 
with the far more exciting prospect of designing an advanced space- 
craft for a trip to the Moon. When STG's top management met a 
month later, on 2 November 1959, it was the advanced spacecraft rath- 
er than the modified Mercury that they decided to pursue.tg4 
*The panel ignored the sixth McDonnell experiment, which differed radically from the 
other five. It projected the use of a heavily instrumented unmanned Mercury capsule to study 
the problems of stability and heating during reentry from lunar orbit, simulated by launching the 
capsule into a highly elliptical orbit with the Atlas-Centaur. 
?At the meeting were Robert R. Giiruth, his special assistant Paul E. Purser, Kurt Strass, 
Robert 0. Piland, John D. Hodge, Caldwell Johnson, Charles J. Donlan, Max Faget, Charles W. 
Mathews, and James A. Chamberlin. 
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That was the story of STG planning for better than a year. Al- 
though engineers were still thinking about an improved Mercury, that 
thought took second place to work on a new lunar spacecraft.95 Lifting 
reentry was still seen as an important objective, a point stressed by 
NASA witnesses in budget hearings early in 1960, but not necessarily 
as part of the Mercury program.96 By April 1960, the central aim of 
advanced vehicle development had become "lunar reconnaissance." 
The possibility of a lifting Mercury received only passing mention, as 
advanced planning focused on a spacecraft able to orbit the Moon, "a 
logical intermediate step toward future goals of landing men on the 
moon and other planets."97 This was the program that officially be- 
came "Apollo" in July 1960. As then conceived, it did not go beyond 
circumlunar flight, although lunar landing was the ultimate g0al.98 
What was becoming clear was that any advanced Mercury pro- 
gram, such as lifting reentry, was likely to become a major undertak- 
ing in its own right.99 In March 1960, STG's summary of projected 
funding needs for manned space flight rograms put the cost of a lift- 
ing Mercury project at over $34 mil I? ion during fiscal years 1960 
through 1962.100 STG did go on with its lifting Mercury plans into 
April 1960, getting as far as a preliminary specification for the reentry 
control system and plans to solicit contractor proposals for the sys- 
tem.101 
Lifting reentry, in principle, had NASA Headquarters approval. 
Still lacking was a firm commitment based on a specific proposal with 
clearly defined costs. 102 That commitment failed to materialize. In May 
1960, Administrator Glennan's budget analysis team turned down 
STG's request for funds to pursue advanced technical development of 
Mercury-type capsules. Glennan conceded the probability of Mercury 
flights beyond the three-orbit mission then authorized, to avoid a 
break in manned space flights, if nothing else. But thinking about 
somewhat longer missions was one thing; approving a lifting capsule 
was something else. 103 
That decision put a temporary halt to STG efforts to improve 
Mercury. Mounting problems in the project itself, especially during the 
last quarter of 1960, kept STG busy, and such advanced work as time 
allowed was limited to Apollo. 
NASA AFTER TWO YEARS 
As 1960 drew to a close, NASA's manned space flight program 
was still limited to Project Mercury, but plans and hopes for a larger 
enterprise were rife. At the center of NASA's aspirations was a lunar 
landing program, endorsed by the Goett Committee in mid-1959 and 
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SCALE I N  FT 
NASA's planners in  
1960 and early 1961 
aimed higher than just 
an improved Mercury 
spacecraft. In St.  
Louis, McDonnell pro- 
posed a 14-day space 
laboratory. In Hous- 
ton,  Robert Gilruth 
(second from l e f t ) ,  
Director of the Space 
Task Group, and his 
chief assistants, Charles 
Donlan (left), Maxime 
Faget, and Robert Pi- 
land discuss selection 
of contractors to study 
the feasibility o f  a 
manned circumlunar 
mission (August 1960). 
In Washington, 
NASA's second admin- 
istrator, James Webb 
(center), and George 
Low (right) of NASA 
Headquarters, receive 
a model of the vehicle 
proposed by General 
Electric (April 1961). 
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written into the agency's ten-year plan at the end of the year. This 
goal was framed on technical grounds, as a legitimate end in its own 
right and as the best means to focus further work on manned space 
flight after Mercury. Questions of politics, economics, and the other 
external forces that would decide whether the United States should 
actually undertake such a program played no part in the choice of the 
g0al.104 NASA engineers were convinced that they could reach the 
Moon and that reaching the Moon made sense in technical terms. But 
the technical facts also forced NASA to settle for planning a lesser 
program for the 1960s. A landing on the Moon remained the long- 
range goal, but plans were scaled down for a partway effort, a trip 
around the Moon and back in Project Apollo. 
NASA TEN YEAR PLAN 
Calendar 
Year Event 
1960 First launching of a Meterological Satellite 
First launching of a Passive Reflector Communications Satellite 
First launching of a Scout vehicle 
First launching of a Thor-Delta vehicle 
First launching of an Atlas-Agena-B vehicle (by the Department of De- 
fense) 
First suborbital flight of an astronaut 
1961 First launching of a lunar impact vehicle 
First launching of an Atlas-Centaur vehicle 
Attainment of manned space flight, Project Mercury 
1962 First launching in the vicinity of Venus and/or Mars 
1963 First launching of the two-stage Saturn vehicle 
1963-1964 First launching of unmanned vehicle for controlled landing on the Moon 
First launching of Orbiting Astronomical and Radio Astronomy Observa- 
tory 
1964 First launching of unmanned lunar circumnavigation and return to Earth 
vehicle 
First reconnaissance of Mars and/or Venus by an unmanned vehicle 
1965-1967 First launching in a program leading to manned circumlunar flight and to 
permanent near-Earth space station 
Beyond 
1970 Manned flight to the Moon 
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The main factor in this less ambitious program was the limited 
weight-lifting capability of existing boosters, as well as those expected 
to be ready for the 1960s. The real force of this restriction rested on 
the widely held assumption that a flight to the Moon would be 
launched directly from Earth's surface on a very large booster. Outside 
NASA, workers in the new field of astronautics, picking up a lead 
from early space-travel writers, had proposed rendezvous as an alter- 
native to direct ascent. Within NASA, this idea was slow to take hold, 
although a few isolated voices supported it and grew louder. The pres- 
sure for change came mainly from the field. 
NASA's field centers, though under tighter rein than NACA's had 
been, nevertheless were far from being mere agents of Headquarters. 
The precise ordering of relationships between Washington and the 
field has, in fact, been a continuing source of tension and a factor in 
the frequent reorganizations that NASA has undergone. Policy and 
long-range planning have tended to center in NASA Headquarters, 
design and development at lower levels. But what goes on at one level 
has not always seemed to mesh with what goes on at another. Head- 
quarters policy has sometimes appeared to be nothing more than a 
belated ratification of work already under way in the field. This is the 
way rendezvous entered the space program. 
Some form of rendezvous in Earth or lunar orbit appeared to 
offer the prospect of making do with lesser boosters than the giant 
Nova. While simple in theory, however, orbital rendezvous might well 
present problems in practice. A program designed to test the technique 
was beginning to look like a prudent move. This pointed to another 
aspect of NASA activity during 1959 and 1960, and to a still smaller 
step between Project Mercury and a lunar landing. Suitably altered, 
the Mercury capsule might become the basis for a new program. Given 
a certain eager optimism, such changes might be seen as nothing more 
than an effort to improve the experimental machine and convert it to 
an operational model. By 1960, proving rendezvous techniques was 
beginning to emerge as a logical task for the improved Mercury. 
Prospects for a larger program at the end of 1960, whether lunar 
landing, circumlunar flight, or even rendezvous development, were not, 
in fact, good. During the last quarter of the year, Project Mercury 
suffered setbacks that strained STG morale and raised questions about 
the American manned space flight program.105 The political climate 
was bleak. President Eisenhower rejected NASA's request for Apollo 
funds in the coming year's budget and leaned toward the view that 
Project Mercury was the only manned space flight program the United 
States needed. NASA's prospects under newly elected President John 
F. Kennedy seemed not much better.106 Policy, however, was one 
thing, technology another. NASA could, and did, pursue its technical 
planning. When the climate changed, NASA was ready. 
The Transmutation of Mercury 
D URING January 1961, NASA's manned space flight program al- tered course. At the policy-making level in Headquarters, thinking 
shifted from lunar reconnaissance to lunar landing. This change was 
crucial, not only for the lunar program itself but also for what was to 
become Project Gemini; before 1961 was over that shift would provide 
justification for a rendezvous development program. In the field, the 
newly independent Space Task Group stopped talking about an im- 
roved Mercury capsule and began working on it. Plans for a lunar 
Ending mission and work on an advanced Mercury proceeded 
through the summer of 1961 at different levels and varying rates. 
These separate paths converged in the autumn to give birth to a new 
program. 
Whether these efforts would have borne fruit without a sharp 
change in the political climate is anyone's guess. The past two years 
had seen their share of false starts, dashed hopes, and aborted plans. 
But the climate did change. Within months after taking office, Presi- 
dent Kennedy and his advisors found compelling reasons to support 
an American manned space flight program far larger than Project 
Mercury. One factor was certainly the renewed clamor about a space 
race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Informed opin- 
ion might discount Soviet accomplishments or stress American sophisti- 
cation against Russian brute force; that smacked of quibbling to the 
American public, especially after 12 April 1961, when Cosmonaut Yuri f A. Gagarin aboard Vostok I became the first human being to orbit in i 
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space. Two days later, the chairman of the House Committee on Sci- 
ence and Astronautics was not merely speaking for himself when he 
asserted, "My objective . . . is to beat the Russians." The President 
announced his decision on 25 May 1961, in a speech to Congress on 
"Urgent National Needs." He committed the United States to landing 
an American on the Moon before the end of the decade.1 
NASA had long since begun to lay plans for lunar flights, al- 
though throughout 1960 it had tended to focus on flying around, rath- 
er than landing on, the Moon. A new direction in NASA thinking sur- 
faced at the quarterly meeting of the Space Exploration Program 
Council (SEPC) on 5-6 January 1961. The council was a NASA device 
for smoothing out technical and managerial problems at the highest 
level. Its members were the heads of the field development centers 
and Headquarters program offices,*2 with the Associate Administrator 
serving as chairman.3 The January meeting was the first presided over 
by Robert Seamans in his new assignment, and it marked a decisive 
turning point in the manned space flight program. The first day was 
devoted to manned lunar landing. 
The meeting began with a series of presentations arranged by 
George Low, Chief of Manned Space Flight in the Office of Space 
Flight Programs, to provide "a 'first cut' at a NASA Manned Lunar 
Landing Program."4 Low, an early advocate of orbital staging tech- 
niques as an alternative to the Nova direct approach, made sure that 
the council heard about Earth orbit and lunar orbit rendezvous as well 
as direct ascent.ts The next step was setting up a study team to devise 
*NASA Headquarters had been reorganized in December 1959, largely in anticipation of 
the transfer of Wernher von Braun's Development Operations Division from the Army. The 
major change was the establishment of a new program office, the Office of Launch Vehicle Pro- 
grams, which assumed jurisdiction over the Huntsville facility (later the George C. Marshall Space 
Flight Center) as well as substantial launch facilities at Cape Canaveral. This launch facility, the 
Missile Firing Laboratory, was combined with NASA's Atlantic Missile Range Operations Office (a 
liaison group between NASA and the Air Force) in June 1960 to form the Launch Operations 
Directorate, a semi-autonomous unit of Marshall. Director of the new Headquarters office was 
Don R. Ostrander, an Air Force major general who had been acting head of the Advanced Re- 
search Projects Agency, the Depaxtment of Defense unit responsible for Saturn. Ostrander's staff 
consisted of some 25 people from the Office of Space Flight Development, which now became the 
Office of Space Flight Programs, still directed by Abe Silverstein. Ira Abbott's Office of Aeronauti- 
cal and Space Research now became the Office of Advanced Research Programs. In March 1960 
NASA established a fourth technical program office under Clark T. Randt, the Office of Life Sci- 
ences Programs. Albert F. Siepert's Office of Business Administration changed neither its name 
nor its function during this period. 
?In October 1960, Low had formed a small working group to lay out a preliminary pro- 
gram for manned lunar landing. This group comprised Eldon Hall (Office of Launch Vehicle 
Programs), Oran W. Nicks, and John H. Disher (both of the Office of Space Flight Programs). At 
the SEPC meeting in January 1961, Maxime Faget (Space Task Group) spoke on Apollo, Melvyn 
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a more complete plan. This the council did, naming Low its chairman. 
Unable to agree on the best approach, the council simply asked for "an 
answer to the question 'What is NASA's Manned Lunar Landing Pro- 
gram?' "6 
The Low Committee began its work a week later.* Low himself 
drafted its report, revised it on the basis of comments from other 
members, and submitted it to Seamans early in February.7 The report 
set out the two themes that came to dominate NASA lunar-mission 
planning throughout 1961. First, Low argued that both orbital opera- 
tions and large boosters were going to be needed in the long run. 
NASA must include Nova-class boosters in the national space program, 
but "orbital operation techniques must be developed as part of the 
space program, whether or not the manned lunar landing mission is 
considered." Second, he insisted that, barring unforeseen problems, 
rendezvous "could allow us to develop a capability for the manned 
lunar mission in less time than by any other means."g 
In Space Task Group, the question of rendezvous took a different 
form. It was seen as one of several classes of missions around which a 
follow-on Mercury program might be built. This was one of the sub- 
jects at a meeting on 20 January 1961 between Director Robert Gilruth 
and his chief lieutenants.? Max Faget, aided by his Flight Systems Divi- 
sion staff, led the discussion and outlined hardware and booster re- 
quirements for several possible types of missions.9 Two broad classes 
came in for particular attention: one was labeled extended time in or- 
bit, the other was rendezvous. 
Extended time in orbit covered two possible missions. The first 
was an 18-orbit manned Mercury mission based on augmented capsule 
power supply and environmental control systems. The standard Atlas 
booster already slated for Mercury seemed adequate for this mission, 
but Gilruth suggested that the group think about using an Atlas- 
Agena. Atlas-Agena was a two-stage vehicle. The Atlas, which served 
as first stage, was a product of the Astronautics Division of General 
Dynamics Corporation in San Diego, California, and the Agena was 
built by the Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, Sunnyvale, Califor- 
nia. Agena development began in 195'7 under the Air Force Ballistic 
Savage (Office of Launch Vehicle Programs) on direct ascent, Wernher von Braun (Marshall 
Space Flight Center) on Earth orbit rendezvous, and John Houbolt (Langley Research Center) on 
lunar orbit rendezvous. 
*Other members of the Low Committee were Eldon Hall, Max Faget, John Houbolt, Oran 
Nicks, Alfred Mayo (Office of Life Sciences Programs), Earnest 0 .  Pearson, Jr., and Heinz H. 
Koelle (Marshall). 
tAssociate Directors Charles Donlan and Walter C. Williams; Flight Systems and Flight Oper- 
ations Division chiefs Mex Faget and Charles Mathews, respectively; assistant Engineering Divi- 
sion chief William M. Bland, Jr.; and special assistant Paul Purser. 
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Missile Division. An improved model, Agena B, with a restartable en- 
gine and larger propellant tanks, entered development in June 1959 
and flew on 12 November 1960.10 Atlas mi ht or might not have 
enough power to carry aloft the capsule modi i!ed for the mission; but 
if a primate were to pave the way for a manned mission of 7 to 14 
days, then Atlas was clearly lacking. It could not lift the required 
weight. 
Atlas was even more doubtful for rendezvous missions. Faget and 
his colleagues discussed two ty es, which differed chiefly in their tar- 
gets. Both used Mercury capsu P es modified to make them maneuvera- 
ble, but the target in the first instance was Saint; in the second, an 
as-yet-undeveloped space laboratory. Discussion centered on the need 
for a much "refined capsule with better operational and maintenance 
capabilities, better door, better wiring, possibly a bi-propellant control 
system, etc." All this meant weight, more than an Atlas could lift. But 
the basic objection to the rendezvous mission was that it "might be 
considered too hazardous for a one-man operation."ll 
Whatever their merits, all these possibilities were too vague. Be- 
fore proposing a Mercury follow-on program to NASA Headquarters, 
STG had to be "more specific with regard to particular flights needed, 
funding, management, etc." This was the task assigned to Faget,* who 
had only a week to complete it before a scheduled visit to STG on 26- 
27 January by Abe Silverstein, head of Space Flight Programs in 
NASA Headquarters. The meetings with Silverstein resulted in a shift 
in focus to "the question of capsule redesign to speed up check-out 
and rnaintenance."lz 
With a good deal more work clearly needed, Cilruth turned to 
James A. Chamberlin. Canadian-born and trained at the University of 
Toronto and the Imperial College of Science and Technology in Lon- 
don, Chamberlin had been working in aeronautical engineering and 
design since 1939 for several Canadian firms. By March 1959 he had 
become chief of design for AVRO Aircraft, Inc., of Toronto, where he 
worked on the CF-105 Arrow, an advanced interceptor aircraft.13 
When that project was canceled, NASA was able to recruit Chamberlin 
and several of his colleagues.14 
Chamberlin joined STG in April 1959; by August he had become 
acting chief of the Engineering and Contract Administration Divi- 
sion.15 For the next year and half, he directed STG7s technical moni- 
toring of Mercury development and production. When, on 1 February 
1961, Cilruth assigned him to work on an improved Mercury, Cham- 
berlin remained titular chief of what had since become the Engineer- 
*Faget was assisted by Mathews, Bland, and Kenneth S. Kleinknecht (Gilruth's technical as- 
sistant). 
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ing Division but turned over most of his organization's administrative, 
technical, and operational matters to his assistants, Andre' J. Meyer, Jr., 
and William M. Bland, Jr.16 Chamberlin himself went to St. Louis in 
mid-February; during the next months he actually worked from an 
office in the McDonnell Aircraft Corporation plant two or three days a 
week. 17 
STG's change in status at the beginning of 1961 may have sparked 
its renewed pursuit of a post-Mercury program. Although located at 
Langley Research Center in Virginia, STG belonged administratively 
to Goddard Space Flight Center in Maryland. This clumsy arrange- 
ment served no very useful purpose, since the Space Task Group was 
largely self-directed in any case. So NASA Administrator Keith Glen- 
nan announced on 3 January 1961 that STG was henceforth an inde- 
pendent field element, charged not only with managing Mercury but 
also with planning and carrying out programs "in the general area of 
manned space flight."l8 This was more hope than fact, however; Mer- 
cury was still the only a proved program, and independence was 
largely formal. STG stayed' at Langley, on which it still depended for 
much of its support, both technical and administrative. 
The union with Langley was the next to go, for a number of com- 
elling reasons: the threatened impact on Langley research of a full- 
iedged development effort, the strain of fitting a much expanded STG 
into already cramped Langley quarters, the chance to spread NASA 
more widely across the country, and the need to move before new 
programs had progressed to the point where moving would disrupt 
them.19 These reasons anticipated, rightly as it proved, the President's 
lunar landing decision. Where to move was settled during the summer 
of 1961, after a special committee visited 19 possible sites.*20 Houston 
won the prize, and the booming space agency joined forces with the 
booming city. 
That massive expansion, which saw the tripling of both the 
manned space flight pro ram and the center in charge of it, had been 
well prepared. NASA's I rst two years had seen most of the relevant 
issues raised, many of the answers suggested. Nothing had been decid- 
ed beyond recall, but the channels were carved into which later events 
flowed. In the first half of 1961, some channels broadened, others 
dwindled and vanished. Before the summer was over, a far larger, far 
more complex, and far more costly manned space flight program 
emerged. An enormous lunar project had joined Mercury and a third 
project stood in the wings, justified by the needs of Apollo but grow- 
ing out of the technology of Mercury. 
*Locations surveyed were: in Louisiana, New Orleans, Baton Rouge, Shreveport, and Boga- 
lusa; in Texas, Houston, Beaumont, Corpus Christi, Victoria, Liberty, and Hadingen;-in Florida, 
Tampa and Jacksonville; in California, Los Angeles, San Diego, Richmond, Moffett Field, Berke- 
ley, and San Francisco; and, in Missouri, St. Louis. 
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STC PLUNGES AHEAD 
The report of the Low Committee early in February 1961 pro- 
duced no immediate action. As outgoing Administrator Glennan had 
warned his colleagues in the January meeting of the Space Exploration 
Program Council, lunar landing was not something NASA could un- 
dertake on its own hook; so large and costly a program needed back- 
ing at the highest levels.21 In the uncertain political climate of early 
1961, planning for a lunar landing remained temporarily in abeyance, 
though work on the Apollo spacecraft went ahead in STG. But re- 
newed interest in rendezvous and orbital o erations in NASA Head- 
quarters, as shown in the Low report, le f to a second inter-center 
meeting on rendezvous at the end of February. This time the site was 
Washington, instead of one of the field centers. The agenda reflected 
the changing nature of rendezvous research within NASA. Though 
Langley still dominated the discussions on rendezvous studies, Mar- 
shall took a full session to describe aspects of the rendezvous and or- 
bital operations program it had under contract. This meeting saw the 
lunar orbit rendezvous idea introduced to NASA as a whole.22 Until 
then, it had been limited to Langley circles and NASA Headquarters. 
Rendezvous and orbital operations also figured prominently in 
congressional hearings on NASA's proposed budget for fiscal year 
1962 during the first months of 1961.23 The House Committee on Sci- 
ence and Astronautics, in particular, displayed a marked interest in the 
prospect of orbital rendezvous and scheduled a special hearing on the 
subject for May.24 NASA's budget included some $2 million for fur- 
ther rendezvous studies. This was much less than NASA had wanted, 
but the Bureau of the Budget had sliced $6 million from the agency's 
initial request. The House committee recommended the full $8 million 
and NASA did eventually get the money.25 In sharp contrast to the 
marked concern for space station logistics in 1959 hearings, the testi- 
mony in 1961 consistently stressed the role of rendezvous in mounting 
lunar and planetary expeditions and the broad value of rendezvous 
applications.26 
While NASA spokesmen were telling Congress how important 
rendezvous was going to be, a working group in NASA Headquarters 
was drawing up guidelines for a full-fledged orbital operations devel- 
opment program. The resulting staff paper, ready in May, presented 
the case for the immediate "establishment of an integrated research, 
development and applied orbital operations program." Stressing the 
need for orbital operations in future space programs, the report urged 
NASA to set up "an aggressive program," coordinated with other 
NASA programs and with the Department of Defense, but separate 
from either. Such a program, the report concluded, would buy for the B 
United States at a cost of roughly $1 billion three important skills: the 
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ability to intercept and inspect orbiting satellites, to support a space 
station, and to launch from orbit. 
Bernard Maggin, who had arranged the first NASA rendezvous 
meeting a year earlier, headed the working group.* He sent copies of 
the report to the program office directors in NASA Headquarters and 
to the director of Program Planning and Evaluation. His request for 
comments, however, went unanswered.27 By early May, NASA knew 
that President Kennedy was ready to approve a lunar landing pro- 
gram. The decision for a speeded up and expanded program trans- 
formed the context of NASA planning and made the kind of program 
Maggin suggested seem far too modest. 
In the meantime, James Chamberlin followed his own course. He 
had arrived in St. Louis in February convinced that his job was to 
redesign the Mercury capsule from the bottom up. This was a belief 
not widely shared. The common view had it that Mercury only needed 
to be improved. Chamberlin felt, and as engineerin8 director of Proj- 
ect Mercury he was surpassingly well qualified to ju ge, that the Mer- 
cury design precluded simple upgrading.28 The Mercury capsule was 
merely a first try at a manned spacecraft. It clearly took too long to 
build, test, check out, and launch. The heart of the trouble was Mercu- 
ry's integrated design, which packed the most equipment into the least 
space with the smallest weight. This could hardly have been avoided, 
given the limited weight-lifting capacity of the boosters available for 
the Mercury program. But integration also meant that reaching parts 
to test, repair, or replace was harder than it should be. 
Chamberlin first met with McDonnell engineers to discuss the 
improved Mercury on 13 February. Little more than a month later, he 
had the chance to present some of his ideas to the head of Space 
Flight Programs, Abe Silverstein. On 17 March, Cilruth and his top- 
ranking staff journeyed to Wallops Island, Virginia, for a weekend re- 
treat, where they were joined by Silverstein.29 Mercury problems took 
up some time, but the meeting's main purpose was to discuss advanced 
programs. This chiefly meant Apollo. Chamberlin did, however, have a 
chance to describe his approach to redesigning the Mercury capsule. 
He had attended the meeting mainly to discuss Mercury's pro- 
gress. But after Silverstein outlined a series of desirable future Mercury 
missions, ranging from the one- and three-orbit manned missions al- 
ready planned to rendezvous development, Chamberlin launched into 
a largely impromptu blackboard lecture on the program's future, 
which he saw as very limited. The trouble with trying anything more 
*Its members were Joseph k. McGolrick and Eldon Hall (Office of Launch Vehicle Pro- 
grams), John Disher and John L. Sloop (Office of Space Flight Programs), and Alfred M, Nelson 
and Berg Paraghamian (Office of Program Planning and Evaluation). 
O N  T H E  S H O U L D E R S  O F  T I T A N S  
ambitious with Mercury than had been planned was that even these 
relatively modest goals could only be achieved at the expense of the 
most painstaking and arduous care in testing and checkout. This was 
not a manned spacecraft problem so much as it was a Mercury design 
problem. Drawing on his experience with fire control and weapons de- 
livery systems for fighter aircraft, Chamberlin sketched a new capsule 
structure with its equipment located outside the cockpit in self-con- 
tained modules easy to install and check out. Although Charnberlin 
focused his remarks on capsule modification, he had obviously given 
some thought to a suitable mission for the new design. He had, in fact, 
prepared a brochure dealing with an audacious circumlunar flight for 
the improved Mercury, which Silverstein looked at and dismissed with- 
out comment.30 
Both Silverstein and Gilruth, however, saw the need for changes 
along the lines Chamberlin had suggested. Gilruth asked Chamberlin 
to pursue the ideas in more detail with McDonnell, as the basis for 
specific proposals. Silverstein authorized STG to prepare a work state- 
ment to cover a McDonnell study of modifying the Mercury capsule 
for enhanced equipment accessibility. STG was also to place an order 
with McDonnell for parts to be used in several capsules beyond the 20 
already contracted for. Looking back, Chamberlin was sure that was 
where it started: "As far as I was concerned, the meeting at Wallops 
was the initiation of Gemini."31 
On 14 April STG and McDonnell signed an amendment to the 
original contract for the Mercury capsule. This amendment authorized 
McDonnell to procure so-called long-lead-time items-those parts that 
took longest to get-for six extra Mercury capsules. The parts and 
material so obtained would be used in what was now termed the Mer- 
cury Mark I1 spacecraft, once the desi n had been agreed upon by 
NASA and McDonnell. Specifically exc 7 uded from this procurement 
effort were capsule structure, ablation heatshield, and escape-tower sys- 
tems, but all other capsule systems were covered up to a cost of $2.5 
million .32 
The design of the Mark I1 spacecraft was the subject of a second 
contract. After talks with STG, McDonnell submitted a study proposal 
on 12 April33 McDonnell proposed to spend $126 385 for 9000 hours 
of engineering study, with two objectives: first, to reduce the time 
needed to build and check out a Mark II capsule by improving the 
location of equipment and the way it was installed; second, by means 
of these changes to make the new capsule easy to modify to meet new 
program objectives. Capsule shape and heat protection were not to be 
altered, nor were capsule systems to be replaced or greatly modified. 
The focus of change was to be rearrangement; moving equipment 
from inside to outside the cabin and putting it in modular subassem- 
blies, with special concern for escape, retrograde, and recovery sys- 
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tems.34 McDonnell was authorized on 14 April to proceed with the 
engineering study, and a contract for $98 621 was signed on 24 
April.35 
By then, the study was already well under way. Chamberlin began 
calling on others in STG to help him. The first was James T. Rose, a 
recent transfer to Engineering from Flight Systems Division.36 
McDonnell created a small project group for the study, headed by Wil- 
liam J. Blatz, with Winston D. Nold as chief assistant project engineer. 
Although they brought with them several engineers from McDonnellYs 
advanced design section, the new group drew most heavily on Project 
Mercury, particularly a team led by Fred J. Sanders, for its staff.37 
Chamberlin regarded Mercury experience as indispensable. "That was 
the point," he recalled, "to use and build on experience, to gain and 
not to start over again . . . without the benefit of the detailed hard- 
ware experience."38 
The guiding idea shared by Chamberlin and his McDonnell col- 
leagues was "to make a better mechanical design"; capsule parts would 
be more accessible, leading to "a more reliable, more workable, more 
practical capsule."39 The experimental Mercury capsule was to be 
transformed into an operational spacecraft. At this point, neither 
Chamberlin nor the McDonnell group were much concerned with the 
purpose such a redesigned capsule might serve. The subject arose, of 
course, as Chamberlin's lunar scheme shows, but it took a back seat. 
For the moment, the urgent question was strictly one of improving the 
engineering design. Working out the objectives for a program based 
on the improved capsule could wait. 
DIRECT ASCENT VERSUS RENDEZVOUS 
While Chamberlin, Blatz, and their co-workers were eyeing the 
Mercury capsule and seeing, as engineers always can, any number of 
ways to make it better, events in the up er reaches of NASA were 
moving during the spring of 1961 towar 1 the conclusion that would 
eventually give the engineers their chance to put ideas into practice. 
Enough of a case had been made for rendezvous in the lunar program 
during the past year to make it seem worth a closer look. But Presi- 
dent Kennedy's decision to call for a lunar landing before the end of 
the decade transformed the context of lunar mission planning. 
When NASA planning had first focused on flight around the 
Moon rather than landing on it, rendezvous lacked any urgency. 
Orbital operations seemed a matter of expedience, a way of making do 
with smaller boosters than direct ascent demanded. Circumlunar flight, 
too, could be launched with smaller boosters, but without any need for 
rendezvous, and a lunar landing appeared to be a long way off. 
Nobody denied that larger launch vehicles would be an asset to the 
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American space program, and nothing suggested that building such 
vehicles would pose any special problem other than time and money. 
Rendezvous, on the other hand, was an unknown. How hard it might 
be, how dangerous, could not be predicted. Nobody denied that ren- 
dezvous could be a useful and important technique, but planning the 
lunar mission around it appeared unnecessarily risky. Under the cir- 
cumstances, direct ascent could be defended as more prudent. 
Kennedy's decision changed all that. Cone were the long stretches 
of time that had allowed the choice between rendezvous and direct 
ascent to seem less than urgent. NASA now had to select the method 
that offered the best prospect for meeting the deadline. Even before it 
was announced, but knowing that a decision was imminent, NASA 
began seeking the answer. 
On 2 May, Associate Administrator Seamans formed a task group 
to explore "for NASA in detail a feasible and complete approach to 
the accomplishment of an early manned lunar mission."40 Most mem- 
bers of the ad hoc group came from NASA Headquarters, as did its 
chairman, William A. Fleming, then acting as Assistant Administrator 
for Programs.*41 Fleming had been working closely with Seamans for 
several months and had, in fact, drafted the Seamans memorandum 
that created the task group. 
The Fleming Committee had four weeks to size up the scope of 
the task that NASA faced. This was a tall order for so short a time, 
and the committee felt compelled to limit itself to one approach.42 It 
elected direct ascent as "the simplest possible approach-the approach 
of least assumptions and least unknowns."43 Rendezvous, much the 
biggest unknown, had no place in the lunar landing program, al- 
though it was "an essential program in its own right."44 Having dis- 
missed rendezvous, the Fleming group devoted most of its effort to 
choosing between solid and liquid propellants for the first stages of 
Nova-class boosters.45 While this did permit the group to pinpoint 
some crucial decisions that needed to be made quickly--es ecially the 
importance of an early choice of sites for the large ground l' acilities the 
lunar mission required4Lit merely avoided the question of rendez- 
vous versus direct ascent. Convinced, as Fleming later remarked, "that 
it was always possible to 'build something bigger and make it work,' "47 
his committee saw no reason to base its study on a risky and untried 
alternative. 
*Of the 23 members of the Fleming Committee, 18 were from NASA Headquarters: 
Fleming, Addison M. Rothrock, Albert J. Kelley, Berg Paraghamian, Walter W. Haase, John 
Disher, Merle G. Waugh, Eldon Hall, Melvyn Savage, William L. Lovejoy, Norman Rafel, Alfred 
Nelson, Samuel Snyder, Robert D. Briskman, Secrest L. Berry, James P. Nolan, Jr., Ernest Pear- 
son, and Robert Fellows. Remaining members were Koelle, Marshall~Kleinknecht and Alan Keh- 
let, STG, A. H. Schwichtenberg, Lovelace Foundation; and William S. Shipley, Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory. 
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Others in NASA were not so sure. On 19 May, while the Fleming 
Committee was still meeting, John Houbolt wrote Seamans from 
Langley deploring the state of the launch vehicle program and urging 
more serious attention to rendezvous. We denied any wish to argue for 
rendezvous against direct ascent but insisted that, "because of the lag in 
launch vehicle development, it would appear that the only way that 
will be available to us in the next few years is the rendezvous way. For 
this very reason I feel it mandatory that rendezvous be as much in 
future plans as any item, and that it be attacked vigorously."48 
This was a viewpoint that Seamans, long a student of orbital ren- 
dezvous and openly receptive to such ideas since joining NASA, must 
have shared. On 25 May, he called on Don R. Ostrander, Director of 
Launch Vehicle Programs, and Ira H. A. Abbott, Director of Ad- 
vanced Research Programs, to name "a group of qualified people . . . to 
assess a wide variety of possible ways for executing a manned lunar 
landing." Seamans wanted their report quickly, "at about the same 
time as the one under way by the Ad Hoc Task Group on Manned 
Lunar Landing." NASA Headquarters furnished none of the six 
members of this committee, led by Bruce T. Lundin of Lewis Research 
Center.*49 Lundin regarded his committee as speaking for the field 
centers, in contrast to the Headquarters viewpoint expressed by the 
Fleming group.50 The Lundin report was ready by 10 June, a week be- 
fore the Fleming report. 
Although Lundin's committee discussed other matters, its main 
concern was to compare the several rendezvous schemes with each 
other. It pointedly excluded any specific comparison of rendezvous 
with direct ascent but noted two inherent advantages in rendezvous 
that promised an earlier manned lunar landing. One was the relative 
capacity of a rendezvous-based program to absorb increases in payload 
weight, which meant that early decisions on booster design and devel- 
opment might not so critically affect the program. The other was the 
smaller size of launch vehicles required by a rendezvous mission, a size 
which would not call for the development of large new engines.51 
Time limited the Lundin Committee to a brief qualitative survey, 
which could not compare in scope or detail to the elaborate quantita- 
tive assessment provided by the Fleming Committee..i-52 Clearly, how- 
ever, the choice between solid or liquid propellants in the first stage or 
*Lundin's Committee consisted of Walter J. Downhower (Jet Propulsion Laboratory), Alfred 
Eggers (Ames Research Center), Laurence Loftin (Langley), Harry 0. Ruppe (Marshall), and Lt. 
Col. George W. S. Johnson (Air Force). 
?The Lundin Committee met during the week of 5 June 1961. Most of its sessions were 
devoted to presentations by Ames, Langley, Lewis, and Marshall on Earth orbit rendezvous, by 
Langley and Marshall on lunar orbit rendezvous, and to a general discussion of rendezvous pro- 
posals. 
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two of a Nova booster was too restricted; the proper alternative to di- 
rect ascent was some form of rendezvous. This proposition won unani- 
mous agreement at a meeting between Seamans and the program 
directors* on 18 June, though only after considerable discussion. They 
decided to ursue two courses. Ostrander would form a team from 
NASA Hea d' quarters and Marshall to define an overall plan for using 
orbital operations to achieve manned lunar landing. At the same time, 
the Fleming Committee study of direct ascent would be paralleled by 
an equally intensive investigation of the rendezvous and orbital opera- 
tions approach.53 
The first line of action under Ostrander produced a preliminary 
project development plan for orbital operations by mid-September.54 
For the second, Seamans formed still another ad hoc group that was 
"to establish program plans and supporting resources necessary to ac- 
complish the manned lunar landing mission by the use of rendezvous 
techniques" with as much rigor as the Fleming report. He named 
Donald H. Heaton, his former assistant who had become Assistant 
Director for Vehicles in Ostrander's office, as chairman of the new 
group.55 
Heaton's group was about the same size as Fleming's, but its 
members were more evenly divided between Headquarters and the 
field centers."fts findings, issued late in August, concluded that "ren- 
dezvous offers the earliest possibility for a successful manned lunar 
landing."56 Despite this parade of studies, as future events were to 
show, the issue had only been joined, not settled. But the view that 
rendezvous techniques were important enough to pursue "whether or 
not rendezvous is selected as an operating mode" for the lunar 
mission57 was clearly gaining strength. And this viewpoint was crucial 
to the fate of Mercury Mark 11, which had in the meantime taken on a 
much more sharply defined form. 
Chamberlin and Blatz were ready to report progress toward an 
advanced capsule design early in June 1961. Chamberlin had con- 
ceived his task in terms that diverged widely from what was generally 
expected. Adept at keeping his ideas to himself until they matured, he 
*The meeting was attended by Seamans, Silverstein, Abbott, Ostrander, Siepert, DeMarquis 
D. Wyatt, and Charles H. Roadman (who had replaced Clark Randt as Director of Life Sciences 
Programs). 
?The members were Heaton, Richard B. Canright, L.I. Baird, Rafel, McGoln'ck, Louis H. 
Glassman, John L. Hammersmith, Briskman, Nolan, Warren J. North, a d  William H. Wood- 
ward, from NASA Headquarters; Wilson B. Schramm, R. Voss, Koelle, Peter J. deFries, and 
Harry Ruppe, of Marshall; John Houbolt and Hewitt Phillips, from Langley; Hubert M. Drake, 
from Flight Research Center; and J. Yolles, Air Force System Command. 
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was not much of a talker. As far as Space Task Group knew, at least 
officially, McDonnell was studying an advanced version of the Mercury 
capsule for just two reasons: to extend the capsule's lifetime in orbit to 
one day (or 18 orbits) and to make the capsule easier to check out and 
test before flight.58 The extent of the changes that Chamberlin and 
Blatz revealed to STG leaders on Friday afternoon; 9 June, took some 
of them aback.* Chamberlin explained that the primary aim "of the 
design was to increase component and system accessibility to reduce 
manufacturing and checkout time." That was no surprise. But to do it, 
he had packaged and relocated almost every capsule system. Those 
closest to Project Mercury tended to share Chamberlin's view that the 
Mercury capsule was inherently limited because of its design-making 
it better meant making it over. This was, after all, the heart of the case 
Chamberlin had presented at the Wallops Island meeting in March, 
and he had followed through along the lines he had then suggested. 
But others in STG, more distant from the daily problems of working 
with Mercury, were likely to assume that the capsule needed only rela- 
tively minor changes to improve it, not the nearly complete new design 
that Chamberlin offered.59 
Chamberlin later justified this approach in an enlightening lecture 
on the design philosophy of the Gemini spacecraft (which Mercury 
Mark I1 was to become).Go The main trouble with the Mercury capsule 
was that 
most system components were in the pilot's cabin; and often, to 
pack them in this very confined space, they had to be stacked like a 
layer cake and components of one system had to be scattered about 
the craft to use all available space. This arrangement generated a 
maze of interconnecting wires, tubing, and mechanical linkages. To 
replace one malfunctioning system, other systems had to be dis- 
turbed; and then, after the trouble had been corrected, the systems 
that had been disturbed as well as the malfunctioning system had to 
be checked out again.61 
Mercury designers had been preoccupied with solving such basic prob- 
lems of manned space flight as reentry heating and human tolerance 
of both high acceleration and zero gravity, for "the sole purpose of 
placing a man in orbit in a minimum time." Thus they paid no great 
attention to making a convenient, serviceable spacecraft. That, howev- 
er, was precisely what the new design offered. In it, 
systems are modularized and all pieces of each system are in com- 
pact packages. The packages are so arranged that any system can be 
*Those who attended the Capsule Review Board meetings of 9 and 12 June were Gilruth, 
Walter Wiiams, Paul Purser, Max Faget, Charles Mathews, Robert Piland, Wesley L. Hjornevik, 
George Low, and John Disher. 
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removed without tampering with any other system, and most of the 
packages ride on the outside walls of the pressurized cabin for easy 
access. This arrangement allows many technicians to work on differ- 
ent systems simultaneously.62 
The Mercury capsule, in contrast, could only be worked on from the 
inside, which meant, as a rule, only one person working at a time. 
The new design attacked a number of other Mercury trouble 
spots. Perhaps the most troublesome was the sequencing system. 
Chamberlin argued that one of his chief motives for keeping systems 
in the new design separated was to avoid the endless complications 
Mercury experienced because so many sequentially controlled o era- 
tions were built into it. Most of Mercury's flight operations cou f' d be 
controlled by the pilot, but safety demanded that they also be automat- 
ic, each complex series of events triggered by an appropriate signal 
and ordered through a predetermined sequence by a tangle of electri- 
cal circuitry.63 So complex was Mercury sequencing that Chamberlin 
recalled it as "the root of all evil and anybody that really worked on 
Mercury-that's all they talked about."64 The new design relied on pi- 
lot control, instead of merely allowing it and backing it up with auto- 
matic sequencing. The result was a much simpler machine; the 220 
relays in Mercury, for example, were reduced to 60 in Mark 11.65 
What may have been the most complex sequencing of all was 
demanded by the automatic abort modes in Mercury, which depended 
on a rocket-propelled escape tower to pull the capsule away from the 
booster in an emergency during or just after liftoff.66 In Chamberlin's 
mind, "the sequencing of the escape system was one of the major 
problem areas in Mercury in all its aspects-its mechanical aspects in 
the first part of the program, and the electronic aspects later."67 What 
made this peculiarly frustrating was that the escape tower added hun- 
dreds of lulograms to the capsule's weight, even though it was essen- 
tially irrelevant to the function of the capsule itself; in a successful 
flight it was jettisoned shortly after launch. Yet its many relays and 
complex wiring, besides making it inherently untrustworthy, were 
major factors in prolonging checkout time. To make matters worse, 
the Mercury abort modes-NASA shorthand for the methods that al- 
lowed the pilot to escape when a booster malfunction threatened his 
life-were automatic. Some circumstances not actually calling for an 
aborted mission-including a malfunction of the abort system itself- 
could trigger one, as happened more than once in the Mercury devel- 
opment program.68 
The new design put the pilot in an ejection seat and eliminated 
the escape tower.69 This change, if installed, excluded Atlas as a boost- 
er for the new capsule. Atlas propelled itself with liquid oxygen and a 
mixture of hydrocarbons called RP- 1, a highly explosive combination 
if the booster broke up. No ejection seat had the power to kick a pilot 
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away from an exploding Atlas quickly enough, particularly if esca e 
were not automatically triggered. Safety was thus a key reason for t g e 
escape tower and for its automatic features in Mercury. But Chamber- 
lin had just become aware of a new booster that might relax these con- 
straints. 
Its name was Titan 11, and the Martin Company was developing it 
as an intercontinental ballistic missile for the Air Force and as a 
manned booster in the Air Force Dyna-Soar program.70 Albert C. 
Hall, general manager of Martin's Baltimore Division, had proposed it 
to Associate Administrator Seamans, an old MIT classmate, for a role 
in NASA's lunar mission. Although Seamans was skeptical, he ar- 
ranged for Martin spokesmen to present their case at NASA Head- 
quarters on 8 May 1961. The visit was strictly unofficial, since Titan I1 
was an Air Force project. Any formal contact between NASA and Mar- 
tin required Air Force sanction. Among those who heard about Titan 
I1 that day was Abe Silverstein, who saw enough in the new missile to 
ask Gilruth to look into the possibility of using it somewhere in the 
manned space flight program.71 Silverstein dismissed any thought of a 
role for Titan I1 in the lunar program. 
To Chamberlin, however, Titan I1 looked very good for the im- 
proved Mercury. Weight was the most serious constraint in spacecraft 
design. An improved Mercury meant a heavier Mercury, since the 
price for packaged components was extra kilograms. This, in turn, 
meant that the new design called for a launcher more powerful than 
I Atlas. Titan I1 had power to spare, its total thrust being almost two 
and a half times that of Atlas. Not only could it easily lift the heavier 
spacecraft, but it could also carry the redundant systems that would 
make it a safer booster for manned space flight. This, in a way, merely 
augmented what may have been Titan 11's outstanding features-sim- 
plicity and reliability.72 
Titan I1 ran on storable hypergolic propellants: a blend of hydra- 
zine and unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine (UDMH) as fuel with ni- 
trogen tetroxide as oxidizer. Because this combination is hypergolic- 
fuel and oxidizer burn spontaneously on contact-Titan I1 needed no 
ignition system. Since both fuel and oxidizer can be stored and used at 
normal temperatures-instead of the supercold required by the liquid 
oxygen of Atlas or Titan I-Titan I1 required no cold storage and 
handling facilities. The design and the lessons learned from Titan I 
combined to reduce the 172 relays, umbilicals, valves, and regulators in 
the first version of the missile to 27 in Titan 11.73 This simplification 
struck a responsive chord in Chamberlin, who saw in it something to 
match what he had been trying to achieve in redesigning the Mercury 
capsule. Booster and spacecraft seemed almost to have been made for 
each other.74 
Titan 11's self-igniting propellants had still another advantage. 
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They reacted much less violently with each other than did the cryogen- 
ic propellants of Atlas or Titan I. In June 1961, there was still some 
question about whether a Titan I1 explosion would be sufficiently less 
vlolent, compared to Atlas, to permit the use of an ejection seat. 
Chamberlin was not yet ready to spell out his plans for using Titan 11, 
but that was the way he was thinking. And his active distaste for escape 
towers made him eager to include ejection seats in his design. 
Ejection seats not only promised to relieve a major source of trou- 
ble by getting rid of the escape tower, but they also furthered the con- 
cept of modularization, keeping each spacecraft system, so far as possi- 
ble, independent. "The paramount objective in the program," 
according to Chamberlin, "was to dissociate systems." Ejection seats, in 
what he called "a very happy coincidence that was fully realized at the 
time," also fitted in nicely with another design change, substituting 
paraglider for parachute recovery.75 
STG had not displayed much active interest in Francis Rogallo's 
flexible wing concept after the initial flurry in early 1959.76 Rogallo 
and his co-workers at Langley had pushed ahead with their studies in 
the meantime. By mid-1960, they had convinced themselves that a con- 
trollable, flexible wing could carry a returning spacecraft safely to 
land, thus providing "a lightweight controllable paraglider for manned 
space vehicles."77 STG rediscovered the paraglider at the start of 1961 
as a by-product of work on Apollo. A technical liaison group on Apol- 
lo configuration and aerodynamics met at Langley on 12 January." In 
the course of describing his center's work for Apollo, the Langley rep- 
resentative mentioned the paraglider landing system: "The feeling at 
Langley is that if the paraglider shows the same type of reliability in 
large-scale tests . . . that it has achieved in small-scale tests, the poten- 
tial advantages of this system outweigh other systems." Engineering 
design of large paragliders appeared to be no problem and would be 
demonstrated in manned and unmanned drop tests.78 
Space Task Group engineers met informally with Rogallo and his 
colleagues in February, March, and April to explore the use of a par- 
aglider in the Apollo program.1- The STG team was less than enthu- 
siastic. They believed much work was yet to be done before the device 
W e  group comprised Alan Kehlet as chairman, and William W. Petynia as secretary (both 
of STG), Hubert Drake (Flight Research Center), Edward L. Linsley (Marshall), Eugene S. Love 
(Langley), Edwin Pounder (JPL), and Clarence A. Syvertson (Ames). During January and April 
meetings of the group, visitors were John Disher (Headquarters), Alvin Seiff (Ames), and John B. 
Lee and Bruce G. Jackson (STG). The large-scale program got under way in April, using a fully 
deployed 19-foot paraglider. Tests with partially deployed and packaged paragliders were to fol- 
low. 
?The STG engineers were John W. Kiker, Richard C. Kennedy, Fred J. Pearce, Jr., and Ger- 
ard J. Pesman. Rogallo's team consisted of Delwin R. Croom, Robert T. Taylor, Donald E. 
Hewes, Lloyd J. Fisher, Jr., and Lou S. Young. 
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Above, a drawing of the Titan II, built by the Martin-Marietta Corporation, 
as proposed to be adapted for manned space flight. Below, artist's sketch of 
ejection seats propelling the astronauts to escape distance from a launch fail- 
ure. They would be used in emergencies before launch (pad-abort) and in 
flight to about 18 000 meters altitude. 
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could be seriously considered as a landing system for Apollo. The big- 
gest unknown was the deployment characteristics of an inflatable wing; 
no inflatable structure had ever been successfully deployed in flight. 
Othey questions-how the paraglider was to be packaged, whether the 
pilot's view from the capsule would be good enough for flying and 
landing with it-were nearly as important and also largely unanswered. 
The STG team advised gathering at least six months of data before 
awarding any paraglider development contract.79 At the same time, 
however, McDonnell engineers were looking at a paraglider for the 
modified Mercury, and Marshall Space Flight Center had already let 
two contracts to study paraglider as a booster recovery system. The 
idea clearly had promise, and in May 1961 Gilruth decided to contract 
for further study. 
Three contractors each got $100 000 for two and a half months to 
design a paraglider landing system and define potential problem 
areas.* The best design was expected later to become the basis for a 
development contract to "provide the modified [Mercury] spacecraft 
with the capability of achieving a controlled energy landing through 
the use of aerodynamic lift."80 In fact, the design studies soon received 
a new name-Phase I of the Paraglider Development Program.81 
Observed by a small technical monitoring group from STG, the para- 
glider design studies were under way before May ended.l-82 McDonnell 
engineers also maintained close liaison with paraglider work, inde- 
pendent though it was of the Mercury Mark I1 study contract.83 The 
redesi ned Mercury, as presented by Chamberlin and Blatz to the 
Capsu !? e Review Board in June, could be adapted to a paraglider land- 
ing system, once it was developed.84 
One other significant innovation marked the new design, an en- 
larged overhead mechanical hatch, which would allow the pilots to get 
in the spacecraft more easily and to get out more quickly in an emer- 
gency. It was another way of making the new spacecraft a truly opera- 
tional machine, one that could be entered and left like an airplane. 
Such a hatch was also needed if ejection seats were to be used. But it 
also had a special virtue that its designers were well aware of, though 
they did not talk about it. A large mechanical hatch would enable the 
pilot to leave and return to the spacecraft while it was in orbit and 
*They were Goodyear Aircraft Corporation, Akron, Ohio; Ryan Aeronautical Company, San 
Diego, California; and North American Aviation Space & Information Systems Division, Downey, 
California. Goodyear was an experienced builder of inflatable aerial devices, and Ryan and Nonh 
American were already working on the Marshall contracts. 
tThe technical monitors were Rodney G. Rose, Harry C. Shoaf, Kenneth W. Christopher, 
and Lester A. Stewart; in mid-June, they visited each of the contractors' plants to review progress 
on the study. The group continued to meet with the contractors at regular intervals until the 
studies were completed. 
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thus permit what later became known as extravehicular activity, or 
EVA.85 
The many changes proposed by Chamberlin and Blatz did not 
make the redesigned spacecraft a totally new machine. Though some- 
what enlarged, it retained the-fully tested and proved shape and heat 
protection of the Mercury capsule. It was still to be a one-man craft, 
and its designers expected to use mostly Mercury parts, packaged and 
rearranged but not otherwise substantially altered. The new design 
would not be much longer-lived in orbit than Mercury, 18 orbits (or 
one day) being the most the designers were aiming at.86 Nevertheless, 
members of the Capsule Review Board seemed staggered by the scope of 
the changes presented to them. They refused to accept the complete 
Chamberlin-Blatz package but agreed to reconvene after the weekend to 
decide if any of the new features might be worth pursuing.87 
Chamberlin came back again Monday morning, since he was a 
regular member of the board, but Blatz had returned to St. Louis.* 
The board talked over the design of the ejection seat and hatch, sim- 
pler sequencing, better accessibility, and an 18-orbit capability. Each of 
these ideas had its own appeal, but most of them carried a price tag 
far too high to fit within the scope of the follow-on Mercury program 
STG was then thinking about, a program budgeted for less than $10 
million in the coming fiscal year.88 
Although reaching no clear-cut decision, the board still hesitated 
to endorse Chamberlin's plans in full. Instead, he was allowed to con- 
tinue working on alternative approaches to an improved Mercury, 
while McDonnell studied "the minimum modifications that could be 
made to the present capsule to provide 18-orbit capability" and looked 
into "a larger retro and posigrade pack."g9 This amounted to little 
more than reviving an early Mercury objective, once the ultimate goal 
of the program. Growing capsule weight and power requirements, as 
well as the limitations of the manned space flight tracking network, 
had forced STG to scrap the 18-orbit mission by October 1959.90 The 
idea lived on, however, in the form of a proposal to fit the capsule 
with its own rocket motors to provide the final increment of velocity 
needed to attain an orbit high enough to resist Earth's gravity for 18 
revolutions.91 This was the idea the Capsule Review Board again en- 
dorsed at its meeting on 12 June. 
The matter of a post-Mercury manned space flight program was 
far from settled in the Capsule Review Board meetings of 9 and 12 
*Hjornevik, Low, and Disher, all of NASA Headquarters, had also gone home. 
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June. Chamberlin was not giving up, and McDonnell, despite the 
board's injunction to limit its work to minor modifications, was still 
pressin& 
for a more radical effort. At the beginning of July 1961, top 
STG o cials were looking at an ephemeral "Hermes Plan," calling for 
a new Mark I1 design much along the lines proposed by Chamberlin 
and Blatz a few weeks before. This Mark I1 was contrasted with a min- 
imally redesigned capsule for an 18-orbit mission, now termed Mark I. 
The question of Mark I1 design, as Gilruth's special assistant Paul E. 
Purser noted, was still very much "up in the air."gZ Still unclear was 
the scope of a follow-on Mercury program. A choice in favor of the 
extensively redesigned Mark I1 would impose a far greater effort than 
the slightly altered Mark 1-93 
A McDonnell group led by Mercury manager Walter F. Burke at- 
tended a senior staff meeting at STG on 7 July to outline the compa- 
ny's studies of an advanced Mercury capsule that took three distinct 
forms. One version, the "minimum chan e capsule," involved not 
much more than cutting some hatches in t f~ e side of the capsule for 
better access. Although it could be ready to launch relatively quickly 
and cheaply (11 months, $79.3 million), it had some obvious draw- 
backs. Better access only accented the capsule's cramped interior, and 
the hatches themselves weakened the capsule's structure and heat pro- 
tection. As Chamberlin later remarked, "It was clear that this mod. was 
too little to inspire any additional confidence in the design, and hence 
make it worth doing. Thus, the merits of the greater modifications 
became apparent."94 The second McDonnell advanced design, called a 
"reconfigured Mercury capsule," adhered closely to the Chamberlin- 
Blatz proposal of June. It would take longer to build and cost more 
than the minimum change capsule (20 months and $91.303 million), 
but it might very well be worth the expense. And for another two 
months and $12.248 million, NASA might do even better with Mc- 
Donnell's third version, a "two-man Mercury capsule."95 
The notion of putting more than one man in a modified Mercury 
capsule was not new, having been suggested at least as early as January 
1959.96 That idea had gone nowhere, but Faget revived the possibility 
at the review board meeting on 9 June 1961. Blatz recalled that, after 
he and Chamberlin had made their pitch, Faget's comment was, "If 
we're going to go to all of this trouble to redesign Mercury, why not 
make it a multiplace spacecraft in the process?"97 Faget's interest in a 
two-man spacecraft was prompted, in part, by the prospect of extra- 
vehicular operations. As early as March 1961, he had asked John F. 
Yardley, McDonnell's manager for Mercury operations at Cape Canav- 
eral, to look into the possibility "of expanding Mercury into a two-man 
version" for this purpose.98 Others saw reason for a two-man space- 
craft in the rigors of long missions. If the Mark I1 were to be in space 
for more than a few orbits, then having two men to share the strain 
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and support each other's activities made good sense.99 There was also 
a certain compelling logic in building a two-man spacecraft for a pro- 
gram falling between the one-man Mercury and three-man Apollo. 100 
NASA Headquarters seemed uncertain about the size of the changes 
STG was thinking about during July 1961. George Low told Associate 
Administrator Seamans and the Washington program directors on 6 July 
that McDonnell and STG were working on a minimally modified 18-orbit 
capsule. He reported that 
McDonnell originally looked upon the 18-orbit capsule as a develop- 
ment of a new flight article with substantial increase in size and weight, 
and incorporating rendezvous capabilities. McDonnell has been ad- 
vised, however, to proceed on the basis of minimal changes to the ex- 
isting hardware and to approach design modifications on this basis.101 
But a master plan for orbital operations, dated 19 July, included, besides 
four 18-orbit Mercury flights during 1963, eight one-man Mercury Mark 
I1 flights to be launched at two-month intervals-from October 1963 
through December 1964-and to perform rendezvous and docking tests 
in orbit.102 
Whatever confusion may have existed, however, was resolved before 
the end of the month. On 27 July, Abe Silverstein joined Gilruth and 
other STG leaders, as well as several astronauts, at the McDonnell plant 
in St. Louis. McDonnell engineers displayed quarter-scale models of four 
basic spacecraft configurations: an Eighteen Orbit MK I, a Minimum 
Change MK 11, a Reconfigured MK 11, and a Two Man MK 11. Also on 
display was a full-size wood and plastic mockup of the cockpit for a two- 
man spacecraft-Astronaut Walter M. Schirra, Jr., sat in it and ex- 
claimed, "You finally found a place for a left-handed astronaut!"" 103 
Although the ideas for an advanced Mercury presented by the Mc- 
Donne11 study team were much the same as they had been 20 days ear- 
lier,lo4 the audience on 27 July now represented NASA Headquarters as 
well as STG. Silverstein had long been convinced of the importance of 
Mercury missions more ambitious than merely circling Earth three times. 
What he saw in St. Louis was apparently enough to tip the scales toward a 
decision that many in NASA were ready to welcome. On 28 July, during 
the second day of the St. Louis meeting, Silverstein directed McDonnell 
to focus all further effort to improve Mercury solely on the two-man ap- 
proach.j.105 The choice had been made for a larger, rather than a small- 
er, follow-on Mercury program. 
*Ironically, Schirra flew.in Gemini as spacecraft commander, occupying the left seat and using 
his right hand for most operations. 
TMcDonnell was also told to go ahead with work on the 18-orbit Mark I; this direchve became 
official on 25 October 1961. The 18-orbit Mercury was no longer deemed an improved version. As 
Faith 7, it eventudly carried L. Gordon Cooper, Jr., through the 22-orbit Mercury-Atlas 9 mission in 
May 1963. 
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The NASA-McDonnell meeting in St. Louis on 27-28 July 1961 featured the unveiling of the 
mockup of the Mark II  Spacecraft; above left, sketch of the modularized systems in the two- 
man spacecraft; above right, subjects in wooden mockup of two-man spacecraft in position it 
would rest on launch pad; below left, two-man spacecraft in normal orientation for orbital 
flight; and below right, subjects check open hatch characteristics to evaluate feasibility of ex- 
travehicular activity while in orbital flight. The harness attached to the subject at left simulat- 
ed the weightlessness of orbital flight. 
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In what was to become a familiar pattern, that program had already 
grown far beyond its original bounds. The McDonnell study contract, the 
basis for the company's design work on advanced Mercury, had outlined 
a relatively modest effort. By the time that contract was signed, on 24 
April, the work was well along. In just over three weeks, McDonnell re- 
quested and received a contract increase from $98 621 to $187 189.106 
McDonnell efforts soon far surpassed that limit. By 6 August, the compa- 
ny had assigned 45 engineers to the study, and the original 9000 engi- 
neering manhours called for in the contract had climbed to almost 
23 000; added to that figure were 6000 shop manhours for building and 
testing models not even mentioned in the contract. The estimated cost 
now topped $535 000.107 
Since STG had agreed that advanced Mercury needed more study, 
McDonnell had not felt obliged to wait until its contract had been amend- 
ed to provide the extra funds. The company spent its own money. This 
was the kind of initiative that earned the firm a good deal of respect in 
NASA circles. Where others refused to move without money in hand, 
McDonnell focused on the task and relied on the good faith of its custom- 
er to make up the cost. It was seldom disappointed. In this instance, the 
company proposed a new contract to cover the extra engineering study 
and shop work done since 19 June, when contract funds had been ex- 
hausted, and to pay its projected expenses through the end of Septem- 
ber.108 The original contract and the new request together totaled over 
$670 000, nearly seven times the figure first approved in April. STG did 
not issue a new contract but, instead, amended the procurement contract 
to authorize the additional funds.109 
Before the end of July 1961, the joint efforts of Chamberlin, Blatz, 
and their co-workers in STG and McDonnell had produced the design of 
an advanced Mercury capsule, Mercury Mark 11. Space Flight Programs 
Director Silverstein had endorsed it. Although the final verdict was not 
yet in, the larger program seemed to be in the works, something that 
could scarcely have been predicted when the year opened. The situation 
was transformed on 25 May, when the President asked the country to 
assume the burden and the glory of reaching for the Moon. 
The metamorphosis of Space Task Group into Manned Spacecraft 
Center, followed by its move from Virginia to Texas, flowed directly 
from this decision. STG had been created solely to manage Project Mer- 
cury; as a single-purpose task force, it was outmoded. Project Mercury 
now became only the first step on the path that was to lead Americans to 
the Moon before 19'70. 
As always, the lunar mission, in whatever form, held center stage. 
This was just as true in Headquarters as it was in the field. Although 
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Washington's chief planning concern was the voyage to the Moon, re- 
search and development in the field focused on specific problems raised 
by a lunar mission and the hardware needed to surmount them. STG, of 
course, had Project Mercury to worry about; but when it had time to look 
ahead, what it looked at was the Moon. Even before the President's deci- 
sion for a lunar landing, STG engineers were hard at work on the space- 
craft that would ultimately carry men there. 
Once a deadline had been set, the question of rendezvous as part of 
the lunar mission took on a new guise. By holding out the prospect of 
using smaller and thus more quickly developed boosters, rendezvous 
offered a chance to reach the Moon sooner than did a direct approach. 
During the spring and summer of 196 1, discussion of this promise be- 
came widespread, and support for some form of rendezvous mission 
gathered strength. Even those who objected to chancing a lunar mission 
on an unproved technique were uite willing to admit that the technique 
needed to be developed, if only 7 or its intrinsic value in future manned 
space flight. The growing conviction of the need for rendezvous, still fur- 
ther bolstered by studies during the fall of 1961, provided the framework 
for what became Project Gemini. 
By the time NASA decided that it needed a rendezvous development 
program, a freshly designed spacecraft was on the drawing boards. 
Mercury Mark I1 was not so much the product of planning as it was of a 
kind of technological imperative, the ceaseless and unquenchable desire 
of working engineers to perfect their machines. Some features of Mark I1 
did, of course, spring from thinking about the objectives of a program to 
follow Mercury. But most of the changes in the new design suggested 
improvement in the abstract, rather than means to defined goals. 
When Chamberlin talked about the design, it was in terms of accessi- 
bility and convenience, serviceability and simplification, "a better me- 
chanical design" that was "more reliable, more workable, more practical." 
These are qualities that can never be absolutely realized, though they 
may be endlessly pursued. During the first half of 1961, Chamberlin, 
Blatz, and the others pursued them far beyond the intent of those who 
had set them the task. By July they had reached a point where they were 
willing to pause, although, as the later career of Gemini was to show, it 
was not a point at which they could long rest content. 
When Silverstein endorsed the two-man Mark 11, its designers faced 
a new task. The gap between a spacecraft design, whatever its merits, and 
a manned space flight project was a wide one. Early in 1961, NASA 
Headquarters had set up a formal procedure for planning and carrying 
out new projects.110 The first step for such large and complex projects as 
Mercury Mark I1 now promised to be was a preliminary project develop- 
ment plan. This was the task to which Chamberlin and his colleagues now 
turned. 
From Spacecraft to Project 
W HEN August 1961 began, James Chamberlin, backed by the Space Task Group and McDonnell Aircraft Corporation, had 
produced the makings of a post-Mercury manned space flight pro- 
gram. The major task, rethinking the design of the Mercury capsule, 
was finished, although many details had yet to be worked out.1 A Mer- 
cury Mark I1 project had attained a kind of shadow being and had the 
support of Abe Silverstein, Director of Space Flight Programs in 
NASA Headquarters. Only NASA's highest echelon remained to be 
convinced. 
So far, the working engineers in STG and McDonnell had been 
more concerned with an improved spacecraft than with lar er goals. 
To  give their ideas substance, the now faced the task of &ting the r spacecraft within the framework o a NASA project. This meant find- 
ing those larger goals to justify the cost in time and money that turn- 
ing concept into practice required. It also meant putting together more 
pieces; a project was more than a spacecraft. 
MORE THAN A SPACECRAFT 
Neither Chamberlin and his staff nor the McDonnell designers 
had s ecified a booster for their improved versions of the Mercury P capsu e, although they had mentioned several prospects at one time or 
another and Chamberlin himself was more than a little taken with the 
Titan 11. During June and July, STG Director Robert Gilruth and his 
staff had met often, but always informally, with Martin spokesmen, 
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chiefly James L. Decker, to talk about Titan I1 as the booster for the 
scaled-up Mercury2 
The first formal meeting came on 3 August 1961, when Decker 
briefed Gilruth and his colleagues on "A Program Plan for a Titan 
Boosted Mercury Vehicle."s The Martin plan was decidedly optimistic. 
For just under $48 million, NASA could buy nine boosters, devel- 
oped, tested, and launched, the first launch to be within 18 months.4 
What made this proposal so startling was that Titan I1 was still mostly 
promise. Martin's contract with the Air Force to develop the missile 
was scarcely a year old (June 1960), and Titan 11's maiden flight was 
almost a year in the future. But the company had reason to believe 
that rapid progress was likely. 
For one thing, much of the work and expense of Titan 11 devel- 
opment would be provided by the Air Force missile program. For an- 
other, some of the design and testing of changes needed to convert the 
missile to booster for manned space flight had already been done, 
and more could be expected, as part of the Air Force Dyna-Soar pro- 
gram. The same simplicity and reliability that so appealed to Chamber- 
lin in the Titan 11, augmented by the redundant systems its greater 
power permitted it to carry, likewise promised a quick and successful 
development program.5 
By the end of July 1961, when Silverstein approved the two-man 
Mark 11, STG was all but ready to put that spacecraft on Titan 11. 
Many of the rough spots had already been smoothed away; Martin had 
been talking not only to STG but to NASA Headquarters and the Air 
Force. The formal meeting of 3 August sim ly confirmed a nearly 
accomplished fact. At a senior staff meeting i' our days later, Gilruth 
commented on the vehicle's promise, particularly the greater power 
that made it "a desirable booster for a two-man spacecraft."6 
The choice of a Titan to carry Mercury aloft may have done some 
violence to classical mythology. The giants of Greek myth were far 
removed in time and space from the Roman god. Those who first 
named Atlas and Titan in the mid-1950s were thinking of the symbol- 
ism of power, strength, and invincibility, qualities no less appropriate 
when their missiles were turned to more peaceful uses.7 Yet, in scour- 
ing classical mythology to name their missiles, and setting a precedent 
that NASA followed, they tapped a vein of symbolism far richer than 
they knew. Just as Atlas, though he bore heaven and Earth on his 
shoulders, was but a puny shadow of the Titans themselves, so was the 
Atlas booster far less powerful than the Titan I1 that succeeded it. 
Titan I1 could carry men to new heights, allowing them to say with 
Isaac Newton, "If I have seen farther, it is by standing on the shoul- 
ders of giants."g Titan might also help to underscore the living relev- 
ance of Newtonian science in an age dominated by Einsteinian relativi- 
ty and quantum mechanics. For if "the 'sputniks' constitute[d] the first 
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experimental proof of Newtonianism on a cosmic scale,"g then the 
spacecraft carried aloft by Titan, shifting its orbital path in response to 
the commands of its pilots, offered an applied demonstration of New- 
tonian orbital mechanics. Eventually Titan I1 would carry the renamed 
Mercury on its shoulders in flights that soared far beyond the limits 
previously attained by mankind and would allow them to see farther 
than they had ever seen before. 
At about the same time that Gilruth was endorsing Titan 11, 
Chamberlin was looking at Agena for use as a rendezvous target. On 8 
August 1961, he made his first contact with the Lockheed Missiles & 
Space Company of Sunnyvale, California.10 The Agena was a highly 
successful second-stage vehicle that Lockheed had developed for the 
Air Force. In its then-current version, Agena B, it had flown for the 
first time in 1960. It was powered by a pump-fed rocket engine made 
by Bell Aerosystems Company of Buffalo, New York. Like Titan 11, 
Agena used storable hypergolic propellants-in this case, unsymmetri- 
cal dimethyl hydrazine as fuel, inhibited red fuming nitric acid as oxi- 
dizer. The engine had a dual-burn capability; that is, it could be fired, 
shut off, then fired again.11 This feature, plus its impressive string of 
successes, gave Agena the look of a winner. It not only seemed relia- 
ble, but its extra power offered a chance to practice really large-scale 
maneuvers once spacecraft and target had docked.12 
Chamberlin's talks with Lockheed about Agena as a rendezvous 
target reflected the new orientation of Mark I1 work, toward a project 
rather than a spacecraft. Rendezvous was now a matter of intense con- 
cern within NASA. Despite its great promise, as stressed by the several 
committees that had discussed the subject during the spring and sum- 
mer of 1961, it was still an unknown. Whether rendezvous would be as 
simple and useful in practice as it appeared to be in theory was a ques- 
tion that Mercury Mark I1 might well be able to answer. 
Of other questions looking for answers, one of the most pressing 
involved the effects of extended stays in space on the human body. 
Mercury might lay some fears to rest, but its short missions could not 
allay doubts about long-term space dangers. Those doubts would be- 
come crucial in the Apollo program. A trip to the Moon and back 
demanded at least a week, compared to the four and a half hours of 
the longest Mercury mission then scheduled. Here was another area 
that Mark I1 might explore. The large increase in payload weight 
permitted by Titan I1 and the greater size of Mark I1 would allow the 
spacecraft to carry the extra supplies and batteries or fuel cells to pro- 
vide electrical power for a mission of one or two weeks. 
The end of the first phase of the paraglider development program 
in mid-August, which proved the feasibility of the concept for recovery 
of manned spacecraft,ls pointed to still another part Mark I1 might 













AND HELIUM AND HELIUM 
BOTTLES BOTTLES 
Gemini launch vehicles were (above left) the Titan II and (above right) the 
Agena B. Below is a 1962 drawing of the rendezvous and docking role envi- 
sloned for Agena. 
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trolled return made the ocean the best landing field. But this meant 
that each landing was a major undertaking in its own right, with fleets 
of ships and aircraft deployed to ensure the safe recovery of pilot and 
spacecraft. This clearly would not do if space fli ht were ever to be- 
come a routine enterprise. Fitted out with a parag 9 ider system, Mercu- 
ry Mark I1 might show the way to controlled recovery on land. 
These we& all, however, bnly ideas that needed to be hammered 
into specific proposals with goals, costs, and timetables. This was the 
purpose of the preliminary project development plan that Chamberlin 
and his co-workers began to repare early in August 1961. The focus 
of their effort now shifted f rom the engineering design of an im- 
proved Mercury to framing the program such a capsule might serve. 
McDonnell reoriented work under its NASA study contract toward 
"basic and alternate missions for the MK-I1 Spacecraft" and increased 
the number of engineers assigned from 45 to 74.14 At the same time, 
three McDonnell en ineers, led by Fred Sanders, journeyed to Lang- 
ley, where Chamberfin, aided by James Rose and several contracting 
and scheduling specialists," was getting started on the preliminary plan 
for a new project, using the Mercury Mark I1 two-man spacecraft.15 
The first result was ready 14 August 196 1 .  
REACHING FOR THE MOON 
The "Preliminary Project Development Plan for an Advanced 
Manned Space Program Utilizing the Mark I1 Two Man SpacecraftWl6 
framed six objectives. They were to be achieved in 10 flights, the first 
in March 1963 and the rest to follow once every two months until Sep- 
tember 1964. The first objective was long-duration flights, with men 
in orbit for up to 7 days, animals for up to 14. The two extended 
manned flights, scheduled third and fourth in the program, came first. 
Two animals fli hts were then to provide "completely ob'ective phys- a h iological data w ich could not be obtained otherwise." T ese were to 
be the sixth and eighth flights, because the planners were not sure that 
some of the spacecraft components, especially the retrofire system, 
could be relied upon over so long a time; the required reliability would 
be shown in the earlier manned flights, when manual backup was 
available. Otherwise, the only purpose of the manned flights was to 
*Sander's team stayed at Langley for two weeks; the other two members were Ervin S. Kissel- 
burg and Gilbert G. Munroe. Munroe, who came to Virginia to work on spacecraft weight analys- 
es, soon returned to an earlier assignment on the aircraft side of McDonnell. Frank G. Morgan, 
Jr., the company's marketing engineer for Mercury, was a frequent visitor to STG at this time, 
helping with cost estimates. Chamberlin's contract and scheduling help came from George F. 
MacDougall, Jr., Joseph V. Piland, Walter D. Wolhart, Lester Stewart, Nicholas Jevas, William C. 
Muhly, Richard F. Baillie, Donald L. Jacobs, Allen L. Grandfield, Paul M. Sturtevant, and Paul 
H. Kloeuer. 
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test the ability of the crew to function in space for as long as a week. 
Russian Cosmonaut Cherman S. Titov completed his 17-circuit, 25- 
hour mission aboard Vostok 1T on 6-7 August 1961; although he com- 
plained of nausea, he proved that a man could last a day in space.17 
A look at the Van Allen radiation belts was the second objective. 
The first flight was to be an unmanned test to make sure that space- 
craft and booster would be compatible for manned missions, but it 
would also carry biological experiments. Titan I1 would boost the 
spacecraft into a highly elliptical orbit, 160 kilometers above Earth at 
its lowest point but 1400 kilometers out at its highest and through the 
Van Allen belts to acquire data on radiation. 
Controlled landing was the third goal, to be pursued on all seven 
manned flights. This meant that the pilot had to have some means of 
flying the spacecraft toward a relatively limited landing area. The most 
direct method was to offset the spacecraft's center of gravity to yield 
some degree of aerodynamic lift, using the attitude control system to 
roll the spacecraft during its flight through the air and thus control 
the amount and direction of lift to correct any errors in the predicted 
landing point. Controlled land landing also demanded some way to 
cushion touchdown impact. This was a harder problem, but one to 
which the paraglider seemed to promise an answer. 
Rendezvous and docking stood fourth in the list of objectives. The 
fifth, seventh, ninth, and tenth flights in the program each required 
two launches, so the Titan 11-launched Mark I1 could meet and dock 
with the Atlas-launched Agena B in orbit. The planners foresaw the 
major problem in the first rendezvous missions to be the size of the 
"launch window," the length of time during which a spacecraft 
could be launched to rendezvous with its target. The larger the launch 
window, the greater the difference in speed between spacecraft and 
target that had to be made good. That was beyond the powers of the 
spacecraft alone, but the difference might be made up, in part, by the 
target. Later, with more experience, the engineers expected to reduce 
the size of the launch window. Then the extra power provided by the 
target might find other uses, perhaps in "deep space and lunar mis- 
sions with the target vehicle being used as a booster following rendez- 
vous." The fifth objective was astronaut training, mainly a useful by- 
product of the program.18 
The plan stressed extensive use of vehicles and equipment on 
hand, altered as little as possible. The Mark 11 spacecraft retained 
what the Mercury capsule had proved, its aerodynamic shape, thermal 
protection, and systems components. Some changes were demanded by 
new goals. In the longer flights, crew members needed improved pres- 
sure suits, fuel cells to replace batteries, and more stable propellants 
than hydrogen peroxide in the attitude control system. Although Mer- 
cury carried none of the gear required for rendezvous missions, plan- 
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ners expected to meet these needs with little or no modification of ex- 
isting inertial platforms, radar, and computers; of the major require- 
ments, only a rendezvous propulsion system was not on hand. 
Other major changes were limited to ejection seats instead of 
Mercury's escape tower and the environmental control system, in es- 
sense two Mercury systems hooked together. Since everything else in 
Mark I1 differed little if any from the equipment flight-tested in Mer- 
cury, the engineers looked forward to only a modest testing effort in 
the new project. They guessed that it would cost only $177 million to 
develop, procure, and test eight Mark 11 spacecraft, two of which were 
to be reused.19 
The Mark I1 planners were just as sanguine when it came to 
launch vehicles. Atlas-Agena B could be used almost as it came off the 
assembly line, at a cost to the program of only $38 million for the four 
required. Titan I1 demanded more in the way of changes, but the Air 
Force would bear most of the cost. The chief exception was length- 
ened second-stage propellant tanks to increase the payload by 300 kilo- 
grams. As a manned booster, Titan I1 promised to be so simple and 
reliable that only one extra feature was needed to leave all decisions to 
abort a mission in the hands of the pilots. That was a redundant guid- 
ance and control system. Titan 11's most dangerous potential failing, 
and the only one that demanded an automatic abort system, was first- 
stage engine hardover. A malfunction in the guidance and control sys- 
tem could drive the gimbaled engines to their extreme ositions-hard- 
over-their thrust vector then being directed at the P arthest possible 
angle from the proper flight path, accelerating the booster away from 
the correct course in the region where it would be subjected to the 
greatest dynamic pressure. The danger lay in the possibility of the 
booster's breaking up before the pilots could react. By adding a second 
first-stage guidance and. control system, the hazards of this failing were 
all but erased. Since the booster demanded little in the way of new 
parts, testing could be quite limited. The best estimate of the price of 
the boosters was $86 million. 
The cost of the entire program from drawing board through the 
last flight came to $347.8 million. It would be managed by a project 
office that would also take charge of the rest of the Mercury program, 
the three-orbit flights already planned and the proposed 18-orbit mis- 
sion using the minimum-change capsule. Forming the core of the new 
project office would be the 76 members of STG's En neering Division, 
at the time chiefly engaged in Project Mercury and i? argely outside the 
mainstream of Apollo. The planners were careful to stress that the 
new office could be fully staffed to a total of 175 and the new program 
could be carried on without threat to other programs. Mercury would 
not be hindered, Apollo would not be interrupted.20 
Should the proposed project meet with complete success, the stage 
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would then be set for the sixth objective, which might supplant much 
of Project Apollo. If the Mark I1 spacecraft showed itself able to sup- 
port a crew for seven days or more and if rendezvous proved to be 
practical, then the advanced program based on the Mark I1 might "ac- 
com lish most of the Apollo mission at an earlier date than with the 
A o lo program as it is presently conceived." By taking full advantage 
o P the new spacecraft and rendezvous technique, "it is a distinct possi- 
bility that lunar orbits may be accomplished by the interim spacecraft 
after rendezvous with an orbiting Centaur." This prospect was the sub- 
ject of an appendix to the development plan. 
Centaur was a second-stage vehicle then under development that 
would use high-energy liquid hydrogen as its fuel. If Centaur were 
inserted into orbit by Titan 11, it would have enough power after 
docking to boost the spacecraft to escape velocity. The deep-space ver- 
sion of Mark I1 differed from the rendezvous type only in having 
backup navigation gear and extra heat and radiation protection, 270 
kilograms more on a 2900-kilogram spacecraft. The ap endix ex- 
plored two possible mission sequences. One simply added F our flights 
to the ten in the Mark I1 program. The first two extra flights were 
deep-space missions, with Centaur boosting the spacecraft into an ellip- 
tical orbit with an apogee of some 80 000 kilometers to study naviga- 
tion and reentry problems. The last two flights, scheduled for March 
and May 1965, were circumlunar, and the whole package added only 
$60 million to the cost of the basic Mark I1 program. 
The alternative was an accelerated program, nine flights in all. 
The first three flights were the same in both programs-an 18-orbit 
unmanned qualification and radiation test, an 18-orbit manned qualifi- 
cation test, and a manned long-duration test. In the speeded up pro- 
gram, the fourth and fifth flights developed the techniques of rendez- 
vous and docking with Agena B as the target. Centaur launched by 
Titan I1 then replaced the Agena for the rest of the program-two 
deep-space missions and two flights around the Moon. This faster pro- 
gram put the first Mark I1 in lunar orbit in May 1964 for a cost not 
much greater than the basic 10-flight program: $356.3 million versus 
$347.8 million.21 
During the week after its release, the Mark 11 plan had STG buzz- 
ing.22 A second version of the plan came out just a week later, on 21 
August. It differed from the first in on1 one notable respect. All men- 
tion of a lunar mission for Mark I1 ha d vanished, leaving behind only 
a circumspect suggestion that, "if a vehicle such as the Centaur were 
used as the rendezvous target, the spacecraft would then have a large 
velocity potential for more extensive investigations."23 Even this hint 
dropped out of later versions of the plan. 
The appeal of going to the Moon with Mark 11, however, was not 
Atlas-Centaur was rated operational after this launch on 26 October 1966. 
The tarj;et goal o f  launching a Centaur in 1961 was missed. The first try 
came GII 8 May 1962 and failed, putting o f f  a successful launch until 27 No- 
vember 1963-a date that would have been out o f  phase with Gemini launch 
schedules o f  1962. 
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so easily quashed. After cutting circumlunar flight from the Mark I1 
plan, Chamberlin revived the even more daring idea of using the 
spacecraft in a lunar landing program.24 The booster was Saturn C-3 
and the key technique was lunar orbit rendezvous. The scheme in- 
volved a lunar landing vehicle that was little more than a 680-kilogram 
skeleton, to which a propulsion system and propellahts were attached. 
Fully fueled, it weighed either 3284 kilograms or 43'72 kilograms, de- 
pending on choice of propellants. The lighter version used liquid hy- 
drogen, the heavier used hypergolic propellants. Total Earth-launched 
payload in this mission fell between 11 000 and 13 000 kilograms, one- 
sixth to one-fifth of the 68 000-kilogram payload then in prospect for 
the direct ascent lunar mission. The cost was low, $584.3 million plus 
the expense of two Saturn C-3 boosters, but the risk was high. 
7he flight plan for this lunar landing program derivcd from the 
speeded up circumlunar proposal appended to the Mark I1 plan of 14 
August. The first two flights, in March and May of 1964, were to be 
unmanned and manned qualification tests of the spacecraft and Titan 
11. The next two flights put the spacecraft in orbit for extended peri- 
ods of time. Three flights then developed and demonstrated rendez- 
vous and docking techniques with Agena as target. The eighth and 
ninth missions had Centaur boosting the spacecraft into an 80 000-kil- 
ometer deep-space orbit. Next came three flights to test rendezvous 
between the manned spacecraft and the unmanned lunar landing craft 
in Earth orbit, culminating with the crew transferring from one to the 
other. Flights 13 and 14 had Centaur boosting the spacecraft to escape 
velocity for an early demonstration of circumlunar capability. Saturn 
was to launch the 15th fli ht, a Moon orbital mission. Men would land W- on the Moon in the final ight, slated for January 1966.25 
When Chamberlin proposed this scheme to Gilruth's senior staff at 
the start of September 1961, he was the first in STG to offer a con- 
crete plan for manned lunar landing that depended on the technique 
of rendezvous in lunar orbit.26 STG so far had seen little merit in any 
form of rendezvous for lunar missions, but it reserved its greatest dis- 
dain for the lunar orbit version. The Langley partisans of lunar orbit 
rendezvous had first put their scheme before STG on 10 December 
1960, when they rehearsed what they planned to say to Associate 
Administrator Robert Seamans and his staff a week later.27 On 10 Jan- 
uary, John Houbolt and some of his colleagues met with three STG 
engineers and tried to convince them that lunar orbit rendezvous be- 
longed in the Apollo program. The response was reserved, the scheme 
dismissed as too optimistic.*28 
*Houbolt, Clinton Brown, Manuel J. Queijo, and Ralph W. Stone, Jr., described the lunar 
orbit rendezvous idea to Kurt Strass, Owen E. Maynard, and Robert L. O'Neal. O'Neal's report to 
Associate Director Charles Donlan was distinctly skeptical of Langley's claims on-weight saving. 
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Three months later, Houbolt was back for another briefing, this 
time supported by a printed circular on "Manned Lunar Landing via 
Rendezvous." It included one project called MORAD (for Manned 
Orbital Rendezvous And Docking), a modest two-flight effort to be 
corn leted by mid-1963, intended as a quick roof of the feasibility of 
C r  P ren ezvous. A small unmanned payload wou d propel itself to a link- 
up with a Mercury capsule, its maneuvers unaer the control of the 
Mercury pilot. Tlie key project, however, was MALLIR (Malmed Lu- 
nar Landing Involving Rendezvous). Chamberlin, who attended this 
briefing, had known about Langley's rendezvous work, but had not 
before heard about the lunar orbit version. He asked Houbolt for a 
copy of the circular and for anything else he had on rendezvous.29 
Others in STG had yet to be convinced. Gilruth saw rendezvous as 
a distant prospect, not something for the near future. Mercury was 
proving so troublesome that rendezvous, however simple in theory, 
seemed very far away. He strongly insisted on the need for large 
boosters: 
Rendezvous schemes are and have been of interest to the Space 
Task Group and are being studied. However, the rendezvous ap- 
proach itself will, to some extent, degrade mission reliability and 
flight safety. I am concerned that rendezvous schemes may be used 
as a crutch to achieve early planned dates for launch vehicle availa- 
bility, and to avoid the difficulty of developing a reliable NOVA 
class launch vehicle.30 
This viewpoint was widespread in NASA, leading some to resist ren- 
dezvous, not because they believed it a poor idea but because it 
threatened to subvert another goal seen to be more important. 
The efforts of Houbolt and his Langley colleagues to sell rendez- 
vous in general, and lunar orbit rendezvous in particular, may have 
been frustrated less because their concept was faulty than because, as 
Chamberlin has suggested, "they were considered to be pure theorists 
with no practical experience." The major trouble with the lunar orbit 
rendezvous scheme may well have been that it simply looked too good 
to be true. Paper-and-pencil calculations did yield striking figures, but 
what looked good in theory might not stand up so well in practice. 
Chamberlin and his co-workers, although fully alive to the weight-sav- 
ing features of rendezvous, stressed another aspect-it made a lunar 
spacecraft easier to design. Direct ascent posed a particularly thorny 
design problem because the spacecraft had both to land on the Moon 
and to reenter Earth's atmosphere. A rendezvous mission, however, 
allowed one design for a lunar lander, a second for a reentry cap- 
sule-a distinct spacecraft to meet the special demands of each of these 
Shown here are three competitive modes for landing a man on the Moon. 
The direct mode, which would fly directly from Earth to the Moon, was early 
favored by NASA Headquarters and the Space Task Group. Earth orbit ren- 
dezvous was first favored by the Marshall Space Flight Center, wherein two 
vehicles would rendezvous in Earth orbit and then fly to the Moon. Langley 
Research Center first championed the lunar orbit rendezvous mode in which 
the spacecraft would go into lunar orbit and a small ferry vehicle would take 
the crew to the lunar surface and then back to the mother ship in lunar orbit 
for the return to Earth. 
two most critical phases of the lunar flight. Chamberlin's group had, in 
fact, centered its work on a lunar-lander design, since reentry prob- 
lems were already well in hand. Stressed as an answer to design con- 
straints rather than a weight-saving expedient and sponsored by men 
with plenty of practical experience in Mercury, lunar orbit rendezvous 
in Chamberlin's plan for a Mark I1 lunar landing mission received its 
first serious hearing from STG.31 
Toward the end of September 196 1, Chamberlin's plan showed up 
as part of an "Integrated Apollo Program'' STG presented to Silver- 
stein and his staff at NASA Headquarters. What "integrated" meant 
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was adding a Mark I1 orbital rendezvous project to the Apollo - 
gram. Much of the presentation was drawn from the Mark I1 pre P"  mi- 
nary plan, but part of it was based on Chamberlin's lunar landing 
scheme of 30 August. Some of the figures were new: the lunar landing 
system, complete with propulsion unit and fuel, weighed little more 
than 1800 kilograms, roughly half what the first version had. The cost 
now included the Saturn boosters for a total of $706.4 million, but the 
flight development plan had not changed.32 
Silverstein proved to be no more excited by a Mark I1 lunar mis- 
sion in September than he had been by an improved Mercury lunar 
mission in March. But he was willing to go along with the idea of a 
rendezvous development project. On 6 October, Silverstein asked for, 
and got, Associate Administrator Seamans' formal approval for the 
"preparation of a preliminary development plan for the proposed or- 
bital flight development program." Seamans now granted STC sanc- 
tion to begin talks with McDonnell on buying the Mark I1 spacecraft, 
with the Department of Defense on Titan I1 boosters and launch-stand 
alterations, and with the NASA Office of Launch Vehicle Programs on 
the Atlas-Agena.33 
The Mark I1 project itself, however, had yet to be approved, even 
though Seamans remarked that "our present plans call for a Mercury 
Mark I1 for test of orbital operations during 1963 and 1964."34 Still 
lacking was an approved project development plan. Such a plan, in 
fact, had yet to be submitted, although copies of Chamberlin's prelimi- 
nary plan had been making the rounds of NASA Headquarters in 
search of comments. With his Mark I1 lunar landing scheme rejected, 
Chamberlin now set out to revise the Mark I1 plan and put it in shape 
for Seamans to sign. 
Chamberlin finished the revised project development plan on 27 
October 1961.35 The bulk of it followed the August versions word for 
word, although some new material appeared, some old ideas vanished, 
and some accents changed. Most striking was the greatly increased 
stress on the development of rendezvous techniques. Long duration 
retained first place on the list of objectives, but rendezvous had moved 
into second, with controlled land landing third, and astronaut training 
(still incidental) fourth. 
Cone were the radiation study and the animal flights; no trace 
remained of a lunar mission, nor even of a deep-space sortie. The focus 
became developing the techni ue, rather than applying it. More of the 
text dwelt on rendezvous, wit 1 several new paragraphs to describe in 
detail the special equipment needed for rendezvous navigation, ma- 
neuvering, and docking systems. A closing statement of expected "Proj- 
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ect Results," new in the October plan, clearly showed that rendezvous 
now had priority. The August plan ". . .for an Advanced Manned 
Space Program Utilizin the Mark I1 Two Man Spacecraft" became, in 
October, a "Project . . . 7 or Rendezvous Develo ment." 
The new fight plan also reflected the shi ! t in focus. Although the 
total number of flights in the pro ram only expanded from 10 to 12, 
the rendezvous flights doubled-from four to eight. The first Right 
had become strictly a qualification test of the unmanned spacecraft and 
booster, the spacecraft to be launched into a 160-kilometer circular 
orbit. An 18-orbit manned qualification was still second, followed as 
before by two extended manned missions, though these might now last 
up to 14 days. All other flights were designed to develop and test ren- 
dezvous techniques. 
Logically enough, the October plan proposed a starting date of 
1 November 1961, Instead of 1 September. Two months still se arated P each Right from the next, the first now scheduled for May 1 63, the 
last for March 1965. Program costs, however, climbed higher than only 
two more flights might suggest. The new figure was $529.45 million, 
more than one and a half times the August estimate. Two factors ac- 
counted for the seeming discrepancy. One was the new provision for 
spare spacecraft and boosters: 12 spacecraft rather than 8 (the first 
plan had called for 2 spacecraft to be re-used in later missions; the re- 
vised version planned for 3 spacecraft to be refurbished, but only as 
spares); 15 Titan 11s instead of 10, the extra 3 to serve as backups; 
and 11 Atlas-Agenas instead of 4, 8 to fly and 3 spares. The combined 
effect of these changes added $140.45 million to the program's costs. 
Most of the remainder of the increase came from a new $29-million 
item, "Sup orting Development," for paraglider.36 
STC ! orwarded the revised project develo ment plan to NASA 
Headquarters on 30 October 1961.37 Its approv d; expected as a matter 
of course, Chamberlin got busy setting up the program. Since Mc- 
Donne11 was obviously going to get the rime contract for the Mark I1 I' spacecraft, the company ought to be to d to organize itself for the ef- 
fort, to assign key people to the new program, and to make sure that 
the staff would be available.38 Chamberlin proposed to amend the let- 
ter contract between NASA and McDonnell that had authorized the 
contractor to procure long-lead-time items for Mark 11-39 
Chamberlin wanted the McDonnell effort tailored to making a 
general-purpose spacecraft. This meant that Mark I1 should not only 
be able to perform its assigned long-duration and rendezvous missions, 
but also that it ought to be easy to adapt for other missions. Two other 
design objectives were only slightly less important, both springing from 
the notion of Mark I1 as a truly operational spacecraft (in contrast to 
the chiefly experimental Mercury): it should be simple to test realisti- 
cally on the ground, leaving actual flights free to focus on major goals 
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that could only be achieved in space; and it should be easy to check 
out, so a faulty spacecraft was less likely to cause a mission failure. To 
achieve these goals, Chamberlin thought McDonnell had three central 
tasks to tackle at once: for systems inherited mainly unchanged from 
Mercury, utmost refinement; for new systems, engineering analysis; 
and for special problems, like the integration of a paraglider system, 
special study groups.40 
Chamberlin himself formed a Mark II rendezvous group, whose 
five members were, by mid-October, already talking to people in Lang- 
ley's Aerospace Mechanics Division about some theoretical aspects of 
rendezvous.*41 They had also approached (and been approached by) 
prospective contractors about what equi ment might be needed, which 
allowed them to rough out a set of gui f elines for rendezvous develop- 
ment by 10 November 1961.42 The group then began a series of tech- 
nical coordination meetings with McDonnell spokesmen in St. Louis, 
14- 15 November. 
McDonnell engineers themselves had been looking at rendezvous 
for several months, and the meetings showed that company and NASA 
thinking had diverged sharply. McDonnell had assumed that the target 
would not be maneuverable and that control of the spacecraft during 
maneuvers could be either automatic or manual (or some mixture), the 
choice hinging on how much fuel the spacecraft could carry. The 
company, in other words, thought the spacecraft it was going to build 
should be the active agent in rendezvous. In contrast, Chamberlin's 
group from Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC; Space Task Group had 
changed its name on 1 November 1961) had approached the rendez- 
vous system as a whole, spacecraft and target, and assumed a highly 
maneuverable target, with pilot control of the spacecraft and ground 
control of the Agena. 
McDonnell's approach, which favored a combination of automatic 
and semi-automatic control, required a spacecraft target-tracking ra- 
dar, and a digital computer and inertial platform for guidance, as well 
as a high-ca acity propulsion system. MSG's preference for semi-man- 
ual control ! or the spacecraft-automatically stabilized but steered by 
the pilot--combined with target control under ground command 
stressed changes in the Agena rather than spacecraft equipment: a re- 
startable engine, a data communication system to link the Agena to 
ground controllers, an optical tracking aid of some kind, a radar tran- 
sponder, and an attitude stabilization system. 
McDonnell and MSG decided to combine their approaches, fitting 
the spacecraft with the equipment the company believed necessary and 
*The Mark I1 rendezvous group comprised Jerome B. Hammack, Orton L. Duggan, James 
T. Rose, Jean L. Petersen, and Harry Shoaf. Among those the group talked to were Thomas J. 
Voglewede, Arthur Vogeley, Max Kurbjun, and Edgar C. Lineberry., 
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altering the Agena to conform to what MSC wanted. This "would al- 
low the most flexibility in the choice of rendezvous techniques without 
equipment change."43 
By mid-November 1961, McDonnell had completed most of the 
documents that spelled out the company's view of what should be in 
the expected contract with NASA to build the two-man spacecraft. The 
most important was a detail specification of the Mark I1 spacecraft, 
issued 15 November.% The McDonnell design was deliberately con- 
servative, notably in retaining both the launch escape tower and the 
impact bag used in Mercury. 
McDonnell engineers who drew up the specification could not yet 
be sure that safety permitted striking the escape tower from the de- 
sign. Still under study was what might happen if a Titan I1 exploded 
on the launch pad while the crew was aboard the spacecraft. Whether 
ejection seats could in fact propel the two men away from an explod- 
ing booster fast enough to outdistance the expanding fireball remained 
in doubt. Speed and range of the ejection seat were both critical. As a 
hedge, the Mark I1 design included the escape tower. 
The presence of a Mercury-type impact bag in the s ecification 
was another cautious note. The Mercury capsule had an in P atable bag 
that served to cushion the impact of landing. Although the paraglider 
promised greatly reduced landing stresses, the designers felt that work 
on the concept was not far enough advanced to allow them to rely on 
it entirely. No one really believed that either the tower or landing bag 
was going to be necessary but, faced with drawing up a specification 
for Mark 11, McDonnell engineers chose to put on paper something 
they knew would work.45 
Planning for the second phase of the paraglider program, a two- 
part system research and development effort, had already begun. In 
Phase 11, Part A, the contractor was to spend eight months in further 
study of the design concept, chiefly to settle on what configuration 
would yield the best performance. The second part of Phase II called 
for the as-yet-unnamed contractor to build a prototype paraglider 
landing system, to conduct a series of unmanned and manned flight 
tests, and to complete a final design. The third and final phase of the 
program would see a paraglider system in production and pilots being 
trained to fly it.46 On 20 November, North American received official 
word that it had been awarded the contract and was authorized to be- 
gin work.47 
The same team that had monitored the paraglider design study 
for STG* now joined spokesmen for North American, Langley, and 
Flight Research Center to discuss putting Phase-I1 A into motion. 
They soon agreed that the half-scale models and full-size vehicle for 
*Rodney Rose, Harry Shoaf, and Lester Stewart. 
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this phase should be based on the Mark 11 design. "Power require- 
ments, control actuation, landin ear, etc., should be compatible with 
the MK 11 spacecraft, where MI! f l  is sufficiently firmed up for this to 
be practical without delaying the full-scale test program." Most wind 
tunnel testing would be done by Langley, while Flight Research Cen- 
ter, at Edwards Air Force Base, California, was to take charge of flight 
testing, all under the aegis of MSC. Even at this early date, the inter- 
face-that useful term for the region where two or more things share 
a common boundary-between paraglider and spacecraft was begin- 
ning to pose questions: how the glider and its gear were to be stowed; 
how it was to be deployed, sequenced, and jettisoned; what kind of 
cockpit controls and displays it would need; and how it would fit with 
the emergency escape system.48 
When Gilruth and Chamberlin visited NASA Headquarters in late 
November 1961 to see Associate Administrator Seamans and report on 
the Mark 11 program, they had a good deal to talk about. Spacecraft 
design was just about settled, paraglider development was beginning, 
and some basic approaches to developing rendezvous techniques had 
been decided. Although Gilruth's and Chamberlin's meeting with Sea- 
mans did nothing to dampen their belief that project approval was 
only a matter of time, that time was not yet. Seamans was not quite 
ready to take the final step. November had been a busy month in 
NASA Headquarters, and the turmoil had touched the Mark 11 proj- 
ect. 
One source of delay was the still unsettled question of the place of 
rendezvous in NASA planning. The key factor was the size of boosters. 
The persistent appeal of orbital rendezvous for many NASA and De- 
fense Department planners was its promise (and, in 1961, only its 
promise) of making do with lesser boosters. Even they were a long way 
from ready; the most powerful in operation in the United States at 
that time, the Atlas-Agena, could only put about 1800 kilograms in 
Earth orbit. The smallest payload required for a lunar landing mission, 
even with rendezvous techniques, was thought to be ten times that 
figure. This was a matter of concern to both NASA and the Depart- 
ment of Defense, leading them to form a joint Large Launch Vehicle 
Planning Group in July 1961 under Nicholas E. Golovin for NASA 
and Lawrence L. Kavanau for the Defense Department.*49 
*Serving under Golovin and Kavanau were Eldon Hall, Harvey Hall, Milton W. Rosen, Kun 
R. Stehling, and William A. Wolman (NASA Headquarters); Warren H. Amster and Edward J. 
Barlow (Aerospace); Aleck C. Bond (STG); Seymour C. Himmel (Lewis); Wilson Schramm and 
Francis L. Williams (Marshall); Colonel Mathew R. Collins (Army); Rear Admiral Levering Smith 
and Captain Lewis J. Stecher, Jr. (Navy); and Colonel Otto J. Glaser, Lieutenant Colonel David L. 
Carter, and Heinrich J. Weigand (Air Force). 
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Golovin, technical assistant to Seamans, spelled out what he be- 
lieved to be the group's central goal. "The primary basis for organizing 
information and preparing recommendations for a National Large 
Launch Vehicle Program will be the assumption that this program will 
provide vehicle systems for the attainment of a manned lunar landing 
and return during the fourth quarter of calendar year 1967 or be- 
fore."so The group worked from July through October, its efforts 
yielding a massive preliminary report in November.51 
The team, often referred to as the "Golovin Committee," essayed 
a detailed, quantitative comparison of direct ascent with several forms 
of rendezvous-based missions, and each of the rendezvous missions 
with the others. A subcommittee under Harvey Hall, Chief of Ad- 
vanced Development in NASA's Office of Launch Vehicle Programs, 
took charge of this phase of the study and asked each of three field 
centers to prepare a brief for one form of rendezvous mission. 
Marshall was to work on Earth orbit, Langley on lunar orbit, and the 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory UPL) on lunar surface rendezvous. The 
lunar surface rendezvous scheme grew out of JPL's experience in the 
unmanned lunar exploration program. It proposed to automatically 
assemble unmanned modules on the Moon; this assembly would then 
serve as the return vehicle for a crew carried to the Moon via direct 
ascent from Earth. Hall's own office furnished data for direct as- 
cent.*52 
By mid-September, preliminary analysis strongly supported some 
type of rendezvous over direct ascent as the best basis for a lunar mis- 
sion, though no single rendezvous scheme had a clear edge over the 
others. The smaller boosters that could be used in such a mission 
would be ready sooner, which meant more flight tests and greater reli- 
ability for less money.53 When Hall reported to the full committee on 
10 October, after the field center studies were in,54 lunar surface ren- 
dezvous was out of the running and direct ascent nearly so. The choice 
was narrowing to rendezvous in Earth or lunar orbit, with Hall's 
subgroup tending to favor some combination of the tw0.55 
This view had the full, even vigorous, support of the committee as 
a whole.56 In its report, the Large Launch Vehicle Planning Group, 
after a detailed analysis of the rival schemes, found that orbital rendez- 
vous promised the best chance for an early lunar landing, the lunar 
orbit version perhaps the quickest.57 Either form of rendezvous in or- 
bit, or some hybrid of the two, would beat a direct ascent mission to 
the Moon, because the smaller boosters they needed could be ready 
sooner.58 
Despite its elaborate quantitative analysis, the Golovin Committee 
*John Houbolt was technical supervisor of Langley's effort; Peter deFries, of Marshall's; and 
John W. Small, Jr., of JPL's. 
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did not have the last word in the controversy over direct ascent versus 
rendezvous for an early manned lunar landing. Too many questions 
remained open, too many answers were equivocal, pleasing neither 
NASA nor Defense, and the committee had failed to produce the inte- 
grated national launch vehicle pro ram it had been created for.59 So 
boosters remained the first order o f business. 
Early in November, Milton W. Rosen, author of NASA's first 
launch vehicle program in 1959 and Director of Launch Vehicles and 
Propulsion in NASA's new Office of Manned Space Flight, set up a 
working group to decide on a large booster program geared to 
manned space flight.*so Drawing on the findings of the other commit- 
tees that had been chewing on the problem since May, Rosen's 12-man 
group was able to submit its recommendations by 20 November.61 
The intense two-week study centered on the technical and opera- 
tional problems posed by rendezvous. The group decided that rendez- 
vous looked good but preferred direct ascent for the lunar mission 
because rendezvous was still an unknown. That was something the 
group insisted had to be corrected. Rendezvous had too much prom- 
ise, both generally for a broad range of future missions and specifically 
for an early lunar landing, to permit the techniques to go on being 
ignored. Prudence dictated planning based on direct ascent, but "vig- 
orous high priority rendezvous development effort must be under- 
taken immediately."62 
November 1961 also saw the structure of NASA revamped.63 
Almost eight months had gone into a reorganization of the agency to 
handle a program the size of Apollo. Shortly after he took over the 
reins as NASA's second administrator, James E. Webb, at a retreat in 
Luray, Virginia, on 8-10 March 1961, met with his key people from 
Headquarters and the field centers. Webb stated that the three top 
leaders of NASA would act as a team in running the agency. He and 
Dryden would serve as co-equals and Seamans would function as the 
"operating vice-president," presiding over the daily affairs of NASA. 
Essentially, Webb said, Dryden would be concerned with "what to do" 
and Seamans with "how to do it." 
After the retreat, the problems of getting Apollo defined, ap- 
proved, and pieces of its hardware under contract, and to acquire land 
suitable for the erection of development, test, and operational facilities, 
gave rise to a surfeit of committees to study and recommend action on 
one phase of the program or another. By September, however, Webb 
*Rosen's group began with Richard Canright, Eldon Hall, Elliott Mitchell, Norman Rafel, 
Melvyn Savage, Adelbert 0. Tischler, and John Disher, of NASA Headquarters; and William A. 
Mrazek, Hans H. Maus, and James B. Bramlet, of Marshall, who were soon joined by David M. 
Hammock of MSC. 
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knew that NASA could no longer afford to wait on committees to con- 
vene and make recommendations. He needed decision makers at the 
program office levels. Moreover, the field centers seemed to be com- 
peting among themselves too much. So Webb, Dryden, and Seamans 
searched the country for someone who could come into NASA Head- 
quarters and take charge of Apollo and the new Office of Manned 
Space Flight, an offshoot of the Office of Space Programs now to be a 
program office in its own right. Radio Corporation of America, which 
had earlier sent Robert Seamans to become NASA's Associate Admin- 
strator, now furnished the Director of Manned Space Flight in the 
person of D. Brainerd Holmes.64 
The old program offices vanished. The four new offices-Space 
Sciences, Advanced Research and Technology, Manned Space Flight, 
and Applications-were not the semi-autonomous bureaus their prede- 
cessors had been nor did they retain control of the field centers. They 
became less operating line offices, more advising staff offices. The field 
centers, including the new Manned Spacecraft Center, now reported to 
the Associate Administrator rather than to Headquarters program 
officers. 
These changes furthered the cause of rendezvous but delayed the 
Mark I1 project. Seamans, a longame supporter of rendezvous, won a 
stronger hand in NASA programming and a useful ally in Holmes. 
Silverstein, most owerful of the former program directors and fore- P most advocate o direct ascent, left Washington. His old office was 
gone, and, unwilling to accept the leadership of the new Office of 
Manned Space Flight, he instead assumed directorship of Lewis Re- 
search Center. 
STG had reported to Silverstein's office. He himself favored the 
Mark I1 project, but he also knew that he was going to be leaving 
Washington after the reorganization. He was understandably reluctant 
to commit his successor to a large new program. Holmes, who arrived 
at NASA Headquarters in October, had little to do with the Mark I1 
decision, anyway. The new order left that squarely in Seamans' hands. 
Although the reorganization caused some delay, a larger obstacle 
loomed from another quarter. NASA still depended upon the Air 
Force for its boosters. In November 1961, smooth progress toward 
using a modified Titan I1 in the Mark I1 project hit an abrupt snag. 
John H. Rubel, Assistant Secretary of Defense and Deputy Director of 
Defense Research and Engineering, informed Seamans that the Air 
Force was now developing a 
TITAN I11 Standard Launch Vehicle System. This vehicle is intend- 
ed to serve as the single standardized TITAN vehicle to be used in 
support of both NASA and DOD programs as appropriate. We ex- 
pect the design to meet any or all need which NASA may have for 
space application of the TITAN ICBM. 
Artist's concept of a Titan III  boosting a Dyna-Soar spacecraft into Earth- 
orbital flight. 
Rube1 asked Seamans to see that all NASA studies of Titan be routed 
through the Air Force Systems Command, which had just begun a de- 
sign analysis as the first phase of the Titan 111 program.65 
Titan I11 differed from Titan I1 chiefly in adding two very large 
solid propellant rocket motors. These motors, 3 meters across, were to 
be strapped to a core, a much strengthened Titan 11, to become in 
effect the booster's first stage. Their firing would carry the booster 
aloft, where they would be dro ped and the liquid propellant engines 
of what had been the Titan I1 i!' rst stage would ignite. The much more 
powerful Titan I11 was to replace Titan 11 as the booster in the Air 
Force's Dyna-Soar program. Its use in NASA's Mark I1 project might 
further justify its development.66 
That the Air Force planned to develop Titan 111 as a standardized 
vehicle to meet both its own and NASA's needs for launching payloads 
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of up to 14 000 kilograms into low-Earth orbit came as no surprise to 
NASA. Seamans and Rube1 had discussed the project, and the Golovin 
Committee had endorsed it and recommended launching Mark I1 with 
the Titan I11 core. NASA's response, at first favorable, had since 
cooled. By November 1961, NASA officials evinced little desire to 
adopt Titan I11 for any program, least of all Mark 11.67 This may have 
been the real source of friction. NASA had expected to use a modified 
Titan I1 in the Mark I1 project, but Rubel's letter implied that the Ti- 
tan I11 core was what NASA would get, like it or not. Not only was the 
reinforced core likely to be too heavy, but the central logic of the Mark 
I1 project demanded that it be done quickly because any delay raised 
the prospect of conflict with A 0110. Titan I11 development meant a 
major new program, which cou d hardly be completed in time to meet 
the tight Mark 11 schedule.68 
P 
The Department of Defense countered by claiming that the modi- 
fications NASA wanted in Titan II-lengthened tanks and redundant 
systems-also implied a new development program. This version of 
Titan I1 was now unofficially labeled Titan II-$4. Efforts to resolve this 
impasse led to a top-level meeting of NASA and Defense officials on 
16 November. They decided to recall the Large Launch Vehicle Plan- 
ning Group expressly to study the place of Titan I11 in the long-term 
national launch vehicle program and to decide whether the Mark I1 
project really needed Titan II-s.69 The order went out two days later, 
and the planning group reconvened on 20 November.70 
When the Golovin Committee had finished its brief but intense 
study, Seamans and Rube1 agreed that the Department of Defense 
should go ahead with Titan 111. Titan 1 1 4  they deemed unnecessary. 
The Mark I1 project could be adequately served by "TITAN I1 mis- 
siles, virtually unmodified"; the only changes to be permitted were 
those that mechanically adapted the booster to the spacecraft and oth- 
ers "specifically aimed at and limited to the marriage of payload and 
launch vehicle." Major changes in structure or tankage, or "the addi- 
tion of new or the extensive modification of existing subsystems inter- 
nal to the missile," were specifically excluded.71 
Although NASA failed to get the lengthened tanks and redundant 
systems it wanted in Titan 11, ~t did get Titan 11. Until the day Rube1 
and Seamans made these recommendations, even that issue was in 
doubt. But, with the decision of 5 December, the last obstacle to the 
approval of Mark I1 vanished. And, as events were soon to show, 
NASA was not going to have to make do with "TITAN I1 missiles, vir- 
tually unmodified." 
Seamans' approval of Mark I1 took the form of a note at the 
foot of a three-page memorandum from Holmes' Office of Manned 
Space Flight on 6 December, which offered a concise statement of 
Chamberlm's project development plan. The statement identified the 
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development of rendezvous techniques as "the primary objective of the 
Mark I1 project," with long-duration flights, controlled land landing, 
and astronaut training as "important secondary objectives." It went 
beyond Chamberlin's plan to point out that rendezvous would permit 
manned lunar landing to be achieved more quickly and that rendez- 
vous took on special importance when it became part of the lunar 
landing maneuver itself, an oblique reference to the lunar orbit ren- 
dezvous scheme. 
Holmes asked for $75.8 million from current fiscal year 1962 
funds to start the project at once and promised a formal project devel- 
opment plan in short order. Seamans wrote "Approved" and signed it 
on 7 December 1961.72 The promised plan appeared the next day. 
Only the date on the cover and title page distinguished it from the 
plan of 27 October, copies of which now bore a large red "PRELIMI- 
NARY" stamp.73 On 3 January 1962, NASA unveiled the first pictures 
of the new spacecraft and announced that it had been christened Gem- 
ini.74 
JUSTIFICATION FOR GEMINI 
When Chamberlin and his co-workers in STG and McDonnell 
began to devise a program to fit the new spacecraft they had already 
designed, the choice of goals open to them was wide. How well and 
how long man could survive and function beyond the reach of the 
gravity in which the species had evolved and beyond the shield of air 
which had sheltered it from the harsh extremes of space had long 
been matters of concern. Project Mercury could not-and before May 
1961 had not even started to-resolve these questions, and answers 
were essential before men ventured into deep space. The spacecraft's 
return to Earth was another concern. Landing that could be controlled 
and directed by the crew to an area more nearly on the order of an 
airport than the ocean-sized zones required by Mercury was clearly 
something to be worked for. Neither of these goals, however, was itself 
enough to justify a program for Mark 11. Any post-Mercury program 
would support longer flights, and controlled landing was more conven- 
ience than absolute necessity. Rendezvous, however, presented quite a 
different picture. 
The exciting potential of orbital rendezvous in future manned 
space flight had largely ceased to be a matter for dispute in NASA af- 
ter the middle of 1961. Some planners still hesitated to endorse ren- 
dezvous techniques as the basis for a lunar landing mission in Apollo, 
but none denied its long-term importance. Theory and experiment 
alike suggested that guiding two spacecraft to a meeting in orbit ought 
to present no special problems, but until the technique could be dem- 
onstrated doubts remained. Should rendezvous prove to be as trouble 
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free in practice as it seemed to be in theory, then it might be worked 
into planning for the trip to the Moon and allow that journey to be 
mounted sooner and more cheaply. In late summer 1961, this prospect 
inspired Chamberlin to propose a program for Mark I1 that would 
beat Apollo to the Moon. 
Charnberlin first proposed using rendezvous in Earth orbit to al- 
low Mark I1 to circumnavigate the Moon and followed that up with an 
even more daring scheme based on rendezvous in lunar orbit to land 
men on the Moon. This succession reflected the trend of thinking in 
NASA as a whole. The last half of 1961 saw the technique of lunar 
orbit rendezvous gain growing support as a means to achieve early 
manned lunar landing. But Chamberlin was moving far more quickly 
than his colleagues. Perhaps the greatest defect in his plans was that 
they assumed the rendezvous technique itself to need no special work, 
that a few flights would suffice to prove the technique before going on 
to apply it to larger ends. This was an assumption not widely shared, 
and both plans were rejected for Mark 11, although Chamberlin may 
well have blazed the trail for rendezvous in Apollo. 
This still left the develo ment and demonstration of rendezvous F maneuvers as a proper goal or the Mark I1 project, and that became 
the basis for Chamberlin's revised plan. This fitted NASA's clearly 
growing inclination to see a place for rendezvous in its lunar mission. 
Pressure for a rendezvous development program of some kind was 
becoming intense. Thinking about lunar orbit rendezvous for Project 
Apollo could only make the matter seem more urgent. There might be 
some room for error in Earth orbit, where a failure need not mean the 
loss of the crew. But that margin did not exist in lunar orbit; sound 
and fully proved techniques would be crucial. 
By late 1961, a rendezvous development rogram may well have P become inevitable, and Mark I1 was not the on y candidate in the field. 
Phase A of Project Apollo itself and Marshall's orbital operations de- 
velopment program were likely rivals. The Mark I1 project, however, 
had a clear edge: a spacecraft already designed and very nearly ready 
to go into production and a set of sharply defined and suitably limited 
objectives. When NASA decided late in 1961 that it needed a rendez- 
vous development program, Mark I1 was there. 
Organizing Project Gemini 
W HEN Mark I1 was approved on 7 December 1961, much of the groundwork had already been laid. Aside from the paraglider, 
however, whose development was not directly tied to the Mark I1 pro- 
ject, none of the pieces was yet under contract. The Manned Space- 
craft Center itself was not going to build spacecraft, booster, target, or 
paraglider. In line with the practice pioneered by the Air Force after 
World War 11, NASA relied on private firms to develop and produce 
most of its hardware. The first priority, even before getting the project 
office fully in order, was putting the spacecraft under contract and 
making arrangements with the Air Force for booster and target vehi- 
cle s . 
Because so much of the preliminary design work had been done, 
MSC had a letter contract for the spacecraft prepared by 15 Decem- 
ber.1 Since it called for a "Two-Man Spacecraft" to be developed from 
"the present Mercury Spacecraft, retaining the general aerodynamic 
shape and basic system concepts," there was no question of seeking 
competitive bids. The choice clearly fell to the McDonnell Aircraft 
Corporation, which had not only developed and was building Mercury 
but had also been an active partner in drawing up the new design. 
The company's president, James S. McDonnell, Jr., signed the contract 
on 22 December3 
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The contract did spell out some major changes demanded by the 
broad goal of ending up with "a versatile general purpose spacecraft 
for the accom lishment of space missions of increasing com lexity." 
There were, o ! course, more specific goals: 14 days in Earth or Fl it, con- 
trolled land landing, rendezvous and docking in orbit, and simplified 
countdown procedures. All this meant that the new spacecraft had to 
be larger to carry two men; include ejection seats; have an adapter sec- 
tion that stayed with the spacecraft in orbit to house stores and special 
equipment; carry systems that would allow it to be maneuvered and 
docked in orbit and to be controlled in flight and landing; and have its 
equipment packaged in modules, each independent of the others and 
located outside the cabin so they would be easy to reach while the 
spacecraft was being tested and readied for launch.3 
Despite these changes, the two-man spacecraft was still viewed as 
an improved Mercury. The contract required McDonnell to outfit the 
new spacecraft chiefly with equipment that had already been devel- 
oped so that in most instances expected changes were small. This 
mitted a much compressed schedule. McDonnell was to provide per- ull
scale mockups of spacecraft and adapter within six months and of the 
target vehicle docking adapter (TDA) within ten. The TDA, though 
McDonnell-built, was to be mounted on the target; it carried the gear 
needed to connect spacecraft and target in orbit. McDonnell had 15 
months to produce the first spacecraft, with others due every 60 days 
until 12 had been delivered. Because docking came later in the pro- 
gram, the contractor had 23 months for the first TDA.4 
The new contract between NASA and McDonnell replaced the 
earlier contract that had authorized the company to procure long-lead- 
time items for extra Mercury capsules. Since it was a temporary device 
to cover expenses during the time it took to negotiate a final contract, 
the letter contract had a ceiling of $25 million. The final contract was 
expected by 20 April 1962.5 
Although NASA could deal directly with McDonnell for spacecraft 
development, launch vehicles were another matter. Titan I1 and Atlas- 
Agena belonged to the Air Force, and the Air Force was clearly going 
to have to serve the new project in some role. Just what that role was 
to be, in fact, may have been the first question tackled after formal 
approval. On 7 December 1961, the same day that NASA Associate 
Administrator Robert Seamans approved the project, he and 
Rubel, Assistant Secretary of Defense and Deputy Director of De Yhn ense 
Research and Engineering, issued a joint statement on "the division of 
effort between the NASA and the DOD in the development of space 
rendezvous and capabilities." 
Seamans and Rube1 agreed that the program belonged to NASA 
but that using the Air Force, in essence, as a NASA contractor could 
help the civilian agency achieve its goals and permit the Air Force (and 
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other Defense elements) "to acquire useful design, development and 
operational experience." The Air Force, acting as contractor, would 
see that NASA got its Titan I1 launch vehicles and Atlas-Agena target 
vehicles. (As in the case of the spacecraft, the nature of the project 
precluded any choice of vehicles to be used.) The Department of De- 
fense also intended to provide launch and recovery support for Mark 
I1 missions (the project had not yet been named Gemini) and to help 
NASA in choosing and training astronauts. Making "detailed arrange- 
ments . . . directly between the NASA Office of Manned Space Flight 
and the Air Force and other DOD organizations" was the next step.6 
This task was turned over to an ad hoc group that met for the 
first time on 13 December. Paul Purser, special assistant to MSG Direc- 
tor Robert Gilruth, headed the MSC contingent, and Colonel Keith G. 
Lindell led the Air Force team.* Group cooperation was so marked 
that a first draft of the plan was ready two days later.7 It was passed 
around in both NASA and the Air Force, and two weeks were enough 
to put it in final form as the "NASA-DOD Operational and Manage- 
ment Plan" of 29 December 1961.8 
The plan assigned launch vehicle development-Titan I1 and At- 
las-Agena-to the Los Angeles-based Space Systems Division (SSD) of 
the Air Force Systems Command. The set-up was simple for Titan 11: 
SSD would simply act as MSC contractor. Like NASA, SSD itself devel- 
oped and built nothing. Its role was to manage the "associate industrial 
contractors" who actually provided the vehicles, with help from the 
non-profit Aerospace Corporation of El Segundo, California, in gener- 
al systems engineering and technical direction.9 
Arrangements for Atlas-Agena added another organizational lay- 
er, however, because NASA was already using the vehicle in its un- 
manned space flight programs and there was a working Agena Project 
Office at Marshall Space Flight Center. NASA's newly created Manage- 
ment Council for Manned Space Flight7 simply decided to let the Mar- 
shall office take care of Atlas-Agena for the manned program as well. 
*Representing NASA were Dave W. Lang, Sigurd A. Sjoberg, Charles F. Bingman, Warren 
North, and Colonel Daniel D. McKee; Air Force members were Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. 
Hull, Majors Edward H. Peterson, William E. Haynes, James E. Fasolas, and Earl W. Anderson, 
and civilians Herbert L. Repetti and John F. Bankert, Jr. 
tD. Brainerd Holmes, Director of NASA's Office of Manned Space Flight, had established 
the council and called its first meeting on 21 December 1961. It met once a month to coordinate 
manned space flight activities and to help overcome the obstacles to communications inherent in 
the fact that neither Marshall nor MSC reported directly to Holmes' office. Holmes served as 
chairman. Its membership comprised the two top officials of Marshall (Wernher von Braun and 
Eberhard F. M. Rees) and MSC (Gilruth and Walter Williams) and Holmes' five principal subordi- 
nates: Charles Roadman (Director, Aerospace Medicine), Joseph F. Shea (Deputy Director, Sys- 
tems Engineering), George Low (Director, Spacecraft and Flight Missions), Milton Rosen (Direc- 
tor, Launch Vehicles and Propulsion), and William E. Lilly (Director, Program Review and Re- 
sources Management). 
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MSC, in other words, had to order the vehicles from Marshall, which, 
in turn, procured them from SSD.10 
MSC set the guidelines for launch vehicle development and had 
the last word in any technical dispute, but the day-to-day direction of 
the work belonged to SSD. MSC was to be allowed only limited contact 
with SSD's contractors, watching but not touching. If MSC saw some- 
thing that needed .to be done, it told SSD, which would pass the word 
on to the contractor.* 
The "Operational and Management Plan" assigned two other ma- 
jor functions to the Department of Defense, with SSD actin as agent. 
One required SSD to oversee the modification of launch f acilities at 
Cape Canaveral, Florida, to meet the needs of the new program. The 
other involved SSD in the support of program operations-launching, 
tracking, recovery-along the same lines already worked out for the 
Mercury program.11 
On 26 January 1962, the plan was endorsed as a working arrange- 
ment between NASA's Office of Manned Space Flight and the Air 
Force Systems Command by the heads of the two agencies, Brainerd 
Holmes and General Bernard A. Schriever.12 At the next step up the 
ladder, Seamans and Rube1 were not so sure that everything had been 
taken care of. They had questions about the lan's provisions for De- 
fense operational support and its failure to de R ne in detail a pilot safe- 
ty program, the astronaut selection and training process, and project 
scheduling and funding. These matters seemed less pressing, however, 
than getting on with the development of Titan I1 and Atlas-Agena. 
Seamans and Rube1 decided to let the plan stand as an interim meas- 
ure, until a better defined version could be worked out.13 That took 
another six months and largely confirmed the arrangements already in 
force. 14 
Contracting for launch vehicles was in motion even while NASA 
and Air Force spokesmen were framing the Gemini Operational and 
Management Plan. NASA Headquarters juggled its fiscal year 1962 
research and development funds to come up with $27 million, which it 
allotted to MSC for Titan I1 on 26 December 1961. As soon as notice 
came that funds were on hand, MSC wired SSD that work on the Ti- 
tan I1 could start. SSD told the Martin Company's Baltimore Division 
to go ahead on 27 December.15 
In the meantime, the MSC group that was to take charge of Gemi- 
ni was writing a formal statement of work for Titan 11. Ready on 3 
*Scott H. Simpkinson, James A. Chamberlin's technical assistant, spent about a month as liai- 
son at the Martin-Baltimore plant before turning these duties over to Harle L. Vogel, who served 
until the end of the Gemini program. A. B. Triche was the liaison with Lockheed at Sunnyvale 
throughout the program. 
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January 1962, it went to SSD with a formal request to buy 15 launch 
vehicles for Gemini. Although it could hardly have been a surprise, 
Titan I1 now appeared to require many more changes than had been 
allowed in the NASA-Air Force agreement only a month earlier. The 
terms of the memorandum that Seamans and Rube1 had signed on 5 
December 1961 explicitly limited changes to the fewest needed to 
adapt the missile to its spacecraft payload. But that was not going to be 
enough. To fit Titan 11 for Gemini would require new or modified sys- 
tems to ensure the safety of the crew during countdown and launch. 
This included specifically a system to detect existing or impending 
malfunctions and signal them to the crew. MSC also expected changes 
in Titan I1 to enhance the probability of a successful mission, though 
what these were to be was not s elled out. The Air Force had Martin- 
Baltimore under letter contract I! y 19 January 1962.16 
Putting Atlas-Agena under contract took longer, despite just as 
quick a start. The first steps had been taken before the Mark I1 pro- 
ject was approved. After its mid-November meetin with McDonnell,l7 k the MSC rendezvous group had been able to de ne what would be 
required of Agena in greater detail and to check back with Lockheed 
Missiles & Space Company, its builder, about how these needs might 
be met. The MSC group outlined its views on Agena requirements in a 
note on 19 December 196118 and requested that Lockheed be asked 
to assess Agena's role in a rendezvous mission. Lockheed responded 
on 26 January 1962 with a report on Agena systems related to rendez- 
vous-propulsion, communications and control, and guidance-and 
some informed guesses about further development that might be 
needed.19 
By the end of January, MSC had evolved a fairly clear idea of the 
rendezvous techni ues it planned for Gemini20 and had prepared a P statement of work or Atlas-Agena. This was forwarded to Marshall on 
31 January, along with a request to buy 11 Atlas-Agenas. Atlas as 
launch vehicle for Agena was no problem, since it was already being 
used for just that purpose in other programs. But Agena needed a 
good many changes to adapt it to its rendezvous role-radar and other 
tracking aids, a restartable engine, better stabilization, more elaborate 
controls, and a docking unit were only the more important. 
Fortunately, time was not so pressing for Atlas-Agena as for the space- 
craft and Titan I1 since it was not scheduled until later in the pro- 
gram. MSC wanted the first target vehicle delivered in 20 months, or 
about September 1963.21 MSC did not pay its first installment to Mar- 
shall for buying Atlas-Agena until early March 1962, and another two 
weeks elapsed before SSD told Lockheed to go ahead with Gemini- 
Agena development.22 
By March 1962, all major Gemini systems-spacecraft, booster, 
target, and paraglider-were under contract. This reflected the care 
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and forethou ht that had gone into the project plan. It also mirrored 
the absence o f any compe~tion for major Gemini contracts. The proj- 
ect had been designed around an improved Mercury spacecraft, 
which made the company that built Mercury the only reasonable 
choice to receive the contract for Gemini. Of boosters powerful 
enough to lift the new s acecraft, only Titan could be ready in time P for Gemini schedules. At as-Agena was the only likely target. And par- 
aglider, the only major system to undergo the competition and elimi- 
nation process and not really tied (on paper) into Gemini, had been 
under contract before the Mark I1 project was approved. 
RUNNING THE NEW PROJECT 
Informal working arrangements and ad hoc groups had carried 
the Mark 11 project through its formative stages and handled the first 
steps in putting it under contract. But something more settled would 
be needed to oversee the future career of Gemini. By the end of De- 
cember 1961, a Gemini Project Office was taking shape, though with- 
out official status as yet.23 Its first report," issued on 5 January 1962, 
was little more than an educated guess at potential problems in meet- 
ing Gemini launch schedules. Original launch dates were revised, with 
the first flight optimistically set for late July or early August 1963 (in- 
stead of May). One notable, but unremarked, change spaced the first, 
second, and third launches only six weeks apart-mid-September for 
the second, late October or early November for the third-while the 
remaining flights remained at two-month intervals. Since hard data for 
real analysis did not yet exist, the report did little more than point up 
the need for placing subcontracts promptly.24 
Setting up the project office was only part of the complicated task 
of reorganizing the Manned Spacecraft Center and moving it from 
Virginia to Texas. On 15 January 1962, Director Gilruth announced 
the formation of separate Mercury, Apollo Spacecraft, and Gemini 
Project Offices.25 The old Engineering Division was abolished, its staff 
divided between the new Gemini and Mercury offices. Chamberlin, 
former head of Engineering and prime mover of the Mark II project, 
took over as Manager of Project Gemini. Kenneth S. Kleinknecht, Gil- 
ruth's technical assistant, became head of the Mercury Project Office 
(then in the throes of trying to launch John Glenn into orbit aboard 
Mercury-Atlas 6, an event that took place on 20 February).% 
Chamberlin's deputies separated-William Bland remained with the 
ongoing Mercury program and Andre' Meyer moved into Gemini with 
*Compiled principally by Nicholas Jevas and William C. Muhly, scheduling specialists who 
had worked on the project development plan. 
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Chamberlin. Meyer recalled that he and Kleinknecht "split the Engi- 
neering Division in half. Just about as evenly as we could split it, put 
half the talent in one group and half the talent in the other group . . . 
just the two of us sitting across a desk and arguing-'No, I don't want 
this man.' 'We want this man.' " 
Gemini came out of these sessions with a roster of 44, Mercury 
with one of 42." The 18-person staff of MSC's liaison office at the 
McDonnell plant in St. Louis, headed by Wilbur H. Gray, was assigned 
to Gemini but served both projects. Meyer took over as chief of pro- 
ject administration in the new office with a staff of 10. The other 
members of the project office were temporarily grouped in spacecraft 
management, launch vehicles integration, and flight operations sup- 
port.27 
The first members of what was to become the Gemini Project 
Office (GPO) arrived in Houston during December 1961 ; the transfer 
was largely complete by February 1962. Gemini was among the first 
MSC elements to be resettled in Houston, once it was fully divorced 
from Mercury. Meyer's chief task during this period was to recruit, 
interview, and hire people to fill out the project office, specifically seek- 
ing experts with at least ten years' experience in each of the essential 
disciplines required to manage work on both spacecraft and launch 
vehicles. This was the central function of the project office: to plan, 
direct, and coordinate all aspects of the Gemini program and, more 
specifically, to see that Gemini contractors produced systems that al- 
lowed the program to meet its objectives. GPO enjoyed a degree of 
autonomy that permitted Chamberlin to deal directly with McDonnell 
and Air Force Space Systems Division. He reported only to MSC 
Director Gilruth, and that was chiefly a matter of keeping Gilruth in- 
formed on the status of the project.28 
One of Chamberlin's first concerns was choosing his key staff 
members. He had Meyer, but for his other two chief lieutenants he 
turned to the Astronautics Division of General Dynamics Corporation, 
in San Diego. When interviews with Duncan R. Collins and Willis B. 
Mitchell, Jr., convinced Chamberlin that these were the men he need- 
ed, he got NASA Headquarters to approve his choice, a necessary step 
because both Mitchell and Collins were appointed at salaries above civ- 
il-service levels-so-called excepted positions. Collins became spacecraft 
systems manager and Mitchell launch vehicle systems manager. 
Mitchell also took over most of the personnel and functions of "flight 
operations support" when that branch of the project office quietly dis- 
appeared.29 
*The division was actually 43 and 43; Walter J. Kapryan, in charge of engineering at Cape 
Canaveral, was transferred to Gemini on paper but was assigned full-time to Mercury until fur- 
ther notice. 
O N  T H E  S H O U L D E R S  O F  T I T A N S  
When GPO officially settled in Houston in March 1962, the 
Manned Spacecraft Center was an organization without a home. Plans 
were under way for building a physical plant for the new center at the 
Clear Lake site south of Houston, but during most of its first two years 
MSC was housed in rented buildings (eventually a total of 13) scattered 
over much of the city and at Ellington Air Force Base, about halfway 
between Houston and Clear Lake. GPO, minus its manager, was in- 
stalled in offices at the Houston Petroleum Center, a sprawling set of 
one-story buildings just off the Gulf Freeway. Chamberlin's desk was 
some distance away on the other side of the Freeway in the 
Farnsworth & Chambers building, which served as MSG's interim 
headquarters.30 Such mundane matters as getting from one office to 
another, phoning a colleague, or even finding a desk complicated life 
but scarcely slowed the pace of the program. 
Coordination meetings between GPO and its prime contractors 
were already beginning.31 These meetings were Gemini's central man- 
agement device. Chamberlin and Meyer set up six coordination panels, 
three for the spacecraft-mechanical systems, electrical systems, and 
flight operations-and one each for paraglider, Atlas-Agena, and Titan 
11. The panels provided a setting where design and engineering prob- 
lems could be talked out and settled as they arose. The also he1 ed to 
short-circuit such complex chains of command as mig K t have s !I' owed, 
for example, the target vehicle program, in which GPO had to deal 
with Marshall, the Air Force, and Lockheed-spokesmen for each sat 
on the panel and were able to resolve problems with far greater dis- 
patch than might otherwise have been possible. Panel membership was 
not fured, but shifted with items on the agenda for each meeting. But 
the essential experts were permanent, and outside help could be called 
in as needed. 
Decisions reached at each panel meeting, usually once a week, 
were submitted to Chamberlin. They could be implemented only after 
he or Meyer had signed the minutes. This had the double advantage 
of lettin those most familiar with the specific problems work out the 
technic2 details and, at the same time, keeping the project manager 
fully informed about what was going on. These coordination meetings 
remained the heart of the day-to-day decision-making process 
throughout Gemini's developmental phase. The number of panels 
roblems mounted and new areas needed closer attention. 
as ! Later in t e program, panels concerned mainly with development pro- 
grams tended to give way to panels oriented more toward operations. 
At the same time, panels met less often, since there were fewer techni- 
cal problems to reconcile as development faded into production and 
operation.32 
GPO's function was to manage Project Gemini, not to build space- 
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craft or boosters. That was the task of the contractors who, early in 
1962, were gearing up for their part. 
Gemini management at McDonnell comprised six functional divi- * 
sions corresponding, for the most part, to divisions within the compa- 
ny as a whole, each under a manager who reported to Walter Burke, 
company vice-president and general manager for spacecraft.*33 The 
key position was that of the Gemini Engineering Manager. Robert N. 
Lindley, like Chamberlin, had found himself without a job when the 
Arrow project was canceled and had also moved from Canada to the 
United States. Unlike Chamberlin, however, Lindley found a place in 
industry.34 As engineering manager for Gemini, his central responsi- 
bility was the design and development of the spacecraft. This included 
not only the work that McDonnell itself was to do but also the specifi- 
cation and technical management of the effort to be farmed out to 
subcontractors. Under Lindley were three project engineers: Raymond 
D. Hill, Jr., had charge of electrical and electronic design, Fred Sand- 
ers of mechanical design, and William Blatz of design integration and 
testing.35 
The first engineering task was to define the spacecraft as a whole 
and each major subsystem to conform to the job required by the terms 
of the NASA contract. Since the basic form and function of the vehicle 
had already been decided by the time the contract was awarded, the 
definition phase centered chiefly on refining details and was largely 
complete by the end of March 1962. The products of this effort were 
SCDs for each major spacecraft system. The SCD, or Specification 
Control Drawing, was not the simple document its name implied. 
Often running to several hundred pages, it set out precisely what 
McDonnell expected the final system to look like and to do. After each 
SCD was discussed and cleared with NASA, McDonnell sent it out to 
potential subcontractors for bids. With minor exceptions, McDonnell 
developed and built only the spacecraft structural shell and electrical 
system. All other major spacecraft systems were developed under sub- 
contract, with McDonnell acting as supervisor and integrator. 
Like so much else in Gemini, subcontracting plans were well along 
before the project received formal sanction. McDonnell had convened 
*Three of the six managers handled both Mercury and Gemini: William Dubusker for manu- 
facturing, William D. Eckert for program administration, and John F. Yardley for launch opera- 
tions. The other three worked only on Gemini: Robert F. Cortinovis for procurement, A.S. Tor- 
gerson for reliability and quality assurance, and Robert N. Lindley for engineering. A seventh 
manager reporting to Burke, Logan T. MacMillan, was assigned solely to Project Mercury. 
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a review board early in November 1961, at which rocurement and 
engineering specialists began going over the spacecra !' t to decide which 
parts to buy.36 Within a week after James McDonnell signed the con- 
tract with NASA, his company was able to present MSC with a list of 
the major items it planned to procure rather than make and to pro- 
pose a set of bidders for each item.37 
This was the prelude to a January 1962 meeting between Cham- 
berlin, Burke, and Gray to reach an understanding on a standard pro- 
cedure for securing NASA approval in the company's choice of sub- 
contractors.38 This could become a delicate matter, since a number of 
Gemini systems were to follow Mercury closely enough to suggest sole- 
source procurement-that is, asking only one company for a bid in- 
stead of seeking competitive proposals from several firms. 
McDonnell awarded its first subcontract on a sole-source basis. It 
was for the development of the spacecraft environmental control s s- 
tem, which supplied the oxygen, regulated the temperature, and J s -  
posed of wastes for the crew. In broad terms, it was to be little more 
than two Mercury systems hooked together, so McDonnell simply se- 
lected the company that had developed the Mercury system, Ai- 
Research Manufacturing Company of Los Angeles, California.39 NASA 
agreed, and McDonnell told AiResearch to go ahead on 19 February 
1962.40 
McDonnell's second subcontract set the pattern for those systems 
that had no real Mercury counterpart. The Gemini spacecraft was 
going to have to maneuver in orbit to achieve rendezvous, and this 
meant that it had to carry a propulsion system (called OAMS for Orbit 
Attitude and Maneuvering System). Besides letting a pilot steer the 
spacecraft, the OAMS also held the ship steady in orbit and, at the 
start of the mission, provided the power to push the s acecraft away 
from the spent second stage of the launch vehicle an to insert the 
craft into orbit--or, in case of trouble, to abort the mission. The com- 
plete OAMS had 16 small engines, which burned hypergolic propel- 
lants fed under pressure from one fuel (monomethylhydrazine) and 
one oxidizer (nitrogen tetroxide) tank. All engines were mounted in 
fixed positions and were run at fixed levels of thrust. Eight of the 
OAMS engines were rated at 11 1 newtons (25 pounds of thrust) and 
fired in pairs, allowing the pilot to pitch, roll, and yaw the spacecraft 
and so control its attitude. The other eight engines were rated at 444 
newtons (100 ounds of thrust); two were oriented to fire forward, two B backward, an two to each side. This was the maneuvering part of the 
system. In July 1962, the rated thrust of the two forward-firing en- 
gines was reduced to 378 newtons (85 pounds). 
A second spacecraft rocket system, the reentry control system, was 
functionally distinct from the OAMS but used the same lund of en- 
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gines, so the same contractor would develop them. The reentry control 
system comprised two rings of eight 11 1-newton (25-pound) thrusters 
located forward of the crew cabin. Either of the rings alone could 
handle the job, but the function was crucial enough-holding the 
spacecraft attitude steady during its reentry into the atmosphere-to 
justify complete duplication.41 
McDonnell decided that any of four companies might supply the 
OAMS and the reentry control system and asked each of them to 
submit a technical proposal. The prime contractor rated the bids and 
sent a survey team of en neering, quality control, and procurement 
personnel to grade each o Hi the prospective subcontractors on resources 
and capabilities. North American Aviation's Rocketdyne Division in 
Canoga Park, California, won the highest combined rating. Although 
Rocketdyne's quoted cost was highest, it included an extensive test 
program unusually early in development, a feature that particularly 
impressed NASA, which made the choice. McDonnell told Rocketdyne 
to commence work on 26 February 1962.42 
By the end of March, most of the major subcontractors had been 
instructed to proceed, and all had been selected by the end of May. 
The Air Force Space Systems Division, acting as NASA's contractor for 
Gemini launch vehicles, moved just as quickly. SSD set up a Gemini 
Launch Vehicle Directorate to manage booster development, naming 
Colonel Richard C. Dineen as director and Colonel Ralph C. Hoewin B as deputy.*43 General systems engineering and technical direction o 
development, with special stress on man-rating-making sure that Ti- 
tan I1 was a safe and reliable booster for manned launches-was con- 
tracted to the Aerospace Corporation, which filled much the same role 
in Mercury for the Atlas booster. Aerospace set up its own Gemini 
launch vehicle program office under James A. Marsh.44 
Gemini launch vehicle development was assigned to Martin's Balti- 
more plant, although the Titan I1 missile was developed and built in 
Denver. Baltimore got the nod chiefly to avoid any conflict between 
booster and missile work, although the decision did also help to sustain 
a facility that might otherwise have had to shut down.45 Bastian Hello 
took over as Gemini Program Manager, reporting directly to Albert 
Hall, Martin vice-president and general manager of one of the three 
Martin divisions located in Baltimore. 
Martin did not set up a Gemini project organization as such. 
Rather, each of the nine functional departments in Hall's division ap- 
*The directorate had four branches: programs, under Major Roland D. Foley; engineering, 
under Lieutenant Colonel Alfred J. Gardner; safety and test, under Lieutenant Colonel Emmett 
J. Kelly; and procurement, under Wiiam Fried. 
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pointed a Gemini manager, who took charge of the program work in 
his area but remained in the normal departmental chain of com- 
mand.* Hello also had the help of a rogram manager at Denver, where 
the booster's propellant tanks woul f be built since the tooling re uired 
was too costly to duplicate in Baltimore, and a Martin-Canaverd pro- 
gram manager responsible for launch facilities and operations.? 
Subcontracts played a much smaller part in the Martin than in the 
McDonnell scheme of things, largely because the booster differed 
much less from the missile than the Gemini spacecraft did from the 
Mercury capsule. For the most part, Martin could simply buy what it 
needed.46 
Those systems that did need to be develo ed--engines, airborne 
guidance, ground computers-were not handed f by Martin through 
subcontracts. Instead, they became the subjects of separate SSD direct 
contracts. The contract for propulsion systems went to Aerojet-General 
Corporation's Liquid Rocket Operations plant in Sacramento, Califor- 
nia, in March. Two other major contracts followed later, one with 
General Electric in Syracuse, New York, to furnish the booster radio 
guidance system (the missile used inertial guidance), the other with the 
Burroughs Corporation of Paoli, Pennsylvania, to supply ground com- 
puters and implement launch vehicle guidance equations.47 
The target vehicle for Gemini required even less in the way of 
special arrangements. Both Atlas and Agena were ongoing programs, 
already well established, and there seemed little need at the outset for 
anything more than fitting them to Gemini. The Agena Project Office 
at Marshall, headed by Friedrich Duerr, bought these vehicles for all 
NASA programs, and Gemini was simply another customer.t.f- For the 
target as for the booster, SSD acted as NASA's contractor. Atlas-Agena 
programs were managed by SSD7s SLV-3 Directorate, commanded by 
Colonel F. E. Brandeberry. The Directorate's Pro ram Integration Di- 
vision, under Major John G. Albert, took care of NASA Agena pro- 
grams.048 SSD authorized Lockheed to proceed with Gemini Agena 
development on 19 March 1962, and Lockheed assigned Herbert J. 
Ballard to manage the Gemini program.49 
At the time NASA was arranging to buy Agena for Gemini, the 
model in use was Agena B. Agena B was essentially hand tailored for 
*They were Edward D. Tarmey, Contracts; Lee J. Knight, Finance; George A. Biddle, Plan- 
ning; Eddie Ball, Sales and Requirements; Jeremie U. LaFrance, Engineering; Martin Barrett, 
Materiel and Procurement; Franas 0. Furman, Manufacturing; Haggai "Guy" Cohen, Quality; 
and Gordon T. Chambers, Logistic Support. 
?Howard J. Jansen was the Denver manager; 0. E. Tibbs had the Cape job. 
t?Duerr assigned George J. Detko as chief project engineer to monitor the target vehicle 
program in behalf of MSC. 
$Captain Norbert J. Walecka became project engineer for Gemini Agena. 
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each of its missions, but the Air Force had decided to develop a more 
advanced Agena D, needing only to have the proper equipment mod- 
ules installed to carry out any particular mission. On 10 May Brockway 
McMillan, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Devel- 
opment, invited NASA to join in this rogram. This appealed to the 
engineers, but the managers hesitated ! or much the same reasons that 
had obtained in the case of Titan 111. Agena D was a distinctly less 
ambitious effort than Titan 111 had been, however, and Duerr wired 
Albert on 11 June that Gemini would use Agena D.50 
The Atlas for Gemini was also to be a standardized vehicle, the 
SLV-3. This improved version of the Atlas included many mechanical 
and electrical changes designed to make it more reliable, less trouble- 
some. Its total engine thrust was upped by about 10 percent, mainly to 
offset the weight added by these changes.51 On 23 July Seamans noti- 
fied Rube1 that NASA would support the SLV-3 program and planned 
to use the standard booster in all NASA actitivies that required an At- 
las. For its projected role in Gemini, Atlas needed nothing that resem- 
bled development. The Air Force bought it from the Convair Division 
of General Dynamics Corporation right off the production line in its 
San Diego, California, plant.52 
The one real exception to Gemini's smooth progress through its 
first half year was paraglider. Its development was a step ahead of the 
rest of Gemini, North American having been authorized to begin work 
on 20 November 1961, and the headstart may have accounted for the 
earlier signs of trouble. 
Paraglider was controversial. Although GPO, and Charnberlin in 
particular, stoutly defended the concept, others in MSC had strong 
doubts. The Engineering and Development Directorate under Max 
Faget had been notably cool to the idea from the outset. The key ques- 
tion had been, and still was, "whether the deployment reliability of a 
single paraglider will equal that of a main and back-up chute sys- 
tem."53 The long-time efforts of Langley's Francis Rogallo, inventor of 
the paraglider, to sell his concept had been repeatedly countered by 
the argument that parachutes had proved they could be relied upon to 
recover spacecraft. Instead of wasting time on an untried concept, 
Faget's group favored efforts to improve parachute technology to 
permit land landing. They advocated using a new form of parachute 
that could be steered, with landing rockets to cushion the final impact 
as the spacecraft touched down.54 
Another source of opposition to paraglider was the Flight Opera- 
tions Division under Christopher C. Kraft, Jr. Questions of reliability 
here took second place to concern for the operational problems posed 
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by paraglider in the Gemini program. For Kraft's division, using par- 
aglider and using ejection seats were two sides of the same coin: one 
required the other, neither was reliable, and both promised immense 
practical obstacles to the safe return of the astronauts.55 Kraft himself 
urged on Chamberlin, and later on MSC Director Gilruth, his objec- 
tions to both systems.56 
paraglider critics found plenty of ammunition in North Ameri- 
can's slow progress toward a working system. At first, paraglider devel- 
opment aimed at a landing system for manned spacecraft in general. 
Early in 1962, however, GPO decided that the program ought to be 
oriented explicity to Gemini. North American faced a large new effort 
and a major delay, and not just because the Gemini spacecraft was 
much larger than the generalized model first planned for. The half- 
scale free-flight test vehicle would have to be redesigned to carry a 
flight control system, just as the full-scale model did. North American 
had to join with McDonnell to design a compatible landing gear system 
and check it out in a test program. And, finally, North American now 
had to develo and qualify emergency parachute systems for both 
half-scale and P ull-size test vehicles.57 
This last demand, in particular, delayed North American, and it 
was mid-March before a subcontract for the emergency parachute sys- 
tem could be placed.58 Norbert F. Witte, North American's project 
manager for paraglider, planned to begin free-flight tests of the half- 
scale model toward the end of May. With its wing inflated and de- 
ployed before it left the ground, the test vehicle needed no emergency 
parachute. It would be towed into the air b a helicopter and released 
to fly under radio control. This series o i! tests would allow North 
American engineers to see how well the paraglider flew, how precise 
flight control could be, and whether the vehicle could flare-raise its 
nose to increase wing lift and drag and slow its rate of descent-just 
before landing.59 
These were all questions that needed answers, but the most crucial 
was still whether or not the wing would deploy in flight. That had to 
wait for the emergency parachutes, since the test vehicles were too 
costly to risk without a backup system. Witte expected to have the half- 
scale emergency system tested by the start of June, when deployment 
tests could begin. The full-size emergency parachute would take longer 
but ought to be ready by mid-July. There still seemed to be a reasona- 
ble chance to complete this phase of the development program by Sep- 
tember 1962 .Go 
Timing was critical for paraglider development, since its place in 
the Gemini program depended upon its 
schedule. Des ite snags in the current phase 
berlin decide 8 that North American needed 
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phase, a 14-month effort to design, build, and test an advanced two- 
man paraglider trainer, to start a flight simulation program, and to 
design and develop a fully man-rated prototype Gemini paraglider 
landing system.61 That was in March 1962; by May the task was scaled 
down to require only the design of the prototype system, rather than 
its complete development. This was expected to reduce the time to five 
months from the date of the contract award.Cn 
The project office still expected the araglider to be ready on 
time, but warned in a 4 May schedule an af ysis that the program "will 
require close monitoring to prevent slippage." Paraglider was sched- 
uled to be installed in the second Gemini s acecraft, which would be 
the first to carry a crew. The first spacecra ! t, since it was unmanned, 
was slated to come down by parachute. A prudent response to delays 
already incurred dictated that plans be laid for using a parachute sys- 
tem in the second spacecraft as well. B mid-June, GPO conceded that 
the paraglider would not be ready unti r the third flight.63 
Despite some doubts about the paraglider, Project Gemini was 
moving smoothly in the s ring of 1962. GPO noted a certain tightness 
in launch vehicle schedu !' es that might constrict the time needed to 
resolve any unexpected problems but concluded that close monitoring 
would help to bring the modified Titan I1 out on time. Late delivery 
of some components from McDonnell subcontractors threatened 
schedules for building the first two spacecraft, but the threat seemed 
modest. The target vehicle and its booster, Atlas-Agena, appeared to 
present no problems, even after a slow start, since a target was not 
needed until the fifth mission.64 
Overall, August 1963 still seemed like a reasonable prospect for 
the first launch. But the ambitious timin of the second launch (the 
first manned flight in Gemini, earlier sche f uled just six weeks after the 
first),65 was now adjusted to allow a more realistic three months and 
set for November 1963. The rest of the program held to an every- 
other-month schedule, the 12th and final flight to be in July 1965.66 
From the viewpoint of the project office as it surveyed Gemini prog- 
ress and prospects in its first half-year, there were no serious prob- 
lems.67 
Project Gemini had won approval in late 1961 over several com- 
peting rendezvous development proposals because its design was fur- 
ther along than those of its competitors and because its scope seemed 
to be limited enough to fit the relatively compressed span of time be- 
tween the last flights in Mercury and the first mission in Apollo. That 
these reasons were valid appeared amply borne out by the rapid place- 
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ment of contracts during the first months of the project's official exist- 
ence. Within a matter of six months, most major contracts had been 
awarded and a firm organizational framework had been established. 
Even Congress appeared unperturbed that NASA had embarked 
on a large new project with scarcely any advance warning to those 
expected to furnish the money for it. In doing so, NASA had not ex- 
ceeded its authority. Although obliged to lay out its spending plans 
during budgetary hearings, NASA at that time received a single appro- 
priation for research and development and was largely free to dlstrib- 
Ute the money as it saw fit. The $75 million in fiscal year 1962 funds 
needed to get Gemini started were provided simply by shifting money 
from one account to another inside NASA.68 
In hearings early in 1962 on the upcoming fiscal year 1963 budg- 
et, NASA spokesmen felt no need to apologize for the new project. 
Quite the contrary: from Administrator James E. Webb on down, 
they described it in glowing terms, stressing its role in the development 
of rendezvous techniques and in extending the length of man's stay in 
space-but all within the context of a merely enlarged (or advanced) 
Mercury. This was, of course, a fair picture of the thinking that lay 
behind Project Gemini, and none of the listening congressmen chal- 
lenged it.69 
Chamberlin summed up the optimism that pervaded Gemini dur- 
ing its first half year in his monthly report on project office activities as 
of 28 May 1962. He saw no problems that might imply delays for the 
program, although "all elements of the schedule are extremely tight." 
There were no technical problems that contractors and project office 
could not handle. "As technical problems arise they are being assigned 
to capable organizations for solution with close project office monitor- 
ing to assure progress. No technical problems are particularly out- 
standing at this time."7o 
Despite its complexity, Project Gemini was meeting only success. 
The project office remained silent about any doubts it may have had 
that Gemini's objectives could be achieved on time. 
Expansion and Crisis 
S summer gave way to fall in 1962, the smooth progress that Pro- 
ject Gemini had enjoyed during its first half year roughened. A 
Concern mounted over the steady expansion and rising costs of the 
project as a whole. Hopes for using much of Mercury's technology in 
Gemini eroded. One system after another became the subject of full- 
scale development, rather than modification or simple transfer from 
Mercury. The scope of launch vehicle development likewise grew far 
beyond first expectations. Costs kept climbing until they collided with 
an unexpectedly restricted budget toward the year's end. 
These concerns were virtually unknown outside NASA. But the 
striking dual mission launched by the Soviet Union in August led some 
to wonder if the United States had any hope of flying the first rendez- 
vous mission. Vostok 111, piloted by Major A. G. Nikolayev, lifted off 
on 11 August, followed a day later by Lieutenant Colonel P.R. Popo- 
vich in Vostok IV. The two spacecraft came close enough to each other 
to spur some talk of rendezvous. With no means of maneuvering their 
spacecraft, however, the two cosmonauts could not match orbits or 
speeds. The Soviet Union had shown only that it could launch two 
spacecraft in quick succession, so there was still hope for the maneu- 
verable Gemini spacecraft to achieve the first rendezvous, if it survived 
its troubles. 1 
CHANGING PLANS AND RISING COSTS 
Preliminary cost estimates from Gemini contractors began reach- 
ing the Gemini Project Office in March 1962. These rough figures 
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pointed toward a large but not yet clearly defined increase in the pro- 
jected total cost of the program. Air Force Space Systems Division 
(SSD) discussed finances with the project office at the first launch vehi- 
cle coordination meeting on 1 March and furnished its first budget es- 
timate for the program at a meeting in Houston later that month. 
Boosters now appeared likely to cost Project Gemini a good deal more 
than had been supposed. The development plan of December 1961 
had assumed $113 million for modified Titan I1 launch vehicles. But 
the March 1962 figure was half again as much-something over $164 
million.:! 
The statement of work for Titan I1 that SSD had received early in 
January called for more than the limited modifications first proposed. 
It required a malfunction detection system and other unspecified 
changes to improve the missile. Making sure that Titan 11 could safely 
launch manned spacecraft-referred to as man-rating-was crucial, 
and it was going to cost money. A revised statement of work in mid- 
May 1962 spoke of "an adaptation of the Titan I1 ICBM," rather than 
"a development of the present Titan I1 ICBM," and spelled out the 
changes required in greater detail. They included not only a fully re- 
dundant malfunction detection system but also a backup flight control 
system; an electrical system with backup circuits for guidance, engine 
shutdown, and staging; inertial instead of radio guidance; and a new 
launch tracking system.3 
The target vehicle likewise soon seemed to demand more than 
had first been expected. Even though Agena work was moving at a 
slower pace, by May the $88 million programmed for Atlas-Agena 
development in the December 1961 plan had climbed above $106 mil- 
li0n.4 
The project development plan had the Gemini spacecraft costing 
$240.5 million. This figure, like those for launch and target vehicles, 
could not have been more than an educated guess, with a natural bias 
toward guessing on the low side to make the program more palatable. 
But McDonnell's first formal cost proposal for the Gemini spacecraft 
still came as something of a shock. The first step in negotiations be- 
tween the project office and McDonnell to convert the letter contract 
of December 1961 into a definitive contract was a series of technical 
meetings in Houston between 19 April and 24 May 1962, to make sure 
that both sides agreed on plans and specifications.5 McDonnell's "Gem- 
ini Spacecraft Cost and Delivery Proposal," prepared for these meet- 
ings, raised the spacecraft ante to $391.6 million.6 
This new and higher estimate was based in part on McDonnell's 
more careful study of the cost of what the contract called for, in part 
on its enlarged view of what the program ought to include. The letter 
contract, for example, had mentioned the need for flight simulators 
and trainers as well as test spacecraft but included no specifics. A new 
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feature of engineering development for Gemini was to be the use of a 
number of test articles-spacecraft built for early static and dynamic 
testing-for want of which Mercury had sometimes been delayed. GPO 
admitted that building them might slow spacecraft construction at first 
but believed that the data they provided would more than make up for 
the temporary setback.7McDonnell proposed four boilerplate spacecraft 
(metal models designed to be used chiefly in escape and recovery sys- 
tem testing) and four static articles (non-flying spacecraft to be used in 
structural tests). McDonnell also proposed to add to Gemini a test pro- 
gram that it had worked out in Mercury. Known as "Project Orbit," 
this entailed building an extra spacecraft and target docking adapter 
for an extended series of laboratory-simulated orbital missions "to in- 
vestigate potential problems and to evaluate engineering changes gen- 
erated during the life of the program."s 
A major part of crew training for Gemini depended on simulating 
in great detail every aspect of a mission, to expose the astronauts be- 
fore they left the ground to anything they might meet during a flight. 
The basic device was a flight trainer, a precise duplicate of the real 
spacecraft, in which crews could fly a complete simulated mission from 
launch through touchdown, seeing through its windows what they 
would see in flight, hearing the noises--even feeling the vibrations- 
they could expect. There were to be two flight trainers, one in Hous- 
ton and the other at Cape Canaveral, each hooked up to mission con- 
trol and remote displays to form a complete mission simulator. 
Three aspects of a mission were outside the scope of the flight 
trainers. One involved the forces imposed upon the astronauts by high 
acceleration during launch and by rapid deceleration during reentry. 
These stresses could be matched on a man-carrying centrifuge. The 
project office planned to use the one at the Naval Air Development 
Center in Johnsville, Pennsylvania, its gondola fitted out with a mock- 
up of the inside of the spacecraft. Maneuvering in orbit to rendezvous 
was the second aspect. This was to be simulated by a translation and 
docking trainer, in which the crews would practice techniques of ren- 
dezvous and docking.9 The third, extended weightlessness, was then 
beyond human ingenuity to imitate. 
Training equipment and test articles together, increased in detail 
and enlarged in scope, came to just under $39 million in McDonnell's 
cost proposal. McDonnell also needed money to cover its roles in mis- 
sion planning and launch operations support and for spare parts and 
checkout gear, to name only some of the more costly items. And all 
this aside from the expense of developing and building the spacecraft 
($242.7 million), which alone exceeded the December budget ($240.5 
million).lo Even at that, McDonnell's estimate was still little more than 
guesswork. Few of the company's subcontractors had yet provided any 
hard financial data. The chiefs of procurement and financial manage- 
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ment at MSC jointly deplored both the size of the McDonnell estimate 
and the lack of data on which it was based, a viewpoint that echoed 
Paul Purser's marginal note on SSD's interim financial plan for boost- 
ers in April 1962: "This is still up in the air. Attempts are being made 
to bring down these costs."ll 
On 12 May 1962, in a review of Project Gemini for NASA Admin- 
istrator James Webb, the Office of Manned Space Flight revealed for 
the first time the pattern of rising costs that was beginning to mark the 
program. Since the project development plan was issued, little more 
than five months earlier, Gemini's expected cost had climbed from 
$529.5 million to $744.3 million.12 Given the shaky data on which the 
new total depended, it could not be the last word. The program kept 
growing and technical problems began to appear, not all of them in 
areas where they had been expected. 
SOME FORESEEABLE PROBLEMS AND A SURPRISE 
As Project Gemini moved from design into testing during the 
spring and summer of 1962, problems multiplied, although not (with 
one exception) beyond what might be seen as the normal headaches of 
a large-scale research and development project. Those areas that de- 
manded the longest step beyond current practice were those where 
trouble threatened. The paraglider program, with its early start, began 
running into marked delays in planning and design before the rest of 
Project Gemini. When actual testing began in May 1962, only two con- 
tract months remained to settle on the best design for a paraglider 
landing system. 
The first task was qualifying an emergency parachute recovery sys- 
tem for the half-scale vehicle. North American began on 24 May wth 
a successful drop test at the Naval Parachute Facility in El Centro, Cal- 
ifornia, near the Mexican border. Two failures followed before a sec- 
ond success, on 20 June. What should have been the final drop to 
complete qualification failed on 26 June, when the vehicle's electrical 
system shortcircuited. North American shuttled the vehicle 260 kilome- 
ters back to its plant in Downey for a closer.look, which revealed a de- 
sign flaw. The company reworked the test vehicle and returned it to El 
Centro for another try, on 10 July, with no better luck. This time the 
drogue designed to pull out the main parachute failed to do so. After 
another round trip to Downey for changes, everything worked on 4 
September. GPO agreed with North American that the half-scale 
emergency landing system was now qualified. But two and a half 
months had been lost. 
The full-scale emergency system proved even harder to qualify. 
First came design problems, then the parachutes were late in arriving. 
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North American could not ship the test capsule to El Centro until 20 
July. The Air Force's 651 1 th Test Group, which ran the El Centro test 
range, demanded a special test to be certain the vehicle's pyrotechnic 
devices were safe-that delayed the first qualification flight until 2 
August. It was a success, but more delays followed-first bad weather, 
then the lack of a launch aircraft. The second drop, on 21 August, was 
marred by one of the three main parachutes breaking loose. Damage 
was only minor, as it was in the next test, on '7 September, when two 
parachutes failed. Efforts to correct this problem took over two 
months. On 15 November, some four months after the full-scale emer- 
gency recovery system was supposed to have been qualified, the fourth 
drop was a disaster. When all three parachutes failed, the test vehicle 
was destroyed as it hit the ground. Clearly the system could not be re- 
lied upon. GPO directed McDonnell to furnish North American with a 
boilerplate spacecraft for further tests at some later date.13 
These problems, however disheartening, should not have cast any 
shadow on the concept of a paraglider. The emergency parachute sys- 
tems were intended only to back up testing; they were not part of the 
Gemini landing system. Yet the pattern of delays, errors, and malfunc- 
tions that marked North American's efforts to qualify the emergency 
system proved to be symptomatic of a lingering malaise. Para lider 
advocates knew that the program would be made or broken, so f ar as 
Gemini was concerned, by the success or failure of flight testing, and 
time was limited. North American had been chosen over Ryan and 
Goodyear because of its first-rate job in testing the design during the 
summer of 1961.14 But on 28 November, scarcely a week after North 
American received word to go ahead with paraglider development, 
NASA notified the company that it had been selected as prime con- 
tractor for the Apollo spacecraft. The impact on paraglider was cata- 
strophic. North American froze the number of engineers assigned to 
paraglider, then allowed even that group to decline. The quality of 
work suffered as well, becoming, in the opinion of one NASA engineer 
assigned to the program, "abysmal."l5 
The pattern of trouble sketched in emergency system testing er- 
sisted when North American began testing the paraglider itsel r by 
flying half-scale models with wings inflated and deployed before they 
left the ground. Scheduled to begin in May 1962, these trials got un- 
der way in mid-August at Edwards Air Force Base, 100 kilometers 
north of Downey. North American's first try, on 14 August, got no- 
where. Because a plug pulled loose inside the capsule, the wing, which 
was tied down for takeoff, failed to release after a helicopter had 
towed it to the proper height. The wing released too soon in the sec- 
ond try, three days later, although the capsule did go briefly into a 
stable glide. North American also achieved a stable glide in the third 
flight, on 23 August, but an erroneous radio command caused the ve- 
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hicle to come down too fast and suffer some damage in landing. The 
fourth flight was postponed twice, each time because someone forgot 
to charge the battery. Towed aloft on 17 September, the vehicle failed 
to release on command, voiding the test. Twice in a row, short circuits 
forced the contractor to call off the fifth flight test, the second time on 
2 1 September. 16 
That same day, James Chamberlin, MSC Gemini Project Manager, 
ordered North American to halt flight tests of the half-scale paragli- 
der. He ex ressed "growing concern" over "the repeated unsuccessful P attempts o S&ID [North American's S ace and Information Systems 
Division] to conduct satisfactory pre 1 eployed half-scale paraglider 
tests." Flights were not to resume until the contractor had reor anized 
its paragl~der project and could spell out just what it intendef to do 
about the test vehicle's electronics and pyrotechnics and the company's 
own checkout and inspection procedures.17 
North American had already made some moves along the lines 
Chamberlin demanded. The paraglider effort was raised to the status 
of a major program, and George W. Jeffs was named Paraglider Pro- 
gram Manager on 1 September 1962. Norbert Witte, the former pro- 
ject manager, stayed on as Jeffs' assistant.18 Jeffs was something of a 
corporate troubleshooter, and he had the respect of the NASA engi- 
neers working on paraglider.19 This augured well for the future, but, 
in the meantime, a fully successful flight test had yet to be performed. 
North American reworked the half-scale vehicle in its lant, then 
shipped it back to Edwards Air Force Base on 15 October ? or another 
try. A bad ground transmitter stalled matters for a while but, on 23 
October, the fifth test flight was a complete success.2o Even with all its 
problems, the series of tests had met its main oal, showing that the 
paraglider was stable in free flight.21 But pre f eployed flight testing 
ended more than two months late, and the crucial deployment flight 
tests-spreading the paraglider wing in flight-had not even begun. 
In the meantime, other problems were beginning to compete for 
the attention of the overworked project office. Like the paraglider, 
ejection seats had been a controversial innovation in manned space- 
craft, and their development problems also gave critics an early open- 
ing. The reasons were much the same. Both systems were a long step 
beyond current practice, both presented test problems not clearly relat- 
ed to their final roles, and both were subject to changing requirements 
that imposed makeshift adjustments, further complicating matters. 
Although ejection seats were widely used in military aircraft, they 
were designed to give pilots a chance to survive, not to guarantee that 
survival. Manned spacecraft levied more stringent demands. Most criti- 
cal was the "off-the-pad abort mode." Before liftoff, the spacecraft 
perched some 45 meters from the ground atop a shell filled with po- 
tentially explosive chemicals, the Titan I1 launch vehicle. However rig- 
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orous the precautions, there was always the danger of some mischance 
setting it off. For a length of time that might stretch into hours before 
they were airborne, the crew would be aboard with no recourse, 
should that mishap occur, save their ejection seats. The Gemini seat 
had to be able to propel itself from a starting point 45 meters in the 
air in a trajectory stable enough to get clear of an exploding booster 
and high enough to allow parachutes to open. No existing seat could 
do that, and developing one that could was the crux of the Gemini 
eff ort.22 
McDonnell chose Rocket Power, Inc., of Mesa, Arizona, to supply 
the rocket catapult (or rocat) for the Gemini escape system.23 For the 
seat itself, McDonnell turned to Weber Aircraft, of Burbank, Califor- 
nia.24 As luck would have it, the Naval Ordnance Test Station at China 
Lake in the middle of California's Mojave Desert had earlier construct- 
ed a 45-meter tower for Sidewinder missile tests. This tower was ad- 
mirably suited for simulated off-the-pad ejection (or, acronymically, 
Sope) tests.25 Kenneth F. Hecht, who left the ordnance test station in 
January 1962 to take charge of Gemini escape and recovery systems, 
set up a special working group to oversee seat development and quali- 
fication." He was convinced, and in this he was seconded by those who 
knew most about ejection seats, that the key problem was finding ways 
to control the relationship between the rocat's line of thrust and the 
shifting center of gravity of the seat-man combination while the rocket 
was burning. Without this control,,a trajectory of the proper height 
and stability could not be achieved. This was one of the reasons why 
Hecht insisted the tests be conducted with a dummy in the seat, rather 
than with a solid mass. He also knew that haste was vital, since the seat 
design could not be settled until the answers were in.26 
The first Sope test came off on schedule 2 July 1962, followed by 
four more over the next month. All produced their share of problems 
and mechanical failures, each dealt with as uickly as possible to et on 
with the next test. None of these mechanic3 problems much bot 1 ered 
Hecht and his colleagues, because they had their eyes on the dynamic 
problem of rocket thrust and center of gravity. They were concerned 
with ejection at this point, not the complete escape sequence through 
recovery, and thought they were close to solving that key problem.27 
From this viewpoint, the first five tests were a success. But if the goal 
were seen as a complete system with all parts working as they should 
in the final version, the tests left much to be desired. The seat seemed 
to be turning into a maze of makeshift fixes, and the personnel recov- 
ery parachute system (the crewman's landing device) had failed twice. 
*Hecht's group included Edward A. Armstrong, Louis A. Bernardi, Frederick T. Burns, Paul 
R. Penrod, Hilary A. Ray, and Stanley White. 
For simulating aborts from the spacecraft on the launch pad, ejection seats 
were tested from the 45-meter tower (above) at the Naval Ordance Test Sta- 
tion, China Lake, California. Aborts in flight were simulated on the rocket- 
propelled test sled at China Lake. Below left, a dummy is hoisted into the 
Gemini spacecraft mockup mounted on the sled. Below right, three high- 
speed photos (reading up) show ejection, seat propulsion, and descent by 
parachute. 
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At an extended meeting in Houston on 6 and 7 August, the total sys- 
tem viewpoint prevailed. Sope testing was halted until a com lete de- 
sign of the whole system was ready and the personnel parac Ute had 
been fully tested.28 
R 
A month elapsed before McDonnell was able to report on 6 Sep- 
tember that seat design and testing were complete, clearing the way 
for a new round of Sope trials. Tests on 12 and 26 September went 
well but highlighted a set of problems with the rocket motor. Some 
were functional and some structural, but all affected, however slightly, 
the direction of thrust and so made accurate control impossible. Test- 
ing stopped again, pending the availability of the rocat in its final 
form.29 This delay was much prolonged, lasting well into 1963. 
. Other major Gemini systems seemed less troublesome. Through 
the summer and early fall of 1962, such problems as appeared could 
be, and were, regarded as nothing more than the routine hurdles in a 
large program. One possible exception was the fuel cell, which, like 
paraglider and ejection seats, was new to manned spacecraft and had 
aroused some debate, at least in its General Electric version. 
The basic source of electrical power in the spacecraft was to be 
batteries. The weight of ordinary batteries, however, became prohibi- 
tive as missions increased in length. Something more was needed, and 
the choice was fuel cells. That choice was resolved in January 1962. 
After analyzing the merits and defects of competing approaches, Rob- 
ert Cohen of MSC strongly recommended the General Electric fuel cell 
as lighter, simpler, and more generally suited to Gemini needs than 
other designs he had investigated.30 
In a fuel cell, hydrogen and oxygen react to produce water and 
heat. The unique feature of the General Electric design was its use of 
a solid ion-exchanging membrane in which electrolyte and water were 
chemically bound; most other cells diffused gases into a liquid electro- 
lyte. A separate stream of coolant condensed the water produced at 
the cell, then removed it through a series of wicks to keep the reaction 
going at a constant rate. This used little of the cell's own power, in 
contrast to the gas-diffusion cells that required a complex self-powered 
process of flushing with hydrogen, condensation, and centrifuging to 
remove the water produced. General Electric had devoted intense re- 
search to the design since 1959 and had already set up a fuel-cell facil- 
ity, the Direct Energy Conversion Operation in West Lynn, Massachu- 
setts.31 McDonnell shared Cohen's view and formally recommended 
General Electric for a subcontract, to which NASA agreed.32 
Nonetheless, in early 1962 the General Electric fuel cell was still 
no more than a laboratory device, however promising.33 NASA Head- 
quarters was looking into fuel cells for Apollo, which raised some ques- 
tions about Gemini's choice of General Electric. The Office of Manned 
Space Flight's survey of General Electric alleged that the company was 
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understaffed, slow in getting started, and unlikely to meet Gemini 
schedules-a11 this in addition to what seemed to be an untested and 
questionable design concept.34 Cohen responded to these charges for 
GPO. He saw no reason to doubt that General Electric would meet its 
commitments: the company was adding to its staff and improving its 
effort, which had only begun with an order from McDonnell two and a 
half weeks earlier. More important, the much tested General Electric 
design was at least as far along as any other and was inherently sim- 
pler to boot.35 That settled the issue. 
As development got under way, General Electric began to run into 
problems that seemed to suggest that theory had outpaced practice. 
The most serious in mid-1962 was how to achieve a satisfactory bond 
between cell membrane and frame. Solving these problems appeared 
more likely to tighten the schedules than to threaten the program as a 
whole. In any case, the worst appeared to be over by the end of Au- 
gust.36 
During the last half of 1962, the paraglider's troubles probably 
posed the greatest threat to an approved Gemini objective, that of land 
landing, although ejection seats and, to a lesser extent, fuel cells were 
also worrisome. The paraglider was a major new system that demand- 
ed a large-scale effort. Ejection seats and fuel cells, though not so nov- 
el, were still major innovations in manned space flight. In all three 
cases, the novelty of the application and the advance beyond current 
practice imposed a greater development effort than required for other 
Gemini systems. Given that fact, the problems should have come as no 
surprise. A quite unexpected source of trouble loomed in another 
quarter. The suitability of Titan I1 as a launch vehicle for manned 
space flight came into question. 
Responsibility for developing the Titan I1 missile belonged to the 
Ballistic Systems Division (BSD), like SSD a part of Air Force Systems 
Command. Titan I1 research and development test flights began on 16 
March 1962, with a launch from the Atlantic Missile Range in Florida. 
In its first flight, Titan I1 displayed a disquieting characteristic. A min- 
ute and a half after it lifted off, while the first-stage engine was still 
firing, the missile began to vibrate lengthwise like an accordian about 
11 times a second for roughly 30 seconds. This was not likely to bother 
a missile too much, but it implied real trouble for a launch vehicle with 
a manned payload. The steady acceleration of a booster like Titan I1 
pressed a crewman to his couch with about two and a half times the 
force of gravity at that point in a normal flight. Bouncing at an extra 
two and a half gravities (+ 2.5g) could badly hamper a pilot's efforts to 
respond to an emergency, a matter of special concern in Gemini since 
the crew played so large a role in flying the spacecraft9 
Titan 11's longitudinal oscillations quickly acquired the nickname 
"pogo stick," soon simply Pogo. Its cause remained unclear, how to get 
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rid of it a matter of guesswork. By July, Pogo was becoming a regular 
topic at MSG's weekly senior staff meetings, and BSD had formed a 
special Committee for Investigation of Missile Oscillations.* 38 The 
problem turned out to be surprisingly easy to solve for the missile: 
higher pressure in the first-stage fuel tank cut Pogo in half during the 
fourth test flight, on 25 July, although nobody was quite sure why.39 
There were some ideas, however. Martin engineers thought the 
culprit might be oscillating pressure in propellant feedlines, analogous 
to the chugging of water in pipes, or "water hammer." This suggested 
the use of something like the surge tanks familiar as devices to stabilize 
pressure in the flow lines of hydroelectric plants and pumping stations. 
Martin proposed to install a surge-suppression standpipe in the oxi- 
dizer line of a later Titan 11. MSC endorsed the plan, and BSD 
agreed. By the end of August, GPO was cautiously optimistic. The 
lowered Pogo level of +1.25g achieved in the fourth Titan I1 test 
flight was still too high for manned space flight, but the water hammer 
analogy at least suggested an answer.40 
GPO was also watching another problem. In two of its first four 
test flights, Titan 11's second-stage engine failed to reach full thrust. 
The causes appeared to be different in each case and unrelated to one 
another. Just how serious this might be-could not be foreseen. Much 
depended upon whether or not it recurred, and GPO adopted a wait- 
and-see stance.41 
Project Gemini's technical problems in the summer and fall of 
1962 might have aroused more concern if a far more serious threat 
had not intruded. The financial structure of the program began to tot- 
ter. Two circumstances combined to produce a major crisis. On one 
hand, Gemini contractors were spending money at a much faster rate 
than the project office had expected. On the other, Congress was slow 
to approve NASA's appropriation for fiscal year 1963, which restricted 
the funds available to Gemini. However serious development problems 
might be, or become, they could always be resolved if there were 
enough money. But now the question was how to spread limited funds 
over an ever more costly program. 
The pattern of program growth and cost increase revealed during 
the spring of 1962 presisted, and with the same shortage of dependa- 
ble information. To NASA's repeated pleas for more funding data, 
McDonnell regularly denied that any existed. In mid-July 1962, three 
*Chairman of the special committee was Abner Rasumoff of Space Technology Laboratories. 
Titan II missile N-15, launched 
from Cape Canaveral in Janu- 
ary 1963, was the second Titan 
to show a substantial reduction 
in longitudinal oscillations af- 
ter pressures were increased in 
the propellant tanks. 
months after its first budget proposal, the company could still not pro- 
vide a detailed forecast of program costs because "cost projections 
from suppliers and subcontractors are currently unavailable as pur- 
chase order values continue to change and negotiated costs have not 
been established."42 In August, when MSC and McDonnell began 
working out the final terms of the spacecraft contract, the contractor 
proposed a startling total of $498.8 million, double NASA's first esti- 
mate in December 1961 and more than $100 million higher than the 
company's own April 1962 proposal.43 Hard negotiation brought the 
new figure down to $464.1 million,44 but efforts to agree on a final 
price were suspended before the end of August because the whole 
Gemini program was in trouble. 
Othgr costs were also on the upswing during the summer and ear- 
ly fall of 1962, though not as spectacularly as those for the spacecraft. 
SSD's March 1962 figure of $164 million for the launch vehicles 
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topped $170 million by September.45 Less than a month later, SSD 
submitted to NASA a formal revised budget of $172.61 million.46 
Word reached MSC in July that the Atlas-Agena for Gemini now had 
a price tag of $12.3 million over its earlier total,47 and this despite the 
fact that NASA had deleted the three spares to cut the number of At- 
las-Agenas on order from 11 to 8.48 A s ecial briefing for NASA Ad- 
ministrator Webb on 28 September revea l'ed that Project Gemini might 
cost as much as $925 million before it was over, 25 percent higher 
than Webb had been told in May it was going to cost and 75 percent 
more than MSC's first estimate.49 
Such fast-rising costs would have been bad enough at any time. 
Now they presaged disaster, since Congress had not yet acted on 
NASA's appropriation for fiscal year 1963 (which began on 1 July 
1962). Without an approved money bill, NASA was compelled to carry 
on under a joint congressional resolution that provided enough money 
to support projects at roughly the same level they had enjoyed the 
year before but not enough to cover increases.50 Gemini's status was all 
the more threatened because it had not even appeared in the 1962 
budget. NASA had found enough money to get Gemini started, but 
that was a makeshift that could not su port an ongoing program. P The bill that authorized NASA's unds was signed into law on 14 
August, but the bill to appropriate that money was yet to come. 
Congressional action on NASA's 1963 appropriation was not complet- 
ed until 25 September. The figure was $3 774 115 000, $113 161 000 
less than NASA had asked for and $70 000 000 under the total author- 
ized in August.51 
This delay prevented the Office of Manned Space Flight in Wash- 
ington from giving MSC the normal authority to spend money on the 
basis of the full year's budget. Instead, that authority was being grant- 
ed on a month-to-month basis.52 Monthly funding brought anguished 
complaints from contractors, as expenses constantly threatened to out- 
strip the resources available to pay for them. By October, MSC was 
being bombarded with telegrams, each with urgent demands for full 
and quicker funding33 
Lack of an appropriation also prevented NASA from adopting a 
final financial operating plan (FOP) for fiscal year 1963. Each center 
prepared an annual FOP to be approved by NASA Headquarters for 
alloting funds at the start of the fiscal year.54 To meet the impending 
crisis, Associate Administrator Seamans imposed a ceiling of $1.5 1 bil- 
lion on NASA research and development expenditures for the coming 
year. By this time, however, estimated funding needs for this purpose 
had already exceeded the figure first presented to Congress and now 
stood at $1.9 1 billion. Manned space flight chief Brainerd Holmes 
warned Seamans that current schedules could only be met by a supple- 
mental appropriation from Congress. 
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In the meantime, Holmes directed MSC to prepare two separate 
fiscal-year 1963 FOPS: one staying within the Seamans-imposed ceil- 
ing, the other geared to actual needs. For Gemini, this meant a limit of 
$234.1 million against a needed $299 million. Holmes predicted a se- 
vere setback to program schedules if the smaller budget prevailed: a 
three-month delay in the first launch and in the first long-duration 
flight, an extra ten-month wait for the initial rendezvous mission, and 
no paraglider before the third flight.55 
Hopes for meeting the higher budget were dashed when President 
Kennedy rejected NASA's case for extra funding. Holmes notified 
MSC on 9 October that its funds for fiscal year 1963 would be limited 
to $660.1 million. He directed the center to prepare new schedules to 
r a e c t  this limit, voicing the somewhat forlorn hope that the unavoida- 
ble delay of several months mi ht be made good if "later develop- 
ments make it possible for the A ministrator to obtain a FY 63 supple- 
mental."56 
8 
The new ceiling was $27 million less than MSC had planned for 
under the earlier Seamans ceiling. The situation was now critical. 
Already tight at the level of $687 million, a budget of $660 million was 
nearly crippling. And Project Gemini bore the full brunt. Upon first 
hearing of the newly reduced budget, MSC planned to split the $27- 
million cut between Gemini and Apollo. Washington, however, or- 
dered Gemini to take all the losses. Wesley L. Hjornevik, MSC's Assist- 
ant Director for Administration, evaluating the situation for the senior 
staff on 19 October, saw no way out of this dilemma except to curtail 
Gemini sharply. "It appears," he glumly remarked, "that the conse- 
quent reduction to Gemini can only come by dropping paraglider, 
Agena, and all rendezvous equipment." 
Further complicating matters was the rate at which Gemini was 
piling up costs, a rate much higher than expected. Hjornevik pointed 
out that the program seemed to be costing $15 million a month, rather 
than the planned $1 1 million.57 A budget memorandum that reviewed 
Gemini funding during the first quarter of fiscal year 1963 described 
as "an area of growing concern and one which can no longer be left 
unattended" the speed at which costs for spacecraft, paraglider, launch 
vehicle, and target vehicle were growing. The FOP could not "support 
acceleration of cost rates so projected by these contractors. Unless ap- 
propriate direction is given to the contractors to restrict this buildup or 
a Gemini reprogramming action is effected immediately then funding 
difficulties will commence during the second quarter.''58 
The project office had already moved to reprogram Gemini, to 
alter the course of the program - and compel the contractors to con- 
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form to the newly limited budget. Reprogramming was much more 
drastic in some areas than in others. Paraglider escaped almost un- 
touched. McDonnell's spacecraft effort took some trimming but re- 
mained much what it had been. The launch and target vehicle pro- 
grams, the Air Force portion of Gemini, endured the most far-reach- 
ing changes. Plans for testing the Gemini launch vehicle were shar ly P cut back. Target vehicle testing was even'more drastically curtailed; or 
some months, in fact, whether Agena still had a Gemini role was an 
open question. 
Realignment of McDonnell's work began first. Spokesmen from 
McDonnell and its subcontractors met in Houston at MSG on 24-26 
August and again on 6-8 September. They agreed to limit the scope of 
development for some spacecraft systems and gound equipment.59 But 
MSC Director Gilruth told Walter Burke, McDonnell's spacecraft chief, 
not to do anything right away. When Gilruth talked to Burke on 8 
September, the financial situation was still fluid enough to warn against 
too-hasty action. By the end of the month, however, prospects for any 
quick easing of the money crisis were fading. Burke flew to Houston to 
see Gilruth and Chamberlin on 28 September. Gilruth told Burke to 
carry out the earlier agreement on the revised scope of the program. 
Burke set his staff to work that same day on the necessary paperwork, 
wiring the subcontractors formal notice of their altered responsibilities 
and drawing up the required purchase order changes.60 
Reprogramming at McDonnell in St. Louis was mainly a matter of 
making some adjustments. The company cut back its own and its sub- 
contractors' quality assurance and reliability programs, reduced the 
number of published reports, decreased the number of spare parts to 
be maintained, trimmed the amount of engineering data and support 
required of subcontractors, and limited its support at Cape Canaveral. 
The net result of these changes was to slice $26 million from the $464 
million that McDonnell thought its part of the project would cost, 
bringing the total down to $438.2 milhon.61 
The largest savings in spacecraft development were to come 
through lessened testing by subcontractors. Teams from GPO spent 
much of October on two-day trips to major spacecraft subcontractors.* 
At each plant, they reviewed in detail the effect of various forms of 
*The teams included Richard R. Carley, Robert Cohen, Duncan R. Collins, Paul L. Charvoz, 
William H. Douglas, John R. Hoffman, Clifford M. Jackson, Lemuel S. Menear, Jean Petersen, 
and Wiiam F. Smith. Companies visited were Minneapolis-Honeywell, St. Petersburg, Florida 
(inertial measuring unit); Minneapolis-Honeywell, Minneapolis (attitude control and maneuver 
electronics); Electro-Mechanical Research, Inc. (data transmission systems); IBM, Owego, New 
York (computer); Westinghouse, Baltimore, Maryland (rendezvous radar); Motorola, Scottsdale, 
Arizona (digital command system); Collins Radio Company, Cedar Rapids, Iowa (voice communi- 
cations); Advanced Technology Laboratories, Mountain View, California (horizon sensor); and 
General Electric, West Lynn, Massachusetts (fuel cells). 
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systems failures, plans for qualification and reliability testing, and test 
facilities required. In general, they agreed that reliability testing could 
be sharply curtailed at the expense of slightly increased qualification 
testing. Qualification tests ensured that something worked; they usually 
preceded reliability tests, which made sure that something worked con- 
sistently. Assured reliability could thus be gained from augmented 
qualification tests.62 Concerned by the way the program had grown, 
GPO also asked McDonnell for prompt notice of any future action that 
might affect contract costs or schedules.63 
Spacecraft reprogramming was largely complete by mid-October, 
but the project office saw some further trimmin possible in Mc- K Donnell's test program. After a review of its plans or structural tests 
of the spacecraft, the contractor concluded that one of the four pro- 
grammed static articles might be dispensed with, and GPO agreed.64 
The project office also suggested that Project Orbit mi ht be canceled, 
a view McDonnell opposed. The dispute was eventual f y resolved with 
Orbit restricted to testin the spacecraft's heat balance and renamed 
"spacecraft thermal quali k cation test."@ 
Another casualty of Gemini's financial straits was a lately revived 
lunar landing scheme. This time the impetus had come from NASA 
Headquarters in the person of Jose h F. Shea, newly appointed Depu- 
ty Director for Systems in the 0 8 ce of Manned S ace Flight. Shea P wanted McDonnell to study using a Gemini spacecra t as a lunar logis- 
tics and rescue vehicle, a possibility also under study during that sum- 
mer by the Space Technology Laboratories.66 The eight-week Mc- 
Donne11 effort explored the concept of a two-man command module, 
evaluated using a Gemini spacecraft to land two men on the lunar sur- 
face, and looked at the design changes needed for such a mission.67 
Meanwhile, GPO computed the cost of buying extra spacecraft.68 
McDonnell submitted its findings to NASA Headquarters in November 
1962.69 Whatever chance the scheme may have had, however, vanished 
in the wake of Gemini's money problems, and the idea once again 
came to nothing.70 
With the spacecraft taken care of by mid-October, the project 
office turned to launch vehicle rogramming. Limited funds compelled 
GPO to restrict 1963 costs to ! 59.28 million, some $10 million below 
its earlier plan and $18 million less than the $77.5 million SSD now 
claimed to need.71 Chamberlin wired Richard Dineen, SSDYs chief of 
Launch Vehicle Development, on 19 October to apprise him of the 
new funding limits. GPO believed that Gemini's major goals might still 
be met despite shortage of funds. The key was a sharp cutback in test- 
ing, especially where it involved repeated engine firing.72 To Dineen, 
these changes seemed drastic, and he asked Chamberlin for a fuller 
explanation.73 Chamberlin insisted that there was no hope of more 
than $59.28 million for 1963, which meant the planned test program 
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had to be reduced and, in part, canceled. He asked Dineen for an ear- 
ly meeting to decide how to put these changes into effect.74 SSD still 
objected.75 Chamberlin persisted, wiring Dineen on 16 November that 
a meeting to review the launch vehicle test program was urgent and 
"should take precedence over other SSD/Aerospace/Martin/Aerojet 
Gemini commitments."76 The meeting finally convened on 27 Novem- 
ber. 
The proposed changes were indeed drastic. The revised engine 
program called for only 34 test firings, less than a fifth of the number 
originally planned. This would yield all the data needed at a saving of 
several million dollars, if effort were focused on thorough develop- 
ment and qualification to make sure each part worked and would keep 
on working.77 Sound engineering, in other words, made reliability a 
natural product of develo ment and qualification. SSD and its contrac- I=' tors could scarcely quarre with this view, but they tended to see relia- 
bility in more statistical terms-a part was reliable if it failed no more 
than some very small percentage of the times it was tested. The issue 
was not merely philosophical. Proving reliability statistically meant 
more tests, more equipment, and more money. 
What was true for engines was also true for other arts of the 
launch vehicle. Martin's reliability program was budgeted f or $2.7 mil- 
lion, but the GPO approach, by concentrating dollars on qualification 
rather than on reliability testing, could cut that figure in half.78 
Further study convinced Chamberlin that most of the planned pre- 
launch firings of the complete launch vehicle could also be safely dis- 
carded, and they were.79 
NASA's budget crisis in the fall of 1962 never posed any real dan- 
ger to Project Gemini itself. Work on spacecraft and launch vehicle 
was simply adjusted to meet an unexpected funding squeeze. Whether 
the Gemini that emerged from reprogramming would be the same 
project that had been planned, however, was another question. Tight 
money threatened to deprive Gemini of its chief objective, the devel- 
o ment of orbital rendezvous techniques. For several months the role P o Atlas-Agena in the program was in jeopardy, as NASA Headquar- 
ters debated dropping it, cutting it back, or keeping it with whatever 
slippage restricted funding entailed. The choice was not made any eas- 
ier by the complex management structure of the target vehicle pro- 
gram. Two organizations, Marshall and SSD, stood between GPO and 
Lockheed, Agena's builder. 
Word of tight budgets and a need to cut costs had reached Mar- 
shall's Agena Project Office by early October 1962 but was slower get- 
ting to SSD.80 The first firm notice that the Atlas-Agena program was 
to endure something more than a routine economy drive came on 23 
October, when Chamberlin wired Friedrich Duerr, Agena systems 
manager at Marshall, "to reshape and reschedule the Atlas-Agena to 
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conform to budget limitations. MSFC is further directed to establish 
accounting procedures and funds expended monitoring procedures to 
assure that Agena development is prosecuted within the established 
fund limitations." 
GPO had just completed a detailed study of changes that might be 
made in the Agena program to keep costs within budget limits. It con- 
cluded that $16.7 million could be sliced from the 1963 Atlas-Agena 
budget, dropping it from $27 million to $10.3 million. Chamberlin 
presented Duerr with the $10.3-million figure as a funding limit for 
fiscal year 1963, as part of an overall goal to reduce the cost of develop- 
ment by a third. For Agena, like Titan 11, the savings were to be 
found mainly in less engine test firing and more built-in reliability. But 
Agena faced sterner sanctions-no more money and all work stopped 
until reprogramming was complete.8 1 
Duerr passed the word to the Air Force,s:! although, as he in- 
formed Chamberlin, GPO's view of the savings that might be achieved 
was "optimistic" and the changes could only mean a long delay in the 
development program.83 Reprogramming began with a meeting in 
Houston on 25 October to discuss plans and schedules. What reliability 
meant emerged as the central issue, just as it did for Titan 11. A sec- 
ond meeting, to agree on a specific plan, was set for 2 November.84 
Before that meeting convened, however, the real need for Agena 
in the Gemini program was called into question. In mid-1962, NASA 
had decided in favor of the lunar orbit rendezvous scheme for the 
Apollo lunar landing. That tentative decision was confirmed on 24 Oc- 
tober by the findings of a manned lunar landing comparison study.85 
At a meeting of the Manned Space Flight Management Council six 
days later, Holmes raised the issue of Gemini objectives in light of this 
decision. Shea reviewed Gemini's aims and claimed "that all of these 
objectives appear to be possible of achievement without use of the 
Agena in the program." MSC Director Gilruth disagreed, and an in- 
conclusive debate over the fate of Agena followed. Although he knew 
that time was running out, Holmes asked Gilruth to study the matter 
further.86 
Meanwhile, the second reprogramming session convened at the 
Lockheed plant in Sunnyvale, California. The monthly spending rate 
under the Gemini-Agena contract had reached $2 million during Octo- 
ber. The limit for November, however, was fixed at $650 000, and 
Lockheed was instructed to stay within it. Lockheed spokesmen pro- 
tested, claiming that Bell Aerosystems, the engine subcontractor, could 
not produce engines for an October 1964 launch if funds were so re- 
stricted. Chamberlin told them they had no choice-they must find 
ways to stay within the fixed limits. Lockheed had a week to provide a 
rough cost estimate for the revised program to SSD, which would turn 
its findings over to Marshall's Agena Project Office, which, in turn, 
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would pass its findings up the line to GPO. A final meeting to coordi- 
nate the changes was scheduled for 20 November.87 
Duerr reminded Chamberlin that limited funding was bound to 
cost time, perhaps as much as 14 months, in Agena development. 
Extra money-$12.7 million instead of $10.3 million for the current 
fiscal year-could hold the loss to a less painful five and a half 
months.88 But even at that, it would still be "a maximum risk program. 
That is to say that the target vehicle program has been minimized and 
no allowance is made for contingencies that may arise which would 
adversely affect costs and schedules."89 Chamberlin knew as well as 
anyone that time was being traded for money, but his hands were tied. 
A financial operating plan for 1963 had yet to be approved. Whether 
Agena could even be kept in the Gemini program-and not the pre- 
cise level of funding-was the crucial question. 
At a meeting of MSC's senior staff on 9 November, Chamberlin 
strongly objected to Shea's claims at the Management Council meeting 
on 30 October. Shea, and others in NASA Headquarters, believed that 
rendezvous goals might be met by using a "piggyback rendezvous 
package, carried aloft in the adapter section of the spacecraft and then 
ejected in orbit to serve as a stable but non-maneuverable target. 
Chamberlin dismissed the piggyback technique as inherently limited 
in contrast to the stabilized and maneuverable Agena. He also believed 
that the package would be far heavier than its proponents claimed. 
Andre' Meyer, chief of GPO administration, figured its weight at 180 
kilograms, twice the Headquarters estimate. If that were true, it could 
mean the end of paraglider. Meyer thought the package would cost as 
much as Agena, although without the problems and expenses of sepa- 
rate launches.90 
MSC had been thinking along similar, but much more modest, 
lines. A study issued on 28 March 1962 had concluded that a piggy- 
back rendezvous target could provide useful data. A month later, 
McDonnell had suggested testing the spacecraft rendezvous radar and 
maneuvering systems on an early Gemini flight with what it called a 
"Rendezvous Evaluation Pod (REP)." This was a small bat- 
tery-powered module with a radar transponder, radar beacon, and 
flashing light, the whole package weighing about 30 kilograms and 
designed to give the pilots a chance to practice terminal rendezvous 
maneuvers with their spacecraft. In June, MSC had told McDonnell to 
go ahead with design and development. The REP would be carried on 
the second and third Gemini flights. Planning was largely complete by 
the end of 1962, with Westinghouse, the rendezvous radar subcontrac- 
tor, responsible for components and McDonnell for the package and 
its ejection.91 This, however, amounted to little more than an experi- 
ment, intended to prepare for, not supplant, the Agena rendezvous 
missions. 
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On 16 November, Wesley Hjornevik, chief of MSC administration, 
reported to the senior staff that a financial operating plan for fiscal 
year 1963 had finally been a proved. Agena funding, however, had 
been withheld.92 Target vehi d e reprogramming went ahead, with the 
final meeting on 20 November in Houston. Lockheed's new program 
was accepted. The major changes made reliability demonstration part 
of development and qualification testing, cut engne development test- 
ing to the bone, and trimmed production lead times to keep down 
1963 expenses. This last meant chiefly that Lockheed was to work at a 
reduced level through the rest of calendar year 1962, then return to 
full effort on 2 January 1963. The program would be four months 
late, but its total cost could be as low as $44.1 million, $32.7 million 
less than estimated before reprogramming began.93 
Gilruth outlined the revised Atlas-Agena plans to the Management 
Council on 27 November, with a sharp reminder that "it is very critical 
that a decision as to the inclusion of the Atlas-Agena in the program is 
reached soon if the Agena target schedule is to be maintained." 
Holmes promised a ruling by 10 December.94 Not only had the fate of 
Agena become a matter of public speculation, but lack of funds threat- 
ened to stop the target vehicle even before anything was decided.95 
The decision came early but turned out to be only a stopgap: 
$900 000 for another month. This brought the total for fiscal year 
1963 to $4.9 million; the balance of the planned $10.3 million for At- 
las-Agena remained in abeyance.96 Shea, who had proposed dropping 
Agena from Gemini, told a re orter that NASA was thinkin about 
several alternatives to simplify t R e rendezvous concept, with a 8 ecision 
due shortly. He gave Agena only a 50-50 chance of staying in the pro- 
gram.97 Agena's fate was in the hands of a NASA-wide committee, 
which Shea himself headed. A thorough investigation, bolstered by the 
well-informed and forceful case presented by James Rose, the GPO 
member, decided the committee in favor of Agena. A wire from Wash- 
ington on 21 December authorized MSC to s end the full $10.3 mil- 
lion needed for the reprogrammed Agena in &cal year 1963.98 
MSC also took over management of the Gemini Agena program. 
NASA decided to transfer all its Agena programs from Marshall so 
that that Center could focus on the Saturn launch vehicle for Apollo. 
Lewis Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio, assumed control of all 
NASA Agena programs except Gemini, which went to MSC.99 MSC, 
now dealing directly with SSD,loo took formal charge of the Gemini 
Atlas-Agena program on 14 January 1963, with active advice from the 
Marshall office for the next month and a half.101 Lockheed and SSD 
also adjusted their management relationships. The Gemini manager at 
Lockheed, Herbert Ballard, moved up a notch; he now reported di- 
rectly to the head of Lockheed's Medium Space Vehicles Programs. 
SSD followed suit by upping the rank of its program manager from 
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captain to major; and Major Charles A. Wurster took over the 
reins. 102 
Since the only function for Atlas in Project Gemini was launching 
the target, its fate waited on Agena's. But Atlas, too, suffered in 
NASA's fall budget crisis. On 25 July 1962, NASA Associate Adminis- 
trator Seamans had agreed to support Air Force development of a 
standard Atlas launch vehicle, SLV-3.103 By the time the Department 
of Defense had drafted a formal Memorandum of Agreement and 
forwarded it to NASA on 21 August, NASA's funding outlook had so 
deteriorated that it could no longer contribute to the program. Sea- 
mans restated NASA's interest in SLV-3 development but declined to 
commit the roughly $10 million that was to have been its share of the 
cost.104 
Reprogramming raised the possibility of using surplus Atlas boost- 
ers from the Mercury program in Gemini. Chamberlin asked SSD for 
an opinion. A report to the Atlas-Agena reprogramming meeting of 
20 November was favorable. Chamberlin then asked the Adas contrac- 
tor, General Dynamics/Astronautics, for a formal proposal.105 The 
results made conversion look promising economically. Three converted 
Mercury boosters could be had for a net cost of $3.364 million, as 
opposed to $5.4 million for three new standard Atlases.106 But by the 
time those figures were submitted on 13 February 1963, Gemini's 
budget crisis was over, and NASA was back in the standard Atlas de- 
velopment program. In December, Seamans had formally committed 
NASA to pay its $10-million share. 107 
THE PROSPECT FOR 1963 
With reprogramming completed, Gemini's prospects looked rea- 
sonably bright as 1962 gave way to 1963. The crisis through which the 
program passed in the last quarter of 1962 was monetary, not techni- 
cal. That crisis weathered, the technical problems looked less menacing 
as well. In his report to the Management Council on 18 December, 
Gilruth noted that Gemini still had a number of technical problems, 
but all, he judged, "are being actively pursued and none appear to be 
unresolvable."lo~ 
Gemini had lost time, though. The new Gemini program was 
chiefly a response to budget limits imposed from outside, compounded 
by sharply rising costs. Its immediate goal was cutting back expenses 
during the current fiscal year, and this meant slowing down the pro- 
gram. But a longer program, despite the curtailed and streamlined 
development that emerged from Gemini's fall crisis, was likely to cost 
more in the long run. Whether the total cost of the program would 
really rise, and how much, could only be answered with the passage of 
time. 
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The effects of reprogramming on Gemini schedules were easier to 
define. Gemini was going to lose four months. The new date for the 
first launch was December instead of August 1963. It was now an 
unmanned suborbital qualification test. McDonnell had proposed in 
July 1962 an extra mission that it called Flight No. 0, a suborbital shot 
to precede the first planned mission. On 20 July, Burke and Chamber- 
lin agreed to replace the planned unmanned orbital flight with the 
suborbital flight as the first mission (a slightly revised version of the 
Mission 0 plan). It was to be a ballistic test to investigate spacecraft heat 
protection, to integrate launch vehicle and spacecraft preflight and 
launch operations, and to obtain data on spacecraft structure and sys- 
tems.109 All other launch dates were set back four months. The second 
flight-manned orbital qualification-followed the first by three 
months, in March 1964, with the rest of the missions coming every 
two months until the 12th and last, now scheduled for November 
1965.110 
By December 1962, everything seemed to be under control again. 
But while the project office and MSC were wrestling with the hard 
tasks of fitting development work to the limited money available, 
NASA Headquarters found itself fending off quite a different threat- 
perhaps the least expected of all. The Department of Defense was 
making gestures toward taking over Project Gemini. 
Challenge and Change 
G OING into its second full year, the Gemini Project Office had just finished moving into new quarters. The office had been split be- 
tween two sites, with project manager James Chamberlin at the Farns- 
worth & Chambers building (interim headquarters for the Manned 
Spacecraft Center) and the rest of the Gemini office across the Gulf 
Freeway in the Houston Petroleum Center. By December 1962, the 
office had doubled its original staff of 44 and outgrown its former 
space. Chamberlin and all of his people moved into the old Veterans 
Administration building on the edge of downtown Houston by 10 
December, and the Gemini Procurement Office of MSC's Procurement 
and Contracts Division followed in March 1963.1 
Putting all of Gemini under one roof no doubt helped as the pro- 
gram became more taxing. The early months of 1963 soon showed 
that many technical problems were far from resolved and that the 
question of money was not fully settled by the reprogramming efforts. 
But Gemini's first big worry of the new year had little to do with tech- 
nology or funding. The Air Force had long been interested in orbital 
rendezvous and manned space flight, as reflected in its unmanned sat- 
ellite interceptor project (Saint) and the maneuverable manned Dyna- 
Soar program. That interest now expanded to include Project Gemini. 
"Blue Gemini" was the tag name for an Air Force manned space 
flight program to develop rendezvous, docking, and transfer for mili- 
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tary purposes, using Gemini-type spacecraft. The germ of the idea first 
surfaced in February 1962, during congressional hearings on the de- 
fense budget, as part of a far-ranging Air Force Space Plan for the 
development of military space technology over the next 10 years. The 
concept became firmer in June, when the Air Force Space Systems Di- 
vision (SSD) began working on plans to use Gemini hardware as the 
first step in a new Air Force man-in-space program called Mods 
(Manned Orbital Development System), a kind o mllitary space station 
with Gemini spacecraft as ferry vehicles. The term Blue Gemini first 
showed up in August as part of a more specific proposal to fly six 
Gemini missions with Air Force pilots in a preliminary orientation and 
training phase of Mods.:! 
Blue Gemini was neither clearly defined nor officially sanctioned. 
Air Force opinion was divided on the best approach to the goal of mil- 
itary manned space flight. Some, like Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis E. 
LeMay, wanted nothing to do with Gemini, fearing that entanglement 
in the NASA program might jeopardize Dyna-Soar. Others, like Major 
General Osmond J. Ritland, deputy for manned space flight in Air 
Force Systems Command, urged a more active Air Force role in Gemi- 
ni, since Dyna-Soar would not fly for at least two years. Civilian offi- 
cials in the Pentagon remained skeptical of any military man-in-space 
proposals, for much the same reason that had tended to block such 
efforts all along: the absence of any clear-cut military need for manned 
operations in space.3 
By the fall of 1962, the situation was in flux. The Saint program 
suffered a sharp cutback in December, following cost overruns and 
schedule slippages. This made Gemini look even more attractive to 
those Air Force planners still convinced of the military importance of 
orbital rendezvous but now lacking a program to test their ideas. 
Techniques for rendezvous between remote-controlled machines, as in 
Saint, would differ from those suited for manned rendezvous, but 
manned work in space looked more exciting anyway. Dyna-Soar, a 
winged glider boosted into space by a Titan I11 to orbit Earth and fly 
back to an airfield landing, had lost much of its promise as a result of 
changes and delays. The exciting potential of such a program, when it 
took shape in the late 1950s, looked much less impressive by the end 
of 1962, especially in contrast to Gemini. No decision had yet been 
made in the Department of Defense, but the entire military manned 
space role was under review and forecasts of Dyna-Soar's extinction 
were rife.4 
Meanwhile, the Air Force role in Project Gemini was limited to the 
one set out in the "NASAIDOD Operational and Management Plan" of 
December 1961, SSD acting as contractor to NASA for launch and 
target vehicles.5 The idea of Blue Gemini-a larger part for the Air 
Force in the program-had a good deal 2f support within NASA, es- 
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pecialjy from MSC Director Gilruth. Gemini had been designed as an 
operational spacecraft, and the Air Force was the most likely customer. 
The Air Force could also be expected to pay for what it wanted, and 
Gemini could use an infusion of Defense funds. At a meeting in Nov- 
ember 1962, Chamberlin and some of his staff described salient aspects 
of Gemini to a group of SSD representatives." This meeting was in- 
tended to lay the groundwork for coordinating Air Force planning 
with MSC and to set up channels for future collaboration.6 
NASA Administrator Webb and Associate Administrator Seamans 
visited the Pentagon for a talk with Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secre- 
tary of Defense, in an effort to convince Pentagon planners that an 
augmented role for the Air Force in Project Gemini was a good idea. 
Chance brought Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to the 
meeting. His response to their offer was more than the two NASA 
spokesmen had bargained for; it took the Air Force by surprise as 
well. McNamara not only welcomed the idea of cooperation-he pro- 
posed merging the NASA Gemini program with the Air Force project 
and moving the combined effort to the Department of Defense.7 
That was too much for NASA. W. Fred Boone, a retired admiral 
who had become NASA Deputy Associate Administrator for Defense 
Affairs on 1 December, took charge of building the case against Gemi- 
ni's transfer to the Air Force. In NASA's view, not surprisingly, "the 
Gemini program should continue under the direction of NASA." The 
keystone of NASA's case was that Gemini was integral to the step-by- 
step climb from the first moves into space in Mercury to the final land- 
ing on the Moon in Apollo. Any delay in Gemini might delay the lunar 
landing. Increased Air Force participation "to further DOD objectives 
in space" was all right, but it must not hamper NASA in promptly 
carrying out the Gemini program.8 
To support his position, Boone asked each of the NASA staff 
offices for a statement on the effects of an Air Force takeover of Gemi- 
ni. The replies stressed the clear threat that such a move might disrupt 
NASA's manned space flight effort in general and the manned lunar 
landing program in particular. Beyond this most pressing danger, they 
feared nasty responses from outside NASA: increased criticism from a 
Congress already perturbed by signs of military influence in NASA 
programs; rising concern from a public disturbed by questions about 
the viability of a civilian space program; and growing disquiet in for- 
eign nations about the United States being a peaceful explorer of space, 
*MSC speakers were Paul Purser, Chamberlin, James Rose, Homer W. Dotts, and George 
MacDougall. Non-NASA visitors were Major Ben J. Loret, Major Earl A. Hoag, and Captain 
George R. Honold (Air Force), and Bill Nordyke, Donald P. Armstrong, and Mike Weeks (Aero- 
space Corporation). 
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which carried the added threat that some counties might expel 
NASA tracking stations from their territories.9 After going over these 
arguments, Boone concluded: 
It is in the national interest that the management of Project Gemini 
remain with NASA's Manned Spacecraft Center. A change in pro- 
gram management would seriously delay and substantially increase 
the cost of the manned lunar landing program. Any delay would 
reduce the chances that the United States will make a manned lunar 
landing before the Russians do. 
A much better choice than giving Gemini to the Air Force would be to 
enhance the role of the Air Force within the framework that already 
existed. 10 
Just as surprised by the McNamara proposal as NASA was the Air 
Force, which shared NASA's distaste for a Gemini takeover, partly 
because it might jeopardize Dyna-Soar, partly because the costs of a 
few fully "blue" Gemini flights would far outweigh any foreseeable 
gains.11 
NASA's arguments for keeping Gemini seemed convincing 
enough'when presented to top Pentagon officials on 9 January 1963, 
bolstered as they were by the Air Force's unwillingness to take the 
program. McNamara and Gilpatric readily agreed not to press for 
transfer of Gemini. However doubtful the future role of military man- 
in-space, they thought the Air Force remiss in failing to accept NASA's 
offer of a larger part in Gemini. That was what McNamara now want- 
ed as a formal pact between the two agencies; and he wanted it soon, 
before he began to present his case for the coming ear's Defense 
budget to Congress on 21 January. Perhaps as much as $ 100 million in 
Defense funds could go to Gemini. McNamara's key idea was a joint 
management board to run the project and he promised to forward a 
draft agreement soon. 
A jointly managed Project Gemini had no more appeal for NASA 
than an outright transfer. Boone dismissed the proposed board as "a 
completely unnecessary organizational appendage"l2 even before he 
saw the promised draft. It arrived on Saturday, 12 January, and did 
nothing to soften Boone's judgment. Claiming that "both parties [DOD 
and NASA] consider that the national interest requires the program to 
be jointly managed," McNamara proposed an eight-man Gemlni Pro- 
gram Steering Board to approve program and funding plans, to safe- 
guard both Defense and NASA experlmental objectives, and to resolve 
schedule and resource conflicts. Although GPO would report to the 
new board, project management would remain unchanged. Defense 
intended to pay for its enlarged role with money for current Gemini 
needs, as well as future board-approved changes.13 
NASA's top management discussed the plan on Monday afternoon, 
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14 January, and Boone drafted a reply. McNamara9s "joint manage- 
ment," in Boone's view, equaled "rule by committee," which "in this 
case would be ineffective, uneconomical, and in fact unworkable." 
Changing Gemini also threatened Apollo and might cost the United 
States its chance to win the space race. The proposed joint board also 
violated the Space Act of 1958, certainly in spir~t and probably in let- 
ter. There seemed to be room enough for the Air Force in the current 
Gemini setup. If not, a joint planning and review (as opposed to man- 
agement) board to advise the NASA Administrator ought to serve the 
purpose. Boone concluded by stating "NASA's strong interest in the 
Dyna-Soar program," hinting that NASA would endorse the Air Force 
project if Defense relaxed its demands on Gemini.14 
NASA's revised version of the Defense draft altered enough words 
and accents to transform its meaning. Gone was any hint of "joint man- 
agement." The steering board had become the Gemini Program Plan- 
ning Board, limited to watchin over a program of Gemini experi- 
ments. There was no mention o ! approving program plans or allom- 
ing resources. At most, the board could inform the NASA Administra- 
tor and the Secretary of Defense of such problems as planning defects 
or schedule conflicts. NASA repeated, and stressed, its claim to sole 
control of Gemini. GPO would not report to the board. The Air Force 
would be restricted to joining "in the development, pilot training, pre- 
flight check-out, launch operations and flight operations of the GEMI- 
NI program to assist NASA and to meet the DOD objectives," just as it 
had been doing. 1.5 
The Defense Department accepted NASA's terms in a series of 
meetings between spokesmen for the two agencies over the weekend of 
19-20 January. Willis H. Shapley, Deputy Chief of the Military Divi- 
sion of the Bureau of the Budget, arranged the meetings and pre- 
pared a series of notes designed to clarify the intent of the agreement 
pro er and to distinguish it from some rumored proposals that had P sur aced in the press. Aviation Week and Space Technology, for exam- 
ple, had reported in its issue of 10 December 1962 that NASA and 
the Air Force had agreed on a cooperative Gemini/Blue Gemini pro- 
gram: NASA would fund Gemini development and fly the first mis- 
sions; the Air Force would fly copilots on one or two of the early mis- 
sions and buy the last four or five Gemini spacecraft for its own flights 
plus a few extra beyond the twelve NASA had ordered.16 
Shapley's notes mostly covered management relations between 
NASA, Defense, and the proposed Gemini Program Planning Board; 
but they also touched on funding and the domestic and foreign impact 
of the new arrangements. Gemini was not to be thought of as a joint 
program, but rather as a program serving common needs, with the 
Department of Defense paying for the military features, NASA in full 
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charge of the program, and the role of the board strictly advisory. 
Defense funds were to be used for nothing but the changes geared to 
military needs; the money was specifically not to be used to speed up 
the current NASA program nor to make up slippages and overruns. 
No major change in policy toward the Air Force role in space was in- 
tended, and the new a reement was to be presented to the public as 
the latest in a series o F efforts to enhance cooperation and to avoid 
duplication between NASA and the Pentagon. 
Webb signed the revised agreement and sent it, along with a 
slightly edited version of Shapley's notes, to McNamara on 21 January. 
The notes were not part of the formal document, but they helped fill 
out the record of understanding between the two agencies.17 The new 
pact was made public the next day. Webb and McNamara "joined in 
stressing the national character and importance of the Gemini project" 
and in their determination to see it "utilized in the national interest, 
and to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort in this area as in all oth- 
ers"-citing the agreements on the management of Cape Canaveral 
(also announced on 22 January) and on such earlier undertakings as 
Dyna-Soar and the national launch vehicle program as examples of 
similar cooperation. 18 
How a seemingly larger Defense role in Gemini might affect inter- 
national opinion was the subject of still further concern. NASA as- 
sured the State Department that Gemini's goals remained unchanged, 
its peaceful scientific character unaltered. NASA still ran Gemini and 
planned to make Gemini's scientific data as widely available as Mercu- 
ry's. The new agreement simply augmented military support of the 
same kind already known to the manned space flight program. Gemini 
was still open, NASA still managed it, and its foreign network stations 
would have no military personnel except medical.19 
Although the NASAIDefense agreement of 2 1 January left NASA 
clearly in charge of Gemini, rumors of an Air Force takeover persist- 
ed.20 Real changes were small. The major innovation was the Gemini 
Program Planning Board, a strictly advisory body whose planning was 
to be confined to military experiments for Gemini flights. Its co-chair- 
men were Seamans for NASA and Brockway McMillan for Defense. 
McMillan was Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and 
Development. Holmes and Boone were the other NASA members; and 
the Department of Defense named General Bernard A. Schriever, 
Commander of Air Force Systems Command, and Lawrence L. Kavan- 
au, Special Assistant for Space to the Director of Defense Research 
and Engineering. The group held its first meeting on 28 February 
1963 at NASA Headquarters in Washington.21 The board in this as in 
later meetings did attend to the place of military experiments in Gemi- 
ni. But experiments did not remain its only concern, nor did they turn 
out to be the board's signal contribution to Gemini. 
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CHAMBERLIN DEPARTS 
The dispute between NASA and the Department of Defense about 
who was to have the last word in Gemini, whatever might be its long- 
range impact, agitated only the highest echelons. MSG engineers knew 
little of what was going on and, in any case, had their hands full with 
their own problems. Gemini reprogramming had slowed the rate at 
which money was being spent, but costs still spiraled upwards. 
Although stretching out the program was bound to offset immediate 
savings by larger total costs unless parts of the program were chopped 
out, the size of the increase soon surpassed anything that might have 
been expected. Meanwhile the revised program suffered from the 
growing severity of the technical problems that had afflicted it before 
and during the fall budget crisis. Paraglider testing and Titan I1 
anomalies loomed largest. 
Despite some talk about dropping paraglider from Gemini to meet 
fiscal constraints, paraglider development came through largely un- 
scathed. While other major systems suffered more or less drastic cut- 
backs, paraglider's budget expanded. By the end of 1962, contract 
changes and overruns had raised the price of the current phase of 
paraglider development from four and a half to over seven million 
dollars.22 
North American Aviation, the paraglider contractor, was still hav- 
ing problems with flight testing. The success of 23 October 1962, 
which concluded the test series of a half-scale model launched with its 
wing already deployed, proved only a respite. The next step was trying 
to deploy the wing in flight. North Amer~can refitted the half-scale test 
vehicle at its plant in Downey, California, and shipped it back to Ed- 
wards Air Force Base for its first flight test, scheduled for 27 Novem- 
ber. The all-too-familiar pattern of minor problems, mostly electrical, 
delayed the flight day by day until 10 December, and then the results 
were disappointing. The capsule tumbled from the helicopter, fouling 
the drogue parachute intended to pull the can, in which the wing was 
stored, away from the paraglider. Wing inflation intensified the tum- 
bling and the emergency drogue parachute ejected too soon. When 
the capsule spun down past 1600 meters, the minimum recovery alti- 
tude, radio command detached the wing and allowed the capsule to 
descend on its emergency parachute.23 
The next attempt, on 8 January 1963, after its share of delays, 
produced even worse results. There was no tumbling, but the storage 
can was late in separating; so the capsule was falling too fast when the 
wing started to inflate and its membrane tore. As the capsule fell below 
1600 meters, its wing not yet fully deployed, emergency recovery was 
ordered to no avail. The main parachute remained packaged, and the 
capsule crashed. Picking through the wreckage, North American in- 
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spectors found that a squib switch in the emergency parachute's elec- 
trical system had misfired. That was not the only problem, but it was 
the most discouraging-the switch was a standard item, much used in 
the space program and not known to have failed in 30 000 successive 
firings. GPO warned North American to be sure everything that had 
gone wrong was corrected before trying again.24 
A month later, North American reported to the paraglider coordi- 
nation panel that five distinct failures had been spotted, studied, and 
fixed. The panel was convinced, but Chamberlin was not. After an 
extended meeting with George Jeffs, manager of the paraglider pro- 
gram for North American, Chamberlin decided to give the trouble- 
plagued half-scale flight-test program another chance.25 Once again, 
the current crop of troubles had little impact on plans for the next 
phase of development, which covered the rest of flight testing, pilot 
training, and paraglider production. Part of Phase 111, gearing up for 
production, was worked out and under way by 22 January. North 
American's proposals for the rest of the program were ready by the 
end of the month. GPO approved and, with the concurrence of NASA 
Headquarters, readied a new contract.26 But the Office of Manned 
Space Flight had second thoughts and stopped the procurement action 
"for the time being."27 The halt proved to be permanent. 
The Gemini paraglider program foundered on North American's 
third attempt to deploy a half-scale .wing in flight. Although the first 
two flights had been at least partial successes, the third, on 11 March, 
offered no comfort at all. The storage can failed to separate, so the 
wing could neither eject nor inflate. When the radioed command to 
deploy the emergency parachute produced no response, the second 
half-scale test vehicle joined the first as wreckage3 Paraglider testing 
came to an abrupt halt. 
Gemini's other major headache early in 1963, Titan 11, posed a 
far greater threat to the program as a whole. There would still be a 
Project Gemini without paraglider, but not without Titan 11. Despite 
some hopeful signs, the status of the launch vehicle remained very 
much in doubt. The central problem was still the lengthwise vibration, 
or Pogo, that bounced the vehicle while its first-stage engine was burn- 
; but other technical problems began to compete for attention. 
E orts to resolve them were coming up against a crucial disparity be- 
tween Air Force and NASA goals in Titan I1 development. 
The Martin Company's proposed answer to Pogo-a surge-sup- 
pression standpipe in the first-stage oxidizer feedline-was installed in 
the soon to be infamous Missile N-11, the eighth Titan I1 that the Air 
Force launched in its missile development program, on 6 December 
1962. The supposed cure, far from damping the Pogo effect, raised it 
to +5g, and the violent shaking induced the Stage I engines to shut 
down too soon.29 A rueful Robert Gilruth told his fellow members of 
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the Manned Space Flight Management Council that he saw one hope: 
"the fact that the addition of the surge chamber affected the oscillation 
problem may indicate that the work is being done in the right place."30 
The next Titan 11, launched on 19 December, carried no stand- 
pipes; but increased fuel-tank pressure, which had shown good results 
on some earlier flights, again reduced the Pogo level. This missile also 
featured oxidizer feedlines made of aluminum instead of steel, which 
seemed to have some bearing on the sharply lessened amplitude of 
oscillation. This was disconcerting, no reason for the effect being readi- 
ly apparent. The Pogo problem clearly needed more study.31 
In the tenth flight, on 10 January 1963, Pogo hit a new low of six- 
tenths the force of gravity (+0.6g) at the spot on the missile where a 
manned spacecraft would be located. This was getting close to the level 
tolerated on Mercury flights, roughly 50.45g. But Gemini's astronauts 
were supposed to take a larger part than Mercury's in flying their craft 
into orbit. NASA's goal for the Titan I1 remained L0.25g at most. 
Nonetheless, despite the still large gap between performance and goal, 
increased fuel-tank pressure had so reduced "POGO type oscillations" 
that Gilruth could say, "this now becomes a secondary problem."32 
He may have been more concerned about another problem than 
he was optimistic about Pogo. Despite the low Pogo level on the tenth 
flight, the missile's second-stage thrust was only half what it should 
have been. On some earlier flights, the failure of second-stage engines 
to build up to full thrust had been blamed on Pogo. That now ap- 
peared doubtful. Another source of unease, and the one Gilruth now 
tabbed as the major problem, was the threat of unstable combustion in 
the second-stage engine. Static firing tests during January 1963 showed 
that the Aerojet-General motors might have trouble reaching a steady 
burn after the shock of starting.33 
But this was as yet mostly surmise, and Chamberlin's concern still 
centered on Pogo, chiefly because he was not at all certain how far the 
Air Force Ballistic Systems Division (BSD), which was in charge of Ti- 
tan I1 missile development, would go to meet Gemini's much stricter 
demands.34 His fears were confirmed on 29 January, when BSD's Ti- 
tan Program Office froze the missile design with respect to devices for 
cutting vibration levels, since increased ressure in first-stage fuel 
tanks and aluminum oxidizer feedlines re uced Pogo below specifica- 
tions for the missile airframe and systems. 
B 
This was an answer only for the missile. Tank pressures were 
nearing structural safety limits, and more pressure could not lower the 
vibrations much further, anyway. But the level was still too high for 
Gemini. BSD intended to keep looking for a way to achieve the lower 
value NASA wanted; but early in March, BSD decided that it could no 
longer accept the costs and risks of efforts to reduce the oscillations 
any further.35 
Secretary of Defense Robert 
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and his staff. 
Chamberlin had no direct line to BSD, his only channel being 
through SSD. With BSD in charge of missile development and SSD of 
Gemini launch vehicles, NASA was largely a spectator. Chamberlin 
could do little more than appeal to SSD to intercede with BSD. Since 
there was no flight test program for the Gemini booster, the Titan I1 
missile research and development program was the only chance to 
solve Gemini problems. But BSD was responsible for a weapon system, 
not a launch vehicle, and was understandably loath to risk the missile 
for the booster. 
During March, therefore, Chamberlin spent a lot of time on the 
telephone, asking Richard Dineen, in charge of Gemini launch vehicle 
development for SSD, for help not only with Pogo but on the threat- 
ening combustion instability problem. Chamberlin hit hard on his 
long-standing demand for a rigorous qualification program but now 
stressed that qualification must be "followed by a suitable number of 
successful flight tests" to reach the required level of confidence in a 
booster for manned space flight. He wanted to know what plans Di- 
neen had for making sure that the Air Force test program would meet 
Gemini's needs, and Dineen promised a report in short order.36 
Word of Titan 11's troubles was slow to reach NASA's upper eche- 
lons. When James Marsh, head of the Gemini launch vehicle program 
at Aerospace Corporation, discussed the current status of the booster 
at a meeting of the newly formed Gemini Program Planning Board on 
7 March, he was far from alarmist. Seamans got the impression that 
things were well in hand. A detailed redesign of the turbopump im- 
pellers in the first-stage engines would take care of the Pogo problem, 
according to Marsh, and the unstable burning in the second-stage en- 
gines was no risk to Gemini.37 
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This view was rudely shattered a week later, when Seamans trav- 
eled with Secretary McNamara and a party of Defense officials to Hous- 
ton for a close look at Gemini. He learned for the first time that MSC 
was now thinking of two unmanned flights, rather than one, cutting 
the number of manned missions to ten, the first delayed five months 
until August 1964. Trouble with Titan I1 was offered as the main rea- 
son for this drastic change in schedule, and combustion instability was 
cited as potentially a greater problem than Pogo. McNamara assured 
Seamans and MSC that Titan I1 would be fixed, but Seamans was still 
doubtful.38 
This was only three days after the crash of the second half-scale 
paraglider test vehicle. The conjunction of the newly revealed impact 
of Titan I1 problems and the latest in the series of paraglider mishaps 
suggested that Project Gemini was in deep technical trouble. To make 
matters worse, Gemini had new money worries. The reprogramming 
effort of the last quarter of 1962 had slowed the rate at which Gemini 
was spending money but at the expense of stretching out the program. 
In the nature of things, a longer program was liable to cost more over- 
all; when Holmes reported, early in February, that Gemini's total cost 
would reach $834.1 million, the figure was not too disturbing. That 
was about $60 million over the lowest estimate in September 1962 but 
well short of the $925 million that had then appeared to be a possibili- 
ty.39 
Just a month later, however, on 8 March 1963, MSC's revised pre- 
liminary budget for fiscal year 1964 reached NASA Headquarters, and 
it was a shock. Gemini's estimated total had shot over the billion-dollar 
mark. The new figures was nearly twice the cost first a proved in 
December 1961 and almost $200 million higher than the i! gures Sea- 
mans and other NASA officials had been using as the basis for NASA's 
fiscal year 1964 budget request, most recently in House hearings ear- 
lier that week.40 So large an increase, coming on the heels of what had 
seemed to be a resolution of Gemini's funding problems, took NASA 
Headquarters by complete surprise. Chamberlin, as manager of Gemi- 
ni on the field level, knew what was happening. But, waiting for an 
opportune moment to break the news, he was overtaken by events. 
Unexplained cost increases combined with seemingly critical prob- 
lems in paraglider and Titan I1 development to bring Chamberlin's 
tenure to an abrupt end.41 On 19 March, Gilruth relieved Chamberlin 
of his duties as project manager and assigned him to the ost of Sen- 
ior Engineering Advisor to the Director, cutting him off ? rom any di- 
rect connection with Gemini. Charles Mathews took over as acting 
manager. He came to Gemini from the Engineering and Development 
Directorate, where he had recently added the job of Deputy Assistant 
Director to his work as Chief of the Spacecraft Technology Division. 
Mathews was a charter member of Space Task Group, having come 
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with Gilruth from Langley's Pilotless Aircraft Research Division. He 
had headed STG's Flight Operations Division until 1'7 January 1962, 
when he moved over to the Engineering and Development Directorate 
as chief of what was then called the Spacecraft Research Division.42 
When Chamberlin left Gemini, an era ended. In the large and 
complex undertakings of modern high technology, one person can 
seldom be credited with so large a share in the shaping of a project as 
Chamberlin deserved for Gemini. Much of the ultimate success of the 
project had its roots in Chamberlin's brilliance as a designer and skill 
as an engineer, but so did some of the current harvest of troubles. The 
talented engineer can always see new ways to improve his machines, 
but the successful manager must keep his eyes on costs and schedules, 
even if that sometimes means settling for something good enough in- 
stead of better. 
But perhaps in a deeper sense, Chamberlin can be seen as a victim 
of the way Gemini was created and funded. Approved as something of 
an afterthought in the American manned space flight program, absent 
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from NASA long-range budget plans, Gemini began with shaky fi- 
nances. Crushing time pressure made thin s worse. Gemini, although 
in most ways just as sophisticated as Apol f o, began later and had to 
finish its flight program much sooner than the lunar program. As 
Chamberlin later remarked, "we went ahead as fast as possible with 
whatever funding could be scrounged.. . . If Gemini were too late, 
there would be no need for it, and it would be cancelled." In this set- 
ting, technical problems that might otherwise have appeared little 
more than routine assumed a more ominous guise. 
Chamberlin's colleagues in and out of NASA deeply respected him 
as an engineer and designer but also saw his flaws as a manager and 
recognized the difficulties of the situation. His sudden and largely 
unexpected departure was thus not the blow to project morale that it 
might have been. The shock was also eased by the identity of the man 
who replaced him. Mathews was well known and widely esteemed. He 
took over a program that did seem to be in trouble.43 
The shaky status of Gemini costs and schedules was the major fac- 
tor in Chamberlin's ouster, and it was to those matters that Mathews 
first turned in his new role as acting program manager. An early move 
was a critical review of the Gemini flight program. This produced one 
quick decision: an unmanned mission would be flown in place of one 
of the manned flights; only 10 of the 12 Gemini flights were now to 
carry crews. This was largely a response to the stubborn problems in 
Titan I1 development. The first flight had been planned most recently 
as a suborbital ballistic shot to test spacecraft heat protection and vali- 
date spacecraft structure and systems. With launch vehicle status un- 
certain, however, this no longer seemed sufficient cjualification for 
manned missions. Another question mark was the spacecraft itself, 
which did not seem likely to be ready in time.44 
GPO had a new flight schedule to submit to Manned Space Flight 
Director Holmes by 11 April. It differed sharply in some key ways 
from earlier plans. The major change was that the first flight, still due 
in December 1963, was to be orbital, its rimary objective the flight P qualification of the booster. The spacecra t would serve chiefly as an 
instrument carrier, neither separating from the launch vehicle's second 
stage nor being recovered. Gemini's second flight, postponed from 
March to July 1964, was now what the first had been-a suborbital bal- 
listic flight intended to prove the spacecraft could withstand high heat- 
ing rates but also to qualify all launch vehicle and spacecraft systems 
for manned flights. 
The first men to fly in Gemini now had to wait for the third mis- 
sion, in October 1964, five months later than had been scheduled for 
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the third flight and seven months past the former date for the first 
manned flight. The mission was not only late, it was much reduced in 
scope. First planned for a full day, or 18 orbits, the mission now 
seemed likely to be no more than three orbits, mainly for systems eval- 
uation.45 The three-orbit limit became official in mid-June 1963. This 
raised the question of what to do with the package that both of the 
first two manned spacecraft were supposed to carry into orbit to prac- 
tice the final stages of rendezvous. Three orbits hardly seemed long 
enough. By the beginning of July, the rendezvous evaluation pod was 
cut from the first manned mission.46 
The pod stayed on the fourth flight and second manned mission, 
scheduled for seven days in orbit during January 1965, three months 
after the third. This longer interval between launches was planned for 
the rest of the program. The two months that had been allowed no 
longer seemed time enough to chec\k out machines and train crews. 
Another change in the flight prograrp inserted a rendezvous mission 
between the two longer flights, so the fifth would be a rendezvous mis- 
sion and the sixth would remain in orbit 14 days. The two long mis- 
sions had been back-to-back, but this left little time to absorb the les- 
sons of one such flight before launching another. The last six missions, 
each about three days long, all focused on rendezvous. The final flight 
was scheduled for January 1967, nearly two years after the date first 
approved in December 1961 and more than a year later than expected 
after reprogramming in late 1962. The new flight plan also reflected 
the uncertain status of the paraglider landing system, now scheduled 
only from the seventh flight on. Earlier spacecraft would rely on para- 
chutes, and the first land landing was not expected until October 
1965.47 
NASA Headquarters approved the new Gemini fli ht plan on 29 
April 1963.48 The lengthened schedule and space $ -out launches 
eased the pressure on Project Gemini in terms of both time and mon- 
ey. Technical problems and money shortages were the proximate cause 
of the changes, but throughout 1962 the shape of Gemini had been 
subtly shifting. Mercury technology proved less easy to transfer to 
Gemini than expected, partly for technical reasons-the planned cou- 
pling of two Mercury environmental control systems to provide for a 
Gemini crew, for example, went by the board as engineers tried and 
failed to convert the concept into detail specifications49-but mainly 
because the image of Gemini had altered in the eyes of its makers. 
"Instead of being merely a transition between Mercury and Apollo," 
Gilruth told his colleagues in the Management Council on 30 April, 
"the Gemini program now actually involves the development of an 
operational spacecraft."50 
Holmes spelled out what this meant in a lengthy memorandum to 
Seamans on 3 May. By building into Gemini the most up-to-date tech- 
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nology, rather than merely modified Mercury equipment, "Gemini 
would have extensive and most useful applications in earth orbital 
space operations," even, ultimately, "as a resupply vehicle for future 
space stations." It would also produce a beneficial side effect: the new 
Gemini promised to be a much greater help to Apollo in such areas as 
systems development, preflight checkout, and mission training. None 
of this came cheaply, either in time or money, but Holmes argued it 
was worth it because "we have a much more valuable and worthwhile 
Gemini Program than could have been had if we had not taken advan- 
tage of our increased knowledge to develop and design the best space- 
craft possible within the limits of our present technology."51 
These were the arguments that NASA spokesmen used to explain 
the higher costs that Gemini had incurred in the past fiscal year and to 
defend their budget request for fiscal year 1964 to congressmen grow- 
ing restive in the face of soaring NASA needs. Gemini, Holmes told 
the House Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, was "much more 
than a big, overgrown Mercury."52 It had, said Webb, "what I would 
characterize as the potential for the first workhorse of the Western 
space world in very much the same way that the DC-3 airplane be- 
came a great workhorse of aviation for many, many pur oses."53 
How much of this was merely after-thelfact ration 2 lzation may be 
open to question, but whatever hopes NASA officials might have for 
using Gemini or helping Apollo depended on solving some urgent 
problems. Development of the new technology that was to transform 
Gemini was lagging. The most advanced spacecraft systems-propul- 
sion, escape, and fuel cell-were running into trouble; the paragllder 
program had faltered; and, worst of all, the Titan I1 launch vehicle 
posed a question mark for manned space flight. Maybe Gemini would 
become a workhorse, and maybe that prospect was good reason to de- 
lay the flight program. But the many technical problems, Gemini's new 
acting manager admitted when interviewed by a leading trade journal, 
had already wrecked the old schedule.54 
ATTACKING PARAGLIDER AND TITAN~II PROBLEMS 
The most pressing worry when Mathews took charge of the p;oj- 
ect in mid-March 1963 was what to do about the trouble-plagued para- 
glider development program. Back-to-back failures, as North Arneri- 
can tried to deploy the wing in flight, had destroyed both half-scale 
test vehicles. GPO had been funding paraglider on an interim basis 
since February, little money was left, and North American was ready 
to quit unless it got new directions. With neither time nor money 
enough to replace the two lost test vehicles, GPO had to work out a 
new test program with North American, using the hardware still on 
hand or almost ready-the two full-scale test vehicles slated for deploy- 
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ment tests, the half-scale boilerplate left over from emergency para- 
chute system qualification, and the paraglider trainer that North 
American was building.55 
Spokesmen for North American and MSC met in Houston 27-28 
March to discuss the options. Telephones in GPO, in the Gemini Pro- 
curement Office, and in North American were busy over the next two 
weeks as the main features of a revised test program were argued, 
talked out, and settled. The key decision was to divide the flight se- 
quence in half and work through the problems of each phase separate- 
ly before trying to demonstrate a complete flight from deployment 
through landing.56 
Spreading the wing in flight was still the crucial problem, and it 
was to be tackled with the two full-scale test vehicles. The new test plan, 
however, was simpler than the old. As the vehicle dropped from a 
high-flying aircraft, its wing would inflate and deploy to convert its fall 
into a glide down to 3000 meters. That ended the test sequence. 
Explosive charges would sever the cables that suspended the test vehi- 
cle from the wing, and the now wingless vehicle would descend to 
Earth beneath a large parachute. The rest of the flight sequence, glid- 
ing from 3000 meters to a landing, was to be studied with two tow-test 
vehicles, modified versions of the paraglider trainer. Towed by a heli- 
copter to the proper altitude and then released, this vehicle would be 
flown by a pilot down to the California desert. In the final stage of the 
program, Gemini static articles would be fitted with standard paragli- 
der gear and flown through the complete flight sequence from deploy- 
ment to landing.57 
If everything went according to plan, the paraglider landing sys- 
tem could be ready for the seventh Gemini spacecraft. By the time 
McDonnell started building the tenth spacecraft, paraglider gear could 
be installed at the proper place on the production line.58 
On 12 April 1963, Mathews outlined for North American what 
had to be done at once to put the new program into effect. The com- 
pany was to stop all work on landing gear for the full-scale test vehicle, 
since it would now land via arachute, and to forget about trying to P convert the half-scale boilerp ate into a half-scale test vehicle. Instead, 
the boilerplate would be used as a tow-test vehicle to work out takeoff 
techniques needed later for manned flights. North American also had 
to qualify the new full-scale parachute system, which differed substan- 
tially from the emergency system-using three Mercury-type para- 
chutes-that North American had tried hard to qualify, without much 
success, during the summer and fall of 1962. By the end of April 
1963, North American had shifted gears and was working along the 
lines laid out earlier that month.59 
The reoriented paraglider program was formalized in a new con- 
tract between North American and NASA on 5 May 1963 that also 
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closed out the earlier contracts. MSG and the contractor agreed on a 
year-long program (to May 1964) more tightly focused on the basic 
design of a workable paraglider system than the old had been, with 
such matters as flight training and production postponed until the de- 
sign had been roved.60 NASA settled the earlier contracts with North 
American for i' 7.8 million and negotiated a $20-million price for the 
new effort that was intended to save paraglider landing for Gemini.61 
Although doin something about paraglider was the most pressing 
problem Mathews f aced when he took over Gemini, Titan I1 was the 
greater concern for the program as a whole. So far, Air Force efforts 
toward clearing up the troubles had been limited to what was needed 
to make its missile work. Nothing extra was yet being done to see that 
Titan I1 met Gemini's needs, although Bernard Schriever had assured 
Holmes that any Titan I1 problems that threatened Gemini would be 
taken care 0f.62 Pogo seemed to Mathews, as it had to Chamberlin, the 
most urgent, and Mathews, like Chamberlin, insisted that +0.25g at 
the spacecraft was the highest level of vibration that NASA could ac- 
cept. BSD, however, professed to be content with the g-level of +0.6g 
already achieved, well below earlier levels as high as 5g. That was low 
enough for the missile, and BSD firmly refused to spend any more of 
its money to lower it further.63 
GPO could do little to change BSD's stand, but Schriever, whose 
command embraced BSD, did have something to say about it. He or- 
dered top officials of both BSD and SSD to his headquarters at An- 
drews Air Force Base in Maryland on 29 March 1963 to present a 
status report on Titan I1 problems related to its role as Gemini launch 
vehicle. Spokesmen for the major Titan I1 contractors-Martin, Aero- 
jet, Aerospace, and Space Technology Laboratories-were on hand to 
discuss their efforts. What Holmes and the other NASA representa- 
tives Schriever had invited to the meeting heard was far from reassur- 
ing. 
Brigadier General John L. McCoy, Director of BSD's Titan System 
Program Office, led off with an account of the two outstanding prob- 
lems, longitudinal oscillation and combustion instability. Neither, he 
stressed, now threatened missile development. Trying to meet Gemini 
standards by changing any of the missiles still to fly in the develop- 
ment program was too chancy. McCoy's job was to develop a weapon 
system, which he objected to risking for Gemini. 
The contractors argued that the problems were just about solved. 
Both Aerospace and Martin-Baltimore endorsed the optimistic view of 
Aerojet-General's chief project engineer for Titan I1 engines, Alvin L. 
Feldman. Feldman pointed out that Pogo had already responded to 
increased fuel-tank pressure, and he saw even more promise in a com- 
bination of standpipes in the oxidizer lines and mechanical accumula- 
tors in the fuel lines. Unstable burning might be handled by modifying 
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the baffles on the injector that fed propellants to the engine or by 
starting the flow of propellants with some inert fluid. 
A closed-door session limited to NASA and Air Force officials fol- 
lowed this open session. Here Holmes vented his frustration at the 
parade of numbers, statistics, and percentages on Titan I1 problems he 
had heard. The crucial point, he insisted, was that no one knew what 
caused either Pogo or unstable burning; without that knowledge, the 
booster could not be judged man-rated. Since the Air Force was now a 
bigger partner than before in Gemini, Holmes thought that Defense 
funds ought to pay a share of whatever the price might be to fit the 
launch vehicle to Gemini. But even if NASA had to pay the whole bill, 
even if Gemini had to face more delays, Holmes wanted these short- 
comings corrected. Lieutenant General Howell M. Estes, Schriever's 
second-in-command, agreed. They decided on a joint development 
and test program expressly designed to bring Titan I1 up to Gemini 
standards, with Air Force Titan I1 money to get it started and the ques- 
tion of funding the rest to be referred to the Gemini Program Plan- 
ning Board.64 
Just three days later, on 1 April, McCoy was heading a new Titan 
II/Gemini Coordination Committee," which, by 5 April, had drawn up 
a "Joint Titan IIIGemini Development Plan on Missile Oscillation Re- 
duction and Engine Reliability and Improvement." It spelled out the 
work needed to cut Pogo levels to NASA standards and to reduce the 
incidence of combustion instability in the second-stage engines. It also 
outlined an "augmented engine improvement program" to clean up 
the design of the first- and second-stage engines and to enhance their 
reliability. McCoy's committee planned to direct the effort, with funds 
supplied by BSD's Titan System Program Office. The plan to improve 
and man-rate Titan I1 had two major restrictions: the weapon-system's 
flight test program was not to incur undue delays by waiting for Gemi- 
ni items; and McCoy had the final say on if and when to fly Gemini 
improvements, with missile program objectives taking precedence.65 
The Gemini Program Planning Board concurred in the plan a 
month later, on 6 May, and recommended that the Department of 
Defense pay for it, starting at once with current Defense emergency 
funds. This meant $3 million from fiscal year 1963 money and another 
$17 million from the next year's budget. The Air Force provided half 
the $3 million by the end of the month, with a firm promise for the 
balance .66 
In acting on the Titan I1 plan, the board was moving beyond its 
charter, which called for it simply to decide what military experiments 
*Members were Richard C. Dineen of SSD, James A. Marsh of Aerospace, and James G. 
Berry, Titan I1 project director for Space Technology Laboratories. 
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should be carried on Gemini flights. Its roster of members, however, 
included Holmes and Schriever, as well as Seamans and McMillan, 
making it the logical group to coordinate a high-level attack on Titan 
II's problems. When the board submitted its recommendations to Sec- 
retary of Defense McNamara and NASA Administrator Webb on 29 
May, no one was surprised that it covered not only experiments but 
the pursuit "with utmost urgency" of the Titan I1 improvement plan, 
using Defense funds and the missile test program.67 McNamara and 
Webb endorsed the board's findings. McNamara specifically agreed to 
pay for the program and directed the Secretary of the Air Force both 
to fund it and to flight-test the improvements in the missile program. 
In a memorandum to the board members, Webb stressed 
the urgency we attach to the development of the Gemini Launch 
Vehicle. It is of the utmost importance that the cause of the present 
deficiencies in the Titan I1 be determined and remedial action ac- 
complished as expeditiously as practicable. . .to eliminate the launch 
vehicle as a potential source of delay in the Gemini schedule.68 
The delay was already more than potential, as attested by the 
major role Titan I1 problems had played in Gemini's new flight pro- 
gram. But further delays loomed ahead as the Titan I1 missile test 
program unexpectedly faltered during the spring of 1963 and threat- 
ened to undo the improvement plan before it had fairly begun. The 
18th flight test of the Titan I1 missile was launched on 24 May 1963. It 
was only the 10th fully successful flight and the last for months to 
come.69 
The next launch, five days later, produced a particularly disap- 
pointing failure. Martin, Aerojet, Aerospace, and Space Technology 
Laboratories had worked hard to confirm the hypothesis that Pogo 
during first-stage flight was caused by coupling between the missile 
structure and its propulsion system, the couple making an unstable 
closed loop. A study of year-old static-firing data led Sheldon Rubin of 
Aerospace to believe he had found the missing link in the analytic 
model; the partial vacuum produced by pumping caused hydraulic 
resonance in the fuel suction line. If valid, this finding would correct 
the two major shortcomings of prior analyses, which had failed to pre- 
dict where oscillations ceased during flight and had wrongly predicted 
that oxidizer standpipes alone would suppress Pogo. Rubin's corrected 
model showed why Missile N-1 1 in December 1962 was less stable than 
other Titan 11s and how adding fuel accumulators as well as oxidizer 
standpipes would suppress Pogo. The missile launched on 29 May car- 
ried Pogo suppression devices for both oxidizer and fuel to test their 
combined effect. But, leaking fuel in its engine compartment, the mis- 
sile burst into flame as it lifted off. Its controls damaged by the fire, 
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the missile pitched over and broke up 52 seconds later. In contrast to 
Missile N- 1 1, the Pogo devices were absolved from any blame for the 
failures, but the flight ended too soon to provide any Pogo data and 
the problem remained unsolved.70 
This setback was followed by another, on 20 June, in the 20th Ti- 
tan I1 flight. This was purely a military test, the missile being launched 
from a silo at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. First-stage 
flight was troublefree, with Pogo levels low enough (+_.62g) to meet 
Air Force standards. But partial clogging of the tiny holes in the oxi- 
dizer injector of the second-stage gas generator caused thrust to fall 
off shortly after staging to about half the required value. The same 
thing had happened in two earlier tests; had the missile been carrying 
a spacecraft, its crew would have been forced to abort the mission.71 
Back-to-back failures at this stage in the program compelled BSD 
to suspend Titan I1 flight testing. Only half the 20 flights so far 
launched could be called fully successful, and McCoy now faced the 
task of making good on at least 12 of the 13 flights still left him, to 
rove that Titan I1 was ready to join America's strategic deterrent 
Forces. The missile had to come first, and McCoy again ordered a halt 
to any further attempts to lower Pogo levels as too great a risk to what 
remained of his test program. Although Major General Ben I. Funk, 
SSD commander, appealed McCoy's decision to Systems Command 
Headquarters, the whole question of Gemini-Titan development, and 
particularly of flight-testing a cure for Pogo, was once more unsettled. 
In the aftermath of reprogramming, Gemini was buffeted by new 
crises. An offhand Defense Department bid to take over the program 
flustered NASA's top echelons briefly, but technical problems began 
taking on fearsome proportions early in 1963, with paraglider and 
Titan I1 looming as the greatest question marks. When the first 
months of 1963 also revealed that Gemini's money troubles had not 
been settled, the stage was set for a change of project managers. 
Charles Mathews replaced James Chamberlin as head of a faltering 
program. The framework was solid enough, a tribute to Chamberlin's 
engineering efforts, but costs, schedules, and administration were not. 
Mathews moved swiftly and smoothly to take these problems in hand. 
In short order, the status of the rogram was reviewed; its schedules, 
budgets, and objectives reassessel; and its revision outlined. By mid- 
1963, Gemini's managerial worries, both internal and external, had 
been at least temporarily resolved by a tightened organization, a 
lengthened schedule, and a modified program. But the major technical 
problems persisted and even worsened. 
With many of the Gemini launch vehicle's parts still short of flight 
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status and with BSD firmly opposed to risking its own program to 
solve Gemini's problems, the prospect of meeting the December 1963 
deadline for the first Gemini launch was dimming. NASA was no long- 
er concerned sim ly with the status of the vehicle and the effect of 
specific problems P ike Pogo and unstable combustion on its chances of 
being ready in time. Although its promise had been great, Titan 11's 
flight record was so poor that NASA was beginning to wonder whether 
it belonged in Project Gemini at all.72 
The Darkest Hour 
T HE easing of Gemini's managerial problems by mid-1963 opened the way for a concerted attack on Gemini's technical problems. 
Even under new management, however, the last half of the year saw 
Project Gemini at its lowest ebb. The Gemini spacecraft, the Agena 
target vehicle, and, most seriously, the Titan I1 launch vehicle--each 
raised problems that threatened to overwhelm the program. This was 
to be Gemini's darkest hour, and it began with another dual flight 
that raised new fears of a Soviet victory in the race for first space ren- 
dezvous. On 14 June, Lieutenant Colonel V. F. Bykovsky orbited 
aboard Vostok V. Cosmonaut Valentina Tereshkova followed two days 
later in Vostok VI. The two passed within five kilometers of each oth- 
er. Once again, however, there was a crumb of hope in the Vostok's 
lack of maneuvering capability. It was a faint hope.1 
Gemini's biggest question mark in mid-1963 was the launch vehi- 
cle. Flight tests of the Titan I1 missile, suspended in June after two 
successive failures, had yet to produce results good enough to convince 
anyone that a booster derived from this missile was a safe bet for Gem- 
ini. To make matters worse, Brigadier General John McCoy, director 
of Titan programs for the Air Force Ballistic Systems Division (BSD), 
strongly opposed any changes in the missile to meet Gemini stand- 
ards-and for sound reasons. He could not afford to risk the failure of 
the missile program for a chance to help Gemini. 
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As the Titan II program faltered, NASA concerns mounted. The 
Gemini Program Planning Board persisted in its efforts to resolve the 
impasse between NASA and BSD. On 28 June, the board asked NASA 
to state the least it would accept for launch vehicle performance, the 
Air Force to describe its program in detail. Board co-chairman Robert 
Seamans, NASA's Associate Administrator, asked MSC Director Robert 
Gilruth for a precise statement of MSC standards for making Titan I1 
over as the Gemini launch vehicle. The response, on 1 August, was a 
brief review of "Gemini Launch Vehicle Specifications and Require- 
ments," which pin ointed the three major problem areas that made 
the Titan II unsa ? e for manned space flight-longitudinal oscillation 
(Pogo), dynamic instability of the second-stage engines, and detail de- 
sign faults of Titan I1 engines. MSG insisted "that these problems must 
be satisfactorily solved and the solutions incorporated into the GLV 
prior to its use in the manned Gemini program."2 
Every Titan II so far flown had displayed Pogo, although the level 
had varied, reaching a low of just over one-third the force of gravity 
(+0.35g) in the 17th test flight. on 13 May 1963. This potential haz- 
ard to pilot safety prompted a survey of available data on human toler- 
ance of such vibration, leading MSC to conclude that Pogo should be 
completely eliminated, or at least not allowed to exceed k0.25g. A test 
rogram on the centrifuge at NASA's Ames Research Center in Cali- 
rornia, completed in July 1963, tended to confirm the validity of this 
stand; an MSC astronaut test program conducted immediately after 
the Ames tests provided even stronger support. Higher levels might be 
tolerable, but 0.25g still seemed a prudent upper limit. MSC preferred 
an experimental program to trace Pogo to its source and eliminate it 
but would settle for this bearable limit if proved on Titan I1 flights 
before the vehicle flew in Gemini.3 
The second major problem, combustion instability, had not yet 
occurred in flight, but Aerojet-General's ground tests had revealed in- 
cipient instability during second-stage starting-that is, the initial en- 
gine-firing pulse could trigger uneven burning in stage-I1 engines. In 
a statistical sense, the engine was stable, since Aerojet-General could 
show that the instability rate was no more than two percent in ground 
tests. From a physical viewpoint, however, the engme had to be de- 
scribed as dynamically unstable, and that risk could not be accepted 
when human lives were at stake. Statistical reliability was not enough 
for a manned booster. Aerojet-General must develop and prove a 
dynamically stable engine before the first manned Gemini flight.4 
The third major area of concern comprised a range of problems, 
each minor in its own right but significant in the aggregate. Of the 10 
full or partial failures in the 20 Titan I1 test flights to date, Pogo could 
be blamed for only one, dynamic instability for none at all. The others 
resulted from small defects-a clogged injector, a failed weld, a broken 
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line. The central problem seemed to be "a real lack of understanding 
on the part of Aerojet of procedures and responsiveness to problems 
that must be associated with the development of engines for use in a 
manned launch vehicle."5 
When several top-ranking MSC officials visited Aerojet's Sacra- 
mento plant in July 1963, they were dismayed at what they saw and 
concerned about a number of questionable practices in design, manu- 
facturing, and quality control, in general, and several components- 
turbine idler gears, main fuel valves, turbine seals, and turbine mani- 
folds-in particular. The Air Force Space Systems Division (SSD), 
NASA's agent for launch vehicles, had already spotted 40 engine parts 
that could be improved. MSC judged that most of these changes had 
to be made and the results confirmed in flight before the booster was 
committed to the first manned Gemini mission.6 
The Gemini Program Planning Board heard NASA's report on 
launch vehicle performance standards on 5 August 1963, revised the 
wording slightly, and accepted it. With this statement as a basis, MSC 
and SSD were to arrange a formal agreement on the goals of reduced 
Pogo, a stable second-stage engine, and improved engines. They were 
also to agree on the programs needed to achieve these goals and the 
criteria for deciding when the goals had been met.7 
Although Titan 11 itself was still a question mark, the managerial 
logjam that had so far prevented a concerted attack on its shortcom- 
ings as a manned booster now appeared to be breaking up. Major 
General Ben Funk, SSD Commander, told Gilruth on 8 August that 
Air Force Headquarters had approved the "augmented engine im- 
provement program." Funk agreed that Aerojet's efforts left some- 
thing to be desired, then outlined a series of steps he had taken to 
tighten up the firm's work. He had still another piece of good news. 
The decision to fly no more Pogo fixes on Titan flights had been re- 
versed. The gas generator clogging problem that had marred the Ti- 
tan I1 flight of 20 June seemed to have been solved, and the booster 
would soon be flying again. Missile N-25, scheduled for a September 
launch, would carry standpipes and accumulators to suppress Pogo.8 
Aerojet-General began work on the improved engine program in 
September. That same month also saw a start on the Gemini Stability 
Improvement Program, or Gemsip, an effort to redesign the injector 
of the second-stage engine to overcome incipient combustion instabili- 
17.9 When the Gemini Program Planning Board met again, on 6 Sep- 
tember, MSC and SSD had agreed on the statement of "Gemini 
Launch Vehicle Specifications and Requirements for Major Titan II 
Problems" that the board had requested.10 It fully met NASA's de- 
mands. Things seemed to be moving at last. 
Titan 11, however, had yet to prove itself. Missile problems had 
already prompted NASA, earlier in 1963, to replace one of Gemini's 
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manned missions with a second unmanned flight. Still unsolved, they 
now forced NASA to plan yet another unmanned flight. On 12 July, 
Mathews told MSC's senior staff that GPO was thinking about backing 
up the first Gemini flight with an extra unmanned flight (making a 
total of 13 instead of 12) roughly midway between the first two sched- 
uled missions, or about 1 April 1964. The proposed payload was a 
boilerplate capsule with instrumentation pallets like those in Spacecraft 
1.11 
At a meeting on 5 August, the Gemini Program Planning Board 
agreed to review the plan. The next day, Mathews wired Walter Burke 
at McDonnell to begin work on the adapter that would attach capsule 
to launch vehicle. NASA Headquarters approved the new mission and 
suggested calling it Gemini lA, or GT-1A.* Based on data from Mc- 
Donnell and SSD, the project office figured the cost of the extra flight 
at around $2 million.l2 
William C. Schneider, Gemini Project Manager at NASA Head- 
quarters, presented NASA's case for the extra flight to the planning 
board on 6 Se tember. In essence, NASA wanted t~ guard against a 
failure of the i! rst mission by planning a contingent mission, identical 
to GT-1, to fly before the scheduled GT-2. The board concurred, and 
Mathews wired Richard Dineen, SSD's Gemini launch vehicle overseer, 
to make sure that the second launch vehicle would be ready in time to 
meet the date for GT-1A. The new mission was strictly a backup, 
however, to be flown only if GT-1 failed to meet its objectives. The 
decision waited on the outcome of the first mission.13 
For GT- lA, MSC diverted a boilerplate spacecraft being built for 
flotation tests by a local Houston contractor. Named Boilerplate lA, it 
arrived at the Center on 24 Se tember, where the Technical Services 
Division began the task of ma ri ng it flightworthy. Regular biweekly 
panel meetin s started early the next month, and the rebuilt boiler- 
plate was rea f y in mid-November. It left Houston via flatbed truck on 
13 December, reaching Cape Canaveral three days later, there to have 
its wiring and equipment installed; the work in Houston had been lim- 
ited to the structure. The adapter, built and instrumented by Mc- 
Donnell, arrived at the Cape 27 January 1964. By then, however, the 
threat that had called forth the effort had largely dissipated, and little 
further work was done before GT-1A was formally canceled on 17 
February. 14 
That cancellation reflected a striking turnaround in Titan I1 pros- 
pects from their lowest ebb during the summer and fall of 1963. BSD 
resumed the flight test program on 21 August. Although the flight it- 
self was a success. NASA suffered another setback. This missile was the 
*GT, for Gemini-Titan, had become the standard designation for non-rendezvous missions; 
GTA, for Gemini-Titan-Agena, for rendezvous missions. 
142 
T H E  D A R K E S T  H O U R  
first of five planned to carry the Gemini malfunction detection system, 
crucial for Gemini because it was to provide spacecraft pilots with the 
data they needed on existing or impending booster problems during 
launch. BSD had agreed to fly the system "piggyback"-installed, 
working, and reporting to ground receivers and recorders, but not 
otherwise acting on the missile. The system flown on 21 August suf- 
fered a short circuit 81 seconds after liftoff and provided no further 
data. 15 
Titan 11's next launch, on 23 September, did little to dispel the 
gloom. A guidance malfunction threw the missile out of its planned 
trajectory. Since the missile was guided inertially and the Gemini 
booster used radio guidance, this had no direct bearing on Gemini. 
That was small consolation, however; Pogo reached f 0.75g, very nearly 
the worst since the disastrous flight of Missile N-11 in December 
1962.16 
The heart of the matter was foot-dragging by BSD on the ques- 
tion of flying Gemini fixes. Once again, the planning board took a 
hand. It decided to replace the agreement between MSC and SSD of 6 
September with a more authoritative Memorandum of Understanding 
between the co-chairmen of the board, Seamans of NASA and Brock- 
way McMillan, Under Secretary of the Air Force. The board directed 
NASA to submit another statement of requirements for the Gemini 
booster and the Air Force to provide a development plan, complete 
with costs and schedules, for dealing with Pogo, combustion instability, 
and engine improvement. The board specifically asked the Air Force 
for a schedule of all remaining Titan I1 flights, with a plan for 
flight-testing changes to reduce or eliminate Pogo and unstable burn- 
ing.17 
The meeting of the board took place on 11 October 1963. Four 
days later, the flight-test question was finally resolved. General Ber- 
nard Schriever, a member of the board as well as commander of Air 
Force Systems Command, called a meeting in Los Angeles of BSD, 
SSD, and Titan II contractors. Schriever himself firmly supported an 
active program to clean up launch vehicle problems. Of special con- 
cern was whether to follow through with plans to fly Missile N-25 with 
oxidizer standpipes and fuel accumulators. Aerospace, backed by Space 
Technology Laboratories, argued strongly for the planned flight, espe- 
cially since engine ground tests begun in August had confirmed fuel- 
line resonance as-the culprit in the failure of Missile N-11 and shown 
that fuel accumulators would solve the problem. They carried the day, 
winning the crucial decision to proceed with the test flight of N-25 as 
planned. Funk planned to see his BSD counterpart regularly and ar- 
ranged for meetings between the two project managers, Dineen and 
McCoy, to make sure that there was no more backsliding.18 
Later events were to prove that this time the question had, indeed, 
O N  T H E  S H O U L D E R S  O F  T I T A N S  
been settled. Meanwhile, however, only the test flights could show that 
more determined management was the answer to the technological 
problems. Titan I1 was still in trouble, and the weekly status reports 
that Seamans was getting from the Air Force Systems Command after 
mid-september reflected a promising beginning but little more.19 
Some thought was even being given to dropping Titan I1 from the 
Gemini project altogether. The Propulsion and Vehicle Engineering 
Laboratory of NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center began to study the 
desperate expedient of substitutmg the Saturn 1 launch vehicle for 
both Titan 11 and Atlas.20 
PARAGLIDER ON THE WANE 
Work on the reoriented paraglider program of May 1963 got off 
to a quick start. Before the end of the month, North American Avia- 
tion was working out techniques for launching a tow-test vehicle from 
the ground. This preliminary effort, which involved first a car-towed 
half-scale vehicle and then one towed by helicopter, was.designed to 
show what the paraglider would do during towlng and liftoff and to 
work out proper towing techniques, all this to prepare for that part of 
the new test rogram in which a pilot would fly the test vehicle from P an altitude o 3000 meters to a landing. NASA's Flight Research Gen- 
ter also conducted a series of tow tests, the whole effort being complet- 
ed in mid-October 1963.21 
May 1963 also saw North American begin work on the other 
phase of the new test program, testing the deployment sequence with 
the full-scale test vehicle. Since this phase of testing called for the test 
vehicle to land by parachute, the first step was to qualify a parachute 
recovery system, one standard Gemini parachute backed up by a sec- 
ond. North American got off to a smooth start. Two drops of a small 
bomblike test vehicle on 22 May and 3 June showed that the system's 
two small stabilization parachutes worked. The contractor quickly be- 
gan testing the full system on a boilerplate test vehicle. A minor mal- 
function marred the first drop on 24 June, but three good tests fol- 
lowed in July, with only one more needed to prove the system. What 
was to have been the final drop, on 30 July, brought a crucial setback. 
Both main and backup parachutes failed, and the boilerplate 
crashed.22 
The com any wanted to get on to the next phase of testing and R argued that t e failure could be safely ignored, partly because North 
American believed it knew how to correct the problem, partly because 
further tests would require a new boilerplate and mean a delay in the 
program. The logic was sound enough, but GPO feared that, although 
the immediate problem might be easily corrected, its root cause-the 
instability of the vehicle-might produce other, and worse, problems. 
The Gemhi Parachutes 
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If Gemini were forced to use parachutes instead of the trouble-plagued par- 
aglider for landing the spacecraft, the landing sites would shift from land to 
sea. Below, left, is a water landing test in the Salton Sea at El Centro, Califor- 
nia. The notable difference from Mercury landings is that the Gemini space- 
craft lies in the water horizontally rather than vertically. Since an emergency 
landing on land could not be ruled out, tests in the California desert (below 
right) sought impact data on vertical landings. 
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GPO and North American agreed on two further drop tests. 
McDonnell furnished the new boilerplate, which North Amer~can, on 
the basis of spin-tunnel tests, modified to provide a more stable sus- 
pension system. That took time; over three months elapsed before the 
next drop, on 12 November 1963. Everything worked, and another 
test three weeks later confirmed the result; the parachute recovery sys- 
tem was at last qualified for full-scale vehicle deployment tests.23 
Proving the parachute system was not the only source of delay. 
Design engineering inspections of the full-scale test vehicle on 1 Au- 
gust and the tow-test vehicle on 27 September produced the normal 
share of required changes. Wind tunnel tests of North American's first 
full-scale prototype wing at Ames Research Center in October yielded 
too little data and had to be repeated in early December. So it was 
late November before the contractor could deliver the first tow-test 
vehicle to Edwards Air Force Base to begin its manned program and 
mid-December before the two full-scale vehicles arrived.24 With almost 
two thirds of the time available under the new contract exhausted, 
North American had yet to begin the major flight-testing portion of 
the program. 
By the fall of 1963, the status of paraglider in Gemini was once 
more in jeopardy--only partly because of North American's troubles. 
The inflated frame used in the paraglider design was being challenged 
by advocates of what seemed to be a viable alternative-an all-flexible 
gliding parachute, the so-called parasail. This device offered a lift-to- 
drag ratio ranging from 0.9 to 1.2, lower than paraglider's but still 
enough to provide worthwhile range and control. It was further handi- 
capped by its relatively high rate of descent, which required landing 
rockets to cushion impact with the ground. But, overall, parasails 
matched conventional parachutes closely enough to promise a reasona- 
bly quick and relatively cheap development of a reliable device for 
land landing. 
The gliding parachute had, in fact, competed with the inflated- 
frame paraglider design back in 1961, when the choice of a land-land- 
ing technique for what was then the Mercury Mark I1 project was 
being made. Although rejected for Mark 11, the concept persisted as 
the subject of a modest research and development program at MSC.25 
As paraglider faltered, parasail seemed more attractive. Project Gemi- 
ni's new manager, Charles Mathews, was more receptive to parasail- 
or less committed to paraglider-than James Chamberlin had been. 
Supported by MSC Director Gilruth, Mathews called on GPO for an- 
other look at parasail. In April 1963, after the second half-scale test 
vehicle had crashed but before the future of the paraglider program 
was decided, he asked McDonnell to study changing Gemini's landing 
system from paraglider to parasail.26 
While McDonnell pursued its study, MSC's Flight Operations Divi- 
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sion and Systems Evaluation Division continued testing a parasail sys- 
tem and pressing for its adoption. Paraglider still had highly vocal 
backers, however, who denied that its problems involved anything 
more than sequential details that would have to be ironed out for any 
recovery device, even conventional parachutes. Claiming that paragli- 
der development had been known from the first to be a hard task, 
they objected to dropping it after so much of the work had already 
been done.27 The lines were drawn where they had been in 1961: 
Flight Operations Division and the Engineering and Development Di- 
rectorate still opposed paraglider; most of the project office and the 
prospective pilots, supported by Flight Crew Operations, favored it. 
When McDonnell finished its study early in September 1963, the 
issue was carried to NASA Headquarters. The company's informed 
guess at the cost of a parasail and landing-rocket system for the Gemi- 
ni spacecraft was $15.7 million, with a good chance to be ready for 
Spacecraft 7. When the parasail proposal was informally presented to 
NASA Headquarters on 6 September, it was rejected. Dropping para- 
glider on the verge of flight testing, leaving nothing to show for all the 
time, money, and effort already spent, was out of the question. The 
alternative, going ahead with parasail development as something to fall 
back on if paraglider failed, was ruled out for lack of funds to support 
both tasks at once.28 
Although reprieved, the paraglider program did not come 
through unscathed. High-level talks between MSC and NASA Head- 
quarters produced still another reorientation of the program." The 
paraglider landing system program was stripped of all other objectives, 
leaving as its only goal proving paraglider's technical feasibility-which 
meant primarily showing that the wing could be inflated and deployed 
in flight to achieve a stable glide-with the accent on staying within the 
$16.1 million budgeted for fiscal year 1964. Until that goal had been 
met, there was to be no further work on a prototype system for Gemi- 
ni, much less on production. Gilruth insisted on a clear understanding 
that paraglider might still fly on Gemini if the flight tests succeeded, 
that paraglider's future in Gemini had not been foreclosed.29 The im- 
plication of foreclosure was nonetheless there. 
Under orders from MSC, North American ceased its efforts to 
keep the full-scale test vehicle fitted with the latest Gemini equipment. 
MSC also directed McDonnell to stop all testing related to installing 
the paraglider, to design parachute versions of all Gemini spacecraft, 
and to plan on putting paraglider in the last three, the last two, or 
*Major participants were MSC Director Gilruth, NASA Associate Administrator Seamans, 
George E. Mueller (who had recently replaced Brainerd Holmes as Deputy Associate Administra- 
tor for Manned Space Flight), and George Low (Mueller's Deputy Director for Programs). 
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only the last spacecraft. Nothing of paraglider was to remain in the 
spacecraft except the option to put everything back if the flight testing 
succeeded. Parachutes had, by late 1963, displaced paragliders as the 
planned means of recovery through the ninth mission. Paraglider 
landing was still listed for the last three Gemini flights, but some plan- 
ners, SSD Commander Ben Funk among them, assumed paraglider 
would not be included in the tenth mission, either, "and probably will 
not be carried on any of the twelve flights."30 The very fact of paragli- 
der's doubtful status had already begun to close off any real chance to 
fly in Gemini, whether it proved itself or not. 
A common feature of spacecraft development, and always a mat- 
ter of concern, seems to be an innate tendency toward weight growth. 
Gemini was no exception. A complete paraglider landing system 
weighed almost 360 kilograms more than a conventional parachute 
recovery system. Once paraglider's place had been questioned, that 
difference was seen as a bonus and was simply used up. Experiments, 
for instance, began to encroach on as yet unfilled space allotted to par- 
aglider, especially after January 1964, when the Manned Space Flight 
Experiments Board was formed. Gemini's planners were beginning to 
look on paraglider as an extra demand on the payload budget, already 
pushing the limits set by the booster. If paraglider were to be restored, 
some other mission objectives would have to give way.31 In other 
words, even if North American succeeded in showing that paraglider 
worked, that could no longer guarantee an attempt to fly the system in 
Gemini. Everything rested on the outcome of North American's up- 
coming effort to deploy the wing on the full-scale test vehicle in flight; 
although success could not ensure a place for paraglider, failure would 
surely bar it. 
Work on the systems that made up the Gemini spacecraft was 
moving along well in early 1963. Design had largely been completed, 
and developmental tests were starting.32 In some instances, this re- 
vealed unexpectedly hard problems. Three systems, in particular-fuel 
cell, propulsion, and escape-began to emerge as potentially critical 
areas. As a group, these systems called for the largest advance beyond 
existing technology. Each was essential to a major Gemini objective, 
each was new to the manned space flight program, and each resisted 
efforts to resolve its problems. 
A major innovation in the Gemini spacecraft was the substitution 
of fuel cells for conventional batteries as the prime source of electrical 
power during flight. McDonnell had subcontracted the development of 
this system to General Electric (GE). By the end of 1962, GE had com- 
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pleted facilities at its Direct Energy Conversion Operation in West 
Lynn, Massachusetts, to produce fuel cells. GE had also surmounted 
the first serious development problem: leakage of oxygen through the 
cell's ion-exchange membrane, which proved to be largely the result of 
mechanically induced stresses rather than an inherent design weak- 
ness.33 
Solving this problem, however, exposed another. With leakage 
controlled, fuel-cell test units working over longer times showed de- 
graded performance. The cause appeared to be contamination of the 
membrane by metal ions from the fiber glass wicks that removed water 
produced by the operation of the cell. Leaks in the tubes that fed hy- 
drogen to the cell were a second source of test failures. Both problems 
demanded design changes. Dacron cloth replaced fiber glass wicks, and 
a titanium-palladium alloy supplanted pure titanium tubing, which had 
proved susceptible to cracking. Slow delivery of both materials, as well 
as the necessary redesign, began to affect schedules. Dacron produced 
its own problems: the new wicks touched the membrane, drew off elec- 
trolyte, and impaired cell function. Thinner wicks were an easy an- 
swer.34 
The test failures, design changes, and revised production tech- 
niques combined to delay the fuel-cell program. GPO began looking 
for ways to increase the rate of fuel-cell production and to install fuel 
cells at a later point in spacecraft assembly. A visit to GE in May 1963 
convinced both GPO and McDonnell that the current program was 
unrealistic; schedules allowed too little time for testing and failed to 
provide for contingencies or troubleshooting.35 Throughout the spring 
and summer of 1963, McDonnell and GE kept juggling test and pro- 
duction units, trying to meet ever less tenable schedules, as slippage in 
the fuel-cell program mounted.36 These efforts were complicated by 
further development problems. 
The project office was far from certain that fuel cells would be 
ready on schedule, even when GE began shifting its main effort from 
engineering and development to making fuel-cell stacks on the pro- 
duction line.37 On 2'7 August 1963, GPO asked McDonnell for an en- 
gineering evaluation of batteries for electrical power in Spacecraft 3, 
the first man-carrying ship, scheduled for October 1964; the fuel cells 
were to remain aboard to be used only on a test load for purposes of 
flight qualification. When and if proper operation was confirmed, they 
might then be hooked into the spacecraft main electrical system. 
McDonnell had a plan for dual installation of batteries and fuel cells 
ready within a month.38 Mathews then requested a design study of 
substituting batteries for fuel cells in all seven spacecraft planned for 
two-day rendezvous missions.39 
NASA Headquarters also took action. George E. Mueller, NASA's 
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The Gemini fuel cell that supplied electrical power to the spacecraft consisted 
of three stacks connected in parallel to form a battery section. Each stack was 
made up of  32 cells between the end plates. At top left is a sketch of a fuel 
cell stack and its location in spacecraft equipment adapter section. At top 
right is a schematic of the principle of  its operation. At bottom left is a set of  
three fuel cell stacks assembled without their cover. At bottom right is a fuel 
cell with cover undergoing test at the Direct Energy Conversion Operation, 
General Electric, West Lynn, Massachusetts. 
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new De uty Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, ar- 
ranged I' or three senior engineers from Bell Telephone Laboratories* 
to visit the GE plant to assess the status of the fuel-cell program.40 
Rumors were already circulating that fuel-cell problems might force 
NASA to limit all Gemini missions to two days.41 GE experiments had 
shown that Gemini fuel cells had an operating life of 600 hours in 
theory, but a number of factors, among them the high operating tem- 
peratures imposed by a newly redesigned cooling system, had reduced 
that figure to less than 200 hours in practice.42 Fuel-cell problems were 
never conceptual. As a source of electrical power for long-term orbital 
missions, no one doubted that cells had a solid edge over batteries. 
The rub came in trying to convert that concept into hardware to meet 
Gemini specifications-essentially a matter of nuts and bolts, com- 
pounded to some extent by managerial shortcomings. This was clearly 
pointed up in the findings of the Bell experts, who toured the GE 
plant on 29-30 October 1963. 
Their key tasks were to spot the development problems that re- 
mained and to answer two questions: Could GE solve these problems? 
What were the contractor's prospects of meeting Gemini production 
schedules? The team pinpointed technical matters of fuel-cell struc- 
tures, materials, and the like, as exemplified by uneven current distri- 
bution because of poor contact between membrane and catalyst or ca- 
talyst and rib. The Bell engineers thought that GE could solve these 
problems, given enough time. Whether there was time, however, was 
something else; the team suggested that NASA might want to think 
about a backup program. GE was already six months late. Despite its 
stated intent to make up the lost time, GE would be doing well to 
maintain the current schedule. The Bell recommendations, like those 
put forward a little later by McDonnell in a survey of possible fuel-cell 
changes to meet Gemini operational needs, were restricted to narrow 
technical considerations.43 
Fuel-cell production came to a halt on 26 November, as two GE 
task groups tried to resolve persistent engineering and manufacturing 
problems. Testing of the stacks on hand continued, but GE could build 
no new ones until a thorough study had revealed the causes of poor 
fuel-cell performance.44 
Still fearing that fuel cells might not be ready for Spacecraft 3, 
Mathews instructed Walter Burke to alter the spacecraft's electrical sys- 
tem to accept either batteries or fuel cells as power sources when the 
spacecraft reached Cape Canaveral. By mid-December, convinced that 
the fuel-cell system could not be qualified in time, GPO opted to fly 
*N. Bruce Hannay, Frank J. Biondi, and Upton B. Thomas. 
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the first manned mission with batteries. But Spacecraft 2 would be fit- 
ted with both systems, chiefly to afford a chance to qualify the fuel-cell 
reactant system. The reactant supply system was a distinct develop- 
ment. The system, subcontracted to AiResearch, stored and fed to the 
cells the hydrogen and oxygen they ran on.45 
There was still little reason to believe that fuel-cell problems could 
be resolved even for later Gemini flights. On 20 January 1964, Ma- 
thews asked Burke to begin work on a battery-operated system for 
Spacecraft 4. Switching from fuel-cell to battery power for these two 
spacecraft cost Project Gemini almost $600 000.46 The GE task groups 
having completed their intensive six-week search for the causes of the 
problems, a meeting was scheduled in Houston on 27 January 1964, 
between NASA and its contractors to review fuel-cell status and to de- 
cide what to do about it.47 
Although some missions might have to be curtailed, the Gemini 
spacecraft could carry men aloft without fuel cells by using convention- 
al batteries. No such easy answer existed for the escape system. Any 
effort to replace it with something else would not only be difficult but 
far more costly. In the spring of 1963, some thought the change would 
be worth whatever it cost. MSC's Flight Operations Division revived a 
proposal to replace ejection seats with an escape tower, the system 
used in Project Mercury. Doubtful that the seat could be qualified in 
time and skeptical of its value as an escape device in any case, chief of 
Flight Operations Christo her Kraft urged Gilruth to start a backup 
program to see, at least, i i' an escape tower could be used for Gemini.48 
Gemini Project Office, seconded by the astronauts and Flight Crew 
Operations, still believed that Gemini ejection seats could be made to 
work. Hard-to-solve problems were only to be expected in the develop- 
ment of so advanced a system.49 Things were, in fact, starting to look 
up. Simulated off-the-pad ejection (Sope) tests had been suspended in 
the fall of 1962 until all system components were ready and the com- 
plete escape sequence, including recovery of dummy astronauts, could 
be demonstrated. The system had also grown more com lex; it now $ included a device-a hybrid of balloon and parachute calle a ballute- 
to prevent an astronaut from spinning during free fall if he had to 
eject from an altitdde much higher than the 2000 meters at which his 
personal parachute was set to deploy.50 
When Sope testing resumed on 7 February 1963, the results were 
disappointing from the standpoint of proving the complete escape 
sequence-the ballutes failed to inflate and release and the personal 
parachute did not deploy properly. But, in the view of Kenneth Hecht 
and his colleagues in GPO who were in charge of escape-system devel- 
opment, the test marked a real breakthrough. They had been con- 
vinced that the key problem was dynamic, the relationship between 
rocket-motor thrust vector and the shifting center of gravity of the 
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seat-man combination. Analysis of the data from the test revealed that 
they had been overlooking a significant factor in their calculations-the 
tendency of the ejecting mass to tip as a result of its inertia when it left 
the end of the guide rails. With that factor accounted for, the key 
problem was solved. "The remaining technical problems," Hecht later 
recalled, "were in debugging the details of a very complex design."Sl 
That, however, was no small order. Measures were taken to en- 
sure that the personal parachute would deploy at the low dynamic 
pressure associated with off-the-pad aborts. McDonnell and Weber 
engineers also cleaned up the makeshift additions to seat design that 
had piled u in the course of development. But the complete escape P sequence sti 1 had to be proved. All that took time. The new package 
was given its final checkout on 22 April 1963.52 Three weeks later, on 
15 May, Sope testing was under way again, with heartening results. 
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The last four tests in the series of 12, which had be un in July 1962, 
were almost flawless, only an insignificant failure o f part of the test 
gear marring the final test, on 16 July. The development phase of pad 
ejection testing was now complete.53 
Still unfinished, however-indeed, scarcely begun-was a second 
series of development tests, sled-ejection tests. These were not so novel 
as the Sope tests, being in common use for all ejection-seat develop- 
ment. They simulated ejection at high dynamic pressures-as might be 
met in an escape during first-stage booster firing. In the Gemini tests, 
conducted at the Naval Ordnance Test Station in California, two ejec- 
tion seats were mounted side by side in a boilerplate spacecraft carried 
on a rocket-propelled sled running on tracks. Known as the Superson- 
ic Naval Ordnance Research Track, it was, obviously, called "Snort." 
But the delays met in So e tests, compounded by the reprogramming 
of late 1962, slowed the s f) ed program.54 
This may have been just as well, because the test vehicle was badly 
damaged in its first run, on 9 November 1962.This was not an ejec- 
tion-seat test. The test station needed a trial run to confirm its data on 
sled performance and structural soundness. It got what it wanted, but 
a rocket motor broke loose and smashed into the boilerplate, starting a 
fire. Althou h both boilerplate and sled needed a lot of work, GPO 
foresaw no d elay in the sled-test program itself, since other factors had 
already required it to be rescheduled, leaving ample time for re airs.55 
Flawless Sope tests on 15 and 25 May 1963 showed that t R e new 
seat design was working and sled tests could begin. A dynamic dual 
ejection on 20 June was a success, followed by a second good run on 9 
August. That turned out to be the last test in 1963. The seat system 
went through still another redesign, this time to provide for the auto- 
matic jettison of backboard and egress kits.56 A more serious problem, 
and one that persisted, had little to do with the system itself. Testing 
was continuously hampered by shortages and slow delivery of parts, 
particularly the pyrotechnic devices that were crucial to so many of the 
system's functions.* 57 
Although fuel-cell and escape systems had begun to look trouble- 
some in 1962, the thrusters on which the Gemini spacecraft relied for 
attitude control and maneuvering in orbit and for control during reen- 
try seemed at first to present no special problems. The subcontractor 
*The ejection seat was not the only system in Gemini having troubles with pyrotechnics. 
They seemed to be causing problems throughout the program, so much so that, in August 1963, 
Charles Mathews established an ad hoc committee to review the Gemini pyrotechnics systems- 
design, qualification, and functions. Headed by Russell E. Clickner (Mercury), the committee 
consisted of Joe W. Dodson (Mercury), Roger N. Messier (Technical Services), Chester Vaughan 
(Systems Evaluation and Development), and Robert Cohen and Percy Miglicco (Gemini). The 
work of the committee had a widespread influence on Gemini pyrotechnics and associated sys- 
terns-circuitry, redundancy, system design, logic, and qualification testing. 
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for both these systems, Rocketdyne Division of North American, fo- 
cused its research effort on developing an engine of 11 1 newtons (25 
pounds of thrust) able to perform within specification for five minutes 
of constant burning. McDonnell and Rocketdyne en 'neers assumed 
that a thruster design able to meet that standard coul f also sustain the 
pulsed, or cyclic, firing that would be called for in practice. They 
also thought that a working, 11 1-newton-thruster design need only 
be scaled up to meet the performance demanded of the 445- 
newton (100-pound-thrust) maneuvering thrusters. They were wrong 
on both counts.58 
Then Rocketdyne began running into trouble in steady-state 
thruster firing. Early tests of the small thrusters showed they tended to 
char through their casings and to fall off sharply in performance with- 
in little more than a minute of continuous firing. When this problem 
was fixed early in 1963 by a makeshift strengthening of the throat re- 
ion of the thruster, which allowed it to attain a full five minutes of 
iring and more, Chamberlin was cautiously optimistic about having 
qualified units ready to be installed on time.59 
That hope suffered a setback when Rocketdyne turned to pulse 
testing and found that pulsing thrusters burned out their ablative lin- 
ers far more quickly than identical thrusters firing continuously. Char 
rates-the s eed with which thrust-chamber liners burn up-were one 
and one h a/=' f times greater in pulsed firing, and thrusters were failing 
as their lining material was exhausted and their casings burned 
through. Such expedients as oxidizer to fuel ratio lowered (from 
2.05: 1 to 1.3: 1) to reduce chamber temperatures and thus char rates, 
thickened ablative linings, and shortened firing times (for some thrus- 
ters) could only alleviate, not solve, the problem. In May 1963, Rocket- 
dyne had neither completed the design of the reentry control thrusters 
nor fired the attitude thruster through a full pulsed duty cycle. The 
company had fallen three months behind schedule in delivering the 
thrusters and other parts of the system to McDonnell for Spacecraft 3, 
and development testing was equally laggard. 
To make matters worse, new tests revealed that the larger maneu- 
vering thrusters could not be simply enlarged versions of the attitude 
engines. Rocketdyne had, so far, done very little work on the maneu- 
ver thrusters, partly because of its focus on the smaller model and part- 
ly because it had been slow to provide test hardware and facilities. 
During April 1963, testing of the larger OAMS thrusters had ceased 
altogether. The new findings now compelled the company to reactivate 
that test program at once.60 
Rocketdyne made one design change after another in an effort to 
put together a thruster that worked, with no striking success. By July 
1963, McDonnell was willing to accept a version of the attitude thrus- 
ter that could not be ready until Spacecraft 5. Relaxed test require- 
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ments and less stringent performance standards-lower oxidizer to 
fuel ratios, shorter firing times, and reduced thrust ratings and specific 
impulse for all engines-helped a little, but grounds for real o timism 
were slight.61 As the summer of 1963 drew to a close, no smal /' OAMS 
thruster had achieved a full mission duty cycle. A few larger OAMS 
thrusters had, but too few to be sure and with too small a margin of 
life beyond the duty cycle. The reentry control thrusters looked a little 
better, largely because of the lesser demands placed on them. They 
had to function only for a relatively brief time during reentry and 
could be expected to run dry before burning through.62 
Even the reentry thrusters, however, hardly inspired confidence. 
Stabilizin the spacecraft at subsonic speeds during the last phase of 
reentry, from roughly 15 000 to 3000 meters, had been intended as 
one function of these motors. (The other, and more important, was to 
hold the spacecraft in the correct attitude for retrofire to control the 
angle of reentry and thus to prevent either too steep or too shallow a 
flight back into Earth's atmosphere.) But, in September 1963, GPO 
decided that the thruster problems were severe enough to warrant 
seeking another way to steady the spacecraft. Since the first six Gemini 
spacecraft were then slated for parachute recovery, GPO decided to 
add a drogue parachute to the system for this purpose. Development 
testing of the parachute recovery system had finlshed in February, and 
qualification testing was well advanced. Mathews ordered a halt to 
these tests on 3 September and directed McDonnell to add the drogue. 
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The first hope, that the new system could be ready for Spacecraft 2, 
did not survive a close look at the effort required. It was slated instead 
for Spacecraft 3, the first manned spacecraft; Spacecraft 2 would fly 
with the non-drogue version.63 
Rocketdyne, still struggling to meet the 232.5 seconds of pulse 
operation required of the small attitude thrusters and the 288.5 sec- 
onds demanded on the larger maneuvering thrusters, received a jolt in 
October 1963 from a McDonnell warning that thruster life would have 
to be doubled or tripled. Astronauts flying simulated missions used the 
thrusters even more strenuously than they were desi ned for, and 
there seemed to be no choice but to widen the margin o f performance. 
Several months elapsed before the new demands were settled at 557 
seconds of pulse operation for the small thrusters and 757 seconds for 
the larger ones. In the meantime, however, thruster testing at Rocket- 
dyne ground to a halt, and the program threatened to founder. No 
end to development testing was yet in sight, and the start of qualifica- 
tion testing was a long way off. During November and December, 
Rocketdyne undertook an intense study of the basic features of small 
ablative rocket engines; McDonnell began work on an alternative de- 
sign, cooled by radiation rather than ablation; and GPO was thinking 
seriously about the drastic step of starting qualification tests before 
development tests were completed.64 
A NEW HEADACHE 
Despite its key role in Gemini, the Agena target vehicle had re- 
ceived far less attention from GPO during 1962 and early 1963 than 
other parts of the program, chiefly because time seemed more than 
ample. Since it was not scheduled into the flight pro ram until the 
fifth mission, Agena started with seven months more f ead time than 
the spacecraft and Titan 11, and that margin more than doubled as a 
result of the reprogramming crisis of late 1962 and the revised flight 
schedule of April 1963. By the spring of 1963, although still slated 
for the fifth mission, Agena's maiden flight was not expected until 
April 1965, 13 months later than originally planned and trailing the 
first Gemini mission by almost a year and a half.65 
That was just as well, because Agena development had moved 
very slowly. Agena's two propulsion systems, primary and secondary, 
were subcontracted to Bell Aerosystems Company in Buffalo, New 
York. The primary system was built around the Bell Model 8247 en- 
gine, into which were pumped storable, hypergolic propellants: 
uns mmetrical dimethyl hydrazine as fuel, inhibited red fuming nitric d aci as oxidizer. Its rated thrust was 71 000 newtons (16 000 ounds), 
Atlas launch vehicle) as well as powering later orbital changes. 
P and it helped push Agena into orbit (the main boost coming rom the 
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The major change in the new engine from the standard model on 
which it was based was in the starting system. Solid-propellant charges, 
or "starter cans," in the standard model fed high-speed gas to start the 
turbine which pumped propellants to the engine. Since these cans 
could not be reused, the number of times the engine could be restart- 
ed was limited by the supply of extra starter cans that could be carried. 
Gemini required an engine that could start at least five times, and Bell 
proposed to meet this demand by switching to a liquid-propellant start- 
ing system. Liquids were stored in rechargeable pressurized tanks, 
which fed them to a gas generator where they were converted to gas 
and transmitted to the turbine. MSC approved the change in Septem- 
ber 1962.66 
Like the primary system, the secondary propulsion system was a 
modification of a system already in use. Several Agenas had carried an 
auxiliary propulsion system to permit small adjustments of orbits. Two 
major changes set off the new model, 8250, from the former system: 
the new secondary propulsion system was modularized instead of hav- 
in its parts scattered at various sites in the vehicle, and stainless steel f be lows were used in place of Teflon bladders to expel propellants 
from their storage tanks. The Gemini-Agena secondary s stem com- 
prised two identical modules, separately mounted but fire cr in unison. 
Each module was self-contained, with propellants, pressurized nitrogen 
to operate the bellows, controls, plumbing, and two thrusters. The 
larger of the two thrusters, rated at 890 newtons (200 pounds), was 
intended chiefly for minor orbital adjustments, and the smaller 71- 
newton (16-pound) thruster for orienting the Agena just before the 
primary propulsion system fired. MSC had approved the modified sec- 
ondary propulsion system in August 1962.67 
Bell had just started its test program when, in the fall of 1962, 
Gemini's budget crisis struck. While Agena's role in Gemini was under 
fire, development stopped. But when the smoke lifted, Agena was still 
very much a part of the program. Contract negotiations between SSD, 
as NASA's agent, and Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, the prime 
contractor, began in January 1963.68 Testing of Agena propulsion sys- 
tems could now begin. When it did, Gemini confronted a major new 
problem area. 
By April 1963, Bell had completed a development version of the 
primary propulsion system, test-fired it, and shipped it to the Arnold 
Engineering Development Center (an Air Force test facility in Tulla- 
homa, Tennessee) for a series of tests to prove that the engine would 
restart at the pressures and temperatures it would meet in Earth orbit. 
Tests began on 3 May and continued over the next two months with 
few surprises, although two problems did emerge. One involved the 
turbine, which tended to spin too fast. The other trouble spot was the 
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latch-type gas generator valve that controlled the flow of propellants 
from the start tanks to the gas generator. These valves sometimes 
opened when they should have stayed closed, failed to open on com- 
mand, or stuck open. SSD reported to MSG's AtlasIAgena panel that 
both problems were being closely studied.69 
Bad luck rocked the program on 15 July, however, when the two 
problems combined. The valve failed during a test, calling for an 
emergency shutdown of the engine. A mistake in the choice of shut- 
down procedures spun the turbine out of control and destroyed the 
turbopump assembly. That was the end of testing at Tullahoma. Bell 
planned to finish the series in its own plant in Buffalo, once the prob- 
lems had been corrected. 
The turbine was fairly easy to fix by adding an electronic circuit to 
monitor its speed and shut it down automatically if it started spinning 
too fast.70 But the gas generator valve was not so simply fixed. The 
failure on 15 July was not its first. A new design was clearly called for. 
Bell set out to improve its latch-type valve, but how good even an im- 
proved version could be was a real question. Bell also went to work on 
an alternative design, solenoid operated rather than latch-type. Tests 
over the next few months lent weight to the view that a solenoid valve 
was not only inherently more reliable but also reduced the complexity 
of the engine as a whole.71 
These advantages, and the still unanswered questions about the 
latch-type valve, swayed a meeting at the Bell plant on 15 November. 
The participants decided to switch to solenoid gas enerator valves in K the Gemini-Agena primary propulsion system and orget about latch- 
type valves. But development had been much delayed. Preliminary 
flight-rating tests had been scheduled to begin in September. Switching 
to the new valves would cost four months and postpone the start of 
these tests until January 1964.72 
Problems and delays also cost money. Negotiations in January and 
February of 1963 had set the price (including Bell's fee) of primary 
system development at $4 771 030. The price tag for solving the tur- 
bine problem would be about $300 000. Total costs kept going up, 
especially after the valve design proved hard to resolve. Toward the 
end of August, the money actually being spent began to exceed that 
predicted. By late October, Bell's guess at the cost of completing the 
program had climbed to $6.177 million, which Lockheed thought was 
at least $300 000 too l0w.73 
Agena's secondary propulsion system developed along the same 
lines. The new stainless steel bellows produced delays and rising costs. 
Negotiated cost and fee was $4 395 81 1; by the time that figure was set- 
tled in May, Bell was already asking for an additional $500 000 for the 
bellows. Scarcely a month later, actual spending was passing predicted 
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expenses as bellows and tanks required still further design work and 
. In mid-October, Bell's best estimate for the secondary 
system was 4.63 million, while Lockheed forecast $5.2 million.74 
Growing engine costs were only part of a trend that brought the 
Gemini-Agena program to another critical pass in the late summer and 
fall of 1963. Other program costs were also rising, and the comfortable 
schedule cushion wth which Agena had emerged in the revised pro- 
gram of April had eroded. Shortly before NASA Headquarters sanc- 
tioned the revised pro ram, Lockheed estimated the cost for its work 
at roughly $50.4 mil 7 ion, with $17 million needed for fiscal year 
1964.75 After meetings in May and June to settle details of the new 
schedule, Lockheed reported its projected total cost as $53.285 million, 
but SSD had set its sights even higher. NASA's Air Force agents want- 
ed $37.2 million in fiscal-year 1964 funds for Atlas-Agena, with $26 
million of that earmarked for Lockheed's Agena contract. GPO pro- 
tested. Mathews thought that was too much money in view of the 
stretched-out schedule and wondered if the program could be com- 
pleted at any reasonable cost with money being spent at that rate. He 
warned SSD that such spending could not be allowed.76 When SSD 
replied on 10 September 1963, current demands were down but the 
price of the total program was up again, to $57.46 million for Agena 
and $103.555 million for the entire Atlas-Agena program.77 
As costs rose, schedules slipped. One source of delay was attempt- 
ed improvements. The first Agena D programmed for Gemini was 
AD-13. Meanwhile, however, the Air Force had started a program to 
improve the standard Agena, the first of which was to be the AD-62 
model. The improved version, unlike the earlier model, came 
equipped with Bell's 8247 engine, which Gemini needed anyway. Since 
there seemed plenty of time, Lockheed's contract was amended to re- 
place AD-13 with AD-62 as the first Agena for Gemini, at a cost of two 
months. Another month or more vanished when the Air Force decided 
to put the restartable Bell engine in AD-71, rather than AD-62, and 
GPO agreed to take that one. Work on test facilities at Lockheed was 
slower than expected, adding to the slippage, and development prob- 
lems in the propulsion systems threatened to delay the program still 
further.78 
The Gemini Project Office was less than happy with the course of 
events, its manager least of all. Mathews was concerned about rising 
costs, of course, but he was just as concerned with the dearth of infor- 
mation that was reaching him through the filter of SSD. With the Air 
Force running the Gemini-Agena development program for NASA, 
Mathews could only plead with his agent to exert more control. Not 
only was GPO being bypassed in the process that approved changes 
Lockheed wanted to make, but the project office was not always even 
told what these changes were. Mathews observed, with good reason, 
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that such decisions as switching from AD-13 to AD-62 (and later AD- 
71) for the first Gemini-Agena were bound to cause program delays. 
He urged SSD to think twice about any further changes "considering 
the deleterious effects that improvements can have."79 
SSD, however, was not really much better informed than GPO 
about Lockheed's changes. Mathews' protests about the lax and shallow 
control SSD imposed on Lockheed highlighted the gulf that divided 
NASA from the Air Force on the administration of government con- 
tracts. The Air Force referred to accept Lockheed's record in filling P past contracts as pro0 of its competence. The government was, in es- 
sence, paying for Lockheed's expertise. Pressing for too many details of 
funding or technology might h~nder progress, cutting into the contrac- 
tor's flexibility without adding much to its prospects for doing the 
work. To the Air Force, NASA's demands for detailed technical and 
financial data seemed at best superfluous, at worst harmful. What 
NASA wanted, of course, was real control of the program, and that 
demanded precise and thorough information. Lockheed was merely a 
case in point. The conflict between NASA and the Air Force over how 
tight a rein the government needed to exercise spanned the whole 
range of contract management. For NASA, it was a basic and never- 
ending problem.80 
In an effort to bring the Gemini-Agena program into line, Ma- 
thews dusted off and sent to Charles Wurster, SSD's chief of Gemini- 
Agena engineering, a formal statement of work that dated back to July 
1963. Such a document was needed, in any case, since there had been 
no formal work statement since Marshall Space Flight Center had left 
the picture. The new statement diverged most sharply from the old in 
the stress it laid on schedules and management. GPO insisted on tight 
control of all contractors, chiefly by using the system of coordination 
panels to keep close watch on what was going on. GPO also wanted the 
last word on any changes, with none to be approved until that office 
was satisfied that it had every piece of relevant data. So widely did 
NASA and Air Force viewpoints diverge that it was 18 months and 15 
versions of the work statement later, in March 1965, before MSC and 
SSD finally agreed.81 
NASA also planned to bring the Aerospace Corporation into the 
target vehicle program in a role analogous to that it already held in 
the launch vehicle program, general systems engineering and technical 
direction. The official end of Mercury in June 1963 had freed a num- 
ber of experienced engineers for other work. Wurster suggested, and 
Mathews agreed, that Aerospace had something to contribute to Gemi- 
ni's Atlas-Agena program, especially in view of the work it had done 
with Mercury's Atlas launch vehicle. Also in favor of the plan was a 
chance to impose a degree of technical continuity via Aerospace across 
all phases of Gemini being carried out under Air Force contracts.82 
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Even if these measures worked, however, they would take time to 
show any effect. In the meantime, the Gemini Atlas-Agena program 
was in trouble, with engine development lagging badly, funding and 
schedules still changing for the worse without much warning. By the 
end of 1963, most of the time that had seemed so ample in the after- 
math of the revised Gemini flight program just eight months before 
had vanished. The schedule for completing Agena development and 
for building the first iarget vehicle now had no slack, and any further 
problems threatened to delay the first rendezvous launch.83 
The last half of 1963 witnessed Project Gemini beset by technical 
problems that stubbornly resisted solution. No major Gemini system- 
whether launch vehicle, paraglider, spacecraft, or target vehicle-could 
confidently be judged ready to fly. These months, in which the ap- 
proved Project Development Plan of December 1961 had scheduled 
Gemini's first four flights, became instead a time of troubles; even the 
revised schedule of April 1963, which called for a first flight before the 
end of that year, proved beyond reach. And as if to underscore those 
troubles, the Soviet Union showed that it still held the lead in the 
space race; 1 November 1963 saw the launch of Polet I, a new space- 
craft planned "for use in manned orbital rendezvous flight." Although 
unmanned, it "described complex figures in s ace" that shifted its first 
nearly circular orbit to a highly elliptical 143 - by 343-kilometer orb- 
it.84 
F; 
Yet, throughout these months that seem so trying in retrospect, 
the enthusiastic engineers and technicians, both in government and 
industry, sustained optimism that transcended the hard facts.85 Part of 
that optimism might be chalked up to experience. The pattern of ris- 
ing costs, sagging schedules, and tough problems was a familiar one at 
the cutting edge of aerospace technology. Then, too, although the pre- 
cise nature of Gemini's problems could not have been predicted, they 
did arise where they were expected-in those systems that demanded 
the greatest advances beyond current technology. That the escape sys- 
tem, for example, should be hard to develop and qualify scarcely came 
as a surprise. It had to meet standards far more stringent than had 
ever been imposed on ejection seats before, and the general nature of 
the problems to be met could be, and were, foreseen.86 
Initial schedules and cost estimates tend to be based on the most 
optimistic assumptions, the completely troublefree development of 
many complex systems. And these estimates depend on guesswork 
when new technology is involved-informed and reasoned, to be sure, 
but guesswork nonetheless. Rightly or wrongly, an organization like 
NASA assumes that Congress, the source of the money to make things 
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go, prefers fast, cheap programs: the shorter the time and the lower 
the price, the better a program's chances for support. But there is an- 
other, perhaps more weighty, reason for planning optimistically. If 
time and money are provided for contingencies, then they tend to be 
used simply because they are there. On the other hand, starting with 
the strictest limits and yielding further increments of time and money 
grudginglv may well produce the optimum achievement of the desired 
g0al.87 
In reality, most of Gemini's troubles in 1963 and later were the 
product of careful planning and design, credited to the program's 
first manager, James Chamberlin, that got the project off to such a 
quick and promising start. This auspicious beginning encouraged 
NASA to move toward a more ambitious rogram, to push Gemini 
closer to its design limits. Problems that mig R t have looked only mildly 
worrisome in the context of the original Gemini concept took on a 
more threatening guise when the margin for error had been much 
reduced. 
For a variety of reasons, then, Gemini workers were more confi- 
dent than a backward look at the difficulties may seem to warrant. But 
the problems were real; and their gravity should not be downgraded 
even though, in almost every instance, they responded finally to efforts 
to resolve them. 
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T HE faith that sustained Project Gemini's managers and workers through the dark days of 1963 was not misplaced. Even before 
the year was over, some of the hardest problems had begun to yield. 
Gemini's prospects were far brighter by the spring of 1964 than they 
had been in the fall of 1963. There was still much work to be done, 
and not every effort at problem-solving was crowned with success. The 
project that stood on the verge of proving itself in the spring of 1964 
was not the same project that had begun two years and more before, 
nor even the same project that emerged from the budget and manage- 
rial crises of late 1962 and early 1963. But most of what its founders 
had set out to prove had survived, and what had been lost could be 
balanced with what had been gained. 
On 1 November 1963, "Program" replaced "Project" in the title of 
the office that directed Gemini. This change reflected its responsibility 
for the program as a whole, and not merely for the spacecraft. Since 
that had been true from the outset, the new name did no more than 
underwrite a reality that already existed. MSC Director Robert Gilruth 
announced it as part of a major reorganization designed to strengthen 
both Gemini and Apollo now that Mercury was over.* Mercury's man- 
*Other major elements affected by the reorganization were Flight Operations and Flight 
Crew Operations Divisions, which emerged as Directorates. Walter Williams went to NASA Head- 
quarters as Deputy Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight Operations, leaving James 
C. Elms as sole Deputy Director of MSC. But Elms, who had come to MSC to strengthen its orga- 
nization, decided his work was done and resigned in January 1964 to return to industry. George 
Low, NASA Deputy Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, was appointed Deputy 
Director of MSC on 19 January, to take effect on 1 May 1964. 
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ager, Kenneth Weinknecht, joined Gemini as deputy manager under 
Charles Mathews. Mleinknecht brought with him about a third of his 
former staff .I 
On the same day, 1 November 1963, an important realignment of 
NASA Headquarters also went into effect, and for much the same rea- 
son: Project Mercury's demise was a chance to reassess the agency's 
management structure. James Webb, Hugh Dryden, and Robert Sea- 
mans had become dissatisfied with the November 1961 reorganization. 
Headquarters had failed to secure the strong program direction over 
Apollo that Webb had wanted. When hardware development problems 
continued to mount, with attendant escalating costs and slipping flight 
schedules, something very definitely had to be done. Moreover, having 
a program the size of Apollo, along with all the other programs NASA 
was pursuing, made it difficult for one man--Seamans in this case-to 
serve as "general manager" over day-to-day affairs. In 1961, Webb had 
needed decision makers at the program level, but in 1963 he needed 
this talent, armed with the proper authority, at the administration level 
to unify the agency, provide direction to the field centers, and lessen 
some of the autonomy the latter had held onto so  tightly. The major 
change involved putting the field centers under Headquarters "Asso- 
ciate Administrators" for special activities-George Mueller for 
Manned Space Flight, Homer Newel1 for Space Science and Applica- 
tions, and Raymond L. Bisplinghoff for Advanced Research and Tech- 
nology-rather than under the Associate Administrator as they had 
been. Mueller, who had replaced Brainerd Molmes as chief of manned 
space flight, now took charge of both the program and the centers 
carrying it out-MSC, Marshall Space Flight Center, and Launch Op- 
erations Center. Mueller also set up a Gemini Program Office in 
Washington," chiefly as a device to oversee Gemini and to bring to- 
gether in a single group all those in NASA Headquarters whose work 
related to Gemini. William Schneider had taken over a tiny liaison 
office of seven people from Colonel Daniel D. McKee earlier in the 
year. Now he headed a program office seven times that size. Several 
months would elapse before the effects were felt in Houston.2 In the 
meantime, some of Gemini's most severe technical problems were at 
last beginning to respond to hard work in the field. 
TITAN PI MAKES THE GRADE, BUT NOT PARAGLIDER 
What had been Project Gemini's greatest concern-whether Titan 
I1 could function as a booster for manned space flight-was soonest 
*This was for NASA the beginning of the "five-box" program organization that Mueller de- 
manded. In Headquarters, under Acting Gemini Program Director George Low and his Deputy, 
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laid to rest. Titan I1 Missile N-25 was launched 1 November 1963 
from the Atlantic Missile Range, the 23d in the series of test fli hts 
conducted by the Air Force Ballistic Systems Division (BSD). It f ur- 
nished the first real proof that Titan 11 would do for Gemini. Missile 
N-25 was equipped with the standpipes on its oxidizer lines and me- 
chanical accumulators on its fuel lines that the revised theory had pre- 
dicted would suppress the severe lengthwise bouncing (Pogo) that 
threatened Titan PI'S role as a manned booster. The November flight 
proved it worked. The devices installed in fuel and oxidizer feedlines 
reduced Pogo to the lowest level ever in a Titan II flight, only one- 
ninth the force of gravity (+O.llg), and for the first time well below 
the +0.25g that NASA insisted marked the upper limit for pilot safe- 
t y S 3  
The Gemini Program Office had no way of forecasting that the 
next five months were to see the Titan I1 test flight program produce 
an unbroken string of successes. But, knowing that standpipe and ac- 
cumulator had worked on Missile N-25, GPO inferred that the theory 
behind installing these devices had been confirmed and acted quickly, 
sure that the Pogo problem had been solved. On 6 November, GPO 
decided to procure several sets of the suppression devices for Gemini 
launch vehicles. The soundness of that action was soon confirmed. Ti- 
tan II launches on 12 December 1963 and 15 January 1964 both car- 
ried the oscillation dampers and both met NASA standards. The 15 
January flight, added at Aerospace urging, proved the devices effective 
even with reduced fuel-tank pressures. This was all the more hearten- 
ing because raised tank pressures had lowered Pogo levels in some ear- 
lier missile flights.4 
While Titan I1 was proving itself in flight, NASA and the Air 
Force completed their nearly year-long efforts under the aegis of the 
Gemini Program Planning Board to fix standards for the Gemini 
launch vehicle. NASA's final statement, on 15 November 1963, re- 
hearsed its long-stated demands: longitudinal oscillations during pow- 
ered flight must be no greater than +0.25g, incipient combustion insta- 
bility must be eliminated, and all known design shortcomings and 
anomalies revealed in Titan PI ground and flight tests must be correct- 
ed. On the same day, BSD and SSD (Space Systems Division) of the 
Air Force Systems Command issued a plan to prove in flight their 
program to reduce Pogo and improve engines. These two documents, 
along with the earlier Air Force plan for cleaning up Titan 11 prob- 
lems, answered the board's request of 11 October 1963 for data on 
Schneider, were Major Richard C. Henry, Program Control, Acting; Eldon Hall, Systems Engi- 
neering; LeRoy E. Day, Test; John A. Edwards, Flight Operations; and Dwight C. Cain, Reliability 
and Quality. 
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which to base a formal Memorandum of Understanding between 
NASA and the Air Force.5 
What NASA required and how the Air Force planned to respond 
were discussed for the last time at the board meeting of 3 December. 
The board accepted the NASA specifications as reasonable, the Air 
Force plans to resolve the problems and verify the results as technically 
feasible. Then the co-chairmen of the board, Brockway McMillan for 
the Department of Defense and Robert Seamans for NASA, signed the 
formal "Memorandum of Understanding on Certain Design Require- 
ments for the Gemini Launch Vehicle."6 No further managerial obsta- 
cles blocked the way to a man-rated Gemini launch vehicle. 
The compound of jurisdictional disputes and technological prob- 
lems that had made the launch vehicle the single biggest question 
mark in the Gemini program until late in 1963 vanished almost over- 
night. By mid-January 1964, Titan I1 no longer seemed a concern. 
After the missile's third success with Pogo suppression gear, on 15 
January, Seamans was convinced "that the currently completed flight 
demonstrations of POGO fixes indicated a qualitative understanding of 
the problem and its solution and provided sufficient confidence to go 
ahead with the Gemini program," Another sign of the times was the 
end of the weekly Titan I1 status reports Seamans had been getting 
from Air Force Systems Command because, "based on the successful 
resolution and flight verification of the axial oscillation fix (Pogo) on 
missiles N-25, -29, and -31, the primary requirement, for which this 
weekly report was originated, has been satisfied."7 
Pogo had not, of course, been the only problem, although it was 
the greatest. Still to be resolved was the potential instability of Titan 
11's second-stage engine, which Aerojet-General had begun to tackle in 
October 1963 with Gemsip, the Gemini Stability Improvement Pro- 
gram, focused on working out a new design for the propellant injec- 
tors. Gemsip ended 18 months later with complete success, having 
cost the Air Force about $13 million. NASA spent $1.45 million to in- 
stall the changes in the last six Gemini launch vehicles. The first six 
flew with the old-style injectors, which NASA later defended on the 
somewhat specious grounds that no instability had shown a p  in a Ti- 
tan 11 flight. That was essentially a statistical argument of the kind ear- 
lier rejected as a basis for man-rating. NASA found a better reason for 
going on with the flight program. Aerojet engineers knew that any 
number of techniques might be used to reduce starting shocks, the 
major trigger for unstable burning. Very early in Gemsip, they found 
that a certain minimum pressure in the cartridges that started the 
motor eased the problem. Temperature conditioning-keeping the 
start-cartridge temperature above a critical value-proved even more 
effective. This was the finding that chiefly convinced NASA that Titan 
II's second-stage engine was safe enough for manned missions, al- 
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though only Aerojet's redesigned injector finally provided a dynami- 
cally stable engine.8 
NASA's third concern about Titan I1 had been just how reliable 
some engine parts were. This was less a matter of design than of the 
general standards of manufacturing and quality control observed by 
Aerojet-General. The Air Force, however, saw potentially dangerous 
weaknesses in design that demanded the development of new parts, an 
effort that got under way in September 1963 as the Augmented En- 
gine Improvement Program. NASA deemed improved engines nice, 
but not vital (as damped Pogo and stable second-stage engines were) 
for Gemini. This was just as well, because the engine improvement 
program produced small results for the $11 million it cost the Air 
Force: some minor design shortcomings corrected, welding techniques 
improved, and better assembly methods adopted. NASA did buy one 
product of the program for Gemini, redundant shutdown circuitry, at 
a cost of $1.5 million. But the rest of the hardware developed under 
the program looked more risky than what it was intended to replace. 
The Air Force canceled the rogram in November 1964.9 
Looking back, NASA o & cials had nothing but praise for the hard 
work put in by the Air Force and its contractors to man-rate Titan I1 
for Gemini even while they were trying to prove it as a missile. As 
George Mueller reported to NASA Administrator James Webb: 
In the broad view of this booster program where a military vehicle, 
the Titan 11, was selected prior to its development and a program of 
man-rating carried out actually in parallel with the flight test and 
acceptance of the military versions, we have, I believe, a unique situ- 
ation. It is unique not only in technical complexity but also in man- 
agement relations and control. . . . [Tlhis collaboration between 
two demanding users has produced an unusually reliable military 
launch vehicle . . . [and] a man-rated launch vehicle with a remark- 
able record of success. . . .Configuration management is not a new 
term but the detailed application of the Air Force to the GLV 
[Gemini launch vehicle] development is a model of its kind and a 
significant contribution toward improved management of all major 
programs, in DOD and in NASA. We have seen major improve- 
ments in electrical circuit design, in electrical soldering and welding 
techniques, in assembly procedures and in test specification.10 
This picture of a smoothly meshed team moving from success to suc- 
cess, although true enough for the last six months of the program, 
slighted the obstinate technical and managerial problems that had to 
be surmounted before the happy outcome was reached. 
Even in retrospect, the record of Titan I1 research and develop- 
ment flights was spotty, especially in view of the high promise that had 
induced NASA to choose it for Gemini in the first place. Only 22 of 
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the 32 flights that comprised the test program would have succeeded 
in launching a Gemini mission. Based on Titan 11 flight tests, in other 
words, every third or fourth Gemini mission would have been abor- 
tive; this does not include the Pogo that rattled missiles during first- 
stage flight without compromising Air Force test objectives. This pic- 
ture was, nevertheless, far brighter than it had been in mid-1963-half 
the 20 tests flown by 20 June would have been failures on Gemini. 
The concentration of all 10 unsuccessful flights in the earlier part of 
the program, however, may have held the greatest promise. The un- 
broken string of 12 nearly flawless flights that concluded the Titan I1 
test program strongly implied that the missile's problems had, in fact, 
been solved. With Pogo reduced to tolerable levels by techniques that 
accorded with theoretical analysis, the threat of combustion instability 
eased by an operational expedient, and a series of successes to show 
that other troublesome areas had been cleared up, Titan I1 could be 
judged man-rated in the early spring of 1964. This judgment seemed 
amply confirmed by Gemini-Titan I, launched 8 April 1964," the day 
before the last flight in the missile's research and development test 
program and well before men were first scheduled to ride the Titan.11 
The striking vindication of Titan I1 in the final months of 1963 
had no parallel in the paraglider program. Paraglider's only chance to 
regain a place in Gemini hinged on the outcome of North American's 
new series of deployment fli ht tests with the full-scale vehicle. A full- 
scale wing was to be uncased and inflated in midair, to prove it could 
support the vehicle in stable gliding and maneuvering under radio 
control. Each of the planned 20 tests was to end with the wing cut 
loose at 3000 meters and the test vehicle landing by parachute. The 
parachute system was qualified on 3 December 1963, clearing the way 
for flight testing of the full-scale vehicle to begin on 22 January 1964. 
The first test did nothing to dispel doubts about paraglider; the second 
test, on 18 February, was also a failure.12 
That same day, George Mueller told the House Subcommittee on 
Manned Space Flight that the paraglider "is not presently scheduled 
on the . . . Gemini spacecraft." 
"Will it be used at all in the Gemini program?" one of the Repre- 
sentatives wanted to know. 
Mueller replied, "That will depend upon the development status 
of the paraglider which we will evaluate next spring. It will also de- 
pend upon the needs for a paraglider for precise landing of the Gemi- 
ni spacecraft which we are developing now with the Air Force." 
Further probing revealed that araglider could be ready for the 
tenth Gemini mission, particularly i F' the Department of Defense lent 
*This flight will be discussed in detail in Chapter IX. 
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its support-this from George Low. But, he added, "we have no mon- 
ey included [in] 1965 or beyond for the paraglider under the assump- 
tion we will not go into production."ls 
NASA's public position was that, while land recovery appeared to 
be both desirable and feasible, it was riskier than water landing. Crew 
safety, the paramount concern, dictated the proven mode of water 
landing for all 12 Gemini flights.14 The risks of land recovery were 
real enough, needless to say, but they had been just as real in 1961 
when NASA decided to adopt land landing as a major Gemini objec- 
tive. Toward the end of winter in early 1964, however, the means to 
that end, a paraglider landing system, had yet to achieve a level of 
performance great enough to rely on. After nearly three years of 
work, there was still no certain answer to the key paraglider pro- 
blem-how to unship and inflate the wing from a two-tonne spacecraft 
plunging downward through the atmosphere. The risk that loomed so 
large early in 1964 was perhaps not so much land landing as paragli- 
der 12nding. 
Paraglider still had ardent defenders in NASA, and the decision to 
strike it from Gemini was not yet final.15 But NASA was ready to drop 
the paraglider, the more so since the system might still fly in another 
version of Gemini. In the spring of 1963, under the auspices of the 
Gemini Program Planning Board, the Air Force had begun laying the 
groundwork for its own Gemini program, Gemini BIManned Orbital 
Laboratory (Gemini BIMOL). The Air Force X-20 orbital glider, still 
often called by its former name, Dyna-Soar, had been canceled in De- 
cember 1963, a victim of low priorities and lagging development. Some 
X-20 funds were diverted to the new MOL program, wh~ch projected 
two men in a modified Gemini spacecraft launched by a Titan 111. In 
orbit, the crew would transfer to a separately launched laboratory for 
two to four weeks, after which they would return in their spacecraft.16 
Air Force planning had progressed far enough by January 1964 to 
require a formal agreement between NASA and the Air Force in the 
form of a memorandum signed by Seamans for NASA and Harold 
Brown for the Air Force.17 Although Gemini B/MOL would not be 
officially approved until August 1965 and design work was only begin- 
ning, NASA saw a chance to save paraglider. On 17 March 1964, 
George Mueller asked the Air Force for "an expression of the DOD 
interest in this capability," whether for Gemini BIMOL or any other 
program. Six weeks later, having concluded that paraglider develop- 
ment had too many problems to warrant putting it in the new pro- 
gram, the Air Force discounted any prospect of joining in paraglider 
development and threw the problem back to NASA: "Should the 
NASA qualify and demonstrate the paraglider in the NASA Gemini 
program, consideration would be given to its application to the Gemini 
B/MOL."18 By then, however, it was too late. 
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North American's further efforts to fly the full-scale test vehicle 
produced a string of failures, each distinct in detail but united in a 
single root cause, "an inability to adequately predict the win loads of 
flexible structure[s]." The fifth failure in a row, on 22 Apri f , was the 
last straw. The next day, William Schneider, NASA Headquarters 
Gemini chief, informed George Mueller that he planned to transfer 
what was left of the paraglider program to Flight Research Center and 
to spend no more Gemini money. A week later, the program office in 
Houston began cutting back paraglider work and phasing the program 
out of Gemini. Early in May, GPO and North American agreed to run 
the rest of the flight-test program with the equipment and money al- 
ready committed. Paraglider was dead as far as Gemini was concerned, 
although a public statement of its demise waited until 10 August.19 
Ironically, North American achieved its first full-scale test vehicle 
success on 30 April, the day after phasin it out of Gemini began. In 
fact, the worst was over. Before the end o f 1964, North American flew 
19 more tests for a total of 25, 5 more than originally planned. By 
July, the deployment sequence was no longer giving much trouble, al- 
though a stable glide after the wing inflated was harder to manage. 
The last three flights, however, displayed the complete sequence with- 
out flaw .no 
The last full-scale test vehicle flight was on 1 December 1964. Two 
days later, NASA told North American there would be no more mon- 
ey for flight testing, but equipment on hand might be used, if the 
company cared to spend its own money. North American seized the 
chance to complete the other major portion of the May 1963 program- 
working out landing techniques with a piloted tow-test vehicle. Tow- 
testing had begun during the summer. On 29 July, a helicopter had 
towed the vehicle up to a height of a few hundred meters, around the 
test area, and back to a safe landing. A free flight followed on 7 Au- 
gust, but the vehicle went into a series of uncontrolled turns, forcing 
the pilot to bail out. North American attacked the problem with dis- 
patch and came up with an altered wing design. On 19 December, a 
pilot flew the tow-test vehicle through the complete test to a safe land- 
ing.21 
NASA had long since decided to dis ense with paraglider for P Gemini, however, and that was irrevocable. 22 The system's shortcom- 
*Paraglider's partisans in NASA had not lost faith, and the concept itself retained enough of 
its pristine attractiveness to justify a further effort. During the last half of 1965, North American 
conducted a research and development program under NASA contract to determine flight and 
landing characteristics in a series of 12 manned tests, plus a number of associated unmanned 
flights. More recently, both the Army and Air Force have been interested in developing the sys- 
tem as part of an unmanned cargo delivery system for combat situations. 
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ings, or at least North American's slowness in coming up with answers, 
account chiefly for paraglider's failure to survive in Gemini. But the 
immediate reason for the abrupt action in the last week of April 1964 
to kill what remained of the Gemini paraglider may have had more to 
do with money than with technology. 
MONEY AND MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS AGAIN 
Gemini's chronic budget ills were marked from time to time by 
acute episodes. The crisis of late 1962 had scarcely subsided before the 
project reeled under a new round of cost increases. By 8 March 1963, 
the program's total price tag stood at just over $1 billion. NASA's pro- 
jected budget for fiscal year 1963 had been $232.8 million after the 
impact of reprogramming had been assessed; actual expenditures 
topped $289 million. The pattern repeated in fiscal year 1964, with a 
planned budget of $383.8 million exceeded by $35 million. By 2 
March 1964, NASA expected to spend over $1.2 billion on the pro- 
gram.23 These increases reflected, in part, Gemini's changing scope 
and the technical problems that somehow proved harder to solve than 
anyone had expected. They also reflected, perhaps inevitably in so 
large and complex a program, mistakes, errors of judgment, and mis- 
management, though Gemini appears to have suffered less from those 
ills than other programs of comparable size. Swelling costs were, for 
whatever reason, evident throughout the program. 
NASA and McDonnell had finished negotiating the Gemini space- 
craft contract in February 1963, settling on a total cost plus fixed fee 
of $456 650 062. This figure was not so firm as it then seemed. At the 
end of 1963, McDonnell estimated total spacecraft costs at upwards of 
$612 million. Something less than half the difference could be ascribed 
to approved changes in the program, as exemplified by the $2.7-mil- 
lion price for adding drogue stabilization to the parachute recovery 
system, though this change was itself rompted by development prob- P lems with reentry thrusters. Much o the balance derived from cost 
overruns on major Gemini subcontracts, with thrusters by Rocketdyne 
and fuel cells b General Electric the chief culprits. The new year 
brought no relie; In March 1964, when NASA estimated the total cost 
of Gemini at $1.2203 billion, the spacecraft accounted for $667.3 mil- 
lion.24 
Launch vehicle budgets were equally ephemeral. The billion-dollar 
estimate of March 1963 had included $240 million for the Gemini 
booster. As the year wore on, Air Force Space Systems Division found 
the situation "extremely fluid. Costs were constantly increasing and 
changes were being approved so fast it was difficult to keep track of 
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them. . . . Engine problems were causing late deliveries and increas- 
ing costs." When SSD completed its first comprehensive review of the 
Gemini budget in January 1964, it felt obliged to revise the cost up- 
ward to $296 million. Just two months later, after another hard look at 
launch vehicle costs, SSD claimed to need $324 million. This was the 
same month, March 1964, when NASA was counting the booster's 
share of a $1.2-billion Gemini budget as $281 million. Toward the end 
of the month, Gilruth warned Major General Ben Funk, SSD Com- 
mander, that MSC's 1964 booster money had been exhausted. With 
three months of the fiscal year still to go, the $46.9 million allotted 
looked as if it would fall $30 million short of expenses. Gilruth was 
much concerned about funding in the coming two years and asked 
Funk to take another look at his needs. Funk replied with an estimate 
of $332 million that included $75.3 million for fiscal year 1965, $8.4 
million higher than NASA had planned.25 
Inexorably rising costs plagued target vehicle as well as launch 
vehicle development, and for much the same reasons: technical prob- 
lems compounded by the fact that NASA and the Air Force simply did 
not agree on how a development program ought to be managed. 
NASA wanted more control than the Air Force thought wise to im- 
pose. NASA efforts to promote its view during late 1963 had availed 
little, and Mathews' communications with SSD grew more caustic. On 5 
February 1964, he scored Bell and Lockheed (and, by implication, 
SSD) for the sorry job being done on Agena engine development. 
Costs had "continued to increase even at this late date to a level far 
beyond that considered reasonable by this office." The excuses offered 
were, in Mathews' view, worthless: 
The emphasis which BAC [Bell Aerosystems Company] has placed 
on the fact that the development effort was to be one of minimum 
cost has apparently led them to a belief that sound technical judg- 
ment was no longer required or that minimum cost eliminated its 
use. The GPO does not consider this argument valid or useful. 
The fault was as much Lockheed's as Bell's. Mathews believed that 
the costs quoted by BAC and submitted by LMSC [Lockheed Mis- 
siles & Space Company] are excessive or unjustified in many areas. 
Moreover, these costs have increased and are continuing to increase 
with apparently little financial hazard to BAC and only after-the-fact 
recognition by LMSC. . . . GPO must express dissatisfaction with 
LMSC and BAC management of these programs.26 
Engine development costs were only part of the problem. The first 
"firm" budget for the Gemini Atlas-Agena program was ready in Sep- 
tember 1963. SSD projected a total cost of $103 million, with Agena's 
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share as $57.5 million. By March 1964, NASA was prepared to spend 
$137 million for the program, $93 million on Agena alone. The $37 
million programmed for Agena in fiscal year 1964 was almost exhaust- 
ed, although that figure was $2.4 million higher than Lockheed had, in 
September, claimed to need. Mathews termed the situation "critical" 
and demanded a complete explanation in writing for the discrepancy 
between current costs and the September projections. GPO once again 
saw, in "the contractor's frequent increases in the estimated costs," 
signs of "a serious need for improvement by the contractor in proper 
planning and cost control." Mathews warned SSD and Lockheed that 
"lack of adequate cost control places this program in real jeopardy."27 
Ironically, at the same time that Mathews was urging SSD to get 
Lockheed under control, the contractor was finding that it needed still 
another $2.5 million in 1964 funds, a request that was duly passed 
along to GPO on 4 April. ~ieutenant Colonel Mark E. Rivers, Jr., who 
had just replaced Major Charles Wurster as chief of Gemini-Agena 
engineering for SSD, saw signs of sloppy management in the new 
Lockheed request, which appeared to be based on small changes that 
had piled up unnoticed over several months.28 
This, then, was the settin in April 1964 when North American, 
for the fifth time in a row, kiled to deploy the paraglider wing in 
flight. Mounting costs in all phases of Gemini development had 
stretched the 1964 budget to the breaking oint, and the trend was P still upward. Paraglider had been budgeted or $16.4 million in 1964, 
but that would be the last of the money. Keeping paraglider meant 
finding new funding or cutting back other parts of the program. In 
the money budget as in the weight budget, once paraglider's status 
became doubtful, its place was preempted. Against this confluence of 
forces-technical, operational, and budgetary-paraglider could not 
stand. 
Whether the target vehicle program could survive was also a ques- 
tion. In late April, budget pressures forced Mathews to discuss with his 
staff some desperate measures. Paraglider, Atlas-Agena, and even one 
of the planned Gemini missions were on the chopping block. Once 
again, however, MSC was able to reprogram funds to save the full 12- 
flight program and, via Agena, the rendezvous objective, if not para- 
glider and land landing.29 One of the factors that may have made 
lace in Gemini shaky in April 1964 was a new round of tech- 
nical pro lems that had cropped up earlier in the month. Agena's g 
Bell's efforts to complete development testing of Gemini-Agena 
propulsion s stems during 1963 had produced spotty results and many 
delays, whicB had, in turn, postponed the start of preliminary flight- 
rating tests of these systems. Scheduled to begin in June 1963, testing 
of the main engine had been put off until January 1964 but began 
only on 6 February. Still another two weeks elapsed before the second- 
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ary system began its tests on 17 February. Both programs soon ran 
into trouble.30 
Main engine testing proceeded with only minor problems through 
the first week in April. In the following week, however, the test pro- 
gram encountered what proved to be a six-week delay when the test 
unit's fuel and oxidizer start tanks failed. These tanks were stainless 
steel canisters with bellows inside them to push t h e r p e l l a n t s  that 
started the main engine. Visible lengthwise cracks in eir outer shells 
allowed the gas that was supposed to force the propellants from the 
tanks to escape. The steel in the shells had corroded. Tanks with a 
new heat-treated steel shell replaced the defective tanks, and testing 
resumed in May. But the tests, which should have ended in April, ran 
into late June. Alarmed by the threat of increased cost such a failure 
implied, GPO demanded a complete written account of the causes and 
effects, a point of special concern being "indications that subcontrac- 
tors may have failed to process materials in a manner essential to the 
proper operation of components being developed."sl 
Agena's secondary propulsion system, like the main engine, start- 
ed preliminary flight-rating tests smoothly, then ran into trouble early 
in April. Failure of a propellant valve, however, imposed only a minor 
delay. A harder problem emerged later in the month during high- 
temperature firing, when the wall of a &rust chamber burned through 
after 354 seconds. While well beyond the 200 seconds regarded as the 
system's longest useful life in orbit, it fell below the specified time of 
400 seconds. Bell installed a new thrust chamber and finished the 
tests-in mid-August instead of the scheduled mid-June. The failure, 
however, needed to be explained, and that meant more tests. Bell 
planned a series of six tests over two weeks, beginning early in Sep- 
tember. Test-cell problems hampered the work, which did not end 
until mid-November and then after only four tests. The four were, 
however, enough to spot the problem--elevated propellant tempera- 
tures-and to show that it would not affect the system's performance 
in 0rbit.32 
Bell's slow progress in its test program delayed Lockheed's testing. 
Because of the scope of changes in propulsion systems required to 
adapt the standard Agena D for Gemini, Lockheed planned a series of 
static firings using an Agena skeleton fitted out with propulsion and 
propellant systems at its Santa Cruz Test Base in California. Lockheed 
received the propulsion systems from Bell in February and March and 
had the test assembly at Santa Cruz by the end of March. Checkout 
problems and Bell's cracked start tanks in April held up the testing. 
Lockheed returned the main-engine start tanks to Bell, but they were 
not replaced until mid-May. Other minor problems delayed the first 
firing until 16 June. Once under way, however, the test program 
moved quickly to an end on 7 August 1964 with no further mishaps. 
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Post-test analysis confirmed that the propulsion systems had come 
through in fine shape.33 
In the meantime, doubts about the Agena's ability to perform its 
mission had been growing. On 15 April 1964, SSD suggested flying a 
non-rendezvous Gemini-Agena mission to bolster confidence. GPO 
dismissed this scheme but accepted an alternative recommendation 
that one target vehicle be assigned the role of development test vehi- 
cle. This would be helpful for troubleshooting malfunctions and test- 
ing changes and would also allow further development testing, should 
the need arise. The plan was approved in May and the first Gemini- 
Agena target vehicle, GATV-5001, was to be the test vehicle. AD-71, 
the first standard Agena D for Project Gemini, had been accepted by 
the Air Force on 30 April and transferred to the final assembly area at 
the Lockheed plant, where it was being converted to GATV-5001. 
Despite its new role, GATV-5001 was expected to remain in flight 
status until GPO decided otherwise, although GATV-5002 was now 
tentatively scheduled for the first rendezvous mission. GATV-5001 was 
not likely to fly unless GPO later opted for a non-rendezvous mission. 
So GPO canceled one of the eight Atlas boosters then under contract 
as Agena launch vehicles, saving the program $2.15 million.34 
The three spacecraft systems that had caused the most trouble in 
1963-escape, fuel cell, and thruster--each enjoyed a sharp change of 
fortune as the year turned. Problems that had resisted the best efforts 
of NASA and contractor engineers for so many months suddenly 
yielded. All the answers were not in yet, but by the spring of 1964 the 
prospect that any of these systems might fail to meet Gemini needs 
had largely vanished. 
Escape system development trials had come to a halt in August 
1963 as the system went through another series of design changes and 
some of its key parts, particularly pyrotechnics, remained hard to get. 
Active testing resumed on 22 November, with the first in a projected 
series of about 30 drops of the ballute, which had been added to the 
crew parachutes for the sake of high-altitude stability. The first 10 
tests, which involved both men and dummies and used a ballute 91 
centimeters (36 inches) in diameter attached by a single riser, ended 
on 9 January 1964. In each case, the subject spun too rapidly on the 
riser.* This was solved by raising the ballute diameter to 122 centime- 
ters (48 inches) and using two-point suspension. Fourteen more drops 
*The Air Force furnished the human subjects for these tests--Colonel Clyde S. Cherry, 
Chief Warrant Officer Charles 0 .  Laine (who made the first jump), and Chief Warrant Officer 
Mitchell B. Kanowski. 
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over the next few weeks, the last on 5 February, confirmed the 
changes, and the ballute was ready for its qualification tests.35 
Only two days later, sled-ejection development trials also came to 
an end. Testing had resumed with the fourth run, on 16 January, and 
ended with the fifth, on 7 February. Everything worked In both tests. 
Since simulated off-the-pad and ballute development tests had already 
been completed, the successful 7 February test brought the develop- 
ment phase of escape-system testing to a close.36 Neither fuel cell nor 
thruster was so far advanced. 
Fuel-cell production had stopped in late November 1963, as a pair 
of GE task groups sought to resolve the system's stubborn engineering 
and manufacturing problems. Within six weeks they had finished their 
work, which furnished the basis for turning the program around. Ev- 
eryone involved in the fuel-cell program gathered in Houston on 27 
January 1964 to review development status and decide what to do 
about it. All agreed that the system needed redesigning. The current 
PB2 model was to be discontinued; the units already built were to be 
used for limited testing and to be carried in Spacecraft 2 .to gather 
data and help qualify the reactant supply system. All future cells were 
to be the new P3 design, and they were to be installed in every space- 
craft beginning with the fifth.37 
Major changes in the new model reflected the narrow technical 
nature of the problems: dams (or baffles) were added to improve hy- 
drogen distribution; the water collection wick was removed from each 
cell; and the orifice of the hydrogen feed tube of each unit was re- 
stricted so that any stoppage caused by water clog ng could be 
cleared. Other changes included adding Teflon to the e f ectrode to cut 
the loss of active material from the membrane and an anti-oxidant to 
the membrane to slow the rate of polystyrene breakdown. Tests had 
also suggested that the crucial problem of short operating life might 
respond to reduced temperatures. When further tests confirmed this 
finding, the coolant supplied to fuel cells was adjusted for lower tem- 
peratures.38 
Although fuel-cell problems were largely technical, GE decided 
the program could be better managed. It reorganized the Direct Ener- 
gy Conversion Operation to work solely on the Gemini fuel-cell pro- 
gram. Roy Mushrush, the new manager, had a background as corpo- 
rate troubleshooter for GE. He arrived on the scene with a blank 
check on the company's resources for whatever help he needed. Mush- 
rush was seconded by Frank T. O'Brien as Gemini manager. Both men 
impressed a NASA visitor with their enthusiasm, and morale through- 
out the plant remained high despite the shakeup.39 
The fuel-cell program was still a uestion mark, and no one could 
be fully certain that the system would 1 e ready in time for Gemini. But 
in the early spring of 1964, the program's technical and managerial 
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problems seemed to have been taken in hand, and prospects were a 
ood deal brighter than they had been. By the end of May, GE had 
fnished switching to the P3 design and had started a broad test pro- 
gram -40 
Rocketdyne's thruster development program was also turning a 
corner. So far, attempts to improve performance had been little more 
than stopgaps, centered chiefly on cutting the engines' thermal load by 
dropping the ratio of oxidizer to fuel. But lower working tem eratures 
and longer engine life were being achieved at the expense o ? combus- 
tion efficiency and specific impulse. This was one of three major topics 
discussed at a review of thruster problems in Houston on 23 December 
1963. Rocketdyne was directed to cut the current oxidizer to fuel ratio 
of 1 : 1.3 still further, if that could be done without harm to good start- 
ing and stable burning. 
Study of another expedient was also approved: shifting the side- 
firing thrusters to align them more closely with the spacecraft center of 
gravity and so reduce demands on the smaller attitude thrusters in 
holding spacecraft attitude during lateral moves. Development of this 
small engine was the least hopeful aspect of thruster work-no one 
really understood what its design ought to include, and tests produced 
large and hard-to-explain variations. No attitude thruster had yet 
shown itself able to fire through a complete mission duty cycle without 
failure. 
A third decision, of greatest impact on the rogram, grew out of 
the 23 December review. Andrd Meyer, chief o /' GPO administration, 
had been urging a change in the design of the ablation material lining 
the thrust chamber. A newly developed parallel-laminate material 
showed promise as an answer to thruster-life problems. Meyer wanted 
the laminates oriented nearly parallel to the motor housing, instead of 
perpendicular as before. His efforts to convince both McDonnell and 
Rocketdyne to make this change had been resisted because of its ex- 
pense, but now, strongly backed by MSC Director Robert Gilruth, the 
idea was accepted and an engine to test the concept was ordered built.41 
The thruster picture brightened perceptibly over the next month. 
Further tests confirmed that reduced oxidizer-to-fuel ratios prolonged 
engine life, bringing the maneuverin thrusters within sight of their 
required mission duty cycles. The per f ormance of the smaller attitude 
thrusters also improved, though not as much. By mid-January 1964, 
NASA Headquarters felt sanguine about the prospects for Gemini's 
big thrusters but saw little hope for so happy an outcome to the devel- 
o ment of the smaller thrusters. There was strong support for a study P o a radiation cooled engine as a backup.42 
Meanwhile, Rocketdyne's efforts during the last two- months of 
1963 to work out the basic problems of small ablative engines had also 
borne fruit. A search through the files uncovered a research report on 
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the problem of heat flux in small engines and an answer in the tech- 
nique of "boundary-layer cooling." The injector of a maneuvering 
thruster was modified to spray about a quarter of its fuel down the 
walls of the thrust chamber before firing. On 25 January 1964, Rocket- 
dyne tested the engine through its full mission duty cycle without fail- 
ure, its liner charring only to a depth of little more than a centimeter 
(one-half inch). A secoad thruster produced the same results. Since the 
lining of the flight weight engine was twice that thick, the margin 
seemed ample. Buoyed by these results, GPO, after a meeting at the 
McDonnell plant in St. Louis on 13-14 February, ordered McDonnell 
to have boundary-layer cooling designed into the larger thrusters in 
time for Spacecraft 5.43 
The smaller attitude thrusters did not respond as well to bounda- 
ry-layer cooling, although it helped. A modified injector, combined 
with an oxidizer-to-fuel ratio of 0.7:1, allowed one small engine to sur- 
vive a 5'78second firing on 15 February with some of its liner intact; in 
earlier tests with the same ratio but without the injector, the liner had 
not lasted beyond 380 seconds. Two flight-weight engines with the new 
injector and lower ratio lasted for 435 and 543 seconds. Another 
change made these results look even better. Canting the lateral engines 
to direct the thrust vector closer to spacecraft center of gravity (as sug- 
gested at the 23 December meeting) was shown to reduce the thruster 
life needed to less than 400 seconds.44 
By mid-March 1964, thruster development and qualification ap- 
peared likely to be completed in time, though without much leeway to 
handle any new problems and with performance that was still margin- 
al. In April, that status was transformed. Thrust chambers lined with 
laminated ablative material oriented almost parallel (at an angle of 
only 6 degrees) to the motor housing achieved dramatically better per- 
formance. The first modified attitude thruster endured 2100 seconds 
of burning without failure on 14 April, a fourfold increase over the 
best prior test. And the next day, a maneuver thruster with boundary- 
layer cooling and the 6-degree wrap fired for 1960 seconds, the test 
ending only when fuel was exhausted. Just as striking was the first test 
of a lateral thruster with the new wrap: 3049 seconds of firing time 
without failure. George F. MacDougall, Jr., Deputy Manager of Pro- 
gram Control in GPO, reported the results to the MSC senior staff as 
"a major breakthrough."45 
Convinced that the answer had been found, GPO lost no time. 
Within two days after the first tests of the small and large thrusters, 
McDonnell and Rocketdyne had orders to replace 90-degree with 6- 
degree wraps in all thrusters and to see that the new thrusters were 
installed in the orbital attitude and maneuvering systems of all space- 
craft beginning with the fifth and in the reentry control systems of all 
spacecraft as soon as possible. By 1 May, however, Spacecraft 5 looked 
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too early for a complete set of new engines. Instead, all its attitude 
thrusters would have the modified injector and 6-degree wrap, but 
only the aft-firing maneuvering engines would feature the new design. 
The less critical lateral- and radial-firing engines would be the old 
model. All thruster designs were now frozen, with further testing limit- 
ed strictly to qualification.46 
Rocketdyne was by no means home free, but the worst of the 
spacecraft propulsion systems' technical problems did appear to be 
over by the spring of 1964. The fuel cell also seemed to be in good 
shape. Gemini's escape system, already through its development test 
program, may have looked best of all. As later events were to show, 
the promise was not quite that easy to fulfill. But none of these three 
most stubborn systems was slated for the first Gemini spacecraft, which 
McDonnell had been building in its St. Louis plant. 
The primary objective of the first Gemini mission, as it emerged 
from the revised flight program of April 1963, was to prove the Titan 
I1 able to launch the Gemini spacecraft and put it into orbit within the 
constraints imposed by manned space flight. To gather and re ort P data were the spacecraft's main functions. Spacecraft 1 was, there ore, 
unique among the products of the Gemini assembly line in St. Louis in 
being largely without standard spacecraft systems. For the most part, it 
carried dummy equipment and ballast to match normal weight, center 
of gravity, and moment of inertia. Structurally, however, Spacecraft 1 
differed from later models in only one important respect. Since mis- 
sion plans did not call for the spacecraft to be recovered, the heat- 
shield simply completed the structure. Four large holes bored in the 
ablative material ensured the total destruction of the spacecraft when it 
plunged back into the atmosphere. 
Working equipment was mounted on two special allets (much P like the "crewman simulator" used in Project Mercury) ocated where 
the crew would be in later flights. Spacecraft 1 carried two active Ge'm- 
ini systems: a C-band radar transponder and related gear to help 
ground radar keep track of the spacecraft, and three telemetry trans- 
mitters to return data to Earth. Data were to be gathered by a set of 
special instruments that measured pressure, vibration, acceleration, 
temperature, and structural loads.47 
McDonnell began testing Spacecraft 1 on 5 July 1963, with plans 
to have it at Cape Canaveral by mid-August. The first phase of space- 
craft systems tests centered on making sure that each working piece of 
equipment functioned properly. Many parts did not, bringing testing 
to a halt on 21 July. The instrumentation pallets had several defects, 
especially in their electrical circuits and in their response to vibra- 
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tion. Other problems included a transmitter and a radar beacon that 
had to be returned to their makers to correct out-of-specification per- 
formance. With these matters taken care of, testin resumed on 5 
August and proceeded smoothly to the end of the Erst phase on 21 
August.48 
Four days later, McDonnell workmen mated the major spacecraft 
modules. The now fully assembled vehicle was ready for the second 
phase of systems tests, checking its overall working and the compatibil- 
ity between the mated sections. It was now slated to arrive at the Cape 
on 20 September. During the first half of the month, tests alternated 
with leftover manufacturin tasks, which slowed things down, but not 
seriously. All systems per f ormed well during the last half of the 
month, as the spacecraft was vibrated to simulate a launch, then trans- 
ferred to the altitude chamber for simulated flight tests under orbital 
conditions. A complete integrated systems test on 30 September con- 
cluded the testing.@ 
A good share of the program office and a sampling of the rest of 
NASA were on hand the next day to watch Spacecraft 1 as it rolled 
out of the test area in the McDonnell plant. Throughout the morning, 
McDonnell experts lectured their NASA guests on the spacecraft, the 
status of each of its parts, and the results of testing. After lunch, the 
NASA party retired behind closed doors to ponder the fate of the 
spacecraft. The McDonnell staff gathered late in the afternoon to hear 
the decision. Spacecraft 1 had been accepted for shipment to the 
Cape30 
When it arrived on 4 October, it entered a new round of testing. 
GPO had decided early in the program that Gemini preflight checkout 
would conform to the Mercury pattern, even though the two-man 
spacecraft had been designed to render that kind of repeated testing 
unnecessary. Plans called for the spacecraft to be broken down to its 
major modules, each of which was retested to the subsystem level. Af- 
ter being put back together again and passing a series of integrated 
tests culminating in a simulated flight, the spacecraft was to be trans- 
ferred from the industrial area to the launch complex.51 
Spacecraft 1, lacking most of Gemini's normal systems, was much 
easier to check out than later models; by the evening of 12 February 
1964, the task was finished. The next step was a formal Preflight 
Readiness Review of spacecraft status, both physical and functional. 
Gemini Manager Charles Mathews and a team of engineers from 
Houston and Cape Kennedy* conducted the review on 18-19 Febru- 
*President Johnson issued an Executive Order on 29 November 1963, changing the name of 
the Launch Operations Center to the John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in honor of the late 
President. The Department of the Interior concurred and Cape Canaveral became Cape Kenne- 
dy. 
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ary, finding nothing that would prevent the spacecraft from being 
moved to the launch complex nor that seemed likely to delay the 
launch.52 
The launch vehicle was not ready for mating, so Spacecraft 1 wait- 
ed until 3 March before its transfer to complex 19. While the space- 
craft waited, minor work continued, especially on the spacecraft shin- 
gles. These beryllium shingles were part of the heat protection struc- 
ture and covered the external surfaces of the two forward modules- 
the rendezvous and recovery canister and the reentry control system. 
A fully acceptable fit was not, in fact, achieved until after the space- 
craft had been mated to the launch vehicle.53 
Building and testing the first Gemini launch vehicle was not as 
easy as getting the spacecraft ready, because GLV-1 had the same role 
as the later boosters in the program. Just as McDonnell had been 
building spacecraft despite hard-to-resolve problems in some space- 
craft systems, the Baltimore division of Martin-Marietta had been 
building launch vehicles for Gemini, even during the long months 
when the Air Force and its contractors were struggling to make Titan 
I1 reliable." 
Titan 11 was built around its propellant tanks, one for fuel and 
one for oxidizer in both the first and second stages. Martin's Denver 
division, which held the missile contract, provided the tanks for Gemi- 
ni boosters as well and shipped the set for GLV-1 to Baltimore in Oc- 
tober 1962. After a lengthy series of tests, with special attention to 
welded joints to be sure they were both strong enough and leakproof, 
the tanks were ready for formal inspection in mid-February 1963.t 
Only three passed. The second-stage oxidizer tank was cracked. It was 
returned to Denver and replaced by the tank intended for GLV-2, 
which reached Baltimore on 1 March.54 
By 21 May, the first Gemini launch vehicle was fully assembled 
and ready to begin testing as a unit. A check for wiring continuity re- 
vealed a short circuit in the second stage where a wire's insulation had 
been cut through by a defective clamp. When inspectors found several 
other clamps with the same defect, every one of the more than 1500 
*GLV-1 was already at the Cape on 26 October 1963, a week before the flight of Titan Mis- 
sile N-25 first promised an answer to the Pogo problem. It was mostly Martin-Denver people who 
were struggling with missile problems. 
tThe inspection team, headed by Major Robert Goebel (SSD), included representatives of 
Martin, NASA, Aerospace, and  the Air-Force. Coordinating the team's activities was John R. Lov- 
ell, GLV-1's "chaperon." A launch vehicle chaperon started his duties at Denver with the building 
of the tanks, then traveled with the tanks to Baltimore and went through all the testing, keeping 
complete records of everything that took place and the results. He flew to the Cape with the as- 
sembled vehicle and remained with the booster until it was launched, when he returned to Balti- 
more. Aerojet-General also used the chaperon system, calling its people "guardian engineers." J. 
W. Gustafson shepherded the first- and second-stage engines from their beginnings in Sacramen- 
to, California, to liftoff at the Cape. 
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wiring-harness clamps in GLV-1 was removed, all wiring inspected, 
and a new set of clamps installed.55 
When electrical continuity had been confirmed, the first stage was 
erected in Martin's new Vertical Test Facility on 2 June, the second a 
week later. This facility was a tower 50 meters high, adjoined to a 
three-story blockhouse fitted with test and checkout equipment, or 
AGE,* matching the AGE at complex 19 in Florida that would later 
ready GLV-1 for launch. The tower and blockhouse inside the Martin 
plant were designed to provide test data and to be compared with data 
gathered during checkout at the Cape.56 
The first phase of the test program, subsystem functional verifica- 
tion to make sure that each of the vehicle's subsystems was working, 
began on 10 June. These tests went more slowly than planned. For 
one thing, the second stage had been late going up, partly because of 
electrical problems and partly because its engine arrived late. For an- 
other, minor troubles cropped up-hydraulic tubing that was not fully 
cleaned, solder flux that had boiled from a pinhole in a joint and 
gummed a gyroscope. By the end of June, subsystem testing had fallen 
about two weeks behind schedule, a source of concern but as yet no 
threat to the launch planned for December 1963. The functional veri- 
fication tests lasted until late July, when a review of the data by SSD 
and the Aerospace Corporation found GLV-1 ready for the next phase 
of testing.57 
GLV-1 began combined systems tests on 31 July with a series of 
tests designed to uncover any interference between the vehicle's several 
electrical and electronic systems. Five systems failed to meet standards 
after the first round of testing. Efforts to correct the problems-mainly 
by adding filters and grounds to Age and airborne circuits-produced 
results, though slowly. Only after the sixth test, on 5 September, was 
all interference cleared up. The launch vehicle's last hurdle was a 
combined systems acceptance test (CSAT), which included a complete 
launch countdown, simulated engine start, liftoff, and flight, and end- 
ed with the simulated injection of the spacecraft into orbit. After sev- 
eral practice runs in conjunction with the electrical-electronic interfer- 
ence testing, Martin conducted the formal CSAT on 6 September, 
then presented both the data and the vehicle to the Air Force on 11 
September for acceptance. 5s 
Far the next week and a half, the Vehicle Acceptance Team, 
headed by SSD's Colonel Richard Dineen, met at the Martin plant in 
Baltimore. SSD, NASA, and Aerospace inspectors explored the vehicle 
*AGE is one of those acronyms that tend to take on a life of their own. The formal meaning 
of AGE is aerospace ground equipment, but the acronym was (and is) immeasurably more com- 
mon in use. 
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and studied its manufacturing and test records. This detailed inspec- 
tion disclosed severe contamination of electrical connectors through- 
out, as well as a broken idler gear in the turbopump. These defects, 
plus the fact that 42 major components had yet to achieve documented 
flight status, forced the team to reject GLV-1. Failing to pass this type 
of inspection on the first try was not unusual, but it meant another 
long delay before GLV-1 reached the launch site.59 
SSD and Aerospace members of Dineen's team also conducted a 
First Article Configuration Inspection (FACI) of GLV-1, with far more 
encouraging results. FACI had been a standard Air Force procedure 
since June 1962, a kind of audit of the actual product-as compared to 
engineering design-to provide a baseline for later products under the 
same contract. No SSD launch vehicle had ever made the grade on its 
first try, but GLV-1 did. Such defects as contaminated electrical 
connectors or broken gears, which barred its acceptance for Gemini, 
did not reflect discrepancies between design and product.60 
No sooner was the inspection over than Martin technicians began 
to set things right. Armed with magnifying glasses, they searched every 
one of the 350 electrical connectors aboard GLV-1 for traces of con- 
tamination and found 180 needing to be cleaned or replaced. All flight 
control equipment that had produced transient malfunctions during 
CSAT was removed and analyzed. Defective units were replaced and 
wiring harnesses reinstalled. At the same time, Martin tried to com- 
plete documentation of failure analyses and qualification of flight 
hardware. This extensive reworking of GLV-1 invalidated most of the 
earlier test results. Martin's plan for an informal retest of problem 
areas only was rejected in favor of a full-scale repetition of CSAT. 
Subsystems testing and a preliminary acceptance test were finished by 
2 October.61 
The second formal acceptance test of GLV-1 ran on 4 October, 
uncovering little that needed to be corrected. Dineen's team recon- 
vened at Baltimore on 9 October and took only two days to complete 
its work and decide that GLV-1 could be shipped to the Cape. The 
team was scarcely enthusiastic about the vehicle. Much work remained 
to be done on GLV-1, but it could be done at the Cape, and there at 
least GLV-1 could be helping to check out the launch complex itself.62 
On 26 October 1963, GLV-1's two stages, each strapped to an 
eight-wheeled trailer, were towed to the Martin Airport, next to the 
plant, and rolled through the rear loading door of a huge C-133B car- 
go aircraft provided by the Military Air Transport Service. A four- 
hour flight brought the two stages to Florida. Still on their trailers, 
they were rolled from the aircraft into the hands of Joseph M. Verlan- 
der's Martin-Canaveral crew, who towed them to Hangar H to be un- 
packed, inspected, and fitted with the gear (such as llfting rings) re- 
quired to erect them. There they remained, under guard, over the 
GeHing Gemini I Ready 
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weekend. On Monday morning, 28 October, the trailer bearing the 
first stage reached complex 19. 
At the launch complex, the Martin crew trundled the first stage 
up the long ramp to the launch vehicle erector, which rested on its 
side parallel to the deck of the test stand. The trailer rolled through 
the large door (the roof when the erector was standing) and stopped a 
meter and a half (five feet) from the other end. The crew secured the 
stage, removed the trailer, and closed the roof-door. A 150-horsepow- 
er electric motor then winched the 127-tonne (140-ton) erector up- 
right, a process that took several hours. The trailer-borne second stage 
arrived at the launch pad a day later. Ordinarily, the next step was 
mounting the second stage on the first, but GLV-1 was slated for a 
special static firing test in mid-December, the sequenced compatibility 
firing of both stages. So stage I1 was placed in the second-stage erec- 
tor, a smaller structure used only for checkout or static firings, and the 
two stages were cabled together. After checking to be sure there was 
no interference, Verlander's team applied electrical power to the two 
stages standing side by side on 13 November.63 
Work at the Cape on GLV-1 was already a week behind schedule. 
Problems in Baltimore had pushed the launch date from December 
1963 to February 1964. Another two-month delay now threatened. 
Mathews announced himself "greatly concerned with the present situa- 
tion regarding the Gemini Program at the Atlantic Missile Range." 
Four distinct groups-SSD, the Air Force's 6555th Aerospace Test 
Wing (in charge of all Cape launches), Martin-Baltimore, and Martin- 
Canaveral-were testing and checking out the launch vehicle, with no 
formal understanding on how responsibilities were to be divided 
among them. Clarification was not long in coming; but meanwhile mat- 
ters had become so confused that two distinct Launch Test Directives 
had surfaced. To make things worse, NASA peo le at the Cape com- P plained about lack of access to technical data rom the contractors. 
Poorly meshed working groups compounded other problems-a time- 
consuming review of the official work plan, procurement snags, and, 
most serious, uestions of compatibility between booster and AGE- 
which extende 1 the planned number of working days to get GLV-1 
ready for launch from 86 to 118. By 22 November 1963, Mathews had 
to tell Seamans that even the already late 28 February 1964 launch 
date was likely to drop back to 1 April although GPO was working 
hard to improve the prospect.64 
In one move to help resolve management problems, Mathews 
united the several coordination panels that had been dealing with Ti- 
tan I1 and related areas into a single Gemini Launch Vehicle Coordi- 
nation Committee with six standing panels." All panels were to meet at 
*Jerome Hammack of GPO was chairman of the Coordination Committee, with Lieutenant 
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the same time every third week, then report to the parent committee, 
which would decide what action was to be taken. That should mean no 
more delays caused by uncertain authority, duplicated effort, or con- 
flicting decisions.65 Mathews and GPO launch vehicle manager Willis 
Mitchell also took steps to make good some of the time already lost. 
The Martin crew switched from two 8-hour to two 12-hour shifts a 
day. Checkout problems persisted, however, and the scheduled se- 
quenced firing slipped from 20 December 1963 to 3 January 1964. 
Although a February launch of GLV-1 seemed out of the question, 
Mathews still hoped to launch by 17 March.@ 
But the problems refused to end. The combined systems test 
scheduled for 13 December was twice postponed and finally completed 
on New Year's Eve. Lack of compatibility between the booster and its 
support systems in complex 19, as well as a faulty turbopump assembly 
that had to be returned to Aerojet-General, were the major causes of 
delay. Next was the so-called wet mock simulated flight test, a complete 
countdown that included filling the propellant tanks; it was voided on 
3 January by procedural errors after propellants had already been 
loaded. The test was called off two and a half hours before the simu- 
lated launch, although the count went on until T-30 (30 minutes b e  
fore launch) to see if any other problems turned up and to give the 
operations crew some practice. Another try, on 7 January, was a suc- 
cess. 
The countdown for se uenced compatibility firing was now set to 
begin, but a three and a ha ? f hour delay was imposed by contaminated 
oxidizer. Then, during the countdown, a malfunctioning first-stage 
propellant valve caused the test to be called off 20 minutes before fir- 
ing. A second try, on 14 January, had to be canceled because unusual- 
ly cool weather had chilled the engine start cartridges below the 275 
kelvins (35°F) specified as the lower limit by Aerojet-General to pre- 
vent combustion instability. At last, on 21 January, the third attempt 
overcame some minor problems and delays to show the whole se- 
quence of fueling, countdown, ignition and shutoff commands, guid- 
ance control, and telemetry. First-stage engines fired for 30 seconds 
and cut off. The second-stage ignited and fired for 30 seconds, halted 
by radio signal from the ground computer as in real flight. Sequenced 
compatibility firing roved that the engines delivered the required 
thrust and gimbale x properly. This static firing, the only one per- 
formed on a Gemini launch vehicle, met all prelaunch standards67 
Colonel Alfred J. Gardner, Chief, Engineering Division, Gemini Launch Vehicle Program, SSD, 
as associate. Panels were headed by John W. Smith (structures), John J. Turner (systems), Mar- 
lowe D. Cassetti (launch guidance and control), Donald Jacobs (abort), Carl Kovitz (test opera- 
tions), and Richard E. Lindeman (cost, schedules, and contracts). All the panel chiefs were from 
GPO, except Cassetti, who worked in the Flight Operations Directorate. 
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With static firing finally out of the way, the ground crew could 
now begin getting the booster ready for the spacecraft. That meant 
putting the second stage on top of the first, which was scheduled for 
2'7 January. But post-firing cleanup found a defective rotor in one of 
the turbopump assemblies. Shipped to the West Coast for repair, it 
returned to the Cape on 29 January. Then a missing seal held up its 
reinstallation until 7 February. 
The launch crew did not wait for the new seal; the turbopump 
assembly could be put back in the second stage after it was erected. On 
31 January, they removed the stage from the small erector and se- 
cured it in the launch vehicle erector, which was then winched upright. 
The upper stage was gently lowered onto the first, and the two were 
bolted together. GLV-1 had assumed its final form. Before the space- 
craft could be mated to the booster, there were still subsystem func- 
tional verification tests (like those done earlier in Baltimore) to be con- 
ducted. Although these tests were supposed to start on 14 February, 
lack of spare parts and questions about failure analyses imposed anoth- 
er week's delay. Once testing began on 21 February, however, it went 
smoothly to verify the launch vehicle's readiness for full systems testing 
by 3 March. 
On that day, Spacecraft 1 arrived at the launch complex to be in- 
stalled in the spacecraft erector support assembly in a controlled-access 
"white room" atop the launch vehicle erector.68 
The revised flight program of April 1963 had projected the first 
manned mission, Gemini 3, for October 1964. But as 1964 ap- 
proached, that prospect was dimming. The first Gemini flight was held 
up by the late delivery and protracted testing of its booster, and Space- 
craft 2 was falling behind schedule at the McDonnell plant. Efforts to 
install spacecraft test and checkout equipment at the launch site in 
Florida moved slowly enough to suggest that time might be too short 
there as well. The already certain delay of the first mission, added to 
the all-too-likely chance that the second would also be late, made the 
prospects for launching Gemini 3 in 1964 look poor.69 
At a meeting on 13 November 1963, the Gemini Management 
Panel* decided that the program's current schedule needed rethink- 
ing. The key question was just how much spacecraft and booster test- 
ing had to be repeated at the Cape to ensure a successful mission. Two 
panel members, MSC Gemini Program Manager Charles Mathews and 
*MSC Director Robert Gilruth had formed the panel in October 1962 to deal with manageri- 
al and technical problems. It brought together the heads of the organizations in charge of Gemi- 
ni-from NASA, the Air Force, and major contractors. 
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Space Systems Division launch vehicle chief Richard Dineen, set up an 
ad hoc study of work plans and schedules aimed at seeing men in orbit 
via Gemini before the end of 1964. Mathews reported the findings to 
the panel at its next meeting, 13 December 1963. Gemini 3 could be 
launched in November 1964 by cutting down spacecraft testing at the 
Cape that merely repeated work already performed in St. Louis and 
by better integrating the entire checkout effort. Launch-vehicle testing 
was already fairly well meshed between Baltimore and the Cape and 
needed only to be smoothed 0ut.70 . 
Spacecraft checkout procedures were altered sharply "to get a 
complete working spacecraft out of the McDonnell plant." All testing 
in St. Louis, along with whatever manufacturing tasks were left after 
systems testing began, was to be modeled on Cape practice. This 
meant that the McDonnell test crew had to be retrained. John J. Wil- 
liams, Assistant Manager for Gemini of MSC Florida Operations,* took 
a Launch Preparation Group of 200 people, drawn from both NASA 
and McDonnell, to spend nearly nine months in St. Louis. They 
throughly revamped the testing process, training the St. Louis crew 
and actually checking out the second and third Gemini spacecraft. 
About half the group returned to the Cape with Spacecraft 2 in Sep- 
tember 1964, and the rest stayed until Spacecraft 3 was ready in Janu- 
ary 1965. The retrained McDonnell crew took over when Spacecraft 4 
began systems testing. Basic to the new process was cutting down on 
repeated testing. Once a subsystem had been tested, it would take its 
proper place in the spacecraft and stay there. No longer was the space- 
craft to be taken apart after it reached the Cape, tested, and put to- 
gether again. Systems were to be rechecked, of course, but only as part 
of the complete spacecraft, not as individual pieces.71 
The booster offered fewer problems in meeting Gemini schedules. 
Aside from efforts to speed up work on GLV-1, already at the Gape, 
the only major ste was to strike flight readiness firing from the test 
program planned !! or the first three launch vehicles. With spacecraft 
checkout streamlined and booster testing smoothed out, GPO looked 
forward to getting back in step with the April 1963 schedule, even 
though the first flight was now going to be about three months late. 
The eight months that had been allowed between the first two flights 
was cut to five, with Gemini 2 only a month behind schedule, in Au- 
gust instead of July 1964. By then keeping to the three months be- 
tween later flights, the first manned mission could be launched in 
November, a month late, but still in 1964.72 
*On 30 March 1964, Gilruth announced that the Preflight Operations Division had become 
an autonomous unit known as MSC Florida Operations. Directed by G. Merritt Preston, the 
group would perform much the same duties as it had in Mercury. The only major change would 
be the participation in testing at McDonnell. 
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A Taste of Success 
W HILE Gemini's first spacecraft and launch vehicle were moving toward their mating on complex 19 at Cape Kennedy, the Gemi- 
ni Program Office itself was coping with another kind of move. The 
permanent home of the Manned Spacecraft Center at Clear Lake, 
though not quite finished, was ready to be occupied. GPO began shift- 
ing its desks from the old Veterans Administration building in down- 
town Houston to the new campus-like setting near Clear Lake on 6 
March 1964. Shortly after the transfer had been completed, Program 
Manager Charles Mathews announced a reorganization of GPO. Major 
changes reflected the growing stress on schedules and testin 
ect Gemini poised on the verge of its first flight. Project A j aw-  ministra- 
tion changed its name to Program Control." Scott H. Sim kinson left E Mathews' staff to take charge of a new Test Operations 0 ce dealing 
with reliability and quality assurance as well as test planning and evalu- 
ation.? Launch Vehicle Integration became Vehicles and Missions, di- 
vided into vehicle development and mission planning offices, plus a 
*The former chief of project administration, Andrd Meyer, became Mathews' senior assist- 
ant; Major Richard C. Henry transferred from the Washington program office to head the new 
GPO Program Control Office; George MacDougall stayed as second-in-command and acting head 
of production engineering; Walter Wolhart headed cost engineering; and James E. Bost program 
engineering. 
W .  Harry Douglas came from the Spacecraft Office as deputy manager and acting head of 
reliability and quality assurance; Charles K. Williams ran test planning; and Victor P. Neshyba, 
test evaluation. 
Above, the Manned Spacecraft Center, 
Houston, Texas, as seen in January 1962. 
The spacecraft center site is to the left of 
the Jim West mansion seen in the fore- 
ground. Right, the site as seen in Sep- 
tember 1964 from a different angle. The 
West mansion is hidden in the trees at 
center. 
new integration office to keep tabs on spacecraftpaunch vehicle and 
spacecraftltarget interfaces." The Spacecraft Management Office sim- 
ply changed its name to the Spacecraft Office."fe Houston-based 
strength of the program office had now reached 117; GPO also main- 
tained representatives at Martin in Baltimore and Lockheed in Sunny- 
vale, California, as well as resident manager's offices at McDonnell in 
St. Louis and Kennedy Space Center at the Cape.$ This was the orga- 
nization that, with only minor changes, saw Project Gemini through to 
its end.1 Before that happy end, however, there was the more immedi- 
ate matter of Gemini-Titan 1. 
By 3 March 1964, spacecraft and booster were at last together on 
launch complex 19 at Cape Kennedy. The series of tests that showed 
all booster systems were working had just been completed, and the 
spacecraft had been hung on a tripod in the "white room" atop the 
launch vehicle erector. This room, with its four levels and 4.5-tonne 
*Willis Mitchell remained manager; Jerome Hammack became deputy manager and acting 
head of vehicle development; Wyendell B. Evans, of mission planning; and Lewis R. Fisher, of 
systems integration. 
?Duncan Collins continued as manager and also acting head of electrical and electronics sub- 
office, with Homer Dotts as his deputy manager and acting chief of the structural and mechani- 
cal suboffice. Guidance and control was the province of Richard Carley, and Kenneth Hecht was 
responsible for escape, landing, and recovery. 
$The Martin-Baltimore representative was Harle Vogel, and the Lockheed-Sunnyvale liaison 
was A. B. Triche. Wilbur H. Gray was head of the Office of the NASA Resident Manager at 
McDonnell throughout the program, ably assisted by Andrew Hoboken; the 48-person office fo- 
cused mainly on engineering and quality control. Walter Kapryan was resident manager at the 
Cape. 
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(5-ton) crane to hoist the spacecraft, was sealed off from the outside 
world and maintained at a constant temperature of 295 kelvins (72°F) 
and a constant relative humidity of 50 percent, to provide a controlled 
environment for the spacecraft and the upper stage of the booster. 
Next to the erector was an umbilical tower 31 meters high. Its seven 
booms supported 31 cables and lines to spacecraft and booster, feeding 
electrical power, propellants, and other needs until the moment of 
launch. Gemini-Titan 1 was scheduled to lift off on 28 March 1964.2 
A premate systems test on 4 March confirmed the spacecraft ready 
for mating the next day, when the spacecraft-to-launch-vehicle adapter 
would be bolted to the booster's upper stage. The effort was delayed 
briefly when a McDonnell worker dropped his wrench on the dome of 
the oxidizer tank just below the spacecraft. A plastic sheet protected 
the dome, but the impact produced a scratch 0.95 centimeter (0.375 
inch) long and 0.0038 centimeter (0.0015 inch) deep in the steel sur- 
face, just 0.16 centimeter (0.64 inch) thick at the point of impact. The 
area was burnished to the depth of the scratch and tested to confirm 
that the metal was still solid.3 
After the spacecraft and launch vehicle had been mechanically 
mated, they also had to be connected electrically. But first the booster's 
status had to be checked in a combined systems test. That was slated 
for Sunday, 8 March, to be followed by three electronic-electrical inter- 
ference tests between 9 and 13 March, to make sure there was no seri- 
ous incompatibility. Minor problems delayed the booster combined sys- 
tems test until Tuesday, and interference testing did not start until 
Thursday, 12 March.4 
The first try at an interference test had to be scrubbed, and that 
cost another four days. On Monday, 16 March, however, the test went 
off without any trouble, prompting the crew to run through the sec- 
ond test at once. The attempt went awry through a procedural error. 
Another try, on Thursday, 19 March, brought bad news. Some ampli- 
fiers in the circuits that controlled the booster's tandem actuators 
(which shifted the engines to alter flight path) showed noisy outputs. A 
special dry run the next day produced the same problem, and the 
third interference test had to wait until the trouble was resolved. 
There was some question about how that was to be done, which was 
settled on Tuesday 24 March, when Martin troubleshooters pinpointed 
the problem-in the test equipment. Another test, on Wednesday, 
confirmed the finding. A conference that evening concluded that the 
data from the dry run the previous Friday met the intent, if not the 
precise format, of interference testing. The test equipment was re- 
moved that night.5 
But the tests had taken almost two weeks longer than planned, 
forcing the launch to be postponed to 7 April 1964. Things now began 
to move more smoothly. On Friday, 27 March, a combined systems 
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test and simulated flight roduced no serious problems.6 The follow- 
ing Tuesday, 31 March, a /' 1 the nonflight parts that GLV-1 had carried 
to the Cape were replaced and Pogo gear installed. GLV-I was sched- 
uled to have its tanks filled with propellants that night as part of a 
complete countdown exercise, the wet mock simulated launch. 
At 9 p.m., as shift workers were clearing the area for the start of 
tanking, someone saw smoke pouring from a switch at the pad. A 
burnt-out transformer and switch motor forced the test to be suspend- 
ed, since there were no spares on hand and the switch performed a 
crucial function. It automatically transferred the launch complex to 
auxiliary power if commercial power failed. Safety demanded that the 
launch area be deluged with water in case of propellant leak; a power 
loss would leave that system inoperable for about 30 minutes if the 
automatic switch were not working. Workmen found a spare trans- 
former at 1:l8 Wednesday morning and installed it, but a new motor 
was harder to locate. One was finally borrowed from the blockhouse 
since that system could be run by hand.7 But another day had been 
lost. 
Propellant loading resumed just before 10 Wednesday night and 
finished four hours later. The countdown began at 5 o'clock Thursday 
morning, but now came weather trouble. The Cape was under an "at- 
mospheric inversion," a blanket of warm air above cooler air near the 
ground, which would block the upward dissipation of toxic fumes in 
case of accident. The count was held from 7 to 8:30, when the inver- 
sion started to break up. Ground crews then removed the propellant 
lines leading to the booster tanks and the count resumed. It followed 
its normal course until three minutes before launch, T-3, when a 
minor problem (quickly corrected) required the count to be recycled to 
T-5. Five minutes later, at half-past noon, the count reached T-0, 
the moment when the booster's first-stage engine would have ignited 
in a real launch. The test was a complete success, free of spacecraft 
problems and marred only by a minor procedural error in the launch 
vehicle countdown. After a vibration test of GLV-1, the tanks were 
drained of propellants, a five-hour process finished at midnight.8 
The Spacecraft Flight Readiness Review Board* convened Friday 
afternoon, 3 April, in the conference room of the Engineering and 
Operations Building, headquarters for MSC's Florida Operations. A 
check of items left open from the preflight review of 18- 19 February 
*The board was headed by Walter Williams and recorded by Lester Stewart; other members 
were Mathews, F. John Bailey, Jr., Christopher Kraft, Donald K. Slayton, and Merritt Preston from, 
respectively, the Gemini Program Office, Reliability and Flight Safety, Flight Operations, Flight Crew 
Operations, and Florida Operations. They evaluated all waivers, deviations, modifications, discrep- 
ancies, and work done at the Cape. McDonnell and MSC systems engineers were on hand to answer 
questions and assist the board. 
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showed that everything had been taken care of except a circuit breaker 
not yet fully qualified. It was close enough, however, for McDonell to 
certify it flightworthy, a judgment the board shared. Only two new 
problems had cropped up since the earlier review, both easily correct- 
ed. The board judged all systems ready for flight, pending the out- 
come of the final systems test, a simulated flight scheduled for 5 April. 
When the simulated flight went off without a hitch on Sunday, Space- 
craft 1 was ready for its mission.9 
Flight readiness of the launch vehicle was reviewed Saturday after- 
noon. The Air Force reported two problems, one of which turned out 
to be nonexistent. The other involved a missing report of the results of 
an analysis of a failure in the secondary autop~lot. The report was still 
absent on the eve of flight, but a phone call confirmed that the prob- 
lem had been analyzed. After the simulated flight on Sunday, Walter 
Williams convened the Mission Review Board. Spokesmen for every 
group involved in the mission reported everything ready-"all systems 
'go.'" At noon, Williams announced that NASA was "proceeding to- 
ward a launch not earlier than 11:OO a.m. Wednesday, April 8."10 
The final decision for launch came on Tuesday morning. At 7:30, 
A~ 
ril, SSD's Status Review Team for GLV-1 met, took a last look at 
the aunch vehicle, and agreed it was ready to go. That recommenda- 
tion was passed on to the Fli ht Safety Review Board at 9:00 a.m. The 
board approved GLV-1 for gght  and committed it to launch, with lift- 
off set for 11 the next morning.11 
Preparations for the final countdown were already under way. 
The first part of the planned 390-minute split countdown started be- 
fore dawn on Tuesday. That 60-minute segment ended at 5 a.m., 
when the count was held for 23% hours to prepare the spacecraft for 
final countdown, install and hook up pyrotechnics, run some launch 
vehicle tests, and load propellants. GLV-1's tanks were topped off at 
4:10 Wednesday morning, with about 75 people from Martin, the Air 
Force, Aerojet-General, and Aerospace on hand. Thirty systems ex- 
perts from McDonnell and MSC arrived at the blockhouse at 4:30. 
The _hold ended right on time, an hour later, and final countdown 
began at 6 a.m. or T-300. No flaw marred the entire five-hour proc- 
ess. 
One second after 11 o'clock Wednesday morning, 8 April 1964, 
the booster's first-stage engine ignited. Of this one-second discrepancy, 
a joking Williams later remarked to a roomful of reporters, "There 
must be something wrong with the range clock." Four seconds later, 
the 136-tonne (150-ton) vehicle lifted from the pad on that curiously 
lambent flame so distinctive of Titan II's hypergolic propellants.12 
Within moments, Gemini-Titan 1 vanished into the hot Florida 
sky, beyond reach of human senses but not electronic sensors. 
Telemetered data flowed back to mission controllers at the Cape, telling 
Gem;ni I 
8 April 1964 
Intent launch team in the block- 
house of  pad 19, Cape Kennedy 
(above left); Chief Test Conduc- 
tor Paul Donnelly monitors the 
final minutes of countdown (ten- 
ter); and the unmanned Gemini- 
Titan lifts off ,  beginning the 
flight program of  Gemini. 
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them that the launch was as nearly perfect as it looked. Two and a half 
minutes after liftoff, the 118 tonnes (130 tons) of propellants in its first 
stage exhausted after driving Gemini-Titan 1 64 kilometers high and 
91 kilometers downrange, GLV-1's first-stage engines cut off. The sec- 
ond-stage engine flared into life, and the four bolts that had held the 
two stages together exploded as they were designed to, cutting the 
spent first stage loose from the still-accelerating second stage and 
spacecraft. Five and a half minutes after launch, the second-stage mo- 
tor stopped, its 27 tonnes (30 tons) of propellants gone. Now 1000 kil- 
ometers downran e and 160 kilometers high, coasting at a speed of 5 7888 meters (25 8 9 feet) per second, Gemini Spacecraft 1, with the 
second stage of GLV-1 still attached, was in orbit.13 
Everything had gone beautifully. Purists might cavil at an excess 7 
meters (24 feet) per second launch-vehicle speed that propelled the 
spacecraft into an orbit reaching out 320 kilometers instead of the 
programmed 299 kilometers. But they could scarcely deny the hand- 
some achievement of the main goals-proving that the booster could 
do its job and that combined with the spacecraft its structure was 
sound. "There's no question these objectives were met," Walter Wil- 
liams observed to the press shortly after launch.* The nearly flawless 
performance of the launch vehicle elated its sponsors, prompting one 
of them, Major General Ben Funk of SSD, to call it "just completely a 
storybook sort of flight."l4 
The mission of Gemini-Titan 1 was much shorter than its actual 
trip. On1 the first three orbits were part of the flight plan. When 
Spacecra i't 1 passed over Cape Kennedy for the third time, about 4 
hours and 50 minutes after launch, the first Gemini flight came to a 
formal close. The spacecraft had been expected to orbit Earth for 
three and a half days. Because of its slightly higher than planned orbit, 
it actually stayed up for nearly four days. During that time, the 
Manned Space Flight Network,? a round-the-world system of tracking 
stations controlled from Goddard Space Flight Center in Maryland, 
followed the vehicle by radar. On Sunday, 12 April, during its 64th 
pass, the steadily slowing spacecraft plunged back into the atmosphere, 
ending its career in flames over the South Atlantic, midway between 
South America and Africa.15 
*This was Williams' only Gemini launch. On 16 March, this veteran director of all the coun- 
try's manned space flights resigned from NASA to accept a position as vice president and general 
manager of Aerospace's Manned Systems Division, to take effect after the first Gemini flight. 
Williams was replaced as Gemini Operations Director by Kraft, who had become MSC Assistant 
Director for Flight Operations in the November 1963 reorganization. 
tNetwork stations used for Gemini-Titan 1 were Kennedy; Grand Banama Island; San Salva- 
dor; Bermuda; Woomera, Australia; Hawaii; Point Arguello, California; White Sands, New Mexi- 
co; and Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. 
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NASA Associate Administrator Robert Seamans commended "the 
Air Force for its most successful Launch Vehicle Program."l6 So fine a 
performance of the first mission augured well for those to follow and 
surely enhanced the prospect that Gemini astronauts would be in orbit 
before the end of the year. But the glow of accomplishment soon faded 
before the hard work yet to be done. While the launch vehicle was 
now qualified for manned missions, the spacecraft was not. Despite the 
gratifying success of Gemini-Titan 1, and some real progress on trou- 
blesome spacecraft systems, there was no time to rest on laurels. The 
target vehicle for Gemini's later missions was still a very large question 
mark, and Gemini's chronic money woes were far from settled. For all 
of that, Gemini's future in the spring of 1964 must have looked much 
brighter than it had only a few months earlier. 
POSTSCRIPTS AND PROSPECTS 
So bright, in fact, did the future seem that the long dormant idea 
of using the Gemini spacecraft for a lunar mission stirred again. 
George Mueller, NASA's Associate Administrator for Manned Space 
Flight, had some reason to be concerned about the outlook for Project 
Apollo in the spring of 1964. Only a few months earlier, plans for 
manned flights using Saturn I had been canceled, leaving Gemini as 
the only possible system for manned orbital flights during the next two 
years or more. Mueller wanted to know if a Gemini lunar mission 
could be flown. If it could, then a contingency plan was to be prepared 
for a Gemini flight around the Moon in case Apollo suffered a serious 
setback. A review of past studies strongly suggested that the idea was 
feasible and that McDonnell should be asked to conduct a more de- 
tailed study.* 17 
But that was not to be. During a tour of the plant in Louisiana 
where Saturn rockets were built, Wernher von Braun, Director of 
Marshall Space Flight Center, told a journalist that Gemini might be 
able to fly around the Moon, but only as "a possible project to salvage 
this country's prestige if the manned lunar goal proves impossible." 
Whether this was intended to squelch an Apollo rival, the effect might 
have been predicted. The same factors that had blocked the idea be- 
fore still held. NASA had too much invested in Apollo-too much 
money, time, and prestige-to really think about Gemini to the Moon. 
Funds, in any case, were tight. On 8 June, Seamans told Mueller there 
would be no money for study contracts. "Any circumlunar mission 
*The review was done by William B. Taylor and John L. Hammersmith, of Mueller's Gemi- 
ni and Advanced Manned Missions offices, respectively. 
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studies relating to the use of Gemini will be confined to in-house study 
efforts."* 18 
But that was never more than a side issue. In mid-1964, the first 
task was still Project Gemini, however attractive the prospects of a 
more ambitious program might seem. The outstanding performance 
of Gemini-Titan 1 and the qualification of the Gemini launch vehicle 
were most cheering portents. When the Gemini Management Panel 
met a week after the mission, on 15 April, a comfortable optimism 
suffused the group. The current work schedule called for the second 
flight toward the end of August and the third in mid-November, with 
almost a four-week cushion in each instance to handle unforeseen 
problems. 19 
This bright outlook darkened in the late summer before a series 
of natural disasters. First lightning, then hurricanes, conspired to 
abuse the second Gemini launch vehicle on complex 19 at Cape Ken- 
nedy and to delay its flight long past the scheduled time. Even had the 
weather been perfect, however, McDonnell's difficulties in getting 
Spacecraft 2 ready to fly might have compromised the schedule. 
Late deliveries-notably of thruster systems from Rocketdyne and 
fuel-cell stacks from General Electric-had slowed construction of the 
spacecraft during 1963. Parts had failed tests that had to be passed 
before they could be installed in the spacecraft; modifications meant 
further delays. Spacecraft 2 could not begin its systems tests until 13 
January 1964.20 
The Spacecraft 2 Design Engineering Inspection (DEI), earlier set 
for November 1963, had been postponed in the face of these delays 
until February 1964. MSC formed a permanent DEI board 31 January 
1964 to make sure that the spacecraft as a whole and each of its parts 
would do what they were intended to do-that the spacecraft could, in 
fact, be expected to achieve its assigned objectives. Normally, the DEI 
for each spacecraft would fall between the end of manufacturing and 
the start of systems testing, but the DEI for Spacecraft 2 was a little 
late. The nine-member board convened at the McDonnell plant on 12 
February.? Also present for the two-day meeting were 50 experts from 
*The in-house studies did continue, culminating in a paper in July 1964 by Calvin C. 
Guild, enumerating 16 different missions that could be classified as "advanced (beyond the 12 
then scheduled for Gemini) and that used the Gemini spacecraft or techniques derived from the 
Gemini program. Among them were the demonstration of land landing with either paraglider or 
parasail, a combined launch in which Gemini would rendezvous with Apollo and check out ship- 
to-ship communications, a minimum rotating space station experiment to provide experience in arti- 
ficial gravity for long-duration space travel, space assembly and repair missions, and a lifeboat rescue 
mission. 
?Chairman and vice chairman of the permanent DEI board were to be the head of reliabili- 
t y  and flight safety and the manager of the Gemini program. The other five would come from the 
(Continued) 
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GPO and McDonnell, as well as another 50 observers from other MSC 
offices, NASA Headquarters, and the Air Force. The board looked 
over the hardware and studied the records to see that each part either 
matched design specifications or was the subject of a proper waiver. A 
long list of minor discrepancies ended up as 22 mandatory changes, 4 
conditional, and 10 to be studied.21 
The first phase of spacecraft systems tests went slowly, as problem 
after problem turned up; troubleshooting them, working out the re- 
quired changes, and testing the results all took time, adding to the de- 
lays. By mid-April 1964, Spacecraft 2 had become the "pacing item" 
for the second Gemini mission, a dubious honor held by the launch 
vehicle before the first flight. Getting the spacecraft ready was now the 
crucial factor in meeting the scheduled launch date.22 This was not 
altogether a surprise. Spacecraft 1 had been little more than an instru- 
mented shell, but GLV-1 had been a launch vehicle in every sense of 
the term. The Martin crews working on GEV-2 were going over 
ground they had already surveyed, but Spacecraft 2 was the first fully 
equipped ship to go through the McDonnell plant and its slow prog- 
ress reflected its novel status. 
After the modules of the spacecraft had been mated, the second 
phase of systems tests began, on 3 July. Further problems hampered 
testing into the next month.23 Whatever delay might have resulted, 
however, became purely academic after mid-August, when Florida 
weather dealt the first of a series of time-consuming blows to GLV-2. 
GEV-2 AND THE ELEMENTS 
While spacecraft testing floundered past snag after snag, GLV-2 
had been moving briskly through its test program despite some rough 
spots. At the outset, the second-stage oxidizer tank was found defec- 
tive, and a new tank had to be built. Since the first-stage tanks were 
not yet ready, the delay was inconsequential. Martin-Baltimore re- 
ceived all four tanks from Denver on 12 July 1963. Engines were late 
in arriving from Aerojet-General, but testing went ahead with non- 
flight first-stage engines. By the end of January 1964, GLV-2 had 
completed its horizontal test program. Early the next month it was 
standing in the Vertical Test Facility; and, after two weeks of modifica- 
tion work, functional verification tests of subsystems began on 21 Feb- 
ruary.24 
GLV-2 finished these tests by 13 April, in roughly two thirds the 
GPO spacecraft office, three directorates (Engineering and Development, Flight Operations, and 
Flight Crew Operations), and Florida Operations. Members for the Spacecraft 2 DEI were F. 
John Bailey, Mathews, Homer Dotts, Aleck C. Bond, John D. Hodge, Virgil I. Grissom, John Wil- 
liams, and Walter Williams, with Robert T. Everline as recording secretary. 
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time taken by the first booster. Another week saw it through electrical- 
electronic interference tests and three reliminary combined systems 
acceptance tests (CSAT), an effort that I! ad cost GLV-1 over a month. 
The formal GSAT was run on 22 April with no trouble, and the re- 
sults were approved by the Vehicle Acceptance Team the following 
week. The dummy engines still had to be replaced, which took a 
month. By mid-June, GLV-2 had been inspected and formally accept- 
ed for the Gemini program. Since spacecraft work was lagging, the 
booster's transfer to the Cape was postponed so Martin crews in Balti- 
more could com lete some of the modifications that would otherwise 
have been made g y the Martin-Canaveral team.25 
Workmen loaded the booster aboard an Air Force 6-133B aircraft 
on 10 July 1964. By noon the next day, both stages had been unloaded 
and secured. Working a two-shift, five-day week, Martin's Cape crew 
expected to have GLV-2 ready for Spacecraft 2 by mid-August. 
Everything proceeded routinely through July and into August, with 
only minor problems causing small delays. This was of no moment, 
since the spacecraft was still in St. Louis. Its shipment, scheduled for 1 
August, had been postponed for three weeks; it could not now reach 
complex 19 before the first week in Se tember. The Martin crew nev- 
ertheless prepared for the final test o k) the booster before its mating 
with the spacecraft and were almost through by 17 August.26 
But that Monday a severe thunderstorm pounded Cape Kennedy. 
About half an hour before midnight, lightning struck complex 19. 
There was no visible damage to the blockhouse, erector, or rocket, but 
that proved nothing about the status of the electrical and electronic 
gear. Whether GLV-2 was fit to fly was a real question. NASA labeled 
the event an "electro-magnetic incident" and demanded a thorough 
investigation. Inspectors from Martin, Aerospace, and the 6555th 
Aerospace Test Wing found no signs of any physical damage, but they 
did locate a number of failed parts, mostly in the ground support 
equipment. This suggested that the complex had not taken a direct hit 
but rather had suffered the electromagnetic effects, or induced static 
charges, of a nearby lightning strike. A test order issued on 20 August 
set the task: To "re-establish confidence in all [launch vehicle], AGE, 
. . . and Facility Systems, and to determine that all degraded equipment 
is replaced and appropriate reverification tests are successfully com- 
pleted." The next day, Gemini manager Mathews flew in from Hous- 
ton for an "Incident Status Meeting." A three-man steering committee 
was appointed to oversee the efforts of Air Force, Aeorspace, and Mar- 
tin work crews.*27 
*The 20 August test order was approved by Martin's Chief Test Conductor and Gemini Proj- 
ect Engineer, Francis X. Carey and William R. Williams. Lieutenant Colonel Stewart V. Spragins, 
6555th Aerospace Test Wing, concurred. These three men made up the steering committee. 
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Two weeks seemed ample to put things back in order. Most sub- 
systems would have to be retested, and all booster systems, test equip- 
ment, and facilities would have to be checked out. Any equipment that 
might have been affected had to be repaired or replaced. After some 
consultation, NASA agreed that no airborne units with semiconductors 
ought to be retained. Once new units were installed, testing could be- 
gin again as though the vehicle had just arrived at the Ca e.28 
Before the work was finished, however, Hurricane C P eo belied the 
forecasts and brushed the Cape on Thursday, 27 August. The Martin 
crew had time to get the second stage down and under cover, but the 
first stage remained upright, lashed in place with the erector lowered. 
Cleo's winds were well below the upper limit that the booster was de- 
signed to withstand. With the weather still bad on Friday, the second 
stage stayed in stora e over the weekend. On Monday, the Air Force 
was getting ready to f aunch its first Titan IIIA from the next complex, 
which hampered work on pad 19 for most of the day. By 3 o'clock the 
next morning, however, the Martin crew had stage II back in place 
atop the first stage. Further work was delayed by the countdown on 
the nearby pad, which ended at 10 a.m., Tuesday, when the Titan 
IIIA blasted off. GLV-2's repeat of subsystems functional verification 
tests began on Thursday, 3 September29 
By then, MSC was just about ready to give up on GLV-2. The 
Center proposed dropping it from the program and moving each of 
the other launch vehicles up a notch. GLV-3 would launch Spacecraft 
2, and the flight program would lose one mission. The Air Force, 
strongly seconded by the launch vehicle contractors, urged NASA to 
stick with GLV-2. A thorough review of the effects of both lightning 
and hurricane, the measures taken to counter them, and the test re- 
sults had convinced the Air Force and its contractors that GLV-2 was 
still as sound as ever. Their case was solid enough to convert the skep- 
tics. An Air Force spokesman concluded: "Based on technical consider- 
ations, Martin Marietta Corporation, Aero et-General Corporation, 
[and] Aerospace Corporation recommend 1 y GLV#2. In addition, 
SSD has reviewed cost and schedule considerations and concludes fly 
GLV#2." NASA agreed, and the work went on.30 
Testing had scarcely begun, however, before Nature intervened a 
third time. Cleo had struck only a glancing blow, but Hurricane Dora 
was aiming straight for the Cape. As Dora approached on 8 Septem- 
ber, Martin workers raced to get both stages of GLV-2 down and safe- 
ly under cover in a hangar. Wednesday was a day of waiting as Dora 
passed by. On Thursday, Dora was no longer a threat, but Hurricane 
Ethel was heading for the Cape and due to arrive by the weekend. 
GLV-2 stayed under wraps. By Monday, 14 September, the danger 
was past, and GLV-2 was back in place before the end of the day. The 
rest of the week was largely given over to replacing semiconductor 
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units and to a thorough inspection of booster and launch complex. 
Testing resumed after the weekend, on 21 September31 
That was the day Spacecraft 2 finally arrived at the Cape. The 
second phase of systems testing at St. Louis had lasted through August 
and into September, with frequent interruptions for the receipt and 
installation of a number of pieces of flight equipment. A simulated 
flight on 15 September completed testing. A Spacecraft Acceptance 
Review Board headed by Charles Mathews had already gone over the 
spacecraft to make sure it was ready for the final simulation." The 
board met again on 1'7 September and decided that Spacecraft 2 was 
now ready for delivery. It was shipped to Florida the following Mon- 
day, 21 September.32 
GLV-2's misfortunes during August and September 1964 forced 
NASA to forego its goal of a manned Gemini flight before the end of 
the year, as a rueful Mathews informed the Gemini Management Panel 
on 29 September. The second flight was now set for mid-November 
1964, the third for the end of January 1965. There seemed no need to 
alter planned dates for the later Gemini missions, although the sched- 
ules would have to be tightened. Once again, Gemini's slowness was 
highlighted by a Russian first. On 12 October, the Soviet Union orbit- 
ed Voskhod I. The three-man crew flew in a "shirtsleeve" environment 
(flight coveralls rather than space suits) and all remained in the space- 
craft to a land landing (previously only Yuri Gagarin was believed to 
have stayed with his vehicle until it landed, the others leaving the 
spacecraft and coming down by parachute).33 
GLV-2 began an expected two weeks of subsystems tests on 21 
September, with the combined systems test that preceded spacecraft 
mating scheduled for 6 October. Spacecraft 2 should have taken only 
11 working days in the hangar area before it joined the booster at the 
launch complex on 25 October. Once a ain, however, work on the H booster went smoothly, but the spacecra t lagged. GLV-2 completed 
subsystems tests and the premate test on schedule. In another week 
the launch vehicle finished electrical-electronic interference tests, the 
last step before it was ready to receive the spacecraft. While the launch 
vehicle was being tested, so was the worldwide tracking network. From 
9 to 16 October, Goddard and MSG put the tracking stations through 
their paces. -i- 34 
*Members of the board were Scott Simpkinson (Gemini Test Operations), Duncan Collins 
(Gemini Spacecraft Manager), Arnold D. Aldrich (Flight Operations Directorate), Philip M. Deans 
(Engineering and Development Directorate), Robert Everline and Galloway B. Foster, Jr. (Gemini 
Office of Program Control), Bailey, Slayton, and John Williams. 
tFor the network test, Kraft, Hodge, Eugene F. Kranz, and Glynn S. Lunney took turns as 
flight director. The network was not quite the same as for the first Gemini mission: the sites this 
(Continued) 
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The spacecraft, however, had yet to arrive at the pad. Work had 
gone well enough the first week, but trouble cropped up in getting the 
thrusters ready for a static firing test. After firing, the system had to 
be flushed and purged, another delay. By 10 October, Spacecraft 2 
was already eight days behind schedule; it lost another two days while 
pyrotechnics were installed. Spacecraft 2 was ten days late when it 
reached complex 19 on Sunday, 18 October, and settled in the tripod 
in the white room an hour before noon.35 
Attempts to run the spacecraft premate systems test brought new 
problems. As one was solved, another appeared; and it was 27 October 
before the test was complete. The final step before the spacecraft was 
joined to the launch vehicle was a premate simulated flight, run in two 
parts. Despite more than one discrepancy revealed by the test, the 
spacecraft was mechanically mated to its booster by noon Thursday, 5 
November. 
After the mating Martin conducted tanking exercises on the 
launch vehicle to check calibration, to see whether or not the launch 
crew could load the tanks accurately with the equpment on hand, and 
to train for launch loading. The Martin crew found some differences 
between the data gathered from calibration and what they thought 
they had loaded. This led to a series of tanking exercises throughout 
the program and set up "a new family of people, called the Wednes- 
day Evening Tanking Society and the Thursday Evening Tanking So- 
ciety-the WETS and the TETS."36 
The troubled course of testing and checkout now smoothed. Over 
the next month, any problems that showed up were handled quickly, 
as Gemini 2 ticked off the milestones on its way to a 9 December 
launch: electrical interface integrated validation, 9 November; joint 
guidance and control test, 12 November; joint combined systems test 
after electrical mating, 17 November; wet mock simulated launch, 24 
November; spacecraft final systems test, 28 November; simulated flight 
test, 3 December; and launch precount, 7 December.37 
SETBACK AND SUCCESS 
Loading propellants aboard GLV-2 began in earnest on Tuesday, 
8 December, an hour before midnight and finished shortly after three 
o'clock in the morning. The final countdown started an hour later. It 
went smoothly, though not quite so smoothly as the first Gemini count- 
down-there were three holds for a total of 41 minutes. The count 
time were Cape Kennedy Mission Control; Goddard; Carnarvon, Australia; Hawaii; Canary Is- 
lands; Bermuda; Cuaymas, Mexico; Corpus Christi, Texas; and two tracking ships-the Rose 
Knot Victor and the Coastal Senfry Quebec. Although it was not completely operational, the new 
Mission Control Center at MSC monitored the exercise. 
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reached zero at 11:41 Wednesday morning, and the first-stage engines 
ignited. One second later, a signal from the master operations control 
set shut down the engine. Flight controllers in the Cape control center 
observed that the launch vehicle had lost hydraulic pressure in its pri- 
mary control system and had switched over from primary to secondary 
guidance and control. Within the blockhouse, technicians began to 
power down the spacecraft and, at three minutes before noon, Flight 
Director Christopher Kraft officially canceled the flight.38 
The proximate cause of the shutdown was the command from the 
master operations control set, an automatic response to an automatic 
function-the switchover from primary to secondary flight control dur- 
ing the 3.2 seconds between ignition and liftoff. After the engines ig- 
nited, the launch vehicle remained bolted to the stand until thrust built 
up to '70 percent of maximum. During that time, a switchover in the 
control system was an automatic shutdown order. The GLV-2 switch- 
over followed automatically when the booster's malfunction detec- 
tion system sensed the pressure drop in the primary hydraulic system. 
GLV-2, in other words, spotted its own hydraulic failure, responded by 
switching over to its secondary system, and then, because it was still on 
the ground, commanded its engine to shut off. 
Having saved itself, GLV-2 stood poised on the pad-a giant ques- 
tion mark. Why had its primary control system failed? The answer was 
quick in coming. Unexpectedly high pressure in one of the hydraulic 
lines had burst the aluminum housing of a servovalve, letting the 
hydraulic fluid leak out. This valve controlled one of the booster's four 
tandem actuators, the devices that moved the thrust chambers to steer 
the vehicle in flight. Why the valve housing had failed was a lesson in 
the folly of unneeded "improvement." At some time during develop- 
ment, someone had decided that the walls of the housing were twice as 
thick as they needed to be; a third of a centimeter of aluminum was 
ample to meet design pressures. No one, however, thought to test the 
actual pressure the housing would have to withstand, nor was any 
impulse test, as such, included in system qualification. More likely than 
not, one or another Titan 11 had suffered the same sort of hard start, 
but the stouter housings that remained standard in the missile could 
survive such a pulse while the lighter structural shell in the Gemini 
booster could not.39 
When GLV-2 shut down, Spacecraft 2 posed something of a prob- 
lem. Launch crews knew what to do with a ready-to-go booster, since 
they dealt with one after the mock launch that was a regular feature of 
launch vehicle checkout. There was no comparable background for the 
spacecraft, however, and that led to some hasty improvisation. Aside 
from its propellants, the spacecraft fairly bristled with pyrotechnic de- 
vices, all armed for flight. Should one of them explode, the results 
might be catastrophic. 
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Draining the booster of propellants took first priority, so Wednes- 
day had passed and Thursday was well along before the main part of 
spacecraft "safing" was complete. One particularly ticklish operation 
remained, however-pulling the pyrotechnics from the isolation valves 
that barred propellants from the spacecraft thrusters until time to fire. 
The problem was complicated by the fact that the ex losive cartridge 
was not a replaceable unit, and the whole valve assem ! ly had to come 
out. But this might allow propellants to reach the thrusters or to spill 
their hi hly noxious chemicals over the workers. The makeshift answer H was to reeze the propellant lines. After one or two false starts-no 
one was quite sure how to do the freezing--copper tubing was 
wrapped around the lines (which were packed in dry ice), liquid nitro- 
gen was run through the tubing, and the whole thing was sprayed with 
COP.* That worked, and the valve assemblies were replaced over the 
weekend.40 
There was really not much that could be done with the spacecraft 
over the next few weeks besides making sure it remained in flight 
status, and nothing much could be done with the launch vehicle until 
new actuators arrived.? A product of Moog Servocontrols, Inc., the 
tandem actuators had been taken back to the vendor's plant in East 
Aurora, New York, for extensive tests. Then the actuators had gone to 
Martin-Baltimore for further testing. The lightweight servovalves had 
to be redesigned. Work was further curtailed by the holidays. A mes- 
senger reached the Cape with the four new parts on 6 January 1965. 
They were installed at once and testing resumed, focused mainly on 
the flight control system. The new round of launch preparations went 
quickly; by Thursday, 14 January, the last major test was complete. 
Reviews of spacecraft and launch vehicle gave both a clean bill of 
health, and launch was set for 9 o'clock Tuesday morning, 19 Janu- 
ary.41 
The countdown began two hours past midnight. It was almost 
flawless, although it did produce one disappointment. Spacecraft 2 had 
been slated to carry six fuel-cell stacks of the old model P2B, left over 
after the design had been updated early in 1964. Despite their known 
defects, flight testing them with the reactant supply system seemed like 
a good idea, but only on a "non-interference with fli ht" basis and with 
a dummy load, since electrical power would actua f ly be supplied by 
battery. The six stacks assigned to Spacecraft 2 had behaved erratically 
*A motor-operated shutoff valve was installed in later spacecraft to make draining the hyper- 
golics a simpler and safer operation. 
+During the lull in Cape activity, NASA realigned its field center operations on a noninter- 
ference-with-Gemini basis. MSC's Florida Operations was transferred to Kennedy Space Center 
and renamed the Launch Operations Directorate (with Kurt H. Debus as Director and Merritt 
Preston as Deputy Director) to "place the responsibility for assembly, checkout, and launch of the 
total Apollo space vehicle with a single organization." 
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since they were first installed in St. Louis. When they acted u 
the abortive countdown on 9 December and threatened to g elay during the
launch, they were scratched from the mission. Only one stack proved 
to be still operable; it was activated on 18 December, then shut off and 
left alone until the next launch attempt. An hour and a half after the 
countdown started on 19 January, hydrogen intake to the stack was 
blocked by a stuck valve. Two hours of work left troubleshooters faced 
with breaking the spacecraft wiring to correct the problem. Since that 
would have meant a hold in the countdown, the attempt to activate the 
stack was called off, and the fuel cells were not operated on Gemini 2.42 
Aside from the fuel-cell roblem, the countdown produced only the 
most minor anomalies an f one preplanned two-minute hold. 
At four minutes after 9 Tuesday morning, Gemini 2 began the 
last unmanned flight in the Gemini program. GLV-2 hurled the space- 
craft 3430 kilometers across the South Atlantic through an arc that 
peaked 160 kilometers above the ocean's surface. The spacecraft en- 
dured the most severe heating Gemini was ever likely to meet as it 
plunged back into the atmosphere, its heat protection proved, its struc- 
tural integrity uncompromised, and all systems working. It dropped 
into the South Atlantic on its parachute about 18 minutes after launch, 
bobbing in the water for an hour and a half until it was picked up by 
the U.S. Navy's aircraft carrier Lake Champlain.43 
Some small question marks dotted the mission, but overall it 
looked quite good. The postflight news conference was a scene of quiet 
jubilation, with pats on the back for everyone involved. Nothing 
earth-shaking turned up in the detailed study of the recovered space- 
craft-nly minor scratches, chars, corrosion from exposure to sea 
water, just about what might have been expected-nothing that would 
in any way militate against the forthcoming launch of Gemini 3, the 
first to carry men aloft.44 
DOWN TO THE WIRE 
While most eyes had been focused on Gemini 2 at Cape Kennedy, 
work on still-to-be-resolved development problems continued else- 
where. Two spacecraft systems indispensable for Gemini's first manned 
mission-thrusters and ejection seats-remained question marks 
through most of 1964, and a third-fuel cells-though not slated for 
Gemini 3, was as yet unqualified. What may have been the largest 
question of all centered on the Gemini Agena, which throughout 1964 
fell further behind schedule. 
In April 1964, Rocketdyne seemed at last to have solved its major 
problems in developing workable thrusters for Gemini, but misgivings 
persisted. When the Jet Propulsion Laboratory approached Rocketdyne 
about developing a small engine for the Surveyor spacecraft, Mathews 
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protested. He argued that the company was still a year away from hav- 
ing the Gemini orbital attitude and maneuvering system and reent 
control system on a sound footing, and that the main reason the wor ? 
had improved was the belief that it would get no more NASA small- 
engine contracts until Gemini work was almost done. Workloads in the 
California plant were heavy, as shown by the large demands for over- 
time, and the original $30-million contract had ballooned to over $74 
million, of which almost $36 million was an overrun. 
Despite the enormous infusion of effort and money, Rocketdyne 
had failed to maintain schedules and deliveries. En nes for Spacecraft i? 2, for example, due in February 1963, arrived on y in January 1964, 
and "the delivered products leave much to be desired." Mathews 
thought it "quite evident that all three interested parties, the Gemini 
Program Office, the Surveyor Program, and Rocketdyne, will benefit 
through the selection of a vendor other than Rocketdyne," since the 
added work could only hamper Gemini without contributing much to 
Surveyor.45 
This concern was echoed by manned space flight chief George 
Mueller;" in a memorandum to his counterpart in the Office of Space 
Sciences, which had charge of the Surveyor program, he urged that 
Rocketdyne be denied the contract. MSC Director Gilruth also acted, 
setting up a special committee to survey Rocketdyne's Gemini pro- 
gram. After hearing some harsh committee findings on 5 August 1964, 
Rocketdyne's president promised that whatever NASA wanted would 
be done. Gilruth sent him a long list of recommendations a week later. 
Some changes were already under way even while the committee was 
meeting, and more followed, including a reorganization of Rocket- 
dyne's Space Engine Division.46 
Among the recommendations was a full-scale NASA audit of 
Rocketdyne's business management practices and Space Engine Divi- 
sion operations. It was a large undertaking, and a report was not ready 
until April 1965. Its findings revealed a badly managed program. 
Having "grossly underestimated the magnitude and complexities" of its 
Gemini subcontract, Rocketdyne had been slow to set up a sound orga- 
nization. As a result, budgets were poorly controlled "and operations 
were inefficient," producing "significant cost overruns and delays." Not 
only had outright overruns very nearly doubled the cost of the pro- 
gram, but, of the 358 engines that should have been delivered by Nov- 
ember 1964 under the original contract terms, only 167 had actually 
been received. Frequent personnel changes at top levels reflected the 
*Mueller, of course, had an additional concern that did not affect Mathews: Rocketdyne was 
also the contractor for the Apollo thrusters and was a competitor with Space Technology Labora- 
tories, Inc. (STL) for the lunar module descent engine. In January 1965, STL was awarded the 
development and production contract. 
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program's weak management, as did the company's complete inability 
to provide records showing the reasons for technical problems, what 
action they prompted, or what impact each problem had on costs and 
deliveries. The auditors recommended "that Rocketdyne's fee under 
the Gemini subcontract be adjusted."47 
When this report was released in the spring of 1965, the worst was 
already over. Rocketdyne's performance had, in fact, begun to im- 
prove markedly in mid-1964, although as late as October Gilruth still 
thought an alternative source for thrusters might be a good idea. 
McDonnell received the first long-duration attitude maneuvering 
thrusters in October 1964, just five months after the new design had 
been released to production. By the time the audit report was issued, 
both the attitude and reentry control systems had been fully qualified 
in their Spacecraft 3 version. How eatly things had changed was 
shown most clearly when the long-li r e thrusters, not expected to be 
ready before Spacecraft 5, were actually installed in Spacecraft 4.48 
Qualification of the Gemini escape system, like that of the space- 
craft rocket systems, was essential before astronauts could be commit- 
ted to a mission. Rapid progress early in 1964, which saw the develop- 
ment test program concluded, augured well, as did a good start on 
dynamic proof-testing. A preliminary sled-ejection test on 4 June 1964, 
to see if hatches and hatch actuators functioned properly under abort 
conditions, went off without a hitch. Qualification testing began on 1 
July with a sled run to simulate conditions of maximbm dynamic pres- 
sure after an abort during the powered phase of launch vehicle flight. 
Once again, everything worked.49 
The same problem that had delayed development testing, one that 
had little to do with seat design, again brought the test program to a 
halt. Some of the pyrotechnic devices on which escape-system opera- 
tion depended failed to arrive. The result was a four-month gap after 
the July run. In the meantime, NASA had decided to go ahead with a 
new test series. Sled and tower tests had been the only dynamic simula- 
tions planned for the system. Neither, however, could show the system 
working through its entire sequence as in a high-altitude abort. That 
became the purpose of a plan to eject the system from a high-flying F- 
106, worked out at a meeting between NASA, McDonnell, Weber Air- 
craft (the maker of the system), and the 651 1th Test Group at El Cen- 
tro, California, on 12 June. The first test, intended merely to show 
that the seat would work with the airplane, was set for September with 
the F-106 on the ground. Two flights, using production escape sys- 
tems, were to follow, with the whole series to be finished in a month. 
Once again, however, lack of pyrotechnics caused delays. Enterprising 
engineers borrowed some from the ejection seat in North American's 
paraglider tow test vehicle, enabling them to run the ground test on 15 
October. But nothing more could be done for three months.50 
Manned Spacecraft Center was visited by a 
steady stream o f  program officials from NASA 
Headquarters in 1964 as the Gemini flight 
program got into high gear; left, Associate 
Administrator Robert 6. Seamans, Jr., receives 
a briefing; below, Associate Administrator for 
Manned Space Flight George E. Mueller (left) 
reviews the program with Maxime A. Faget 
and Charles W.  Mathews. 
Enough pyrotechnics were on hand for another sled run on 5 
November, which revealed a flaw in seat design. An instant after it had 
been ejected, one of the seats suffered a structural failure of its arm- 
rest and side panel that stopped the separation and recovery se uence. 9 Seat and dummy smashed into the ground, strewing wreckage or 148 
meters along the track. The hard question now was whether or not the 
test program had to be revised. The answer was no, provided the re- 
worked seat structure performed well in a test approximating the most 
severe conditions for which the system was designed. In a sled run on 
11 December, it did just that. The system came through with flying 
colors, bringing that part of the qualification program to an e n d 9  
It was perhaps just as well that Gemin1 2 had been so long de- 
layed. By the end of 1964, only one of the four major parts of escape- 
system qualification had been completed. Still to be conducted were 
simulated off-the-pad ejection (Sope), personnel parachute, and high- 
altitude ejection tests. All three resumed in January 1965, when pyro- 
technics at last began to arrive. 
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First to get under way, on 11 January, was parachute testing. Four 
dummy drops and 12 live jumps from low altitudes over the next 
month turned up only minor problems. High-altitude testing fol- 
lowed.52 In the meantime, on 16 January (a year and a half after 
Sope development tests ended) Sope qualification testing began. 
Shortage of pyrotechnics had again been the chief culprit in the delay. 
The first try failed. One seat worked, but the catapult on the right- 
hand seat fired too soon and exploded when the seat jammed agalnst 
the still partly closed hatch. Almost a month passed while all hatch 
actuators were modified and the results checked out. Both the rede- 
signed actuators and the escape system proved themselves in flawless 
Sope tests on 12 February and 6 March.53 
High-altitude ejection was the last test program to resume but the 
first to finish. Nothing went wrong in the first test, an ejection at 4780 
meters at mach 0.65 on 28 January. Two weeks later, however, in a 
test at 12 000 meters at mach 1.7, the aneroid device that was sup- 
posed to trigger parachute deployment failed, although everything else 
worked. That device also failed to deploy the ballute on 17 February, 
in the first high-altitude live jump, forcing McDonnell and Weber en- 
gineers to redesign the aneroid-controlled firing mechanism. Although 
the aircraft ejection test did not have to be repeated, since being eject- 
ed from the F-106 did not cause the failure, the parachute test pro- 
gram did have to be revised. That meant an extra 10 dummy drops 
and 5 live jumps, which began on 2 March. The final jump, on 13 
March, qualified the personnel parachute system and completed the 
qualification of the Gemini escape system as a whole.54 And not a 
moment too soon. The launch of the third Gemini mission, the first to 
carry a human cargo, was only days away. 
The demand for fuel cells was not so pressing in late 1964 as for 
thrusters and ejection seats, since Spacecraft 3 and 4 were already 
being converted to battery power as a result of earlier problems. GI?% 
redesigned fuel cell, the P3, had not at first lived up to its promise. 
Test sections performed erratically, their outputs tending to decay 
under load and their lives falling far short of requirements. This 
prompted NASA Headquarters to ask GPO on 10 July to provide a 
backup battery-power module in case fuel cells were not ready for the 
fifth Gemini mission. This was a drastic step, since Gemini 5 was slated 
for seven days; a battery installation to handle so long a mission meant 
a severe weight penalty and a narrow limit on what might be achieved 
during the flight. One of the main reasons for putting fuel cells in 
Gemini had been to ease constraints on such lengthy missions. GPO 
directed McDonnell to work out with Eagle-Picher, the battery subcon- 
tractor, a plan for a backup system.55 
Early in August, GPO enlarged the scope of the study, asking 
McDonnell to cover the effects of substituting batteries for fuel cells in 
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all two-day rendezvous missions, of using Agena-supplied power in a 
combined long-duration and rendezvous mission, and of such changes 
on the fuel-cell program itself. McDonnell found the feat possible but 
costly, especially in weight. At a meeting on 14 August, Mathews and 
Burke decided to provide Spacecraft 5 with a combined system of bat- 
teries for the peak loads and fuel cells for basic power needs. If most 
of the experiments planned for the mission were discarded, Spacecraft 
5 would only weigh 30 kilograms more with its battery-augmented sys- 
tem. NASA Headquarters sanctioned the change on 1 October.56 
The combined system reflected GE7s success, finally, in pinpointing 
the sources of fuel-cell shortcomings. GE engineers found that the life 
of test stacks declined as electrical load and the temperature of reac- 
tants rose. The greater the load-the amperage drawn from the 
stack--or the higher the inlet temperature, the shorter the stack's life. 
With a constant load, a change of only 17 kelvins (30°F) in reactant 
temperature-3 13 kelvins (103°F) instead of 330 kelvins (133°F)- 
more than doubled stack life, from 125 to 290 hours. Holding the 
temperature constant and varying the load produced similar results. 
With batteries to handle peak loads, a major factor in truncated fuel- 
cell life might have been countered.57 
- 
These findings were based only on analysis of prior test data. Now 
GE revised its test program to see what effect lowered inlet tempera- 
tures and reduced loads actually had on test stacks. The results con- 
firmed the premise. Two test units under a steady three-ampere load 
with reactants at 297 kelvins (75°F) lasted 1100 and 800 hours. Further 
tests produced equally encouraging results at various levels of load and 
temperature under normal and abnormal conditions. All difficulties 
were not yet out of the way, but those that remained were largely mat- 
ters of detail.58 
Concern about "the rapidly rising costs of the General Electric fuel 
cell development program, coupled with the lagging development," 
persisted for a while; but, significantly, that worry was expressed in a 
memorandum never sent.59 The Gemini Program Office in Houston 
retained some doubts about fuel-cell prospects through the early fall of 
1964, urging NASA Headquarters to allow batteries to replace fuel 
cells in Spacecraft 6 to ensure meeting the prime objective of that mis- 
sion, rendezvous with an Agena target vehicle. Headquarters de- 
murred until 6 November, but then granted the change.60 
That decision stood, spacecraft 6 eventually fliing with battery 
power. In the meantime, however, the response of fuel-cell test units 
to lower temperatures was so marked during late summer and early 
fall as to convince both NASA and its contractors that the power system 
for Spacecraft 5 need not be augmented by batteries. That change was 
therefore canceled on 18 December 1964. The Gemini fuel cell com- 
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pleted its basic qualification test program in May 1965, three months 
before it flew in the fifth Gemini mission.61 
Agena was still further down the line, and its laggng pace showed 
no signs of speeding u during 1964. Project Gemini received its first 
Agena D at the end o ? April 1964, but nearly five months passed be- 
fore it was converted into GATV-5001, the first Gemini Agena Target 
Vehicle. Lockheed completed that effort on 24 September and trans- 
ferred the vehicle to the systems test complex, where cabling it up for 
preliminary vehicle systems tests began the next day. Not too surpris- 
ingly, testing did not run smoothly. 
The hardest and most stubborn problems centered in Agena's 
command and communication (C&C) system-the electronic devices 
for tracking the vehicle, monitoring its subsystems, and passing com- 
mands to the vehicle in orbit. Because of Gemini's unique demand for 
rendezvous and docking, Lockheed had to design and prove a new 
C&C system for the Gemini A ena. The new design struck GPO as very 
good, a judgment confirmed b y a special consultant group from Stan- 
ford Research Institute, which recommended only minor changes. 
During testing in October, however, parts of the system started acting 
up. Troubleshooting got GATV-5001 through its testing, but it seemed 
all too likely that the C&C system suffered from basic defects in its 
mechanical and electronic design. The question became, as Mathews 
later recalled, "Should we live with what we had, or should we back off 
and completely redesign the configuration?" When the problems per- 
sisted, the Air Force insisted on redesign, and Lockheed finally initiat- 
ed a "Ten Point Plan for C&C Equipment" in February 1965.62 
In the meantime, GATV-5001 had emerged from its preliminary 
tests in November 1964 and gone to Lockheed's Santa Cruz Test Base 
for a round of captive-firing tests. First, however, the target docking 
adapter had to be installed. This was the unit, built by McDonnell but 
carried aloft by Lockheed's Agena, to which the spacecraft would at- 
tach. When Lockheed workers hoisted the adapter into the test stand 
and tried to mate it with the Agena, they found it did not fit. After 
some struggling, they managed to get the two physically hooked to- 
gether, but the wiring failed to match. The captive firing had to be 
postponed until January.63 
The test on 20 anuary 1965 simulated a full two-week mission. It 
included repeated 2 rings of both primary and secondary propulsion 
systems, with operational data transmitted to telemetry stations at the 
test site and at Lockheed's Sunnyvale plant. The propulsion systems 
worked well, but the C&C system again had problems. One part, the 
programmer time accumulator, jumped erratically, picking up almost 
eight extra weeks. Shipped back to Sunnyvale on 1 February, GATV- 
5001 lost three weeks while Lockheed tried to fix the capricious timer. 
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A makeshift fix allowed GATV-5001 to move on to the next phase, 
electromagnetic and radio-frequency interference tests, while engmeers 
continued their efforts to diagnose and cure the jumping timer. By 23 
February, when the interference tests began, GATV-5001 was more 
than a month behind schedu1e.a 
Interference tests ended 9 March, but the vehicle stayed in the 
anechoic chamber for another week while Lockheed checked out its 
answer to the erratic timer and to a telemetry synchronization problem 
that had also cropped up. On 18 March, GATV-5001 moved to the 
systems test complex for a planned six days of "minor" modifications: 
filters were to be installed in the command controller (another part of 
the C&C system) and the forward auxiliary rack (which supported the 
target docking adapter and housed most of the C&C gear) was to be 
aligned. These two tasks proved to be more than minor. The first 
eventually required a complete redesign, the second extensive machin- 
ing. The result was another lost month. By the end of March, GATV- 
5001 was 66 days behind schedule.65 
Final systems testing got under way on 9 April and ended with a 
simulated flight on 6 May. On 27 May, the Air Force and Aerospace 
team found GATV-5001 formally unacceptable for Gemini, since 
FACI (first article configuration inspection) from 10 to 26 May had 
shown that it was not flightworthy. SSD took the vehicle anyway, but 
conditionally. Lockheed was expected to correct all defects; some were 
merely matters of paperwork, but others, like propulsion and C&C sys- 
tems qualification, were major efforts. GATV-5001 was then flown to 
the Cape on 29 May, to be used as a development test vehicle.66 
In the meantime, the first Atlas booster for Gemini had joined the 
program on 1 December in San Diego. It had then been shipped by 
truck to Cape Kennedy, a six-day trip. It was erected on complex 14 a 
week later, to help in checking out the launch pad and ground sup- 
port equipment. Finished with that by 11 February, the Atlas was 
moved to a hangar, there to be modified and stored until CATV-5002 
arrived.67 
On Tuesday afternoon, just a few hours after the launch of Gemi- 
ni 2, the program received another vote of confidence. Although the 
second launch had been long delayed, the nature of the delays in no 
way cast doubts on Gemini itself; NASA and its contractors decided 
that Gemini missions should be launched at two-month intervals, in- 
stead of the three-month cycle then planned. 
In September 1964, the Air Force had not only convinced NASA 
that GLV-2 ought to fly, but also proposed to speed up the program 
by launching every two months. Although the Vertical Test Facility at 
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Martin-Baltimore had been designed to handle two launch vehicles at 
once, only one of these test cells was working. The Air Force suggested 
opening the second cell to speed up launch vehicle deliveries. SSD 
Commander Funk assured his Gemini colleagues that the Cape crew 
could handle launches only 60 days apart. 
LeRoy E. Day, Headquarters Gemini Test Director, took charge of 
a task force to canvass spacecraft, launch vehicle, and target vehicle 
contractors about the practicality of the plan. A two-month study con- 
vinced Day and his group that it could be done. Although NASA's 
checkout crew at Cape Kennedy expressed a measure of skepticism 
based on their experiences in Project Mercury and the opening stages 
of Gemini, the Gemini Program Office had more faith. GPO had, in 
fact, been thinking of less time between launches when it imposed re- 
vised test and checkout procedures in St. Louis and at the Cape early 
in 1964. When Day presented his findings to Gemini's top echelon on 
19 January 1965, they bought the plan and wanted it put Into effect by 
the fifth mission. This vote of confidence in Gemini was founded on a 
technological judgment, and in that sense it was fully justified. Later 
events were to show that fitting astronaut training into the shorter 
schedule was a harder task, although it produced no problems that 
could not be surmounted.68 
As 1965 dawned, Project Gemini had cleared most of the hurdles 
in its path. The past year had seen its last serious development prob- 
lems overcome. Agena was perhaps not as far along as it should be, 
but there was plenty of talent at hand to put that in order. The repeat- 
ed setbacks suffered by GLV-2 could only be seen as acts of God, not 
defects in technology. That could not be said of its failure on 9 De- 
cember, but little more than a month of hard work was needed to put 
matters right. The second Gemini mission, on 19 January 1965, almost 
matched the first, on 8 April 1964, in the quality of performance. 
Gemini's spacecraft and launch vehicle had been roved. All that re- 
mained, the last hurdle, was sending men aloft. A f though the publicly 
scheduled date for Gemini 3 was the second quarter of 1965, Charles 
Mathews told the Gemini Management Panel shortly after the flight of 
Gemini 2 that late March looked like a good bet.69 
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The Last Hurdle 
0 N 13 April 1964, the Monday after the flight of Gemini-Titan 1, the men and women of the press gathered in the auditorium at 
the Manned Spacecraft Center to learn who would be the first to fly 
the Gemini spacecraft. Robert Gilruth, Director of the Manned Space- 
craft Center, introduced the four astronauts assigned to Gemini 3, the 
prime and the backup crews. Commander of the first team was Virgil 
I. Griss~m-"Gus.~~ His crewmate was John W. Young. Backing up the 
mission were Walter M. Schirra, Jr., and Thomas P. Stafford.1 
The stocky, crew-cut Grissom, an Air Force major,* was an old- 
timer in NASA's manned space flight program, one of the original 
seven Mercury astronauts picked five years earlier. He already had a 
quarter of an hour of spacecraft flying time as passenger on the subor- 
bital flight of Liberty Bell 7 in July 1961, Project Mercury's second 
manned mission, and would therefore be the world's first two-time 
space flyer. Young, his crewmate, was a younger man and a newer as- 
tronaut; a Navy lieutenant commander, he had been one of the nine 
pilots selected for the space program in September 1962. Schirra, like 
Grissom, was one of the Mercury seven. Born in 1923, he became the 
old man of the astronauts corps when John Glenn resigned early in 
1964. In October 1962, Schirra had ridden Sigma 7 (the fifth manned 
Mercury spacecraft) through six orbits in the penultimate Mercury 
*Grissom, a captain in the Air Force when he joined the astronaut ranks, had been promoted 
to major in July 1962, one year after his Mercury flight. 
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mission. StafFord, Schirra's copilot in the backup crew, was an Air 
Force major who became an astronaut at the same time as Young.*2 
Gilruth voiced NASA's "high hopes of flying by the end of the 
year," 1964,3 leading America back into space after an l&month hia- 
tus. Those hopes foundered in the storms that lashed Cape Kennedy 
during the summer. When the launch vehicle for Gemini 2, after pass- 
ing so smoothly through test and checkout, betrayed the mission in 
December, even Gemini's unmanned prelude remained unfinished at 
year's end. But the opening quarter of 1965 saw the success of Gemini 
2 in January and then, scarcely two months later, Grissom and Young 
in orbit aboard "Molly Brown." With that, Project Gemini had clearly 
advanced a long step beyond Mercury and opened a new era in 
manned space flight. 
Within a week after they had been publicly assigned to the mis- 
sion, the Gemini 3 astronauts were busy training for it. All astronauts 
were in training from the time they joined NASA, but for Grissom 
and Young, Schirra and Stafford, the focus now shifted to a specific 
mission. Their first assignment was the Gemini mission simulator at 
the McDonnell plant in St. Louis. This training complex included a 
flight simulator that matched the inside of a Gemini spacecraft and 
provided its riders with almost all the sights, noises, and shakings they 
should meet in a real flight, from prelaunch to postlanding. Because 
astronauts varied in size? and missions differed in goals and onboard 
tasks, no two spacecraft were identical, and the mission simulators had 
to be altered and updated for each flight. But the simulator in St. 
Louis had not yet been engineered to an exact replica of Spacecraft 3, 
so the 36 hours that Grissom and Young spent in it over the next two 
months, as well as the 34 that Schirra and Stafford flew, were devoted 
mainly to learning general systems and operations.4 
*The others who became astronauts with Stafford and Young were Neil A. Armstrong, Frank 
Borman, Charles Conrad, Jr., James A. Lovell, Jr., James A. McDivitt, Elliot M. See, Jr., and 
Edward H. White 11. They were introduced to the public on 17 September 1962. 
'bn January 1963, shortly after the seconcigroup of astronauts was selected, the pilots were 
given specialty assignments in the MSG programs. Grissom, one of the smaller astronauts, was 
assigned to the Gemini spacecraft. Because of this and his Mercury experience, he was very dose 
to the McDonnell engineers and technicians-so dose, in fact that the cockpits of the first three 
spacecraft were designed around him, giving him the best view of the instrument panel and out 
the window. The spacecraft was familiarly dubbed the "GUSMOBILE." Although Young was 
only two inches taller, his seat had to be compressed so he could fit into it. Stafford had to have 
adjustments made on both the seat and hatch to accommodate his six-foot frame. By July 1963, the 
program office had discovered that 14 of the 16 astronauts could not be fitted into the cabin as 
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On 10 July 1964, McDonnell workmen began taking the simulator 
apart to ship it to Houston, there to be set up to match Spacecraft 3. 
The second Gemini mission simulator was already at the Cape, al- 
though not yet updated for Gemini 3. That was supposed to have been 
done by mid-July, but it was not finished until October. Final checkout 
took the better part of a month, and the Gemini 3 crews could not 
begin flying simulations in Florida before 9 November.5 
But no such hangup ever left the astronauts with time on their 
hands. On 10 and 11 May, all four were in St. Louis to review a mockup 
of the cockpit. In the months that followed, they kept a close eye on their 
ship, watchin as it passed through its series of tests and inspections in 
the McDonne 1 lant. They also joined in the testing itself. During the B~ I second phase o systems tests in October and November, Grissom and 
Young spent more than 14 hours in the cockpit, 9 of them while the 
spacecraft was undergoing altitude chamber tests. Schirra and Stafford 
were not far behind, with 8 cockpit hours.6 
During July and August, the four Gemini 3 pilots (and all their 
fellows) were in Dallas for a training program on the moving-base 
abort simulator created by Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc. This device pro- 
jected the Gemini 3 launch profile in striking detail, complete with 
such cues as noise, vibration, and a wide range of motions that might 
be caused by one launch anomaly or another. The trainees also 
learned how to deal with any number of booster or spacecraft systems 
malfunctions.7 
Throughout their training, the prospective spacemen also kept 
their more mundane flyin skills intact. Each managed to average 25 
hours a month in the coc fc pit of an Air Force jet. They also put in 
more than 200 hours apiece in innumerable briefings, three of them 
formal affairs that lasted two days each at Houston, St. Louis, and 
Cape Kennedy, the others an ongoing series of informal systems fami- 
liarizations that were part of each training activity. Periodic reviews of 
mission plans, physical examinations, fittings for flight suits, sessions 
on experiments to be carried on the spacecraft and on biomedical as- 
pects of the mission, and any number of other operational matters 
helped fill the hours to overflowing.8 
In October 1964, the Gemini 3 crews tackled still another aspect of 
training, practice in getting out of their spacecraft after it landed. The 
three-part program began with a review of egress procedures in the 
Gemini mockup at the McDonnell plant, then moved to the flotation 
tank at Ellington Air Force Base, just up the road from the Manned 
Spacecraft Center. The tank was a king-size swimming pool, where the 
crews rehearsed (both with and without space suits) climbing in and 
out of a boilerplate spacecraft that was either floating or submerged.9 
Grissom and Young completed the third hase of this training in P emergency egress from a floating spacecra t during February 1965. 
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They rode a boat out into the Gulf of Mexico, where a model space- 
craft was dumped into the water. Then, fully suited, they went 
through the postlanding checklist and practiced getting out of the 
spacecraft and into their one-man liferafts. The crews also took re- 
fresher courses in parachute landing that month.10 
During November and December 1964, the four crewmen spent 
part of their time in Johnsville, Pennsylvania, at the Naval Air Devel- 
opment Center, the site of a man-rated centrifuge run by the Aviation 
Medical Acceleration Laboratory. The first phase of centrifuge training 
had taken place in July and August 1963, when Gemini controls and 
displays had been evaluated and all the astronauts had been spun 
through acceleration profiles for launch and reentry. For pilots not yet 
assigned to a mission, the second phase simply provided more of the 
same. But for the crews of Gemini 3 and Gemini 4," it was an impor- 
tant part of mission training. They worked in pressure suits, and the 
others trained in shirtsleeves. Grissom rode the centrifuge for 9% 
hours, Young for 11 hours; Schirra and Stafford spent only a little less 
time in the centrifuge than the prime crew.11 
When the mission simulator at Cape Kennedy had been updated 
to match Spacecraft 3, both crews began working in it off and on for 
the next four months. During that time, Grissom put in more than '7'7 
hours flying his mission on the ground, rehearsing every phase of his 
planned flight again and again, not only when everything went right 
but also when something went wrong.? Young put in even more time 
than Grissom, over 85 hours, in the Cape simulator. Schirra managed 
to get in 43 hours, Stafford 54.12 In January 1965, Grissom and his 
fellow crewmen were back in Dallas for more work on the abort simu- 
lator, this time focused on how best to deal with each type of booster 
or spacecraft malfunction. By the time this training was over, Grissom 
had run through 225 aborts and Young 154; Schirra and Stafford each 
totaled only slightly less than Young.13 
When Spacecraft 3 arrived at complex 19, the crewmen resumed 
their active role in spacecraft testing. Sandwiching this exercise be- 
tween trips to Houston for egress and parachute training, Grissom and 
Young still managed to spend almost 19 hours in the cockpit, begin- 
ning with the premate flight test on 14 February and ending with the 
*On 29 July 1964, James A. McDivitt and Edward H. White I1 had been introduced to the 
press as the prime crew for Gemini 4. Frank Borman and James Lovell were announced as the 
backup crew. 
tThe following figures suggest how thoroughly NASA tried to prepare a pilot for his mission. 
Grissom flew 20 normal and 46 aborted launches; 13 normal speed, 5 overspeed, and 4 under- 
speed insertions into orbit; 8 platform alignments; 9 runthroughs of the flight plan; 107 retro- 
fires; and 64 reentries. He experienced 51 simulated failures of the booster and 211 systems mal- 
functions: 57 sequential, 34 electrical and communications, 17 attitude control and maneuver 
electronics, 30 orbital attitude and maneuver, 16 reentry control, 36 guidance and control, and 
2 1 environmentat control. 
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final simulated flight on 18 March. Schirra and Stafford got in more 
than 14 hours of cockpit time. Altogether, the prime crew had logged 
33 hours in their spacecraft before the final launch countdown began, 
and the backup crew had spent 22 hours.14 
Nine months of grueling work were ready to pay off. By Febru- 
ary 1965, Grissom was sure that "We're ready to go." NASA agreed. 
Rumors already put Gemini's first manned flight earlier than the offi- 
cially announced April or May. And NASA Administrator James 
Webb, speaking at Nebraska Wesleyan University in Lincoln, hinted 
that the launch might come in late March.15 The men were ready, and 
the machines very nearly so. 
THE MACHINES FOR GEMINI 3 
McDonnell finished building Spacecraft 3 in December 1963 and 
moved it from the production floor to the white room in the St. Louis 
plant. Engineering changes and equipment installation filled the next 
six months. Despite some NASA worries about tight schedules, the 
spacecraft was ready to begin the first phase of systems testing by the 
end of May 1964, directed, like Spacecraft 2, by the Launch Prepara- 
tions Croup from the Cape. The Development Engineering Inspection 
(DEI), the first of the periodic reviews to make sure that McDonnell 
was giving NASA just what it wanted, was held on 9 and 10 June. 
This first review was chiefly a close look at the modules to be tested, to 
see that they matched specifications and were actually ready to begin 
testing. The DEI produced its share of changes, but nothing stood in 
the way of getting on with the tests.*l6 
While Spacecraft 3 was moving through the McDonnell plant, 
Gemini Program Manager Charles Mathews took a step that showed 
the program had entered a new phase. During July, he set up a Cemi- 
ni Configuration Control Board to be, as he later informed Mc- 
Donnell, the "one official route for all configuration change action to 
provide continuity and coordination." Each Monday morning, Ma- 
thews met with the heads of the Gemini Offices of Program Control, 
Spacecraft, Vehicles and Missions, and Test Operations to review all 
proposed changes and to pass on them-and every change now had to 
*On 8 June 1964, George Low, MSC's new Deputy Director, made a change in the permanent 
DEI board established by his predecessor, James Elms. Low himself, instead of John Bailey 
(Chief, Reliability and Flight Safety) would be chairman. Members of the Spacecraft 3 DEI were 
Low, Charles Mathews, Duncan Collins (Gemini Spacecraft Office), Bailey, Max Faget (Director, 
Engineering and Development), Christopher Kraft (Director, Flight Operations), Grissom (in a 
dual role as astronaut and representative of Flight Crew Operations), John Williams (Florida 
Operations), and Robert Everline (Gemini) as recording secretary. The board reviewed 45 re- 
quests for changes-the board agreed that 17 were mandatory, 6 possible after further study, 16 
unnecessary, and 6 undesirable. 
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be formally presented and justified. When the board met for the first 
time,* on 27 July, the development era of Gemini had clearly ended. 
From then on, the main concerns of the program were production and 
operations.17 
July also saw McDonnell present NASA with its plan for convert- 
ing the Gemini contract from fixed fee to incentive fee. This was a 
direct McDonnell response to a NASA request based on a clause in the 
contract negotiated in 1963. The idea was to give the company a 
chance to earn greater profits by cutting costs, meeting schedules, and 
delivering an outstanding product, but to receive less money if it failed 
in any of the three areas. With development almost complete, such a 
plan became feasible. Mathews had appointed a Gemini Incentive Task 
Group on 2 March 1964, naming as its chairman Kenneth Kleink- 
necht, his deputy and former Mercury manager.tl8 The formal Re- 
quest for Proposal was ready for McDonnell by 19 May, after a re- 
view by NASA Headquarters. Walter Burke, McDonnell Vice President 
and General Manager for Spacecraft and Missiles, arrived in Houston 
on 7 July with a group of colleagues to address a large NASA gather- 
ing on his company's ideas.$19 
During the spring of 1964, the Air Force Space Systems Division. 
(SSD) had also been working out incentives with its major Gemini con- 
tractors, Martin and Aerojet-General for the launch vehicle and Lock- 
heed for the target vehicle. NASA kept close tabs on the progress and 
drew on SSD experience for the McDonnell proposal. Martin's contract 
was converted on 10 June and Aerojet-General's on 17 June; Lock- 
heed negotiations were completed early in August.20 MSC's talks with 
McDonnell lasted through the fall of 1964, the last details being settled 
on 18 December, and NASA Headquarters approved the plan on 28 
January 1965. It called for a total cost of $712 301 640 for the space- 
craft, plus a fee that might range from $28 075 581 to $55 775 581 as 
the company's performance ranged from poor to good.21 
Contract changes notwithstanding, McDonnell had completed its 
tests of Spacecraft 3 modules on 12 September 1964, and was ready to 
*Members (and alternates) were Mathews, chairman (Kleinknecht), Duncan Collins (Homer 
Dotts), Willis Mitchell (Jerome Hammack), Scott Simpkinson (Harry Douglas), Richard Henry 
(George MacDougall), and Stephen D. Armstrong (James I. Brownlee). 
tKleinknechtls team: John B. Alldredge, Leroy E. Kroeker, and Charles D. Heald (from 
MSC procurement); John E. Roberts, Gregory P. McIntosh, Walter Wolhart, and George Mac- 
Dougall (GPO); Earle B. Young (MSC Resources Management), and Richard Henry (NASA 
Headquarters, who later transferred to MSC GPO). Available on an  as-needed basis were William 
A. Summerfelt (incentive approach, schedule, and program planning), Joseph Fernandez (cost), 
Anthony L. Liccardi (configuration control and specifications), Richard A. Schmidt (incentive 
management), and Sidney A. Cariski (contracts and procurement), all from NASA Headquarters. 
z ~ u r k e  was assisted by several key McDonnell Gemini figures, among them A. E. Smith, 
Harry W. Oldeg, J. M. Gardner, Jr., and Frank Morgan. 
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mate them. On 21 September, Scott H. Simpkinson, chief of Gemini 
Test Operations, arrived in St. Louis at the head of 22 engineers from 
GPO and other MSG elements to join the Launch Preparation Group 
and MSC's resident McDonnell office for the second major review of 
Spacecraft 3, the Module Test Review." Twelve teams under the re- 
view board took a careful look at results from the first phase of testing, 
just completed, and reported their findin s to the board, which an- 
nounced the next day that the modules o !? Spacecraft 3 were indeed 
ready to be mated and that the second phase of systems testing might 
begin.22 
Spacecraft 3's third major review began on 3 December as the first 
half of a two-part Spacecraft Acceptance Review (SAR).Ie The space- 
craft had completed all systems tests except its last, the simulated 
flight. After its review of the test results, the acceptance board allowed 
McDonnell to proceed with the flight simulation. When this test was 
finished on 21 December, the board met for the second part of its 
task, a study of all test results, documentation, and overall spacecraft 
status. Three days after the simulated flight, on Christmas Eve, the 
board had "determined that Spacecraft 3 is acceptable for delivery."23 
After the holidays, the spacecraft was loaded aboard a C-124, 
which delivered it to Cape Kennedy early Monday evening, 4 January 
1965. The concept that a fully checked out and integrated spacecraft 
was being delivered had by then been largely accepted. Work in the 
industrial area at the Cape, from the time the craft arrived until it was 
transferred to the launch complex, centered on putting it in shape to 
fly by clearing up manufacturing shortages and installing seats and 
pyrotechnics, rather than by testing, with two major exceptions. 
~ e & u s e  this was the first man-bearing Gemini spacecraft, it was 
the subject of a special communications test at the Merritt Island 
Launch Area radar range. The spacecraft communications systems 
were checked out in a radio-frequency environment that matched as 
closely as possible the conditions they would meet in orbit. Testing of 
the spacecraft propulsion systems was the other exception. Spacecraft 
3 went through a complete end-to-end propulsion systems verification 
test program, including static firing (as had its predecessor), partly to 
check out procedures and gear, partly to build some confidence in sys- 
*Members of Simpkinson's review board were Homer Dotts (Deputy Spacecraft Manager), 
Wilbur Gray (GPO Resident Manager), Charles Williams (Spacecraft 3 engineer), Walter Kapryan 
(Cape Manager, GPO), Grissom (for Flight Crew Support Office), and Everline, coordinator and 
recorder. 
tThe Spacecraft 3 SAR board consisted of Homer Dotts, chairman, Andrew Hobokan (Depu- 
ty Resident Manager), Phillip Deans (Engineering and Development Directorate), John Williams, 
Grissom, Melvin F. Brooks (Flight Operations), Norbert B. Vaughn (Reliability and Quality As- 
surance), and Don R. Coryell (Gemini), coordinator and recorder. 
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tems whose development had been fraught with problems and which 
were not yet fully qualified. Even with these two special tasks, however, 
Spacecraft 3 was ready to move to the launch pad a month after it ar- 
rived at the Cape.24 
The launch vehicle for Gemini 3 had been late reaching the Cape 
through no fault of its own; the long delay in launching Gemini 2 had 
left it with no place to go. GLV-3 had, in fact, been built and tested in 
Baltimore with admirable dispatch. Completed early in June 1964, the 
vehicle had passed its horizontal tests and finished its checkout in the 
Vertical Test Facility by the last day of July. Another three weeks saw 
it through its combined systems acceptance test and review by the Ve- 
hicle Acceptance Team. When the team approved GLV-3 on 21 Au- 
gust, GLV-2 was still sitting on the launch pad in Florida, so GPO de- 
cided to have the Martin crew in Baltimore install the engineering 
changes on GLV-3 that were to have been done at the Cape. After 
looking over these changes, the acceptance team ordered a second 
combined systems test. The test rerun and the results approved, on 9 
October the team once again accepted GLV-3. Martin-Baltimore for- 
mally turned it over to the Air Force on 27 October. Since Gemini 2 
was still unlaunched, the Baltimore crew installed another set of modi- 
fications that had been slated for the Cape, finishing in mid-January.25 
Now there was room at the Cape for GLV-3, but the Air Force 
could no longer spare the C-133B that had carried the first two launch 
vehicles to Florida. A converted Boeing 377 Stratocruiser, nicknamed 
"Pregnant Guppy," had to serve instead, although it could not hold 
both stages at once. It flew the second stage down on 21 January, went 
back to Baltimore to pick up the first stage, and returned to the Cape 
on 23 January. Two days later, GLV-3 was standing on the launch pad 
waiting for the spacecraft, which joined it on 5 February. The pace 
then slowed somewhat, as premate tests of the spacecraft proved trou- 
blesome. Nevertheless, spacecraft and launch vehicle were mechanical- 
ly mated on 1'7 February, less than a month after the launch of Gemini 
2. Another month was ample time to complete systems testing, and the 
simulated flight test on 18 March concluded the task of checking out 
the machines for Gemini 3.26 
PLANS FOR GEMINI 3 
The precise scope of the third Gemini mission remained uncertain 
until very nearly the eve of flight. That its primary purpose, as spelled 
out in the "GT-3 Mission Directive," was 
to demonstrate and evaluate the capabilities of the spacecraft and 
launch vehicle system, and the procedures necessary for the support 
of future long-duration and rendezvous missions27 
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had been settled by the rescheduling decisions of April 1963. Gemini 
3, in other words, was to show that Project Gemini was ready to meet 
its major goals. But just how that was to be done was not clearly de- 
fined until early 1965. 
Such key questions as how long the mission was to be and how its 
specific objectives were to be met were much discussed. NASA Head- 
quarters had tentatively approved the three-orbit flight suggested by 
the program office in April 1963. This seemed too short a mission, 
however, to use the rendezvous evaluation pod (REP), long lanned to 
check out spacecraft radar and maneuvering systems. If t g e mission 
could not be lengthened, some other means must be found "to demon- 
strate and evaluate . . . the procedures necessary for the support of 
future . . . rendezvous missions." Equally unclear was how so short a 
flight could do much to prepare for future long-duration missions.28 
MSC's Flight Operations Division did prepare a tentative mission 
plan in October 1963 that outlined possible use of the pod during the 
second orbit of a three-orbit mission. But the matter was settled when, 
on 4 January 1965, NASA Headquarters decided to strike the pod 
from Gemini 3.29 The question of mission duration surfaced again late 
in the summer of 1964. Word leaked to the press that Grissom and 
Young, backed by the Astronaut Activities Office, were pressing for an 
open-ended mission; that is, leaving it up to the crew to decide how 
many orbits to try for after Spacecraft 3 was in space. GPO was averse 
to the idea, since the tracking network was then geographically limited 
and could only fully cover three orbits. Going beyond that on the first 
flight might be risky. NASA Headquarters again stepped in and 
squelched the idea. When a reporter asked Grissom what he thought 
about the decision, the answer was a curt, "We can do all the testing of 
the spacecraft we need in three trips."sO 
One of the first-order objectives for Gemini 3--one that had to be 
achieved for the mission to be judged a success and any threat to 
which was cause enough to hold or cancel the flight-was to "demon- 
strate and evaluate the capability to maneuver the spacecraft in orbit 
using the orbital attitude and maneuver system (OAMS)." Early plan- 
ning thus called for several OAMS firings.31 The reason for these fir- 
ings suddenly expanded in January 1965. NASA Headquarters sent 
Flight Operations in Houston a set of preliminary data, with orders to 
revise the flight plan to protect the Gemini 3 crew against the danger 
that Martin Caidin, in his space thriller Marooned, had posed: the fail- 
ure of spacecraft retrorockets to work, stranding the crew in space. 
Headquarters proposed three OAMS maneuvers to place the space- 
craft in a "fail safe" orbit, one from which it would reenter whether 
the retrorockets fired or not. Actually, Gemini orbits were too low to 
be permanent, so spacecraft reentry was inevitable. What the fail-safe 
maneuvers were designed to achieve was the spacecraft's return 
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promptly enough to ensure that the crew survived. Coming as it did 
less than three months before the planned launch, the new demand 
threw mission planning into turmoil. But the response was ra id. A 
revised tentative flight plan was ready in little more than a montc and 
the final plan followed on 4 March.32 
The new plan called for firing the aft thrusters to free the space- 
craft from the second stage of the launch vehicle, adding about 3 me- 
ters per second to its speed and putting it into an elliptical orbit with a 
perigee of 122 kilometers and an apogee of 182 kilometers. Just be- 
fore first perigee, about an hour and a half into the flight and over 
Texas, a burst from the forward thrusters would cut 20 meters per 
second from spacecraft velocity and convert its orbit to a near circular 
122 by 130 kilometers. During the second pass over the Indian Ocean, 
some 2 hours and 20 minutes into the mission, would come a series of 
out-of-plane burns totaling 4 meters per second, a part of the former 
flight plan to check out the OAMS, with no bearing on the fail-safe 
plan. Finally, over Hawaii on the third time around, there was a pre- 
retrofire burn to reduce speed by 28 meters per second, putting the 
spacecraft into an elliptical reentry orbit with a perigee of 63 kilome- 
ters.33 
Another relative latecomer to Gemini 3 was a set of experiments. 
Although Project Mercury had included some in-orbit experiments, no 
one seems to have given much thought to Gemini in that context until 
Mercury ended in mid-1963. That summer, the Headquarters Office 
of Space Sciences began looking for proposals. It joined with the 
Office of Manned Space Flight in setting up a Panel on In-Flight Scientif- 
ic Experiments, or POISE, to pass on the merits of proposed experi- 
ments. A Manned Space Flight Experiments Board was chartered in 
January 1964 to decide which experiments would go on which mission, 
Apollo as well as Gemini.34 
MSC had earlier formed its own experiments panel, which met for 
the last time on 16 January to pass on its advice about experiments for 
the first two manned Gemini missions to the NASA Headquarters 
group that had superseded it. Noting that Spacecraft 3 had already 
been built and that the shortness of the planned mission sharply limit- 
ed any active participation by the crew, the panel stressed the need to 
find experiments that would largely conduct themselves and were 
nearly complete in terms of planning, design, and hardware. The panel 
members believed, although GPO did not, that two experiments left 
over from the proposed but never flown Mercury-Atlas 10 met these 
stringent criteria: one intended to explore the combined effects of ra- 
diation and low gravity on cells, the other to study cell growth at zero 
gravity. Both were approved by the Headquarters board when it met 
in Washington the following month.35 
The first experiment had been prompted by signs of radiation 
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damage to cells after earlier flights, the biological effects being in some 
cases greater than might have been predicted from the len h of expo- 
sure; this was a matter of special concern in light of plans ? or long-du- 
ration manned space flight. Either (or both) of two reasons might ex- 
plain this anomaly: unknown biological effects produced by the "heavy 
primaries" component of radiation, blocked from Earth's surface by 
the atmosphere and hence inaccessible to terrestrial laboratories, or the 
interaction of radiation with some aspect of the space flight environ- 
ment, such as prolonged weightlessness. Experiment S-4 was designed 
to furnish a basis for weighing these alternatives. 
Human blood samples were to be exposed to a known quantity 
and quality of radiation (both in the spacecraft and on the ground) 
during the zero-gravity phase of the mission. The fre uency of various 
chromosomal aberrations in both samples could then 9b e compared. To  
be mounted on the right-hand hatch, the experiment was wholly self- 
contained in a half-kilogram (one-pound) hermetically sealed alumi- 
num box that held the blood samples, a radiation source, and instru- 
mentation. The copilot had only to twist the handle and push it in to 
start the irradiation of the blood samples. Twenty minutes later he 
would twist the handle in the opposite direction and pull it out to stop 
the experiment. Word of these actions relayed to the ground would 
allow them to be duplicated.*36 
The second experiment was designed to explore the possibility 
that cells might be directly affected by low gravity-that ong-term 
weightlessness might produce changes with important implications for 
prolonged space flight. Because the effects were easier to detect in 
simple cell systems than in complex organisms and because theory 
argued that effects would appear only in cells upward of one micron 
across, the eggs of a sea urchin were selected as the experimental ma- 
terial. The eggs were to be fertilized at the start of the experiment, 
and the possible changes brought about by low gravity observed at sev- 
eral stages of the development. 
The cell growth experiment was also self-contained, a sealed 213- 
kilogram (1 %-pound) cylinder, to be mounted on the left-hand hatch 
and worked by the command pilot. The handle had to be turned five 
times--once half an hour before flight to fertilize the eggs, then four 
times in flight to fix the dividing cells at specific stages of growth in 
successive samples. Each time the handle was turned, the fact was re- 
layed to the laboratory, where the action would be duplicated on an 
identical package. Results from the simultaneous experiments would 
be compared later.ts7 
*Michael A. Bender, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, was principal investigator on the 
radiation experiment. 
tPrincipa1 investigator for the cell-growth investigation was Richard S. Young, Ames Re- 
search Center. 
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A third experiment found its way into Gemini 3 by a more round- 
about path. Spacecraft falling back into the atmosphere are sheathed 
in an ionized plasma that blocks all radio communication, a source of 
much concern in at least two Mercury missions. In the first manned 
orbital flight, with John Glenn in Friendship 7, the five-minute black- 
out followed a signal that the capsule's heatshield was unlatched. Al- 
though the signal was wrong, Mercury control spent an agonizin five 
minutes until the radio link was restored. Then in the very next /fight, 
M. Scott Carpenter's Aurora 7 overshot its planned landing point by 
400 kilometers because the capsule was misaligned at retrofire. In ei- 
ther case, communications with the reentering spacecraft would have 
made many hearts beat more calmly.38 
A reentry communications experiment had been proposed and 
accepted for Mercury-Atlas 10, but when the program ended with that 
mission unflown, it was suggested for Gemini. Tentatively assigned to 
Spacecraft 3 in March 1964, the experiment failed to win a firm place 
for months, largely because of its half-million-dollar tag. In July, 
however, the Office of Advanced Research and Tec nology in NASA 
Headquarters agreed to share the cost, and the experiment had its 
place in the mission confirmed.39 
Research had shown that, for small objects, adding fluid to the 
ionized plasma during the reentry blackout could restore communica- 
tions by lowering the plasma's frequency enough to allow UHF radio 
transmission to get through. Whether the same technique would work 
for an object as large as the Gemini spacecraft was now to be tested. A 
water expulsion system would be installed on the inside surface of one 
of the landing-gear doors, relics of the days when landing skids were 
to be used with its paraglider wing. The experiment was fully self- 
contained except for a starting switch inside the cabin to be thrown by 
the copilot when the spacecraft had fallen to about 90 000 meters. At 
that point, the plasma sheath would surround the spacecraft, blacking 
out communications. Water would be automatically injected into the 
plasma in timed pulses for the next two and a half minutes, while 
ground stations monitored and recorded UHF radio reception.*40 
During the first two days of March 1965, the Office of Manned 
Space Flight held a Design Certification Review in Washington. The 
review board? asked for, and got, formal pledges from the top execu- 
*The experiment had originally been proposed for Mercury by William F. Cuddihy of Lang- 
ley Research Center. His colleague, Lyle C. Schroeder, later took over as principal investigator 
for the Gemini experiment. 
t ~ h e  board consisted of Mueller, Gilruth, Kurt Debus (Director, Kennedy Space Center), 
Wernher von Braun (Director, Marshall Space Flight Center), Major General Osmond J. Ritland 
(Air Force Systems Command), and Major General Ben Funk (Commander, SSD). 
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tives of all major Gemini contractors that their roducts were ready 
for manned space flight, barring something un k' oreseen turning u P during what remained of Cape checkout. A week later, the spacecra t
Flight Readiness Review revealed only minor and quickly corrected 
problems. The launch vehicle passed its final test, simulated flight, on 
18 March and its Flight Readiness Review on Saturday morning, 20 
March. When the Mission Review Board* met that afternoon, weather 
was the only thing that might delay the mission. Early Monday morn- 
ing, the launch vehicle contractors confirmed that GLV-3 was ready to 
go; at 9 a.m., the Flight Safety Review Board committed the booster to 
launch.4 1 
Martin's pad crew started loading oxidizer aboard GLV-3 at 6:22 
that evening, 22 March, and five hours later all tanks were full. The 
final countdown began at 2 o'clock Tuesday morning, under overcast 
skies. Included in the countdown were static firings of both spacecraft 
rocket systems. This had been a matter of dispute between the astro- 
nauts and the program office. They agreed on plans to fire one ring of 
the reentry control system but not on OAMS firing. GPO, backed by 
the Preflight Operations Division, preferred to fire only the lateral 
thrusters, but the pilots wanted to fire the aft thrusters too. The mat- 
ter was settled in May 1964, when NASA Deputy Director for Gemini 
William Schneider decided both would be fired. Although he knew 
that the extra test time might affect the launch, he believed "that- this 
will save time in the long run and will increase the confidence in flying 
a successful mission."42 
Grissom and Young, who had reviewed their flight plan and gone 
to bed about 9 o'clock the night before, were awakened shortly before 
5 a.m. After steak and eggs, a launch-day breakfast tradition inherited 
from Mercury, they were driven from their Merritt Island quarters to 
pad 16, site of the preflight ready room. They arrived about 6 and 
had their suits on about 45 minutes later. Shortly after 7, a van bore 
them to pad 19. They mounted the elevator for the 1 lth level, where 
their spacecraft awaited them. At 7:30, they were inside with the 
hatches sealed. Because the so-far flawless countdown had moved fast- 
er than expected, they were about 20 minutes ahead of schedule. 
Young later complained about this extra time spent flat on his back 
and fully suited; the planned wait was bad enough. 
Weather was still the big question mark, the overcast not having 
*With Williams gone, Kraft became chairman of the spacecraft and launch vehicle Flight 
Readiness Review Boards and the Mission Review Board. Everline was coordinator and recorder 
for the spacecraft and mission reviews and James B. Jackson for the launch vehicle board. There 
were two new members-William Schneider from Headquarters and Max Faget. The other 
members were the same as for the first two missions: Mathews, Bailey, Slayton, and Merritt Pres- 
ton. 
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lifted as expected. Grissom and Young had been in the spacecraft less 
than an hour when the count was halted, just 35 minutes before 
launch, because the first-stage oxidizer line had sprung a leak. A 
handy wrench applied to a poorly seated nut solved the problem, but 
the count was held for 24 minutes to make certain the leak had 
stopped. By the time the countdown resumed, the clouds over the 
Cape had begun to scatter. Thirty-five minutes later, at 9:24 Tuesday 
morning, 23 March 1965, the sky was almost clear when the engines of 
GLV-3 burst into life. With a "You're on your way, Molly Brown," 
from CapCom (capsule communicator) L. Gordon Cooper, Jr., the 
third flight of Gemini, the first to which men entrusted themselves, 
began.43 
Officially the flight of Gemini 3, unofficially it was the voyage of 
"Molly Brown." During Project Mercury, each pilot had named his 
own spacecraft, although Cooper had some trouble selling NASA on 
Faith 7 for the last s acecraft in the program. Grissom and Young 
now had the same di & culty with "Molly Brown." Grissom had lost his 
first ship, Liberty Bell 7, which sank after a faulty circuit blew the 
hatch before help arrived. "Molly Brown," the "unsinkable" heroine of 
a Broadway stage hit, seemed to Grissom the logical choice for his sec- 
ond space command. NASA's upper echelons thought the name lack- 
ing in dignity; but since Grissom's second choice was "Titanic," they 
grudgingly consented, and the name remained "Molly Brown," though 
only quasi-officially. Later spacecraft were officially referred to by a 
Roman numeral, although a few had nicknames as well.44 
"Molly Brown" lifted off so smoothly that neither Grissom nor 
Young felt anything. Their real cues were seeing the mission clock on 
the instrument panel start running and hearing Cooper announce it 
from mission control. There was less noise than they had heard on the 
moving-base simulator in Dallas. When the first-stage engine cut off 
two and a half minutes later, acceleration plunged from six gravities to 
one. The second-stage engine ignited, bathing the spacecraft in a flash 
of orange-yellow light that disconcerted Young for the moment it took 
him to realize that this was a normal product of fire-in-the-hole stag- 
ing-that is, second-stage ignition before, instead of after, separation. 
The launch vehicle had slightly exceeded its predicted thrust, but a 
warning from Cooper prepared the pilots for the larger than expected 
pitchdown when the second stage took over the steering. Young, who 
had never been in space before, was entranced by his view of Earth's 
horizon and the sense of rapid motion as second-stage thrust built 
up.45 
Five and a half minutes after launch, the second-stage engine 
shut down. The pop of the pyrotechnics that severed spacecraft from 
launch vehicle sounded like the bark of howitzers to Young. Grissom 
fired the aft thrusters to kick the spacecraft into orbit. He lost track of 
many cells. 
Intrepid recovers spacecraft. 
White House ceremony in which 
Grissom receives NASA Distin- 
guished Service Medal: left to 
right, Vice President Humphrey, 
Grissom, President Johnson, and 
Administrator Webb. 
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the time and fired too long, ending up with his incremental velocity 
indicator showing a slight overspeed. But he wound up with an orbit 
of 122 by 175 kilometers, very close to the intended 122 by 182 kilo- 
meters. Gemini 3 was off to a good start-to an almost troublefree 
flight that closely matched the planned mission.46 
The match was not perfect. About 20 minutes into the first orbit, 
just after "Molly Brown" passed beyond range of the mid-Atlantic 
Canary Island tracking station, the oxygen pressure gauge in the envi- 
ronmental control system reported an abrupt drop. Young, assigned to 
watch this gauge, naturally assumed that something was wrong with 
the system. But a quick glance showed odd readings on several other 
meters and suggested that the real trouble might be in the instrument 
power supply. Young switched from the primary to the secondary elec- 
trical converter to power the dials, and the problem vanished. The 
whole episode, from Young's first notice of the anomalous reading to 
his shift from primary to secondary power, took 45 seconds, one clear 
payoff from intense preflight training.47 
Grissom's attempt to run the cell-growth experiment was a fail- 
ure-perhaps, as he remarked later, because he had "too much adren- 
alin pumping" and twisted the handle too hard. Whatever the reason, 
the handle broke, ruining the experiment. The radiation experiment 
gave Young some trouble, but he managed to complete his task. Re- 
sults were suggestive but inconclusive. Exposed to nearly identical dos- 
es of radiation, the inflight blood samples showed more damage than 
the control samples on the ground. While the effect was small, it did 
point to interaction between radiation and some aspect of space flight, 
though just which aspect and how it acted could not be answered. 
Both Grissom and Young believed that most of the trouble with the 
experiments stemmed from differences between the packages they flew 
with and those they had trained with. But they also admitted that they 
"were not quite as fascinated by sea urchins . . . as . . . by the chance to 
carry out some real 'firsts' in space flight."48 
And the Gemini 3 crew did chalk up at least one historic first by 
maneuvering in orbit. The first OAMS burn came an hour and a half 
after launch and lasted a carefully timed 75 seconds, cutting spacecraft 
speed by 15 meters per second and dropping it into a nearly circular 
forbit. Three quarters of an hour later, during the second revolution, 
Grissom fired the system again, this time to test the ship's translational 
capability and shift the plane of its orbit by one-fiftieth of a degree. 
During the third pass, Grissom completed the fail-safe plan with a two 
and a half minute burn that dropped the spacecraft's perigee to 72 
kilometers and ensured reentry even if the retrorockets failed to 
work.49 
They did work, however. As the three-orbit mission neared its 
close, Grissom and Young ran through the retrofire checklist. With 
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everything ready, the pilot fired the pyrotechnics that separated the 
adapter from the reentry module, giving the two s acemen their big- 
gest jolt so far. He then armed the automatic retro i!re switch. One af- 
ter the other, the four rockets exploded into life and burned them- 
selves out. Another set of pyrotechnics cut loose the expended package 
as "Molly Brown" arced back toward the planet she had left four and a 
half hours before.50 
Reentry produced some surprises. At the outset, it matched the 
simulations both men had been through in training, even to the color 
and pattern of the plasma sheath that surrounded the spacecraft. 
Young threw the switch to start the reentry communications experi- 
ments just over a minute after the plasma had formed and communi- 
cations had blacked out. The results were encouraging; at high rates of 
water flow, both UHF and C-band signals from the spacecraft were 
picked up by ground stations.51 
But "Molly Brown" seemed to be off course. The initial computer 
reading showed that she would miss her planned landing point by 
more than 69 kilometers, and Grissom's best efforts to reduce that gap 
were fruitless. Theoretically, the Gemini spacecraft had enou h lift to P be piloted to a relatively precise landing, but its real lift fell ar short 
of what had been predicted from wind tunnel tests. As a result, Gemi- 
ni 3 was about 84 kilometers short of the intended splashdown point. 
Before they touched down, however, the astronauts suffered another 
jolt when the spacecraft assumed its landing attitude. After the main 
parachute deployed, the spacecraft hung from it vertically, with its 
nose suspended at a single point. Before landing, throwing a cabin 
switch shifted the spacecraft to a two-point suspension with its front 
end forward and some 35 degrees above the horizontal. When Gris- 
som hit the landing attitude switch, "Molly Brown" literally dropped 
into place, pitching both men into the windshield, breaking Grissom's 
faceplate, and scratching Young's.52 
The jolt when they hit the water a few minutes later was mild by 
comparison. Although Gemini was designed to float, all Grissom saw 
out his window was water. He realized that the still attached parachute 
was being dragged by the wind, tugging the nose of the spacecraft 
down. With memories of the ill-fated Liberty Bell 7 momentarily stay- 
ing his hand, Grissom released the chute and "Molly Brown" bobbed 
to the surface, having shown herself fully watertight. The mission plan 
called for the crew to remain on board until the spacecraft was picked 
up, a short wait if the recovery ship, the aircraft carrier Intrepid, was 
only about eight kilometers away, as Grissom and Young had last 
heard before they splashed down. When they learned that the real dis- 
tance was closer to 110 kilometers, Grissom asked for a helicopter to 
pick them up and take them to the carrier. Still thinking of Liberty 
Bell 7, however, he refused to crack a hatch until Navy swimmers had 
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attached a flotation collar to "Molly Brown." This spacecraft was not 
going to sink, but the crew endured a long 30 minutes as the sealed 
spacecraft grew hotter inside while it pitched and tossed on the long 
Atlantic swells. "That was no boat," recalled Young. Heat and motion 
took their toll of Grissom, although Young managed to keep his break- 
fast down. Once the collar was in place and a swimmer opened a 
hatch, the two men lost no time in getting out and putting on the 
"horse collar" hoists that lifted them to the helicopter.53 
Medical examinations and debriefings began as soon as the two 
astronauts were in the helicopter and went on for several days. A brief 
stir ensued when Grissom and Young had little to say to scientists 
about their observations, mainly astronomical, while in orbit. Other 
questions were raised about the failure of the cell-growth experiment, 
but most of the fault could be ascribed to a poorly designed package 
that was installed in the spacecraft barely a week before flight-a mat- 
ter of "too little, too late." In any case, the brief mission had centered 
on engineering evaluation of the spacecraft, with a full schedule that 
left little time for extra work. 
Something of a storm later blew up when the press got wind of 
Grissom's having eaten part of a corned beef sandwich during the 
flight. Schirra had bought it at "Wolfie's" on North Atlantic Avenue in 
Cocoa Beach and given it to Young, who smuggled it on board the 
spacecraft. When it was time for the crew to eat the space food they 
carried, Young brought out the sandwich and handed it to Grissom, 
who ate only a few bites as he wanted no crumbs floating around the 
cabin. When the news got to Congress, the lawmakers were upset. 
What was not made clear, apparently, to either the legislators or the 
press was that the official food was only there for evaluation of its 
taste, convenience, and reconstitution properties and had nothing to 
do with any scientific or medical objectives of the mission. No one 
expected to learn very much about the effects of space food on so 
short a flight. The fracas did, however, produce some new and more 
stringent rules about what the astronauts might take with them on fu- 
ture missions.% 
Despite its minor problems, Gemini 3 was a complete success as 
far as its major objectives were concerned. There could be no doubt 
that Gemini was ready for its role in the manned space flight program. 
The time of testing was over.55 
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Pillars of confidence 
A LTHOUGH the revised Gemini flight plan of April 1963 re- mained the basic framework of program operations through 1965 
and 1966, it proved to be, at least in some respects, still too optimistic. 
Lagging fuel-cell development forced the Gemini Program Office in 
August 1964 to settle for four days, rather than seven, as the goal for 
Gemini IV* and also to delete the practice rendezvous with the evalua- 
tion pod from that mission. Gemini V had been slated as the first in 
which spacecraft would rendezvous with Agena target, but that goal, 
too, had to be deferred. 
If some aims had to be postponed, however, they were balanced 
by some worthwhile gains. Extravehicular activity (EVA) emerged as a 
new feature of Gemini IV, and Gemini V expanded to an eight-day 
mission that included practice with the rendezvous evaluation pod. The 
new Mission Control Center in Houston assumed flight control duties 
for Gemini IV,1 taking over that job from the former control center at 
Cape Kennedy. Only two months were to elapse between Gemini IV 
and V, a sign of the progress that NASA was making toward gutting 
space flight on something like a routine basis. Perhaps most important, 
these two missions set Project Gemini firmly on the path to reaching its 
major objectives, sweeping aside fears that astronauts might not be 
able to survive long periods of weightlessness in space and holding out 
the promise that rendezvous could soon be achieved. 
NASA announced the crews for Gemini IV on 27 July 1964, and 
two days later James A. McDivitt and Edward H. White 11, along with 
*With Gemini IV, NASA changed to Roman numerals for Gemini mission designations. The 
text will hereafter use Roman numerals for all Gemini missions. 
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their backups, Frank Borman and James A. Lovell, Jr., talked with 
reporters in Houston. McDivitt and White, aged 35 and 34, had 
known each other since college and had been in the same class at the 
Air Force test pilot school. Borman and Lovell, both 36, first met when 
they were undergoing testing by NASA. Borman was an Air Force 
officer and Lovell was in the Navy. All four men were second genera- 
tion astronauts, part of the'group selected by NASA in September 
1962.2 
Their first task after the announcement was to review the status of 
the spacecraft and booster assigned to their mission. Spacecraft 4 was 
still being built in St. Louis, with some problems caused by a shortage 
of parts.3 In Baltimore, GLV-4 was also in the process of being assem- 
bled.4 After that quick look, the crewmen spent the next five weeks 
cleaning up work left over from their former assignments. Mission 
training had to wait until the end of November, when Gemini Simula- 
tor 2 became operational in Houston.5 
Meanwhile, McDivitt and his crewmates, knowing that EVA might 
be included in Gemini IV, seized every chance to press the case for 
making it part of their mission. This persistence won NASA manage- 
ment's consent to provide the special space suits that EVA required. 
The astronauts were not merely chauffeurs; their role in the program 
went far beyond that of the normal test pilot in determining what was 
to be done and when. Without the strong pressure from the Gemini 
IV crewmen, the G4C suit might have been too far down the line to 
have permitted NASA's late decision to include EVA in the fourth 
mission.6 That decision was not, however, quite so late as it appeared. 
When Cosmonaut Aleksey A. Leonov walked in space on 18 
March 1965, during the Voskhod I I  mission, he revived press com- 
plaints that America lagged in the space race and raised fears that a 
year might pass before a Gemini astronaut matched the Russian's feat. 
When, a little more than two months later, NASA announced that 
White would step into space on the next Gemini flight and use a "zip 
gun" to propel himself, most space watchers merely assumed that 
NASA was st111 trying to keep up with its Soviet rival.7 This may have 
been true as far as timing was concerned; but EVA had been a part of 
Gemini thinking almost from the beginning, and studies had begun as 
early as 1962.8 The road from study to a place in the flight plan, how- 
ever, was a rocky one. 
Even the public linking of EVA with Gemini IV preceded Vos- 
khod I I  by nearly eight months. At the same press conference in July 
1964 where the Gemini IV crewmen took their bow, Gemini Deputy 
Manager Kenneth Kleinknecht had said one of the crew might open 
the hatch and stick his head outside during the mission. McDivitt was 
surprised at how little notice newsmen took of Kleinknecht's state- 
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ment.9 At that point, it was still far from certain that even a simple 
hatch opening would be permitted in Gemini IV. The key questions 
involved equipment and training. 
Gemini IV first appeared as the program's lead-off EVA mission 
in a "Program Plan for Gemini Extravehicular Operation," during 
January 1964. Management response was cool, largely because equip- 
ment development was only beginning.10 During the next few months, 
however, matters improved. The AiResearch Manufacturing Company 
was awarded a contract for the extravehicular chestpack, the David 
Clark Company was sent specifications for the extravehicular suit, and 
McDonnell was authorized to begin an EVA design that was eventually 
applied to Spacecraft 6.11 
After Kleinknecht's largely ignored statement in July on standup 
EVA plans for Gemini IV, the issue continued to be debated within 
NASA. MSC's Engineering and Development Directorate, and its Crew 
Systems Division, in particular, opposed any EVA in Gemini missions 
until crews faced some realistic simulations on the ground.12 The 
scheduled altitude chamber tests of Spacecraft 3 in November 1964 
offered a good chance to meet that demand. Gus Grissom and John 
Young wanted to depressurize the cabin during their training for 
Gemini I11 and open the hatch at a simulated altitude of 46 000 me- 
ters. Selling this idea to McDonnell was not easy. McDonnell, as Young 
later remarked, "certainly didn't want to take the chance of bagging a 
couple of astronauts in the altitude chamber," and NASA was none too 
happy about "putting guys in vacuums with nothing between them but 
that little old lady from Worcester, Massachusetts [the seamstress at the 
David Clark Company], and her glue pot and that suit."ls 
Kleinknecht argued that "if we can't do it in the altitude chamber, 
then we haven't any business *doing it 100 miles [I60 kilometers] in 
space." GPO told McDonnell to "include at least one complete depres- 
surization, hatch opening and closing, and repressurization cycle at 
40 000 feet [12 000 meters] altitude conditions in each spacecraft 
manned altitude chamber test commencing with spacecraft 3." The 
first try at EVA practice left something to be desired, Young recalled, 
when "we opened the hatch and [then] we couldn't close it." But the 
three-orbit Gemini I11 mission was really too short for EVA anyway, 
and GPO focused its efforts on Gemini IV.14 
Plans were firmer by the start of 1965, and the Gemini IV crews 
began training for EVA.15 Nevertheless, the decision of whether to in- 
clude EVA in the mission was far from settled, either at MSC or 
NASA Headquarters. MSG Director Gilruth did approve altitude 
chamber tests for the crew, but only on 12 March 1965, less than a 
week before Leonov's space walk.16 That feat spurred new efforts to 
get extravehicular activity into an early Gemini mission. With the flight 
of Gemini I11 just a week away, that meant Gemini IV. During that 
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week between Voskhod I I  and Gemini III, Gilruth and Deputy Direc- 
tor George Low had their first look at a "hand held maneuvering 
unit," which had been designed and built without fanfare in MSC's 
Crew Systems Division. That device, along with a display of the prog- 
ress with other EVA equipment, brought the Center's top management 
solidly behind trying for EVA in its second manned mission.17 
The hardware still needed to be qualified. Gilruth gave the job to 
Crew Systems with a warning to keep the work as quiet as possible, 
perhaps to avoid any appearance of too-hasty reflex to Russian accom- 
plishments. A model spacecraft was quickly installed in MSC's 6-meter 
vacuum chamber, and preliminary testing was begun.18 By the end of 
April, the vacuum chamber was ready for full-scale EVA simulation, 
and Flight Operations eople had come into the picture to begin work- 
ing out techniques for ! andling EVA as a flight control matter.19 
But NASA Headquarters had yet to be won over. Manned space 
flight chief George Mueller learned about the MSC plans when he vis- 
ited Houston on 3 April; his response was lukewarm, perhaps because 
of the still unqualified status of the hardware. Although he offered no 
encouragement, Mueller was not inclined to order a halt, and MSC 
went ahead with its plans. On 14 May, when Gilruth arranged an EVA 
demonstration for Associate Administrator Robert Seamans, he won a 
high-ranking ally. Seamans promised to discuss MSC's new venture 
with Administrator James Webb and his deputy, Hugh Dryden.20 
The next day, Mathews and three of his men were in Washington 
for another attempt to convince Mueller that EVA belonged on Gemi- 
ni IV. Mueller's crucial question was how EVA, not officially scheduled 
until Gemini VI, could be moved up two flights; the answer was simply 
that everything was ready: all EVA gear was qualified, or nearly so, 
and the crew was trained. After he got back to Houston, Mathews 
called Mueller on 19 May to report that the last piece of EVA equip- 
ment was now flightready.21 
Seamans, as he had promised, did describe the EVA plan for 
Gemini IV to Webb and Dryden. Webb liked it, but Dryden objected 
strongly; he thought it smacked too much of a reaction to what the 
Russians had done. At Webb's request, Seamans drew up a brief stating 
the reasons for putting EVA on the current Gemini mission, which 
concluded: "The hardware for extravehicular activity is flight qualified 
and the astronauts are trained for this operation. Since extravehicular 
activity is a primary goal for the Gemini program, it is recommended 
that this activity should be included in Gemini IV." Webb gave the 
paper to Dryden. On 25 May, Dryden called Seamans to his office and, 
without saying a word, handed him a document. It was the case Sea- 
mans had made for EVA; scribbled on one corner was "Approved, 
after discussing w. Dryden [signed], J. E. Webb, 5-25-65."22 
There was still a question about how and when to make public the 
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plans for EVA. MSG opinion was divided. Some favored breaking the 
news after the fact, some while EVA was in progress, and others at the 
premission press conference 24 hours before launch. In April, MSC 
decided to announce it at the press briefing, if it were approved. 
Seamans, however, rejected that scheme as incompatible with NASA's 
historic policy of openness on plans for manned launches and ordered 
EVA material to be included in the press kit for Gemini IV. When the 
kit appeared on 21 May it contained a one-page discussion of "Possible 
Extravehicular Activity." On 25 May, the same day EVA was approved, 
the press was informed that White would leave his spacecraft and walk 
in space.23 
One reason for Mueller's resistance to EVA was a plan to combine 
it with rendezvous. Gemini IV was scheduled to rendezvous with the 
second stage of its booster in orbit, and White could then use his zip 
gun to propel himself over near the floating stage. This idea was also a 
latecomer to Gemini. The rendezvous evaluation pod scheduled for 
the fourth mission had been forced out in January 1964, when prob- 
lems with the radar design made it unlikely that that crucial equipment 
would be available in time.24 A bit of joking by Cordon Cooper over 
the communications link to Grissom in Gemini 111 on 23 March 1965, 
suggested another kind of practice rendezvous. 
Cooper: I have a time for when you'll be nearest the booster 
[second stage]. Would you like to have that so that you can 
look for it? 
Grissom: Roger. 
Cooper: Roger. 02 plus zero eight plus five two will be dead ahead 
at an elevation of plus eight zero degrees at one niner 
miles. This will be just prior to darkness. It should be very 
bright. Proceed to see if you can rendezvous.25 
Gilruth and Low overheard the exchange and thought it sounded 
like a pretty good idea. Low checked with GPO and Crew Systems and 
got an enthusiastic response. With Gilruth's wholehearted support, in 
May 1965 stationkeeping joined EVA as part of the Gemini IV flight 
plan. The spacecraft would match velocities with the orbiting second 
stage a relatively short distance away in the same orbital plane and 
maintain that position for a time. Grissom had maneuvered "Molly 
Brown," but he had no target. Closing in on a specific object (or point) 
in space was much more ambitious, especially since McDivitt and White 
would have to depend on their eyes to track the target, since the ren- 
dezvous radar was still unavailable. Martin did install flashing lights on 
the GLV-4 second stage to help the crew find it.26 McDivitt and White 
had still another handicap. There was simply no way for them to train 
on the ground for stationkeeping-neither the Cape nor the Houston 
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simulator was designed for this task. McDonnell came through by rig- 
ging equipment to provide a simulated view of the target against a star 
background. McDivitt and Borman spent half a day in St. Louis prac- 
ticing optical rendezvous, but it was makeshift at best.27 
One other major problem confronted Gemini IV planners, the 
physiological consequences of a prolonged stay in orbit and of EVA. 
Charles A. Berry, medical director of the Gemini program, was trou- 
bled by the leap of faith implied by the Gemini flight schedule of April 
1963, which followed the three-orbit Gemini 111 with the seven-day 
Gemini IV. He wanted the length of the mission reduced by half, and 
trouble with fuel-cell development might come to his aid. If batteries 
had to be used, the mission could not last more than four days. In 
August 1964, Mathews reported to NASA Headquarters that Gemini 
IV would be a four-day mission, not only for medical reasons but also 
because the fuel cell would have to be replaced by batteries28 
Berry was not happy even with a four-day mission. Cardiovascular 
problems had cropped up in the last two Mercury missions, and every 
physiologist he met made the same comment about Gemini IV, or so it 
later seemed:"[Don't you] really know that these guys [are] going to 
stand up and pass out and might, indeed, die from this flight? "29 The 
astronauts would be subjected to much the same kind of physiological 
strain as that imposed by prolonged bedrest followed by vigorous activ- 
ity. After their bodies had been deconditioned by days of weightless 
flight, they had to face high reentry g forces, which might well cause 
them to faint. If an astronaut fainted during or after landing, he 
would be held upright by his harness, forcing a perhaps already 
overtaxed heart to work even harder pumping blood to his head. But 
astronauts were not bed patients; besides using their muscles for flight 
tasks they would have been exercising with a bungee cord, a device 
adapted from the nylon strap and handle of a spear gun that required 
a force of 300 newtons (70 pounds) to extend it 30 centimeters (12 
inches) .30 
EVA added still another medical concern, the disorientation and 
motion sickness that might overtake a floating astronaut unable to dis- 
tinguish "up" from "down." Leonov, according to Russian reports early 
in May 1965, had trouble with his vision and orientation "when he 
didn't see the spacecraft." Berry, McDivitt, and White studied a filmed 
interview, with scenes of the space walk, which clearly showed Leonov 
using numerous reference points-the Sun, the spacecraft, Earth-to 
maintain orientation. That seemed to be the best answer, the astronaut 
making sure he knew where he was at all times in relation to the 
spacecraft.31 
From a medical veiwpoint, then, some degree of tension marked 
the approach of the Gemini IV mission. This was, after all, the first 
four-day flight by Americans, and the Russians were airing their fears 
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of disorientation and physiological dangers at numerous medical con- 
ferences. But the crew was trained, and everything that could be fore- 
seen had been considered. There was nothing to do now but wait to 
see what happened3 
FOUR DAYS AND A "WALK" 
About 12 hours before Gemini IV's* scheduled liftoff on 3 June 
1965, the Martin crew started fueling the booster and calibrating its 
propellant loads. Borman and Lovell, the backup crew, flipped space- 
craft switches, tested communications circuits, and handled other 
chores to relieve the rime crew. McDivitt and White had gone to bed 
at 8:30 the night be !' ore. Awakened at 4:10 a.m., they were given a 
brief physical examination. The astronauts left their Merritt Island 
quarters after breakfast and boarded a van for the ride to the pad 16 
suit-up area, where they were helped into their suits while breathing 
pure oxygen to get the nitrogen out of their systems and thus prevent 
aeroembolism, or the bends.33 
McDivitt and White arrived at pad 19 at 7:07 a.m., rode up in the 
elevator, and climbed into their spacecraft at T- 100 minutes. Getting 
in was relatively easy, but even so White's faceplate fogged. He started 
his suit fan and cleared up the moisture.34 
Thirty-five minutes before the scheduled launch, while the erector 
was being lowered, it stuck at a 12-degree angle from the booster. 
Raised to its full height, then lowered again, the erector still stuck. 
After more than an hour, technicians found a connector incorrectly 
installed in a junction box, replaced it properly, and gave the signal to 
lower the erector. This time it worked. Space travel was becoming op- 
erational. This hold, lasting 1 hour 16 minutes was the only delay for 
Gemini IV. On Mercury-Redstone 4, the second manned launch in 
that program, Grissom's Liberty Bell 7 was scrubbed twice and was 
plagued by six holds that totaled 4 hours 1 minute.35 
At 10:16 a.m., Thursday, 3 June 1965, millions of people 
throughout the world looked and listened while Gemini I V  lunged 
spaceward. Television coverage of the launch for the first time had an 
international audience, as the scene was broadcast to 12 European na- 
tions via Early Bird satellite.36 Heightened by the prospect of EVA and 
the first use of the new Mission Control Center in Houston, interest in 
Gemini I V  reached levels never again matched in the program. The 
Manned Spacecraft Center faced a major challenge in the number of 
reporters who wanted to cover the story from Houston. Although 
*The Gemini IV spacecraft had no name, official or otherwise (such as "Molly Brown"), nor 
did its pilots wear a distinctive patch on their suits, as did all later Gemini crews. A few of the 
newsmen called the ship "Little Eva," to symbolize the extravehicular activity. 
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MSC's Building 1 auditorium had been "designed to house all large 
events covered by the news and television services," its 800 seats fell 
short of the space that would be needed to accommodate the 1100 
requests for accreditation NASA had received. To  meet the demand, 
MSG leased one of the new buildings springing up across the highway 
from the Center for local offices of aerospace companies-and that 
move came under fire from the local press when its cost was revealed: 
besides the $96 165 yearly rent, MSC spent $166 000 for modifications, 
$8000 for television monitors, and $6600 for 610 chairs.37 But "Build- 
ing 6,'' housing the NASA Gemini News Center, served its purpose 
well as the base for 1068 newspaper, magazine, radio, and television 
representatives, as well as 60 public relations people from industry.38 
It opened on 25 May, somewhat earlier than the "launch minus five 
days" that had been customary for news centers during Mercury. 
In the spacecraft, McDivitt and White had no doubts about liftoff, 
as they felt their vehicle pick up speed. There was very little noise. 
The hush was broken only when the launch vehicle bounced like a 
pogo stick for a few seconds. Then everything smoothed into near si- 
lence again. Pyrotechnics shattered the illusion of quiet at stage 1 and, 
later, at stage 2 separation. The spacecraft entered an elliptical orbit of 
163 kilometers at the low point (perigee) and 282 kilometers at the 
high point (apogee).sg 
As Gemlni I V  separated from its booster, McDivitt turned the 
spacecraft around to look for the trailing vehicle. White saw the rocket 
venting, with propellant streaming from its nozzle. How far was it, and 
where was it going? McDivitt estimated the distance as 120 meters; 
White guessed it was closer to 75 meters. 
McDivitt braked the spacecraft, aimed it, and thrusted toward the 
target. After two bursts from his thrusters, the booster seemed to 
move away and downward. A few minutes later, McDivitt pitched the 
spacecraft nose down and the crew again saw the rocket, which seemed 
to be traveling on a different track. He thrusted toward it-no suc- 
cess-and stopped. McDivitt repeated this sequence several times with 
the same luck.40 
As night approached McDivitt spotted the booster's flashing lights. 
He estimated that the distance to the target had stretched to perhaps 
600 meters. He knew he had to catch the booster quickly if they were 
going to stationkeep and do extravehicular activity as planned. For a 
while, Gemini I V  seemed to hold its own and even to close with the 
other vehicle. McDivitt thought they got to within 60 meters, but 
White estimated it at 200 to 300 meters. The target's running lights 
soon grew dim in the gray streaks of dawn and vanished with the sun- 
rise. When the target hove into view about three to five kilometers 
away, McDivitt again tried to close the distance. Additional thrusting 
did not seem to bring it any closer. Well aware that he was a pioneer 
Above left, new control room at Houston, used for the first 
time during Gemini IV; center right, White, maneuvering gun 
in right hand, performs first U.S. EVA; above, Cape Kennedy 
snapped from orbital altitude; above right, artist Franklin 
McMahon's sketch of Gemini IV recovery; right, White and 
McDivitt in helicopter after landing. 
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in orbital rendezvous and that choosing the ri ht maneuvers might not 
be as easy as it seemed, McDivitt had previous f y asked Mission Director 
Kraft which was more important, rendezvous or EVA. The space walk, 
said Kraft. McDivitt knew he had to stop spending fuel chasing the 
elusive target by the "eyeball" method. 
As GPO engineer AndrC Meyer later remarked, "There is a good 
explanation [for] what went wrong with rendezvous." The crew, like 
everyone else at MSC, "just didn't understand or reason out the orbital 
mechanics involved. As a result, we all got a whole lot smarter and 
really perfected rendezvous maneuvers, which Apollo now uses." 
Catching a target in orbit is a game played in a different ball park than 
chasing something down on Earth's essentially two-dimensional sur- 
face. Speed and motion in orbit do not conform to Earth-based habit, 
except at very close ranges. To catch something on the ground, one 
. simply moves as quickly as possible in a straight line to the place where 
the object will be at the right time. As Gemini I V  showed, that will not 
work in orbit. Adding speed also raises altitude, moving the spacecraft 
into a higher orbit than its target. The paradoxical result is that the 
faster moving spacecraft has actually slowed relative to the target, since 
its orbital period, which is a direct function of its distance from the 
center of gravity, has also increased. As the Gemini I V  crew observed, 
the target seemed to gradually pull in front of and away from the 
spacecraft. The proper technique is for the spacecraft to reduce its 
speed, dropping to a lower and thus shorter orbit, which will allow it 
to gain on the target. At the correct moment, a burst of speed lifts the 
spacecraft to the target's orbit close enough to the target to eliminate 
virtually all relative motion between them. Now on station, the para- 
doxical effects vanish, and the spacecraft can approach the target di- 
rectly. Gemini IV's problem was compounded by its limited fuel sup- 
ply; the Spacecraft 4 tanks were only half the size of later models, and 
the fuel had to be conserved for the fail-safe maneuvers. When Mc- 
Divitt and White broke off their futile chase, they had exhausted near- 
ly half their load of propellants.41 
White had been too busy helping his partner to give much 
thought to getting ready for EVA. Now that the rendezvous attempt 
was over, White put the zip gun together, while McDivitt read off a list 
of things for him to do. White pulled out the umbilical package and 
mounted suit connectors for the tether and the emergency oxygen 
chestpack. With 20 minutes still to go before cabin depressurization, 
the commander noticed that his copilot already looked tired and hot. 
McDivitt told the Kano tracking station that EVA would be postponed 
until the third revolution-he wanted White to rest. 
While they relaxed, the crewmen talked with Grissom, the Hous- 
ton CapCom, about the synoptic view of the Gulf of Mexico and all of 
Florida, including the Cape and its launch complexes. After a 15-min- 
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ute break, McDivitt picked up the list and White began checking suit 
hose locks and suit integrity. The flight planners had certainly not 
foreseen how much time getting ready for EVA would take, McDivitt 
thought.42 
Over the Indian Ocean, White was ready for EVA at last-hoses 
hooked up, umbilical ready, gun in hand, and chestpack in place-and 
they again rested and chatted. Nearing Carnarvon, Australia, they 
began to depressurize the cabin. Then a mechanical problem arose- 
the door would not unlatch because a spring had failed to compress. 
After much yanking and poking around the hatch ratchet, the door 
suddenly cracked open. White found the hatch as hard to push up in 
zero g as it had been on the ground.43 
Once he had it opened, White rose slowly through the hatch and 
installed a camera to record his movements as he swam in space, with 
the zip gun, tethered to his right arm, floating freely by his side. White 
triggered a burst from the gun, rose above the hatch, and, without 
imparting any motion to the spacecraft, propelled himself away. 
Experimenting with the double-barreled device, he traveled about 5 
meters but found himself higher above the spacecraft than he intend- 
ed. He wanted to go over to McDivitt's window. Short bursts of the 
gun worked well; in fact, it responded throughout much as it had in 
ground training on an air-bearing table, at least in pitch and yaw. 
White was less sure about roll, which he thought would be harder to 
control without using too much fuel. Floating freely, he felt a tendency 
to pitch, roll, and yaw, all at once. He knew the gun could correct this, 
but he was concerned about the fuel it would take. Instead, he tugged 
on the tether and pulled himself aft and high atop the spacecraft 
adapter. White saw the thrusters firing, expelling plumes of flaming 
gas, as McDivitt steadied the spacecraft. White propelled himself away 
from the danger-across the top of the spacecraft and out beyond its 
nose. He used the gun for two pitchovers and two body turns, each 
time stopping easily. Then the compressed oxygen fuel bottle was 
empty-how he wished it had been bigger!& 
There was the usual brief loss of communications between Hawaii 
and Guaymas, Mexico. While White was using the zip gun over the Pa- 
cific, Mission Control was unaware of how he was making out. After 
the voice circuit was restored, radio listeners had a chance to hear an 
American human satellite broadcast his views of the spectacle of Earth. 
White told McDivitt and the world how beautiful it all was, of the pic- 
tures he was taking, and how well he was feeling-no vertigo or duo- 
rientation whatever. And when McDivitt had to tell him it was time to 
come back inside, Mission Control and the whole world heard him 
sigh, "It's the saddest moment of my life." 
While he was floating freely, White had paid no attention to the 
time; and, since they were on the internal spacecraft communications 
O N  T H E  S H O U L D E R S  O F  T I T A N S  
link, Flight Control could not break in on them. Finally, after 15 min- 
utes 40 seconds, McDivitt broke off to ask the ground if they wanted 
anything. "Yes," Kraft chuckled, "Tell him to get back in." After he 
passed this on to White, McDivitt heard boots thumping atop the 
spacecraft. White came back to the hatch as Gemini IV  was passing 
over the Atlantic, dismounted the camera and removed electrical 
connections, and handed all these items to McDivitt along with the 
gun. McDivitt then helped White get settled, pulling on his legs and 
guiding his feet into the footwells.45 
White closed the hatch and reached for the handle to lock it. 
When it failed to catch, he knew it was going to be as hard to close as 
it had been to open. Pushing on the handle lifted White out of his 
seat, so McDivitt pulled on him to give him some leverage. Finally 
White felt a little torque in the handle and yelled for McDivitt to yank 
harder. The door was latched. 
White sat back, physically exhausted, sweat streaming into his eyes 
and fogging his faceplate. McDivitt also felt tired, so they rested before 
extending a radio antenna to find a ground-based voice and tell Earth 
all was well. Carnarvon answered them. The crew of Gemini IV had 
almost circled the globe in an unpressurized spacecraft.46 
While White relaxed, McDivitt began powering down some of the 
spacecraft systems to save electrical power and control fuel, intending 
to drift for the next two and a half days. Seven and a half hours after 
liftoff, White went to sleep. He and McDivitt had intended to sleep al- 
ternate periods of four hours each, but this was hard to do. The con- 
stant crackle of radioed information and orders and the occasional 
automatic thruster firings kept them awake. Whoever was on duty fre- 
quently bumped the sleeper in this uncommonly small bedroom.47 
Gemini IV was the first of the program's longer missions, and it 
imposed a set of new demands on ground control, which moved for 
the first time into a three-shift operation. Kraft acted as both Mission 
Director for the entire flight and Flight Director for the first shift. 
Eugene F. Kranz directed the second shift and John Hodge the third. 
Kraft's shift focused its efforts on helping McDivitt and White carry 
out the flight plan. The second shift concerned itself mainly with keep- 
ing track of systems performance and the use of such consumable 
stores as oxygen and fuel. Realtime flight planning was the special 
province of Hodge's shift. The basic framework of the flight plan was 
set before launch; but on the basis of what had already been achieved, 
how systems were working, and what stocks of fuel and other consum- 
ables remained, the third shift was ready by morning with specific in- 
structions for the crew on tasks to be done or eliminated during the 
day ahead.48 
Backing up the flight control teams were a number of systems 
experts who stood by in the staff support rooms of the new Mission 
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Control Center. They included not only NASA specialists but also con- 
tractor people, some of whom were assigned full-time to Houston 
while m~ssions were in progress. At their home plants, other teams 
maintained systems under simulated flight conditions to provide quick 
answers to flight problems. Technical monitors and prinapal investiga- 
tors were also on hand in the Mission Control Center for the Gemini 
experiment program, now more methodically handled by a new Exper- 
iments Program Office under Robert Piland in the Engineering and 
Development Directorate. Gemini IV's 11 experiments made it the first 
American mission to bear some resemblance to the manned space labo- 
ratory that had long been a staple of space flight thought. 
Gemini IV was also the first mission to employ systematic methods 
to gather, evaluate, and publish information quickly, another demand 
imposed by longer flights and shorter intervals between missions. Willis 
Mitchell and Scott Simpkinson of GPO headed the 150-person Mission 
Evaluation Team that began work at liftoff and kept working through 
postflight inspection and mission evaluation.49 Gemini IV served as 
training ground for pilots, flight controllers, and evaluators alike, set- 
ting the style for later Gemini missions, as well as for future Apollo 
flights. 
Meanwhile, McDivitt and White drifted through space, watching 
systems, making observations, and doing experiments. A rigid con- 
straint on fuel usage hampered most of these activities, although sever- 
al of Gemini IV's 11 experiments were largely unaffected." 
Five dosimeters checked radiation in the spacecraft (experiment 
D-8), especially while Gemini IV was passing through the South Atlan- 
tic Anomaly (an intense pocket of the ionosphere), where radiation 
levels were considerably higher than in all other regions. In the Simple 
Navigation experiment (D-9 ), the pilots used a handheld sextant in an 
attempt to get celestial navigation readings, to judge sextant operation 
and navigational accuracy. McDivitt and White agreed that the sextant 
might be useful for Apollo.50 
McDivitt and White had good fortune in the Synoptic Terrain 
($5) and Synoptic Weather (S-6) photography. The 70-millimeter 
Hasselblad camera worked well and, tourist-like, they tried to capture 
the view. They were especially smitten with the Nile River area--one 
saw Cairo, the other Alexandria-and White remarked that a land- 
mark near a body of water was easier to spot. On one occasion, they 
snapped pictures from the Pacific Coast to Texas, showing good geo- 
logical detail. They performed like professionals in getting pictures of 
weather phenomena. Unmanned Tiros weather satellites provide cov- 
erage from 640 kilometers, but Gemini IV gave the meteorologists a 
closer look, without a mosaic patchwork, at cellular cloud patterns, 
*For descriptions, objectives, and results of all Gemini experiments, see Appendix D. 
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cloud layers in tropical disturbances, lines of cumulus clouds over the 
ocean, and thunderstorm areas.51 
The crew used the bungee exerciser (M -3) more than had been 
planned, but White later said that his desire to do strenuous work 
dwindled during the flight; although, as McDivitt suggested, this might 
have been caused by lack of slee . Both agreed that a systematic exer- P cise program would be needed or long missions. Sensors attached to 
the pilots' bodies, in the Inflight Phonocardiogram experiment (M-4), 
gathered data on heartbeat rates, especially during liftoff, EVA, and 
reentry. As might be expected, their heartbeats were essentially normal 
except during these periods. The bone demineralization experiment 
(M-6) did show a greater mass loss in the small finger and heel than 
that experienced by Earthbound, bedrested patients.52 
One engineering experiment-Electrostatic Charge (MSC-1)- 
gave higher readings than expected. Investigation later determined 
that thruster and water boiler operation produced some moisture, re- 
sulting in a high electrical charge, which dissipated very quickly. 
Concerns that docking in space might generate a harmful jolt were 
laid to rest. The Proton-Electron Spectrometer (MSC-2 ) and Tri-Axis 
Ma netometer (MSC-3), complementary radiation studies, provided f use ul data about Earth's radiation environment and the magnitude 
and direction of local geomagnetic fields. Photographing the red-blue 
Earth limb was the final engineering experiment (MSG- 10 ), designed 
to help train Apollo astronauts in making navigational fixes.53 
After 48 revolutions, covering 75 hours of flight, the spacecraft 
computer was updated during a stateside pass. Told to turn the com- 
puter off, McDivitt flipped the switch and discovered that he could not. 
On the ground, efforts to solve the problem began at once. For the 
next few revolutions, the crew received instructions for trying different 
switch positions, but the computer finally quit entirely. Now they 
would have to resort to a rolling Mercury-type reentry, rather than the 
lifting bank angle the com uter was supposed to help them achieve.54 
In revolution 62, at 9 b hours 28 minutes, they fired their maneu- 
vering thrusters in the proper retroattitude for 2 minutes 41 seconds. 
Afterward they jettisoned the equipment adapter. Bang! bang! bang! 
bang! went the retrorockets. White watched the brown, dusty Texas 
plains pass in review and then released the retroadapter. Gemini IV 
was returning to Earth.55 
At 120 000 meters, McDivitt started the rolling reentry. As the 
spacecraft rotated, the crew saw the adapter, trailing them, turn into 
an orange mushroom as it burned. Without the computer, McDivitt 
and White suspected, they would land short of the planned Atlantic 
landing point. The spacecraft was getting some lift, but they were sure 
it would not be enough. McDivitt and White welcomed the increasing 
g-rates. White noticed no dimming of vision and no shortness of 
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breath. They talked, watched their instruments, and enjoyed the sce- 
nery.56 
At 27 000 meters, McDivitt slowed the roll rate and stopped it 
completely at 12 000 meters. Shortly, he punched out the drogue para- 
chute. When it deployed, the spacecraft gyrated instead of stabilizing. 
At 3230 meters, the main parachute deployed and unfurled with a 
comforting shock, and then they braced themselves for the 1500-me- 
ter, two-point suspension mark. When the spacecraft assumed its new 
position, the crew lurched forward, then backward, but neither 
knocked their helmets against anything. The splashdown-at 97 hours 
56 minutes 12 seconds after launch-was rough, slamming them 
against the water. But they were down and safe, so far.57 
Gemini I V  missed its mark by 80 kilometers; but several of the 
recovery ships had begun moving toward its landing site, and one heli- 
copter crew watched the spacecraft descend to the ocean. Within a few 
minutes, swimmers jumped into the water and attached a flotation col- 
lar. Then the pilots were hoisted into the helicopter. Fifty-seven min- 
utes after touchdown, the crew stepped onto a triumphal red carpet 
on the deck of the aircraft carrier Wasp to be greeted by the ship's 
crew.58 
During the helicopter ride, an MSC physician reported that the 
crew seemed to be in good shape. Nevertheless, everyone wondered 
about their physical condition after being weightless so long. A NASA 
information specialist, who had seen Cooper stagger after his Mercury 
flight, was surprised to see White do a jig-step. A colleague comment- 
ed, "The air of tension [immediately] dissipated." Berry and his medi- 
cal team met the crew aboard the Wasp. Medical examinations over 
the next 66 hours revealed no major problems. In fact, on the day af- 
ter the landing, on his way to the ship's medical ward, White noticed 
some Marines and midshipmen having a tug-of-war. He joined the 
midshipmen for 15 minutes. Although his team lost, White certainly 
appeared strong and healthy. Later McDivitt and White inscribed a 
picture of themselves walking across the red carpet, "The day the 
straw men fell down." Berry agreed, as he found his patients fatigued 
but showing no si n of faintness. Although the loss of bone miss in ! the heel and little nger was not surprising, physicians were startled to 
find a loss in the volume of plasma--circulating blood. Both lost 
weight, as have all American astronauts-McDivitt, two kilograms (four 
and a half pounds); White four kilograms (eight and a half pounds). 
But they paved the way for an even longer mission.59 
Gemlni IV roused great excitement, with all its daily activities her- 
alded in newspapers around the world. Its deeds shunted aside dark 
clouds that loomed on 7 June (the day that McDivitt and White re- 
turned from space), when the U.S. Military Command in South Viet- 
nam announced that its troops would fight alongside Vietnamese 
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forces. President Johnson came to Houston to congratulate them; a 
million Chicagoans showered them with ticker tape; and Administrator 
Webb sent them, at the request of the President, to the Paris Interna- 
tional Air Show, where they met Cosmonaut Uuri Gagarin, the first 
space traveler.60 
PRELUDE TO GEMINI V 
Although Gemini IV  chalked up a success, rendezvous remained a 
question mark. Seamans asked Langley Research Center to study orbit- 
al mechanics, especially the complex decisions on attitude and velocity 
changes and probable fuel usage both with and without computers. 
Langley engineers reviewed the Gemini IV mission results and con- 
cluded that the fuel allotted seemed am le for stationkeeping but that P the crew had simply not been adequate y trained for the job. As Paul 
Purser later remarked, "no one was 'adequately trained' in that the 
differences between motions on earth and motions in orbit were not 
intuitively realized or 'second-nature' to anyone."61 
Another postflight concern was the computer failure. IBM, the 
subcontractor, was unable to duplicate the failure on a test computer, 
and the Gemini IV computer itself worked perfectly through 500 tests 
in St. Louis. Since the trouble remained a mystery, IBM modified the 
Gemini V computer with a manual switch that allowed areas that 
might have caused the problem to be bypassed.@ 
A number of other questions also had to be answered for Gemini 
V. Should a fail-safe reentry be flown? Should there be an EVA? What 
type of suits should the crew wear? Could the crew be trained soon 
enough to shorten the launch intervals from three to two months? 
Could the scientists get their experiments ready in time for them to be 
integrated into crew training? 
Fail-safe orbits had been planned for all manned Gemini flights. 
Missions not slated for rendezvous would use spacecraft thrusters to 
bring the vehicle into the atmos here. Other flights would depend on 
the Agena to push the spacecra P t into the atmospheric fringes. NASA 
Headquarters had imposed this precaution on Gemini 111, whose crew 
later had little to say about it. But Gemini IV's McDivitt and White 
lambasted it; saving fuel for the fail-safe reentry had forced them to 
limit both operations and experiments. With Gemini V slated for 8 
days and 17 experiments, Houston wanted to scrub the maneuver. 
Since the retrorockets had fired as advertised, even after soaking four 
days in space, Mueller agreed.63 
White's successful EVA was going to be a hard act to follow. 
There was little to be gained from merely repeating it, but the envi- 
ronmental system was not ready for anything more advanced. And 
there were other reasons for skipping EVA in the next several mis- 
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sions. McDivitt and White had trouble stowing thin s away before $: reentry; the 8- and 14-day missions coming up woul produce even 
more garbage. As for Gemini VI, that crew wanted to stress only ren- 
dezvous and dockin . Then, too, the Gemini V pilots had been cam- 
paigning vigorously ! or more comfort in orbit-wearing their helmets, 
goggles, and oxygen masks but not their suits. They lost that battle 
and later wore the G4C extravehicular suits that had been bought for 
them before the decision to fly EVA on Gemini IV. With no reason 
for repeating the standup EVA, Mueller and William Schneider decid- 
ed there would be no EVA on the next three missions.@ 
Shortening the intervals between missions was part of the problem 
in getting the crew ready to fly. In September 1964, when plans for 
speeding up the flight schedule were first being studied, flight opera- 
tions and crew training had emerged as the most likely stumbling 
blocks. When the study was completed and accepted in January 1965, 
Gemini V still did not have a crew and training time was getting short. 
Cooper and Conrad were finally named on 8 February, with Neil A. 
Armstrong and Elliot M. See, Jr., as backups.65 Now there were 12 
men (crews for missions 3, 4, and 5) lining up for the trainers and 
simulators. By the end of June, the Gemini V training program was in 
trouble. That was eased somewhat when the Houston simulator, which 
had been used chiefly to familiarize new crews with Gemini systems in 
general, was refitted more specifically for Gemini V.66 
One of Gemini V's chief objectives, the practice rendezvous with 
the evaluation pod, became more urgent after the doubts raised in 
Gemini IV. Cooper and Conrad devoted a large part of their training 
time to preparing for this exercise, which now seemed a crucial pre- 
lude to Gemini VI. It was being planned to simulate, as closely as pos- 
sible, the terminal phase of a rendezvous with an Agena. 
Another requirement for the first rendezvous flight that Cooper 
and Conrad rehearsed was a simultaneous launch countdown, which 
involved their Titan I1 and spacecraft on pad 19 and an Atlas-Agena 
on pad 14, to give the launch crew and flight controllers some experi- 
ence in launching two vehicles at precise times. On 22 July, the Gemini 
V crew went through the motions of a double launch, including five 
holds-for propellant tanking, a faulty command panel switch, space- 
craft problems, erratic range sequencer performance, and spurious 
pulses received at Lockheed's ground stations. The demonstration last- 
ed 867 minutes instead of the scheduled 505 minutes, but it did give 
the needed practice. When the test ended, the lowered erector could 
not be raised. The crew had to be rescued with the "cherry picker," a 
cabin on the tip of a crane that had been used in Mercury and that 
Cooper had insisted be included in the Gemini program. Riding it 
down gave him a sense of vindication.67 
Although Cooper and Conrad were putting in some very long 
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days, the scheduled launch of 9 August was simply too soon. Astronaut 
Chief Donald K. Slayton flew to Washington to try to argue Mueller 
into delaying the date. On 21 July, Mueller reluctantly agreed to post- 
pone the launch until 19 August.68 
The usual reviews started on 29 July with the spacecraft read'iness 
review, followed by launch vehicle readiness, 16 August; mission, 17 
August; and flight safety, 18 August. On 19 August, Everett E. Chris- 
tensen of NASA Headquarters assumed the role of mission director.69 
Although thunderstorms threatened that morning, the operations 
crew decided to push on and launch, if possible. But the predicted 
storm welled over the ad area, and-shades of Gemini 2!-a lightning 
strike near the power f acilities caused the spacecraft computer to waver. 
Finally, the erector was raised and the crew was helped out of the 
craft. Propellants were drained, pyrotechnics removed or defused, and 
a 48-hour recycle begun.70 
Although NASA Headquarters refused to allow nicknames for 
Gemini spacecraft, Cooper was not so easily put off. Conrad's father- 
in-law had whittled a model covered wagon, which inspired Cooper 
with the idea of a patch using that motif and the motto: "Eight days or 
bust." A personal appeal to NASA Administrator Webb led, after 
much discussion, to approval of the "Cooper patch." But Webb hearti- 
ly disliked the motto-if the mission did not go the full eight days, for 
whatever reason, many would say it had "busted"-and turned it 
down.71 
On Saturday, 21 August, Guenter F. Wendt, the McDonnell pad 
leader, hustled Cooper and Conrad into their couches. Precisely at 
9:00 a.m., they felt the modified Titan I1 start them on a far longer 
journey than any made by a bygone, continent-crossing covered wa- 
gon. The start was smooth enough but then came the bumps of Pogo.* 
A few seconds before staging, the bouncing stopped. Gemini V cut 
loose from the booster's second stage at 163 kilometers altitude, with 
an orbital apogee of 349 kilometers.72 
Because of the mission's length, the supply of oxygen and hydro- 
gen for the fuel cell was a concern. Cooper intended to operate the 
cells at the lowest possible pressure. But Conrad suddenly noticed that 
the pressure had dipped too low. Flight Control told him to switch on 
the oxygen heater to raise the pressure. To his surprise, the needle 
*Pogo oscillations reached +0.38g during stage I flight, exceeding the permitted +0.25g for 
a total of about 13 seconds. Within three days after the launch, analysis of flight data showed that 
the oxidizer standpipes had been charged with only 10 percent of the required volume of nitro- 
gen. The fault was quickly traced to prelaunch procedures, which were corrected. This was the 
only Pogo anomaly to mar a Gemini mission. 
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continued to drop. At 2 hours 13 minutes, Cooper yawed the space- 
craft 90 degrees and ejected the rendezvous pod.73 
Cooper turned the spacecraft to the rear, flipped on the radar, 
and got an immediate signal. The radar scale showed the pod moving 
off at a relative speed of two meters per second. Conrad had ex ected R it to drift away and trail behind the spacecraft, but to his astonis ment 
it went out to the side. Finally it started to follow them as they thought 
it should. 
The heater had still not raised the pressure in the cells. Gemini V 
was out of communications range, so Cooper had to make a decision 
without help from the ground stations, as the pressure had fallen be- 
low 138 newtons per square centimeter (200 pounds per s uare inch). ? Never having seen a fuel cell working at a pressure that ow, he was 
afraid it might stop entirely, and he reluctantly elected to power down. 
Without electrical power, rendezvous with the pod was out of the ques- 
tion. Gemini V's crew now wondered if, as Administrator Webb had 
feared, the mission had "busted." Would Mission Director Christensen 
continue the flight or have them come home?74 
Flight Director Kraft now had his first major problem at the new 
Mission Control Center. He knew the s acecraft had enough battery P power for reentry even if the fuel cell fai ed completely, but he needed 
to know if there would be time enough to reach a good reentry zone, 
such as the mid-Pacific near Hawaii on the sixth revolution. While 
Kraft waited for an answer, the fuel cell pressure dropped to 83 new- 
tons (120 pounds). McDonnell set up a test in St. Louis to find out the 
lowest working pressure for a fuel cell. During the fourth revolution, 
the oxygen pressure stabilized at 49 newtons (71 pounds). About this 
time, Kraft was assured that the batteries were good for 13 hours. 
Mission Control Center learned that the low-pressure tests in St. Louis 
were going well. With these facts in hand, Kraft decided Cooper and 
Conrad could fly for at least one day.75 
Kranz and his crew then came on duty. While he and his roblem 
solvers wrestled with the heater, Edwin E. Aldrin worked wit R a Mis- 
sion Planning and Analysis Division team to design maneuvers for 
some sort of practice rendezvous-now that the pod was out of the 
picture-just in case the electrical supply should be salvaged. Kranz's 
team thought it would be safe to go ahead and operate the cells. When 
Hodge arrlved, the three Flight Directors agreed to tell Cooper to turn 
the electricity back on. They were relieved when the pressure re- 
mained stable as the stacks were brought back on the line. Hodge's 
flight planners gave the crew some experiments and systems checks to 
perform, which required more and more power.76 
Thinking they might have to land early, the crew had begun to 
put things away. Now that they were back in business, the cabin was 
soon full of loose gear again. Then it was time for some rest.77 It had 
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been a long, cliff-hanging first day for Cooper and Conrad in their 
"Covered Wagon." 
While Gemini V drifted, the cabin got cold. The crew turned the 
airflow on low but continued to shiver. This was different from Mercu- 
ry flights, where the capsule had tended to overheat. The suit coolant 
circuit seemed cold, too, so they took the hoses off and stopped the 
flow inside the suits. As the spacecraft tumbled through space, the 
sight of the stars spinning around outside the window bothered them 
until Cooper covered the windows and blocked out the view.78 
Cooper and Conrad had no better luck sleeping than McDivitt 
and White. At first they tried sleeping alternately, but the dozer was 
soon disturbed by the ground calling, "Gemini 5, Gemini 5, Gemini 5." 
As long as one of them was awake, there would be radio transmissions, 
and they decided this sleep schedule would not work. So they tried, 
not altogether successfully, to sleep, eat, and work together.79 
Cooper and Conrad considered the third day the high point of 
the flight. They worked steadily on experiments and did a series of 
maneuvers for a "phantom rendezvous." Setting up their calculations 
on the assumption that they were tracking an Agena in a different or- 
bit than the spacecraft, the flight controllers would pass information to 
the crew, just as though the target vehicle really existed. Using both 
ground and spacecraft computations, Cooper would then maneuver 
Gemini V to a rendezvous with this moving point in space, giving him 
a chance to check out the complete maneuvering system. Such precise 
moves were new to manned space flight, but Cooper came through 
like a champion, bringing his spacecraft to the exact position Kraft had 
asked for. Doubts about being able to accomplish rendezvous faded, 
and the mission planners were confident and ready for Gemini VI.80 
The crew powered the electrical systems down again and resigned 
themselves to drifting in space, performing experiments when possible. 
Since the inertial guidance platform was not working, they had little 
success, although they did some experiments, performed radar tests, 
and made vision tests. They saw smoke at Laredo, Texas, for example, 
but did not see a checkerboard pattern that had been laid out for 
them on a field. In the evening, Cooper asked for some uninterrupted 
sleep and got it. 
Cooper slept seven hours and Conrad five, so their work day be- 
gan at a more normal time. It was to be the last busy shift. First, they 
saw a rocket sled test as they flew over Holloman Air Force Base, New 
Mexico. Over Vandenberg, on the next pass, they sighted the contrail 
of a chase plane just before they glimpsed the ignition of a Min- 
uteman missile. In the Atlantic, they observed their prime recovery 
carrier, Lake Champlain, with a destroyer astern. But, down below in 
Mission Control Center, a new problem was causing fresh worries. 
Since there was no way to dump the fuel cell's product water over- 
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board, its storage tank had been partitioned by a bladder wall; one 
side held drinking water, the other stored the acidic liquid. As the 
crew drank, more room for the fuel-cell discharge was provided. But 
the cells were producing 20 percent more fluid than had been fore- 
seen. When an analysis by Kranz' team disclosed that, even at the 
high rate of production, there would be some room left at the end of 
the mission, everyone sighed in relief. Then still another problem 
arose to plague the mission controllers. 
Late in the fifth day, the orbital attitude and maneuvering system 
(OAMS) grew sluggish, and one thruster quit. Kraft canceled all expe- 
riments that required fuel, and the crew turned off the electrical sys- 
tem to help reduce the water buildup. Although several possible solu- 
tions to the thruster problem were worked out, none was successful. So 
Cooper and Conrad again drifted through their rest and sleep period, 
awakening only to find that the whole OAMS had become erratic. Two 
thrusters had now stopped. The spacecraft drifted for the rest of the 
mission, with Cooper only turning on the system occasionally to stop 
excessive tumbling. When things had been working right, the crew had 
been busy. Now Conrad mentally kicked himself for not bringing a 
book.8 1 
Despite all the problems, the crew did a creditable job on the ex- 
periments. Only one of the 1'7 had to be scrubbed-D-2, Nearby Ob- 
ject Photography-since it depended on rendezvous with the pod. Two 
complementary Department of Defense experiments were successful. 
Experiment D-1, Basic Object Photography, proved that the crew 
could acquire, track, and photograph celestial bodies. Weather condi- 
tions somewhat hampered D-6, Surface Photography, but Cooper and 
Conrad did obtain photographs of Merritt Island, Florida; Tampico, 
Mexico; Rocas Island, Brazil; and Love Field, Dallas, Texas. 
Defense experiments D-4/D-'7, Celestial Radiometry and Space 
Object Photography, were combined to make irradiance measurements 
on celestial and terrestrial backgrounds and on rocket plumes. The 
final defense experimentq-8/D-13, Visual Acuity/Astronaut Visibili- 
ty--combined use of an inflight vision tester and the observation of 
rectangular marks in fields near Laredo, Texas, and Carnarvon, Aus- 
tralia. Weather and operational problems made ground observations 
difficult-they never were able to see the Carnarvon field, but the Lar- 
edo pattern was partially read in the 48th revolution. The tester 
showed that the crew's vision did not change during the eight-day 
flight .82 
0 
Gemini V carried the same medical experiments as Gemini IV, 
plus M- 1, Cardiovascular Conditioning, and M-9, Human Otolith 
Function, to see if the ability to perceive the horizontal deteriorated 
during flight. Postflight responses were not significantly different from 
those reported before the mission. Conrad wore inflatable leg cuffs for 
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M-1. When activated, the cuffs pressurized automatically for two min- 
utes out of six. They could be run continuously throughout the flight 
or be turned off. Conrad had some problems with the equipment but 
he felt the cuffs might be useful for extremely long missions. His pulse 
rate returned to normal faster than Cooper's after the flight, and he 
lost four percent less plasma volume. But this could not be conclusively 
traced to the use of the cuffs, since individual responses differ. 
Principal investigator Pauline Beery Mack found that both had lost 
more calcium than the Gemini IV crew, but she was unwilling to pre- 
dict a trend since "a form of physiological adaptation may occur in 
longer space flight."gs 
Cooper obtained the first photographs of the light of the moonless 
sky (zodiacal light and the gegenschein), experiment S-1. He made a 
series of stepped exposures and took two pictures of the gegenschein, 
a faint nebulous light opposite the Sun. Like their predecessors, Coop- 
er and Conrad took synoptic terrain and weather photogra hs. 
Pictures of the Zagros Mountains showed more detail than the o fl! cia1 
Geologic Map of Iran. The crew also provided pictorial cloud studies, 
including tropical storm Doreen. $7, Cloud-Top Spectrometer, the 
other science experiment, proved the feasibility of making cloud alti- 
tude measurements from spacecraft.84 
During the mission, Hurricane Betsy moved relentlessly toward 
the planned landing area. The landing area sea-state contraints for 
Gemini were considerably relaxed from those of Mercury. For Mercu- 
ry, the limits were winds no more than 34 kilometers per hour (18 
knots), waves no more than one and a half meters (five feet); for Gemi- 
ni, winds up to 47 kilometers (25 knots) and waves up to two and a 
half meters (eight feet) were acceptable. Weather for Mercury in all of 
the recovery areas-primary, secondary, or contingency-had to be 
good. No such restraints were ever placed against Gemini-but it cer- 
tainly could not be expected to touch down in a hurricane area. The 
Weather Bureau recommended that Gemini V be brought down early 
to avoid landing too near the storm. Kranz agreed in plenty of time 
for the Lake Champlain to reach the new recovery zone.85 
Because of the erratic, and sometimes inoperable, OAMS, Kraft 
allowed the crew to use one of the two rings of the reentry control sys- 
tem to position the spacecraft properly more than one revolution be- 
fore coming back to Earth. During the 120th pass, Cooper told Mc- 
Divitt (CapCom in Houston for reentry) that Gemini V was ready for 
retrofire.86 
In the darkness near Hawaii, on the morning of 29 August, at 190 
hours 27 minutes 43 seconds, the first retrorocket went off, followed 
by the second and third. After what seemed like an eternity, the 
fourth fired. Cooper eeked out the window and felt as if he were sit- P ting "in the middle o a fire." With the control system thrusters spew- 
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ing flame in front and the retrorockets firing behind, a nighttime reen- 
try had to rely strictly on instruments, Cooper discovered. There was 
absolutely no way of seeing the horizon or a landmark. He and Con- 
rad stayed on instruments until they had passed over the Mississippi in 
the morning light.87 
Cooper held the spacecraft at full lift until it reached the 120 000- 
meter altitude and then rolled it to a planned bank angle of 53 de- 
grees. The reentry gauge soon indicated ,that they were high-there 
might be an overshoot of the landing point. Cooper, responding to the 
instrument, slewed to 90 degrees left instead of 53 to create more drag 
and reduce the landing error. The g-loads quickly shot from 2% to 
W . 8 8  
At 20 000 meters, Cooper punched the drogue parachute button. 
Gemini V, unlike Gemini IV, did not oscillate-it was completely stable 
on the drogue. Cooper then cut in the second control ring thrusters to 
discard the fuel as the spacecraft came straight down. He and Conrad 
watched the main parachute as it unfurled and felt the expected jolt at 
two-point suspension. In contrast to the McDivitt-White landing, im- 
pact was very, very soft. 
Gemini V landed 190 hours 55 minutes 14 seconds after launch, 
130 kilometers short of the planned landing point. The computer had 
worked as it should in this case-the error had been human. Earth's 
rotation rate is 360.98 de rees per day. But, in programming the 
computer, someone had le f t off the two decimal-place numbers and 
fed the machine just the 360 degrees. Cooper's efforts to compensate 
for what he recognized as an erroneous reading had brought them 
down closer to the ship than they would otherwise have been. 
The short landing caused no problems for the U.S. Navy recovery 
forces. A helicopter soon arrived over the spacecraft and three swim- 
mers dropped into the water. Cooper and Conrad were very comforta- 
ble. With a calm sea, Cooper wanted to stay with the spacecraft on this 
pleasant summer morning (about 8:30, Cape time) until he learned 
that the carrier was still 120 kilometers away. Then he and Conrad 
rode the helicopter to the Lake Champlain.89 
The admiral welcomed them aboard ship. Asked what they had 
been thinking about when it looked as though the fuel cell heater 
problem might cause the mission to end early, Conrad pointed out a 
I picture he had drawn between the spacecraft seats of a covered wagon 
halfway over a cliff .go 
Although the crew's worries were over, Berry's were not. His 
postflight concern was the trend in plasma volume and calcium losses, 
which were increasing on these longer missions. He was aware that the 
crew had been forced to drift through space the last three days, with 
little to do; but they should have exercised more. Two days later, to 
Berry's relief, both were physiologically almost back to normal.91 
Two visual acuity experiments' on Gemini V: 
left, the vision tester; below, ground-marker 
test near Laredo, Texas. 
A safe landing and healthy crew after an eight-day space voyage 
increased NASA's confidence in achieving its lunar-landing goal dur- 
ing the sixties. In a span of only three months in 1965 and after just 
two long-duration flights, medical fears of weightlessness began to sub- 
side. Hugh Dryden reflected this optimism in his report for the Presi- 
dent: 
The primary objective of the Gemini V mission to demonstrate 
man's ability to function in the space environment for 8 days and to 
qualify the spacecraft systems under these conditions was met. This 
milestone duplicated the period required for the manned lunar ex- 
ploration mission. 
Gemini V also demonstrated the capability of man-to withstand pro- 
longed periods of weightlessness. The adaptability of the human 
body was indicated by the performance of the astronauts. For exam- 
ple, their heartbeat rates gradually dropped to a level significantly 
lower than their preflight normal rates, but by the fourth day, 
adapted to the weightless condition and leveled off. Upon return to 
Earth, the heartbeat rates were slightly higher than normal, as ex- 
pected, but returned to normal rates during the second day. This 
has assured us of man's capability to travel to the Moon and re- 
turn.92 
Postflight activities for Cooper and Conrad included a six-nation 
goodwill tour assigned to them by President Johnson. During the trip, 
they attended the International Astronautical Federation Congress in 
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Athens, where they talked with the crew of Voskhod 11, Russian Cosmo- 
nauts Aleksey Leonov and Pave1 Belyayev.93 
NASA now turned to plans for the rendezvous and docking mis- 
sion and for the final long-duration flight, both scheduled before the 
end of the year. The goal of five manned flights in a single year 
seemed phenomenal, compared with the experience of Project Mercu- 
ry. But Gemini IV and Gemini V had indeed proved to be pillars of 
confidence, a solid base from which to build. 
"Spirit of '76" 
I N November 1964, halfway through the 1 1 months of training for the first manned Gemini flight, Donald Slayton confidentially told 
Walter Schirra that the Gemini 111 backup crew would pilot the first 
rendezvous mission, Gemini VI. The following February, Schirra let 
newsmen know that he and Thomas Stafford would be the first Ameri- 
cans to rendezvous and dock in space. Two months later, Public Af- 
fairs Officer Paul P. Haney jested, "The purpose of this [news 
conference] is to reveal one of the best-kept secrets in NASA history- 
the identification of the prime crew on GT-6." Gus Grissom and John 
Young received the backup assignments, reversing the crew roles for 
Gemini 111.1 
For the seventh Gemini mission, NASA had scheduled its longest 
flight of the program-14 days. Crew selection was beginning to follow 
a leap-frog pattern; that is, the backup crew for one mission became 
the prime crew for a later flight.* On 1 July 1965, NASA picked the 
Gemini I V  backup crew, Frank Borman and James Love11 to fly Gemi- 
ni VII, with Edward White and Michael Collins as alternates. Collins 
was the fifst member of the third astronaut class (selected in October 
1963) to be named to a flight.1-2 
*The pattern was sometimes broken. Neither Grissom nor White flew a second Gemini mis- 
sion; David R. Scott joined Neil Armstrong on Gemini VIII; and Elliot See (Armstrong's fellow 
backup pilot on Gemini V) and Charles A. Bassett I1 received the prime assignments for Gemini 
IX.  
tothers in the third group were Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., William A. Anders, Charles Bassett, 
Alan L. Bean, Eugene A. Cernan, Roger B. Chaffee, R. Walter Cunningham, Donn F. Eisele, 
Theodore C. Freeman, Richard F. Gordon, Jr., Russell L. Schweickart, David Scott, and Clifton 
C. Williams. This brought the strength of the corps to 30. 
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NASA officials had been wrestling with the order of flights-which 
mission was to carry out what major program objectives-for a long 
time. Slow progress on some systems had forced a shufling of tasks. A 
prime example was the pitfall-strewn route of the Agena target vehicle 
to the launch pad, which affected schedules for both rendezvous and 
long duration. When Charles Mathews took over the Gemini program, 
the target vehicle was in real trouble. Thus, flight schedules were 
changed to fly an Agena mission before the Gemini endurance test. 
Then, if anything happened, there would be time to work on the vehi- 
cle before the next rendezvous flight.3 
Although Gemini Agena Target Vehicle (GATV) 5001 had been 
shipped to Cape Kennedy in May 1965, it was a test vehicle and un- 
qualified for flight. In August, NASA officially assigned GATV 5002 to 
the first rendezvous mission. It was of better production quality than 
5001, but NASA officials still doubted that its main engine could be 
trusted for docked maneuvers with a manned spacecraft. The Gemini 
Program Office firmly opposed firing the big engine. This was an old 
argument. Schirra, in particular, chafed at the limitation and tried 
hard to get it lifted. When that failed, he was willing to settle for a 
chance to try out the smaller secondary engines. For a while, Schirra 
thought he had won his point, but no reference to out-of-plane docked 
maneuvers appeared in the final flight plan.4 
Rendezvous techniques remained largely in the realm of theory. 
When training for Gemini VI began in the spring of 1965, little had 
yet been done toward planning crew procedures for making the final 
maneuvers. Dean F. Crimm of MSG's Flight Crew Support Division 
joined forces with Astronaut Edwin Aldrin, who had studied the pilot's 
role in rendezvous for his doctoral dissertation at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. 
In 1963 and 1964, Aldrin worked hard at selling the project office 
and flight operations on a concentric rendezvous. The target would be 
launched in a circular orbit 298 kilometers high, the spacecraft in a 
lower elliptical orbit. Since the spacecraft was closer to Earth, it took 
less time to circle the globe and could catch up for rendezvous. Aldrin 
and Grimm worked out the trajectories and maneuvers that would al- 
low the spacecraft to intercept the target.5 
A two-week review in April 1965 convinced Grimm and Aldrin 
that MSG's plans for an active human role in rendezvous were in poor 
shape. Most work seemed to stress a closed-loop concept that relied 
more on machines than on men. Radar and computer would make 
rendezvous nearly automatic. Of course, if either failed, so did the 
mission. Aldrin and Crimm believed the pilots should have options if 
the equipment malfunctioned. Grimm went to St. Louis and persuaded 
McDonnell to rig a device that could simulate trajectories, orbital inser- 
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tion, and spacecraft-target rendezvous.* A computer allowed flight 
profiles to be set up that varied the series of maneuvers leading to tar- 
get interception. Crewmen learned what to do if any piece of equip- 
ment failed, and they profited from merely going through the motions 
as they tried to decide which procedures were useful and valid. Schirra 
and Stafford rejected, for example, an early concept for doing rendez- 
vous with the spacecraft inverted-head toward Earth-using the iner- 
tial guidance system to judge spacecraft attitude. They both disliked 
this method because they lost their sense of direction. Overall, the 
prime crew participated in 50 complete rendezvous simulations. As 
Schirra and Stafford trained on the simulator, they took notes and dis- 
cussed with Aldrin and the others the best procedures to use. These 
were then incorporated into charts that would be carried in flight.6 
Aside from concerted efforts to qualify the Agena and to pull to- 
gether rendezvous plans, Gemini VI preparations were fairly routine. 
Measures taken to shorten the launch intervals were surprisingly suc- 
cessful, and the 25 October launch date was not hard to meet. In April 
1965, GLV-6 became the first Gemini launch vehicle to be erected in 
the new west cell of the Vertical Test Facility at Martin-Baltimore; tests 
on GLV-5 were still in progress on the old stand (now called the east 
cell). GLV-6 reached the Cape early in August and went into storage 
until Gemini V was launched. Spacecraft 6 arrived in Florida about the 
same time, but it did not go into storage. Instead, it was hoisted atop a 
timber tower for electronic compatibility tests with GATV 5002, be- 
cause the target vehicle's command and communications system had just 
undergone major modifications. Originally intended as a one-time ex- 
ercise for the first Agena, these tests became a major part of prelaunch 
checkout for all Gemini-Agena missions. When they were finished, the 
test operations group was confident that the Agena would respond re- 
liably to all spacecraft and ground control commands.7 
Gemini VI was the last of the program's battery-powered space- 
craft, which limited the flight to two days at most. Schirra, in fact, 
thought the power would be pretty thin for even this amount of time. 
When the mission directive neared its final version by the end of Sep- 
tember, it provided that the "mission may be cut to one day if all 
objectives are completed." The crew, in other words, could come home 
as soon as they completed rendezvous and docking with the Agena; 
everything else was secondary, even experiments. There were seven of 
these: two depended upon rendezvous with the Agena, one was medi- 
*Grimm and Aldrin had help in setting up rendezvous procedures: at MSC, Branch Chiefs 
Paul C. Kramer (Crew Safety and Procedures) and Edgar C. Lineberry (Rendezvous Analysis); at 
McDonnell, Charles A. Jacobson, Marvin R. Czarnik, William Murphy, Walter Haufler, and Wil- 
liam E. Hayes. Gordon Cooper and Charles Conrad, the Gemini V crew, acted as engineering test 
pilots until the Gemini VI crews could take over. 
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cal, three were photographic experiments as carried on all flights and 
used crew time only when it did not interfere with the major task- 
rendezvous-and one was passive. "On my mission, we couldn't afford 
to play with experiments," Schirra later said, "rendezvous [was] signifi- 
cant enough."s 
"No JOY, No JOY 
On launch day-25 October-at pad 14, a team from General 
Dynamics Corporation conducted the countdown of the Atlas launch 
vehicle capped by the slender Agena. Although this would be its maid- 
en voyage in Project Gemini, Agena was a veteran, in one model or 
another, of more than 140 flights since 1959. The countdown, presid- 
ed over by NASA Mission Director William Schneider," proceeded 
simultaneously for the Atlas, Agena, modified Titan 11, and space- 
craft.9 Noticeably absent were the delays that had plagued Mercury 
launches. Fifteen minutes before the Atlas-Agena was to leave its 
moorings, Schirra and Stafford climbed into the spacecraft and settled 
into their couches.lo 
At 10 o'clock, General Dynamics launch chief Thomas J. O'Malley 
pushed the button that sent the Atlas-Agena skyward. Signs that some- 
thing was wrong appeared minutes later when the target cut loose 
from the booster. The Agena seemed to be wobbling, even as its atti- 
tude control system labored to keep it stable. The small secondary en- 
gines ignited and the gas generator valve opened to fire the main en- 
gine and boost the Agena to orbit. A telemetry signal in the Mission 
Control Center showed that the big engine had started exactly on 
time.11 But that was the last good news. In Houston, Schneider, who 
thought Agenas always flew, was astounded to learn there was a prob- 
lem. In fact, Air Force radar was tracking what seemed to be five 
pieces of the target vehicle.12 
In the meantime, Public Affairs Officer Paul Haney, trying to keep 
the ublic informed, had little or nothing to report. Ten minutes after 
lifto k , he could only repeat that no telemetry signals were coming into 
the stations along the flight control network and that, over on pad 19, 
Schirra and Stafford were continuing their preparations for flight. Af- 
ter 50 minutes, the last flicker of hope gone, Haney told his listeners, 
"We have had a conversation with [the Carnarvon tracking 
station] . . . and their report keeps coming back-No joy-No joy." 
The mission was scrubbed.13 
Actually, only six minutes after launch, a deadening sense of fail- 
*Schneider, newly named Deputy Director for Mission Operations and Gemini Mission Direc- 
tor in NASA Headquarters, retained that position throughout the remainder of the program. 
LeRoy Day replaced Schneider as Deputy Director of the Gemini program in Washington. 
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ure was spreading among those closely connected with the target vehi- 
cle's development. Jerome B. Hammack, who kept tabs on the kgena 
for GPO, was in the pad 14 blockhouse, listening to the flight control- 
lers' comments. He was soon convinced that there was deep trouble. 
The Air Force officer in charge of Atlas-Agena launches, Colonel L. E. 
Allen, thought the Agena had probably exploded. The two men head- 
ed for the Lockheed hangar, where others also gathered for the wake. 
Hasty study of partial telemetry data threw little light on the cause of 
the disaster, but newsmen were clamoring for a press conference. 
NASA and Air Force officials told reporters that they did not know 
exactly what had caused the failure, but that ten days might be enough 
time to decide what to do to keep it from happening again.14 
The gloom that descended upon Gemini was quickly pierced by a 
ray of hope. While the futile countdown for the spacecraft launch was 
still under way, Frank Borman rushed from the outside viewing stand 
to the Cape Kennedy Launch Control Center to find out what had 
happened. He found himself standing with Gemini VII crewmate 
James Love11 near two McDonnell officials, spacecraft chief Walter 
Burke and his deputy, John Yardley. The astronauts heard Burke ask 
Yardley, "Why couldn't we launch a Gemini as a target instead of an 
Agena?" Yardley recalled that the Martin Company had proposed a 
rapid-fire launch demonstration some months before. He asked Ray- 
mond Hill, now in charge of McDonnell work at the Cape, what he 
remembered about the study. Hill briefly outlined the plan, and all 
three began discussing how it could be adapted to carry out Burke's 
idea. 
Borman listened with growing excitement as the McDonnell idea 
jelled. What he heard made sense, with one exception. When Burke 
began to sketch on the back of an envelope how an inflatable cone 
could be attached to Spacecraft 7 to permit docking, Borman drew the 
line; he disliked the thought of anything nuzzling into the equipment 
housed in his spacecraft's adapter section. Burke and Yardley found 
NASA manned space flight chief George Mueller and Gemini Manager 
Charles Mathews and tried out their scheme on them. Neither NASA 
official gave it much of a chance. The two McDonnell engineers left 
the building to see if they could sell their concept elsewhere.15 
Burke's brainstorm was built on more than just a vaguely recalled 
Martin proposal. Shortening the launch intervals to two months had 
proven that hardware could be put into the pipeline faster than in the 
past. But if Gemini VII were to be the target for Gemini VI, the two 
vehicles would have to be launched less than two weeks apart. Mueller 
and Mathews simply refused to believe that it could be done. Ironical- 
Left, the vehicles for the Gemini VI rendezvous 
mission: Titan with Gemini Spacecraft 6 on top 
on pad 19, and the Atlas capped by Agena target 
vehicle 5002 on pad 14. Below left, the rendez- 
vous simulator at McDonnell, which reproduced 
the last 30 meters; center, rendezvous simulator 
at Langley which reproduced the last 65 meters; 
right, docking test at Cape Kennedy to deter- 
mine whether the particular Agena and the par- 
ticular Gemini spacecraft were compatible for 
docking. 
A grim Mission Control waits for final 
confirmation of the Agena launch failure, 
which would force a scrub of the Gemini 
VI mission: foreground, left to right: 
Donald Slayton, John Clark, GSFC; 
standing, left to right, Elliott See, Glynn 
Lunney, Charles Bassett, Howard Tin- 
dall, Robert Gilruth (arm on rear con- 
sole), George Low, Edwin Aldrin; seated, 
center, John Hodge, Christopher Kraft, 
and James Elms. 
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ly, they were the prime movers in urging shorter schedules; but 
Burke's idea far exceeded their expectations.16 
In September 1964, Mueller had asked Schneider if he thought 
activating a second launch complex would help to shorten the time 
between launches. Schneider's first reaction was no. But, in February 
1965, he had his office study the value of launching two Gemini space- 
craft either simultaneously or in quick succession. Eldon W. Hall, 
Schneider's Systems Engineering Director, reported that having two 
crews in orbit at the same time and trading pilots in mid-space would 
have public appeal. Other advantages might be using an unmanned 
Gemini for a space rescue or completing a rendezvous mission if a 
spacecraft failed to launch. But none of these things was worth the 
cost of a second pad and spacecraft modifications. In summary, Hall 
said, "It might be nice, but there is no overwhelming necessity."l7 
Mueller seized every chance to push for shorter launch schedules 
and new objectives to wring added experience from the Gemini pro- 
gram, especially for Apollo. In Houston, Mathews kept his staff on the 
lookout for new ideas for the missions. He had helped Hall with the 
report and agreed that the expense would be too great. Mathews did, 
however, arrange to procure spare parts for pad 19 so it could be 
swiftly restored after a launch.18 
Because of the daily contact between NASA, the Air Force, and 
contractors, ideas for speeding up the program flowed freely at the 
Cape. One of these-a rapid turnaround of the launch vehicle-was 
the result of collaboration between Joseph Verlander, Martin chief at 
Kennedy, and Colonel John Albert, Chief, Gemini Launch Vehicle 
Division, 6555th Aerospace Test Wing. They proposed getting a fully 
checked Gemini Titan ready for launch and then parking ~t some- 
where while a second launch vehicle was prepared for flight. One. 
problem was how to move the first booster, since the engine contrac- 
tor, Aerojet-General, insisted that the vehicle had to remain upright 
once it had been erected and checked out. The answer to that was a 
Sikorsky S-64 Skycrane, a helicopter powerful enough to lift and carry 
the upright Titan 11. It was really quite a sim le plan, though carrying P it out might involve a lot of complexities. A ter a booster and space- 
craft had been checked out in the usual manner, the spacecraft would 
be transferred to bonded storage and the launch vehicle would be 
hauled by helicopter to nearby pad 20, which was not in use at the 
time. Then a second booster and payload would be readied on pad 19 
and launched. The stored and parked vehicles would be immediately 
returned to the pad and launched in five to seven days. 
No one seemed interested in the Gemini "rapid fire," or "salvo," 
proposal except its creators. When Verlander told O.E. Tibbs about it, 
the Martin vice president frowned on the idea of using the Skycrane 
helicopter. Albert outlined the plan to SSD Commander Ben Funk and 
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SSD Director of Gemini Launch Vehicles Richard Dineen but roused 
only mild interest. Burke and Yardley listened politely but did not 
seem impressed. Mathews told Verlander and Albert frankly that there 
was no place in the Gemini program for such an unorthodox sugges- 
tion. In August 1965, Albert took the scheme to Gemini V Mission 
Director Everett E. Christensen, but he received no encouragement 
there, either. This lack of enthusiasm was daunting, and the Martin 
plan seemed destined for limbo.19 
Two months later, however, in the aftermath of an exploded 
Agena, the idea looked better, at least to Burke and Yardley. But they 
got no warmer reception than Verlander and Albert. Failing to sway 
Mueller and Mathews, they left the Launch Control Center for the 
Manned Spacecraft Operations Building, where an impromptu meet- 
ing on what to do next was in progress. Here they again urged their 
scheme, but, as Merritt Preston, the Kennedy launch operations man- 
ager, later said, "Poor Yardley and Burke were pounding a stone 
wall . . . they got the coldest shoulder I ever saw." 
People at the meeting were more interested in the possibility of 
switching the 3670-kilogram Spacecraft 7 with the 3553-kilogram 
Spacecraft 6. Albert and others-among them some of the very men 
who had fathered the rapid turnaround plan-favored the proposed 
exchange. Having been rebuffed earlier, they now thought more con- 
servatively. They reasoned that some of the time and work invested in 
Gemini VI launch preparations might be retrieved by using the 
booster already on the pad and checked out to launch the long-dura- 
tion spacecraft. Burke and Yardley, on the other hand, pushed for 
removal of both the spacecraft and the booster, hoping to buy time for 
their proposal to be given further consideration. But the NASA, Air 
Force, and industry launch teams wanted to wait and see if GLV-6 had 
enough power to lift the heavier Spacecraft 7 into orbit.20 
Mueller called NASA Administrator James Webb in Washington 
shortly after the Agena explosion and told him about the idea of ex- 
changing spacecraft. Webb discussed it the next morning with his 
chief associates-Deputy Administrator Hugh Dryden, Associate Ad- 
ministrator Robert Seamans, Associate Deputy Administrator Willis 
Shapley, and Mueller, now back from the Cape. If the switch could be 
made, the earliest launch date would be 3 December. If GLV-6 were 
not powerful enough to lift Spacecraft 7 into orbit, then the launch 
would take place on 8 December. Gemini VI, postponed to February 
or early March, would still fly before Gemini VIII. There was no men- 
tion of the Burke-Yardley proposal.21 
Having made little headway at the Cape and with the spacecraft 
exchange plan gaining support, Burke and Yardley had headed for 
Houston to broach their idea to MSC Director Robert Gilruth. On 
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Tuesday morning, 26 October, while Webb and his colleagues were 
talking about exchanging the two spacecraft, Gilruth listened to Burke, 
smiled, and said, "Walter, you know things aren't like that in real life." 
Burke shot back, "Tell me what's wrong with it." Gilruth could come 
up with no convincing obstacle. He called George Low in to help him 
nit ick. The Deputy Director was intrigued by Burke's scheme. His f on y real doubt was whether the tracking network could handle two 
manned spacecraft at the same time. But that was a question for Flight 
Operations Director Christopher Kraft. 
In the meantime, Mathews had arrived in Gilruth's office. He was 
no more able than Gilruth or Low to think of any insurmountable bar- 
rier to the plan. Gilruth asked Kraft to join them and show them the 
operational roadblocks that must be there. Taken aback, Kraft first 
said, "You're out of your minds. It can't be done." After thinking a 
few moments, though, he was not so sure. He called Sigurd A. Sjo- 
berg, his deputy, to set up a meeting with his flight operations experts 
for 1:30 that afternoon.-Flight Crew Operations chief Slayton was the 
next to hear the news, and he, in turn, sounded out the pilots for their 
reaction. Schirra and Stafford greeted the prospect with enthusi- 
asm.22 
In Florida, hopes for switching the spacecraft faded when an anal- 
ysis of GLV-6 showed that it lacked the power to orbit the Borman- 
Love11 spacecraft. At a meeting in the office of John Williams, Director 
of Spacecraft Operations, the Cape leaders were now forced to consi- 
der the Burke-Yardley suggestion they had scorned before. As they 
tinkered with a tentative work schedule for a nine-day pad checkout, 
they began to see glimmers of light. Merritt Preston telephoned Ma- 
thews in Houston and LeRoy Day in Washington and told them it 
might work, after all, as far as the machines were concerned. Day 
found that Mathews was now in favor of the plan. Hardware was ap- 
parently no obstacle, but tracking and control operations were still a 
question mark.23 
Kraft came back from lunch with Low and outlined the gist of the 
roposal to his staff. The men in John Hodge's Flight Control Division 
round it "a hell of a great challenge and to a man they wanted to press 
on as soon as possible." One of them suddenly said, "Why don't we 
handle it as if one of the spacecraft were a Mercury-type and the other 
a Gemini-type spacecraft?" Mercury controllers at the tracking stations 
observed data on their consoles, summarized it, and forwarded the 
result by teletype to Mercury Control Center. Gemini VII could be 
handled that way while it served as a passive target for Gemini VI. For 
Gemini missions, the stations were fitted with computer communica- 
tions processors. As the spacecraft passed overhead, the processors in- 
terrogated the appropriate systems for specific data, which were auto- 
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matically transmitted to Mission Control. Gemini VI, the active partner 
in the rendezvous, would be controlled by the more sophisticated sys- 
tem. With this as a basis, an operational mode was laid out. 
After Gemini VII lifted off, flight control would be carried out in 
the normal manner while the pad was being prepared for the second 
launch. Once the flight controllers were sure the orbiting spacecraft 
was operating properly, Mission Control would concentrate on Schirra 
and Stafford in their spacecraft, and the tracking network would watch 
Gemini VII, record data, and send information by teletype to the 
Houston controllers. This mode would continue until the complicated 
rendezvous mission ended and Gemini VI-A (so called to distinguish it 
from the originally planned mission whose objective had been rendez- 
vous with Agena) returned to Earth. Then Gemini VII would become 
the focus of communications again. Kraft was soon convinced that the 
operation could be carried out safely. He told his Mission Planning 
and Analysis Division to set up the flight plan so the second launch 
could take place as soon as the pad was ready.24 
At 3 o'clock that afternoon, Kraft told Gilruth that he was ready 
to talk, and he sounded excited. An hour later, Gilruth, Low, Ma- 
thews, Slayton, Burke, and Yardley heard what Kraft had to say. They 
talked'about it for an hour, then Gilruth called Mueller, who liked the 
dual control idea but wanted to sleep on it. Burke and Yardley left for 
St. Louis with a promise from Gilruth to let them know within 24 
hours what Headquarters decided25 
But the news was beginning to leak out. James C. Elms, Mueller's 
deputy, heard from Washington reporters that there were rumors that 
NASA was going to fly two manned spacecraft at the same time. He 
phoned Houston to ask Low what was going on. When Low had told 
him about the plan, they decided to warn Mueller about the danger of 
news leaks. Realizing that speed was now vital, Mueller called Seamans 
at home. It was too late to do anything that evening, and Seamans 
asked Mueller to come over the first thing in the morning to discuss 
the subject. Although Seamans was very interested in what he heard 
on Wednesday morning, he told Mueller to keep it quiet until he could 
pass it along to Webb and Dryden.26 
That afternoon, 27 October, Webb, Dryden, Seamans, and Shap- 
ley met to discuss the Burke-Yardley proposal. Because Dryden had 
been concerned about adding extravehicular activity to Gemini I V  at 
the last minute, Seamans felt he had to play devil's advocate. Even 
before Seamans finished, Webb was intrigued. Believing himself to be 
less conservative than Seamans about novel ideas, however, Webb tele- 
phoned Mueller and asked him point-blank if it would work. Mueller 
asked him to wait while he doublechecked with Gilruth in Houston. 
Mueller told Gilruth that Webb liked the idea and thought it 
important enough for the President to announce. Mueller warned the 
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MSC Director that there could be no hedging. Once President Johnson 
made the plan public, the nation would be committed. How, Mueller 
wanted to know, did Gilruth feel about the proposal after thinking it 
over for 24 hours? Affirming that it still looked good to him, Gilruth 
nevertheless asked for half an hour to count the votes. Mueller gave 
him 15 minutes. Gilruth and Low polled Kraft, Slayton, Mathews, and 
Preston, stressing what a presidential announcement implied. When 
the affirmative ballot was unanimous, Gilruth called Mueller, who noti- 
fied Webb that he had a deal.27 
Webb then tried to reach presidential aide Jack Valenti but talked 
with Joseph Laitin, an assistant, instead. Laitin asked the Administrator 
to send the proposal to the White House so it could be forwarded to 
the President who was at his ranch near Austin, Texas. Webb drafted 
a memorandum for the Chief Executive, while Julian Scheer, NASA 
Assistant Administrator for Public Affairs, composed a press release3 
The NASA chief informed the President that, barring serious pad 
damage after the launch of Gemini VII, Gemini VI-A could be flown 
in time for Schirra and Stafford to rendezvous with Borman and Lov- 
ell. Webb told President Johnson, "I believe it will be encouraging to 
you . . . to learn that we have gained enough strength in . . . the 
Gemini program to consider . . . such a quick turnaround."29 
On Thursday, 28 October, a press conference was held at the 
Texas White House to announce the Gemini VII/VI-A rendezvous 
mission. That a plan of such sco e could be suggested, discussed, ap- B proved, and announced in scarce y three days was a sign of the mana- 
gerial and technical trust that Gemini had already come to inspire. 
William D. Moyers, the President's Press Secretary, told the news me- 
dia about the plan and answered questions from reporters. Moyers 
said the mission was targeted for January; back at MSC, however, ev- 
eryone from Gilruth on down was working toward an early December 
flight.30 
At Cape Kennedy, normal methods now had to be suspended. 
From the hardware standpoint, success depended upon the perform- 
ance of the launch preparation teams. Members of the NASA, Air 
Force, and Aerospace teams met and agreed on the best way to imple- 
ment the plan. In this emergency situation, Aerojet-General engineers 
came through with procedures for handling the vehicle in a horizontal 
position, even though they had said earlier it must not be done. The 
Air Force's 6555th Aerospace Test Wing took GLV-6 down, one stage 
at a time, and placed it in bonded storage under plastic cover. On 29 
October, the team erected GLV-7 on pad 19.31 Spacecraft work began 
when the McDonnell Cape team was rounded up to hear about the 
new mission. "Oh, man, you are crazy!" was the first reaction of pad 
leader Guenter Wendt when he saw the "SIC #6 Pad Schedule," which 
listed tasks for nine hectic days after the Gemini VII launch. But he, 
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like everyone else, tackled the challenge enthusiastically. While these 
exact schedule details were being pinned down, Spacecraft 6 was se- 
cured in a building on Merritt Island.32 
Crew training presented no serious problems. Schirra and Staf- 
ford were honed and ready to go. They stepped aside while Borman 
and Lovell flew the simulator, taking only occasional sessions to keep 
sharp. Rendezvous plans remained unchanged. But Gemini VII's flight 
plan was altered to circularize the orbit, so Spacecraft 7 would travel in 
the same path that the Agena would have used. 
Although Kraft's group had a workable concept for flight control, 
the operations experts still had a lot of work ahead setting u simulta- 
neous controls for two manned spacecraft. Goddard Space F f' ight Cen- 
ter, in charge of the tracking network, began altering station layouts to 
allow voice communications with Gemini VII and VI-A at the same 
time. Equipment at Goddard was also adjusted to ensure that comput- 
er programs for two manned spacecraft could be prepared.33 
Schirra and Stafford wanted to add extravehicular activity to the 
flight plans-perhaps Stafford could change places with Lovell in a 
demonstration of space rescue-but they met a pronounced rebuff. 
Borman's goal was a 14-day mission. He wanted nothing to do with 
any proposal that might threaten it. "Wally could have had all the 
EVA he wanted," Borman later said, "but I wasn't going to open the 
hatch." There were real hazards in trying to exchange pilots in mid- 
space, since the life support hoses would have to be detached and re- 
connected in a vacuum, leaving the pilots with only the backup system 
to depend on as they traveled between the two spacecraft. It might 
have looked great in the headlines, Borman added, "but one little slip 
could have lost the farm." 
Schirra and Stafford did not give up and turned to Low for help. 
The Deputy Director learned that Stafford, one of the taller astro- 
nauts, sometimes had trouble getting out of and back into the space- 
craft in zero-g tests. Even the barest chance that this might happen 
during the mission made the whole idea seem too risky to Low, but he 
passed the crew's wishes on to NASA Headquarters. The consensus in 
the executive offices was that there should be no EVA on Gemini VII- 
VI-A. Ironically, Spacecraft 6 was the first vehicle to be specifically de- 
signed for EVA. Schirra had worked hard to get it out earlier, so he 
and Stafford could focus on rendezvous. He had done too good a job. 
As he later remarked, "I wrestled that out of there so well that I 
couldn't get it back in when we had the delay."34 
SUITCASE FOR A FORTNIGHT 
Frank Borman and James Lovell had put in long hours getting 
ready to spend two weeks in space. Working directly with the Gemini 
" S P I R I T  O F  76" 
IV pilots and talking with the crew of Gemini V, Borman and Lovell 
learned much about what to take with them and how to prepare them- 
selves physically and psychologically. They already knew the spacecraft 
systems, but they needed to figpre out how to live in such confined 
quarters for so long and still perform useful work. As successful as the 
preceding missions had been, they still wondered if six extra days 
could be safely added to the flight. Edward White and James McDivitt 
had been fatigued; Cooper and Conrad tired and bored. Both crews 
stressed the impossibility of sleeping alternately. Borman and Lovell 
resolved to sleep and work together. 
The astronauts and mission planners had learned another lesson 
from Gemini IV and V. Prescribing tasks for assigned times during a 
flight was useless. So Borman and Lovell would take off with what 
was, in essence, a flight plan outline. Experiments and other tasks 
would be carried out only when the flight controllers and crew could 
fit the job to the opportunity. The only prescheduled tasks fell be- 
tween launch and stationkeeping, the first four hours of a 330-hour 
mission. 
Another innovation that the crew welcomed was adjusting the 
sleep-eat-work-relax cycle to their more normal, Earthbound habits. 
Borman and Lovell had two work periods each day, coinciding with 
morning and afternoon in the United States Central Standard Time 
zone. This schedule also fitted the specialized activities of the three 
flight controller shifts-to execute the flight plan, to analyze systems 
performance and the sup ly of consumables, and to keep up with P what had been done and p an the next segment of activities.35 
Stowage of food and gear was a special problem on a two-week 
flight. Unfinished meals and food wrappers could quickly clutter up 
the spacecraft, as Cooper and Conrad had learned in the eight-day 
mission. Extra storage space in the small cabin had to be found before 
the 14-day trip. GPO Deputy Manager Kenneth Kleinknecht went with 
Borman and Lovell to St. Louis, where Spacecraft 7 was going through 
its test phases, to help them hunt for more space. The search for an 
extra garbage dump was successful: waste paper from their meals 
could go behind Borman's seat for the first seven days and behind 
Lovell's for the next seven. After working out procedures, the crew 
practiced stowing for launch, orbit, and reentry, until they were sure 
they knew where to put every scrap of paper.36 
Tailoring flight and stowage plans for a 14-day mission was impor- 
tant, but even more significant was a newly tailored space suit to make 
Gemini VII more livable. In early une 1965, McDonnell started a test 
program to see if astronauts coul c? ride almost suitless in space. Gor- 
don Cooper and Elliot See, wearing standard Air Force flight suits 
(with medical monitoring plugs, helmets wired for Gemini communica- 
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tions fittings, and oxygen masks connected to emergency bottles), flew 
in the altitude (vacuum) chamber in St. Louis to simulated heights of 
36 000 meters. Both astronauts were elated over the results, but Mc- 
Donne11 personnel were uneasy-in actual flight, the cabin tempera- 
ture might go too high. At an MSG-McDonnell management meeting 
the next month, McDonnell was asked to study another possibility. 
James V. Correale of the Crew Systems Division had suggested using a 
lightweight pressure garment similar in operation to a G3C intravehi- 
cular suit. Although this soft suit would not allow pilots to complete a 
mission if the cabin lost oxygen presure, it would provide them 
enough margin of safety to get to a recovery area. 
Test results at McDonnell showed that the spacecraft environmen- 
tal system actually operated more efficiently with suits off, but NASA 
and McDonnell engineers did not like the idea of the crew being so 
vulnerable. The best way to extinguish a fire in space, for example, 
was by cabin depressurization, which was out of the question if the 
men were suitless. And they needed protection if they had to use the 
ejection seats. Therefore, NASA officials snapped quickly at Correale's 
idea for a lightweight suit. This decision-in August 1965-was too 
late to benefit the crew of Gemini V, but there was enough time to get 
the suit ready for Gemini VII. 
To produce a more comfortable suit, the David Clark Company 
removed as much corsetry as possible from the 10.7-kilogram (23-112- 
pound) Gemini pressure suit. The suit was designed to be removed 
during flight without requiring too much energy or space. A soft cloth 
hood-which used zippers, as opposed to a neck ring, for fastening to 
the torso \portion-replaced the fiber glass shell helmet. The contrac- 
tor, working with MSG's Crew Systems Division, managed to cut suit 
weight by a third, but the 7.3-kilogram (16-pound) suit was still some- 
what heavy. In evaluation and training sessions, however, h r m a n  and 
Love11 found the new garment handy. The soft hood could be zi ped 
open, and the complete suit could be removed and laid on the si e of 
the seats, without having to be stowed awa . fY If the spacecraft systems were per orming properly, the crew 
would take the suits off after the second day in space. The garments 
would then be worn only for such critical phases of the mission as 
rendezvous, reentry, and landing. Use of the lightweight suit, designat- 
ed G5C, was approved in August; by November, qualification was 
completed.37 
Gemini VII carried more experiments than any other flight in the 
program. Because it was the last long-duration mission, its medical 
experiments were particularly important in assessing man's capabilities 
for the lunar landing program. Of 20 experiments, eight were medi- 
cal, a higher ratio than in any other Gemini flight (see Appendix D).38 
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Two of the medical experiments--calcium balance study and in- 
flight sleep analysis-were better suited to a clinic than to a small space- 
craft cabin and were viewed with something less than enthusiasm by 
the crew. Even the name of the "Inflight Electroencephalogram" 
(EEG) experiment made the astronauts a little nervous. Although it was 
merely a study of sleeping habits in Gemini, the EEG was normally 
used to diagnose subtle disturbances such as incipient epilepsy and 
brain tumors. But some specialists believed brain wave recording could 
offer more information, and the astronauts were understandably wary 
of how the results might be interpreted. Changing the name to "In- 
flight Sleep Analysis" solved only half their problem. Since normal hair 
growth would dislodge the scalp sensors after 48 hours, the informa- 
tion had to be gathered at the worst possible time-the first night, 
when most people have difficulty slee ing in a new environment, any- 
way.39 Borman and Love11 also turne c f  a jaundiced eye on the calcium- 
balance study. It was a nuisance because they had to keep a complete 
record of body intake and wastes for 9 days before the flight, 14 days 
during it, and 4 days afterward. Before and after the mission, a nutri- 
tionist from the National Institutes of Health limited the items they 
could eat and drink and weighed out their meals in grams. Almost a 
month of this regimen did not appeal to the crew.40 
The only other medical experiment making its space flight debut 
was "Bioassays of Body Fluids."* Its purpose was to study the effect of 
space flight on body fluid chemistries that might be affected by physi- 
cal and mental stresses. The experimenters hoped to draw some con- 
clusions about the physiological costs of space flight by analysis of ur- 
ine samples.41 
In categories other than medical-scientific, technological, and 
defense---only three experiments were being flown for the first time. 
The other nine were repeated from Gemini I V  and V. Two of the new 
experiments were technological: an in-flight laser transmitter to be 
aimed at a laser beacon at the White Sands Test Facility, New Mexico, 
to establish optical communications from space; and landmark contrast 
measurements of selected areas around the world (primarily coast- 
lines), which might be useful to Apollo for guidance and navigation. 
The third was a Defense experiment to determine the value of star 
occultation measurements for spacecraft navigation.42 
The Gemini VII/VI-A decision made Borman's and Lovell's flight 
more than an endurance test. It changed the amount of fuel they 
could spend for experiments and stationkeeping with the booster and 
forced modifications to turn their spacecraft into a target vehicle. Over 
*This experiment had been part of the Gemini VI mission until the flight was canceled on 25 
October 1965. 
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an early-November weekend, target acquisition and orientation lights, 
a radar transponder, a spiral antenna, and a voltage booster were in- 
stalled on Spacecraft 7.43 
Two WEEKS IN A SPACECRAFT 
Four years earlier the chimpanzee Enos had barely completed two 
circuits of Earth. Now Borman and Lovell were ready to try for more 
than 200 during two weeks in space. On 4 December 1965, they en- 
tered the spacecraft and settled in their couches. The minutes to 
launch ticked off, with the astronauts checking systems, listening over 
the communications circuits, and waiting to hear the erector go clank- 
ing downward. Promptly at 2:30 p.m., the booster rose from the pad. 
There was no doubt about it, Lovell said, the triple cues of CapCom 
Elliot See's countdown, the vibration of the launch vehicle, and the 
noise of the engines all told him he was going someplace.44 
"We're on our way, Frank!" Lovell shouted. As the launch vehicle 
boosted the spacecraft skyward, the booster rolled toward its pro- 
grammed launch azimuth of 83.6 degrees. With only minor deviations 
in its powered phase, Gemini V I I  slid smoothly into its planned 160- 
kilometer keyhole.45 
Shortly after the spacecraft cut loose from its booster only a little 
over six minutes from liftoff, Borman wheeled Gemini V I I  around to 
find the launch vehicle. Two seconds of thrust had been enough for 
the separation maneuver and now he fired for five seconds to get into 
position for stationkeeping. The afternoon Sun glared through the 
windows but in less than 30 seconds he saw the booster. Fuel spewed 
from a broken line, first forming globules and then crystallizing into 
cascades of flakes. The Titan I1 bounced and jumped about the sky. 
Occasionally eclipsing the view of the Sun, the venting fuel created a 
brilliant and beautiful contrast. For 15 minutes, the crew took turns at 
formation flying and picture taking. Stationkeeping was easy, but chas- 
ing the tumbling second stage was costing more fuel than Borman 
liked. And at 15 meters, he was too close to such unpredictable mo- 
tion, anyway. He fired the spacecraft thrusters to move away.46 
Half an hour into the flight, experiments began. Cardiovascular 
conditioning cuffs were sna ped on Lovell's le s, where they started i pulsing. The booster was stii in sight, its lights ashing and billions of 
particles around it. Borman and Lovell saw some unidentifiable objects 
in orbit five to six kilometers awa . About 7:00 p.m., they turned from 
sightseeing to housekeeping, andi at 9:30 they ate their first meal in 
space. Intermittently, air-to-ground communications dealt with an irk- 
some fuel cell warning light, which blinked on and off. As night fell 
below, noise from the ground became less frequent, giving the crew a 
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chance to catnap. Borman's suit was warmer then he had expected; he 
had to turn the control knob to the coldest setting. 
After breakfast, at 9:00 a.m., CapCom See told the crew it was 
time to go to work. Systems reports were run through, their physical 
well-being was discussed, and the day's experiment load was assigned. 
See passed on Mission Control's analysis of the fuel cell warning light 
and news of more mundane events: the theme song of the men aboard 
the aircraft carier Wasp ("I'll Be Home for Christmas"), football scores, 
and a collision between two airliners over New York. Borman retorted, 
"It looks like it's safer up here than down there." "We're not down yet, 
buddy!" Lovell reminded him.47 
Some 45 hours into the flight, Lovell began doffing his suit, a sim- 
ple action that took more than an hour in such crowded quarters. At 
that point, both astronauts had stuffy noses and burning eyes. Borman 
complained that he was too warm. After Lovell had removed his suit, 
however, the general cabin environment improved.48 A debate about 
suits on or suits off during flight that had started before the launch of 
Gemini VII continued for nearly six days into the mission. 
Both astronauts had planned to remove their suits after a two-day 
check of the environmental system. That changed when Mueller got 
wind of it. He objected strongly and so did Seamans, who agreed that 
one crewman should be suited at all times. Either pilot could take his 
suit off for up to 24 hours, but during launch, rendezvous, and reen- 
try, both were to be suited.49 
Borman made frequent comments about Lovell's comfort and his 
own distress. As the hours passed, the rationale of one suit off and one 
on became ever less persuasive. Even sitting with his suit completely 
unzipped and his gloves off, Borman sweated while Lovell remained 
dry. Lovell's first 24 hours unsuited passed, and he elected to sleep 
suitless a second night. Borman agreed, despite his own discomfort, 
because Lovell, the larger of the two men, had more trouble getting 
the suit off and on in the confines of the cabin than he did. Lovell did 
don some special lightweight flight coveralls but took them off after 15 
minutes-it was just too hot. 
One hundred hours into the flight, Borman asked the flight con- 
troller on the Coastal Sentry Quebec to talk to Kraft about taking off 
his suit. Because he knew of Mueller's opposition, he cautioned Cap- 
Com Eugene A. Cernan, on the next pass over Houston, to discuss his 
request with Slayton first and not to present it to Kraft as an emergen- 
cy. Cernan agreed. 
Meanwhile, the controllers tried to get Lovell to put his suit on 
and Borman to take his off, so the surgeons could check the effects on 
both pilots of the suited and suitless conditions. The crewmen wanted 
to wait until the rendezvous with Gemini VI-A had been completed, 
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but Kraft insisted. After 146 hours of flight, Borman finally agreed. 
Two hours later, it was his turn to sit in suitless comfort as Lovell swel- 
tered.50 
The suit question was also working its way up the NASA chain of 
command, as the dail mission evaluation reports became tinged with 
concern about how a i'ert the crew would be for the coming rendez- 
vous. When Borman made his request through Cernan, Mission Direc- 
tor Schneider relayed it to George Mueller in Washington. Mueller 
asked MSC Medical Director Charles Berry (who was also chief flight 
surgeon during the missions) for a comparative analysis of the two as- 
tronauts. Already aware that Gilruth favored suits off, Mueller asked 
for a poll of the other members of the Gemini Design Certification 
Board. 
Kenned Director Kurt H. Debus, Marshall Director Wernher von 
Braun, and g SD Commander Ben Funk all agreed that the reasons for 
bein unsuited outwei hed those for bein suited. Berry reported that 
the b 5 ood pressure an 3 pulse rates were c p oser to normal with suits off. 
The pilots got their wish, and debate ended.51 
Despite Frank Borman's discomfort, spacecraft operations pro- 
ceeded efficiently. The crew conducted experiments, evaluated space- 
craft systems, and worked, slept, ate, exercised, and rested. Good 
humor and good spirits prevailed, bolstered by family reports, the daily 
See-Haney newscasts, and the preparations for sending Gemini VII 
some visitors-the VI-A crew. Borman expressed some concern about 
the fuel needed to get into position for the meeting, but four orbital 
adjustment maneuvers worked well.52 In a nearly circular orbit of 300 
kilometers, the spacecraft's orbital lifetime was now theoretically over 
100 days.53 The friendly target was ready. 
While Gemini VII had rested on pad 19 awaiting launch, welders 
and repairmen had stood by. Borman and Lovell had barely started 
their booster-chasing exercise when Elliot See told them that pad 
cleanup had begun. The normal feeling of anticlimax after a launch 
was absent. If anything, spirits may have seemed too high. "Everybody 
was so excited you'd think they were going to launch the next day," 
John Albert recalled. The Martin crew found minimal damage to pad 
19. Workmen wasted little time on normal painting or cleaning. Their 
objective was to replace critical instrumentation. 
The launch team got GLV-6 up and the spacecraft mated to it in 
one day, complete with standard procedures, tests, and reviews. In 
addition, VII's radar transponder was interrogated as Borman and 
Lovell passed over Cape Kennedy to ensure that it would answer VI- 
A's radar transmissions.54 
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After 56 hours of the Borman-Love11 mission, rapid progress in 
getting Gemini VI-A ready fostered hopes that it might fly on the 
eighth instead of the planned ninth day. A computer problem damp- 
ened these hopes briefly, but, with a new part installed, the final simu- 
lated flight test started and ended without problems. On 9 December, 
Mathews and Funk were convinced that the launch could be made a 
day early.55 
On Sunday, 12 December, Astronauts Schirra and Stafford moved 
through the doors and into the couches of Spacecraft 6 for a second 
time. After a troublefree countdown, precisely at 9:54 a.m., their Gem- 
ini launch vehicle roared into action. The roar was quickly strangled. 
Gemini II's "hold-kill" seemed to be repeating, but this time more criti- 
cally-there were two men strapped atop this sputtering rocket. At 1.2 
seconds, an electrical tail plug dropped from the base of the booster 
and activated an airborne programmer-a clock in the cockpit that was 
not supposed to start until the vehicle had lifted off. Because there had 
been no upward movement, the valves closed to prevent fuel from 
gushing into the launch vehicle's engines. The malfunction detection 
system had sensed something wrong and had stopped the engines.56 
One of the most suspense-filled moments in the whole Gemini 
program followed. If ever there were a time to use the spacecraft ejec- 
tion seats to get away from a cocked and dangerous rocket, this 
seemed to be it. 
Kenneth Hecht; chief of the Gemini Escape, Landing, and Recov- 
ery Office and long-time ejection seat specialist, was surprised when 
the crew did not eject, as they should have if ground rules had been 
strictly followed. If the clock were right, then the vehicle had left the 
ground. Had it climbed only a few centimeters, the engine shutdown 
would have brought 136 tonnes (150 tons) of propellants encased in a 
fragile metal shell crashing back to Earth. There could be no escape 
from the ensuing holocaust. But neither Schirra nor Stafford had 
sensed motion cues; and Schirra, who as command pilot would have 
been the one to pull the "D-ring" for ejection, decided not to, despite 
the ticking clock. 
At the moment of crisis, the veteran test pilot remained calm. 
With no trace of emotion in his voice, Schirra reported, "Fuel pressure 
is lowering." Francis X. Carey, the Martin launch vehicle test conduc- 
tor, was just as matter of fact over the radio circuit to the spacecraft. 
Just a hint of panic might have caused Schirra or Stafford to pull the 
D-ring. Schirra relied, with icy nerves, on his own senses. He knew 
GLV-6 had not moved, and he knew the clock was wrong.57 
When the smoke had cleared and it appeared that the booster was 
not going to explode after all, up went the erector. Guenter Wendt and 
his McDonnell team hastened back to the white room they had so re- 
cently left. After checking on the cabin pressure and making sure that 
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the crew had safetied the seat pyrotechnics, Wendt opened the hatches 
and helped the astronauts, their faces etched with disappointment, out 
of the spacecraft.58 
Seamans had been listening in at NASA Headquarters in Wash- 
ington. Once sure that the crew was safe, he went home. A call from 
Administrator Webb soon brought word that President Johnson was 
greatly disturbed by the failure. All was not lost, Seamans told Webb. 
Gemini VII still had six days in orbit-time enough, he hoped, to find 
the source of trouble and launch VI-A for the rendezvous.59 
The Martin and Air Force teams began recycling the booster for a 
launch to take place four days later. So far as they knew, the only 
thing wrong was a tail plug that had fallen out prematurely. A check 
through the records left no question that the plug had been properly 
twisted into its detents. But testing revealed that some plugs did not fit 
as tightly as others and pulled out more easily. (The harder-to-remove 
plugs, with a safety wire added, became standard for Gemini.)so 
As expected, reporters clamored for details about the engine shut- 
down. Merritt Preston was picked to tell them what NASA knew and 
what it planned to do. Known to the press as a spacecraft expert, Pres- 
ton could not be expected to know all the technical details about the 
launch vehicle and would be saved from having to guess. Although he 
winced at being placed on the firing line, his explanations at a news 
conference were well received and he was not pressed for answers. 
Reporters shared with Gemini officials the belief th2t it was just a case 
of a plug pulling out. The malfunction detection system had worked as 
it should, the crew had remained cool. There seemed every reason to 
believe that the launch could take place in four days.61 
Aerospace engineers routinely examined the launch vehicle engine 
thrust-trace data. The firing trace looked normal at the beginning, but 
some strange squiggles farther along on the graph suggested that 
thrust had decayed before the plug dropped out. A call to John Albert 
caught him as he was leaving for a meeting to discuss plans for the 
launch turnaround. He detoured to get a copy of the graph, which he 
took to the meeting. A telephone call was immediately placed to the 
Aerojet-General plant in Sacramento. A detailed analysis tentatively 
spotted the problem in the vicinity of the gas generator. But the trou- 
ble itself needed to be pinned down. By 7 o'clock that evening-12 
December-the Cape Aerojet engineers were searching the engine, 
piece by piece. All through the night they worked, but to no avail. 
When Charles Mathews came by at 9:00 the next morning, their hag- 
gard and worried faces told him there had been no success. Just as he 
was asking what Aerojet intended to do now, an excited engineer came 
running in, shouting that he had the answer-a dust cover that had 
accidentally been left in the engine. Months before, in the Martin Bal- 
timore plant, the gas generator had been removed for cleaning. When 
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the check valve at the oxidizer inlet was taken off, Martin technicians 
put a plastic cover in the gas generator port to keep dirt out. Later the 
dust cap was overlooked when the unit was reinstalled. The relatively 
inaccessible location of the check valve--on top of the engine just un- 
der the tankage where it could not be seen and all work had to be 
done using mirrors and touch-effectively prevented the errant cap 
from being discovered.62 
Once the trouble was found, the gas generator was cleaned and 
replaced in GLV-6 on 13 December. It had suffered no damage, but a 
question still lingered: Could VI-A be launched in time to rendezvous 
with VIR At the time of the hangfire, recycling was expected to take 
four days, but within five hours of the failure, Elliot See told the Gem- 
ini VII crew that launch was targeted for the third day-15 
December63-with a mighty effort to reduce the 96-hour recycle to 72 
hours. It succeeded.64 The friendly target was still waiting patiently 
upstairs. 
One question remained unanswered and unanswerable. When 
Schirra refused to pull the D-ring that would have ejected the Gemini 
VI-A crew, was that a decision he alone would have made, or was that 
an indication that none of the astronauts would have used the seats?* 
The feelings expressed by the only Gemini pilots who faced that deci- 
sion leave a measure of doubt. 
Stafford's concern was the enormous acceleration-more than 20 
g's-an off-the-pad abort required to throw the seat in a stable trajec- 
tory far enough from the booster to do any good. Even a mentally 
prepared astronaut might suffer severe injury. At best, Stafford be- 
lieved, he would have been walking around for months with a crick in 
his back, like those who had ejected in similar high-impulse Martin- 
Baker seats. Of course, he would also be alive. And Schirra remarked, 
"If that booster was about to blow . . . if we really had a liftoff and set- 
tled back on the pad, there was no choice. It's . . . death or the ejection 
seat."65 
On 15 December 1965, the mood of those working on the rendez- 
vous mission-planners, pilots, and ground crew-was one of high an- 
ticipation. If on this third attempt Gemini VI-A would cooperate and 
*Early in the program, some thought was given to training Gemini crews on an ejection seat 
catapult at the Navy's aircrew training laboratory in Philadelphia. When a Navy test subject tried 
the facility and reported that it was no worse than being catapulted in a plane off a carrier, MSC 
officials decided it was not worth the effort. Warren J. North, Chief of the Flight Crew Support 
Division, said that "generally speaking, the flight crews were all in favor of the ejection seats," in 
spite of the extremely high g-forces. 
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go into orbit, a truly significant world space "first"-rendezvous- 
might be chalked up. Russian endurance records had now been shat- 
tered in two successive American manned space missions, but achiev- 
ing rendezvous would be navigationally significant to the Apollo pro- 
gram as well as important one-upmanship. Having a friendly target to 
approach, one that could point its transponder and talk back as Gemi- 
ni VI-A called out its course and speed, created an atmosphere of 
confidence.66 
At 8:37 a.m. Gemini VI-A rose from its pad. As if forcing it to 
move by will power alone, Schirra urged, "for the third time, go." A 
moment of wonder followed, as the launch vehicle seemed to shimmy. 
This shaking may have been only an impression; because of their re- 
cent experience, both pilots were highly attuned to movement and 
sound. At engine cutoff, Stafford checked the computer and got a 
reading of 7830 meters per second. This told them they were on their 
way. Borman and Love11 in Gemini VII; passing near the Cape Kenne- 
dy area, saw nothing except clouds; but they soon learned from the 
Canary Islands communicator that the orbital parameters of VI-A 
were 161 by 259 kilometers. A few minutes later, as they flew over 
Tananarive, Malagasy Republic, they saw VI-A's contrail and got a 
brief glimpse of the visitors' spacecraft. They put on their suits and 
waited for company to arrive.67 
The rendezvous profile--dubbed "M equals 4" by the mission 
planners for convenience (the "M" had no special meaning)-sched- 
uled the catchup to VII during the fourth revolution of VI-A. Schirra 
and Stafford faced six hours of maneuvering to reach Borman and 
Lovell.68 
At insertion, the chase vehicle trailed its target by 1992 kilometers. 
The VI-A crew aligned the inertial platform to position their space- 
craft for a height adjustment. Over New Orleans, after 94 minutes in 
space, Schirra ignited the thrusters to speed up by 4 meters per sec- 
ond. The perigee remained the same, but the acceleration kicked the 
apogee up to 272 kilometers. Gemini VI-A, being nearer to Earth and 
so moving faster, now lagged only 1175 kilometers behind Gemini 
VI1.69 
Near Carnarvon, at 2 hours 18 minutes ground elapsed time, 
Schirra began a phase adjustment. This had a twofold purpose: to 
reduce the distance to the target and to raise the chase vehicle's peri- 
gee to 224 kilometers. He pressed the button to add 19 meters per 
second to his velocity. Over the Pacific less than half an hour later, 
Schirra turned his spacecraft 90 degrees to the right (southward) and 
ignited the thrusters to push Gemini VI-A into the same plane as 
Gemini VII. Now the distance between the two vehicles had narrowed 
to 483 kilometers.70 
Three hours 15 minutes into the mission, Elliot See told Schirra 
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that radar contact should soon be possible with Gemini VII. The VI-A 
crew got a flickering radar signal, then a solid lock-on at 434 kilome- 
ters range. Over Carnarvon, at 3 hours 47 minutes, the aft thrusters 
fired for 54 seconds to add 13 meters per second to Gemini VI's 
speed. The result was almost a circle, measuring 270 by 274 kilome- 
ters. In slant range distance, the two spacecraft were now 319 kilome- 
ters apart and closing slowly.71 
Schirra and Stafford placed Gemini VI-A in the computer (or au- 
tomatic) rendezvous mode at 3 hours 51 minutes into the flight. While 
the lower orbiting vehicle gained slowly on its target, Schirra dimmed 
the lights on his side of the spacecraft to improve outside visibility. At 
5 hours 4 minutes, he exclaimed, "My gosh, there is a real bright star 
out there. That must be Sirius." The "star" was Gemini VII, reflecting 
the Sun's rays from 100 kilometers away. 
Gradual catchup of the target vehicle lasted until 5 hours 16 min- 
utes; Schirra prepared to make the last rendezvous maneuvers. The 
two ships were now close enough to allow Spacecraft 6 to thrust direct- 
ly toward Spacecraft 7. He fired the thrusters and closed on Gemini 
VII at a rate of better than three kilometers every minute and a half.72 
Schirra and Stafford briefly lost sight of Gemini VII when it passed 
into darkness but soon picked up the target's running lights.73 
Schirra made two midcourse corrections spaced 12 minutes apart 
(at 5 hours 32 minutes and 5 hours 44 minutes). Six minutes later, at a 
range of 900 meters from his target, Schirra began braking his space- 
craft by firing the forward thrusters. Soon he had no difficulty seeing 
Gemini VII. Fittingly, in the terminal stage of rendezvous, the VI-A 
astronauts saw the stars Castor and Pollux in the Gemini (Twin) con- 
stellation aligned with their sister ship. Then Spacecraft 7 flashed into 
the sunlight-almost too bright to look at. From a distance of 200 me- 
ters, it resembled a carbon arc light. Following the braking and trans- 
lation maneuver, VI-A coasted until the two vehicles were 40 meters 
apart, with no relative motion between them. The world's first manned 
space rendezvous was now a fact. In Mission Control, the cheering 
throng of flight controllers waved small American fla s, while Kraft, 
Gilruth, and others of the jubilant crowd lit cigars a n i  beamed upon 
this best of all possible worlds. At 2:33 p.m., 15 December 1965, Gemi- 
ni VI-A had rendezvoused with Gemini VII.74 
When Russian Vostok I11 flew within five kilometers of Vostok IV 
on 12 August 1962, some people believed, with the help of Pravda 
news dispatches, that rendezvous had been accomplished. The two 
spacecraft, however, were in different orbital planes; nor could they 
maneuver to stop relative motion between them. In simple terms, it 
was good shooting from the pad, but the result was the same as if two 
bullets had passed in the middle of a battlefield. Schirra knew what a 
real rendezvous in orbit was: 
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Somebody said. . . when you come to within three miles [five 
kilometers], you've rendezvoused. If anybody thinks they've pulled a 
rendezvous off at three miles, have fun! This is when we started 
doing our work. I don't think rendezvous is over until you are 
stopped--completely stopped-with no relative motion between the 
two vehicles, at a range of approximately 120 feet [40 meters]. 
That's rendezvous! From there on, it's stationkeeping. That's when 
you can go back and play the game of driving a car or driving an 
airplane or pushing a skateboard-it's about that simple.75 
Borman and Lovell had been fascinated by the fireworks of VI-A's 
thrusters during braking and startled by the 12-meter tongue of flame. 
As Schirra and Stafford neared, there was a second surprise. Borman 
said, "You've got a lot of stuff all around the back end of you." Min- 
utes later, during stationkeeping, Schirra told Borman, "So do you." 
Cords and stringers three to five meters long streamed and flapped 
behind both spacecraft.76 
Rendezvous maneuvers had cost VI-A only 51 kilograms (113 
pounds) of fuel. Schirra still had 62 percent left in his tanks. It had 
been easy, he said, and there was plenty of fuel for stationkeeping, 
flyarounds, formation flying, and parking the spacecraft in specific re- 
lative positions. Borman and Lovell were not so wealthy; Flight Con- 
trol told them to stop maneuvers when the VII tanks dropped to an 
11 percent supply. 
For more than three Earth revolutions, the two spacecraft stayed 
at ranges of from 0.30 meters to 90 meters. VI-A approached VII to 
examine the stringers on one occasion. On another, they flew nose to 
nose. Schirra and Stafford swapped the controls back and forth be- 
cause the Sun streamed so brightly through first one window and then 
the other. When it was time for Borman and Lovell to perform an 
experiment, Schirra and Stafford moved out 12 meters and parked. 
For some 20 minutes, in one instance, neither bothered to touch the 
steering handle, as the spacecraft remained stable in relation to its sis- 
ter ship. On the first night pass, the two spacecraft faced each other at 
distances ranging from 6 to 18 meters. Schirra had worried about visi- 
bility during darkness, but it turned out to be excellent--docking light, 
handheld penlight, and even VII's cabin lights were clearly visible to 
him. 
Using what Schirra called his eyeball ranging system, the VI-A 
crew did an in-plane flyaround of VII, roving out to 90 meters. Believ- 
ing this was too far away to be called stationkeeping, Schirra hurriedly 
brought VI-A within 30 meters. The astronauts were highly impressed 
with their ability to control the spacecraft. Velocity inputs as low as 
0.03 meter (0.10 foot) per second provided very precise maneuvering. 
Because of this fine control, he and Stafford concluded that nuzzling 
into and docking with a target vehicle would be no problem. 
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As the pilots' bedtime approached, Schirra flipped the spacecraft 
blunt-end forward and fired his thrusters to impart a small separation 
speed. Eventually, the crews settled down 16 kilometers apart. Bor- 
man, who frequently caught sight of Gemini VI-A in the distance, 
remarked to the Rose Knot Victor tracking ship communicator, "We 
have company tonight."77 
After launch, rendezvous, and stationkeeping, Schirra and Staf- 
ford were utterly exhausted and hungry. They ate a good meal and 
went to sleep. When Schirra awakened with stuffy head and runny 
nose, he was glad that the mission was flexible, with the option of land- 
ing after only one day of flight if everything had been done. He and 
Stafford had achieved all their mission objectives, and the flight con- 
trollers would not be able to give too much more attention to Gemini 
VI-A, anyway. Gemini VII's fuel cell needed help, and Borman, Lov- 
ell, and Mission Control had to focus on its problems if the mission 
were to be able to last 14 days.78 
But Stafford caught everybody's attention for a few minutes. In an 
excited tone he reported: 
Gemini VII, this is Gemini VI. We have an object, looks like a satel- 
lite going from north to south, probably in polar orbit. . . . Looks 
like he might be going to reenter soon. Stand by one. . . . You just 
might let me try to pick up that thing. 
Over "one," the communications circuit, came the strains of the pilots 
playing "Jingle Bells."* The spirit of Christmas glowed-Gemini VII 
was about to begin its 12th day and VI-A, having demonstrated ren- 
dezvous in fine fashion, was going home.79 
Schirra said, "Really a good job, Frank and Jim. We'll see you on 
the beach." He then flipped VI-A blunt-end forward and jettisoned 
the equipment section; retrofire followed automatically.8o 
Schirra placed the spacecraft in an inverted (heads down) attitude 
to see Earth's horizon. Nearing the 100 000 meter fringe of the atmos- 
phere, Schirra set the bank angle at 55 degrees left and held it until 
computer guidance took over at 85 000 meters. The spacecraft threat- 
ened to overshoot its planned landing point. This had to be countered 
by banking first left, then right. Since the Gemini spacecraft obtained 
*Michael Kapp, producer of the Bill Dana "Jose Jimenez in Orbit" record album in the 
early sixties, had given Schirra a small four-hole harmonica on 8 December 1965. (Kapp also 
provided many of the music tapes that were broadcast to the Gemini crews from the Mission 
Control Center.) Stafford, the other half of the two-man space band, jingled small bells. Frances 
Slaughter, of the Cape Flight Crew Operations Office, had fastened them to his boots before a 
training simulation, for a joke, and he took the bells on the flight to provide the rhythm section. 
It had been Schirra who furnished the corned beef sandwich that had created such a furor for 
the Gemini III crew. Asked some time after his flight why he "didn't get too much static for the 
harmonica," Schirra replied, "I think the timing was pretty good on that." 
Left, scorched pad 19 after Gemini 
VPI launch; center, first stage o f  
Gemini VI-A's Titan launch vehicle is 
erected on pad 19; right, Gemini VI- 
A roars a way. 
World's first space rendezvous. 
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its greatest lift flying straight ahead, banking cut lift and shortened 
range. 
The crew turned the computer off at 24 000 meters, deployed the 
drogue parachute at 14 000 meters, and punched out the main para- 
chute at 3200 meters. Gemini VI-A landed about 13 kilometers from 
its planned impact point, recording the first successfully controlled 
reentry.81 For another first, they did it in full view of live television 
beamed from the Wasp via satellite transmission. As on his Mercury 
flight, Schirra elected to remain aboard his spacecraft while it was 
hauled onto the carrier deck. Thus, on 16 December 1965, after 16 
revolutions (and 25 hours, 15 minutes, 58 seconds), the world's first 
manned spaceflight rendezvous mission became a matter of record.*82 
After the guests had departed, Borman and Lovell realized that 
their incentive had gone with them. Events such as stationkeeping, 
experiments, getting out of their suits, and waiting for the VI-A visi- 
tors had sustained their enthusiasm. Even then, the novelty of space 
flight had worn thin, and their thoughts had strayed homeward. With 
VI-A gone and almost three days left, the mission began to drag. Be- 
yond all doubt, 14 days inside this spacecraft was "a long haul in that 
short frame." While in drifting flight, Borman read some of Mark 
Twain's Roughing It, Lovell part of Drums along the Mohawk by Wal- 
ter D. Edmonds-both selected partly because they had nothing to do 
with the space program.83 
During a mission as long as Gemini VII, impressions only indi- 
rectly connected with the flight naturally came to mind. Lovell in- 
dulged in a disquisiton on legs, which were 
affected the most by zero g because you don't realize how much 
exercise you do every day. Just combating Earth's gravity, you do 
quite a bit; and the legs are designed to do most of that work for 
you. They get you around-they walk-they lift up your body. Sud- 
denly, for two weeks, this gravity is taken away. The legs don't have 
a job any more-they're just there. [A man without legs] for Gemini 
would have been perfect because you could utilize that space for 
something else. Everything except for maybe EVA. But in that 
spacecraft, we didn't use the legs for anything.84 
A few minutes after Schirra had played his spirited rendition of "Jin- 
*The National Aeronautic Association, representing the ~e'd6ration AAonautique Interna- 
tionale, certified Gemini VII/VI-A for four manned space flight achievements: longest distance in 
orbit, longest duration in orbit, distance in group flight, and duration in group flight. 
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gle Bells," Borman and Lovell took off their suits. They might as well be 
comfortable. Then they had to see about a thruster problem that had 
greeted them upon awakening. When Borman tried to fire thrust 
chambers 3 and 4, only whitish, unburnt fuel streamed out. The pitch 
thrusters stopped the spacecraft from yawing and thrusters 11 and 12 
also helped, although they were a little too strong in control. One of 
the non-working thrusters was tested after the flight. The laminate in 
the thrust chamber was found to be the old-style 90-degree layup, in- 
stead of the new 6-degree design that had solved the burnout prob- 
1em.85 
But the thrusters were merely annoying; the fuel cell was a great- 
er concern. Despite the warning light during the first revolution, the 
cell had provided enough electrical power for the spacecraft to operate 
normally for 126 hours. The ground analysis team, with an operating 
model set up in St. Louis, had helped keep it going, but power output 
was only partial by the end of the 12th day. The next day, the fuel cell 
threatened to quit completely as the warning light burned continuous- 
ly. Gemini VII might have to end early with a landing in the Pacific 
Ocean, much as the crew disliked the idea of missing the 14-day goal. 
Test results in St. Louis, however, showed that the electrical system 
would carry them all the way. Relieved, Borman slept better than he 
had on any other night in space.86 
Borman and Lovell finished their packing on the last day. Asked 
about their baggage, Borman said the cockpit was clean, he and Lovell 
were wearing their suits, and they were all set to go home. 
Before the retrorockets fired, the ground stations kept the crew 
busy for two hours on the reentry checklist. Flight surgeon Berry re- 
minded them to elevate their feet and pump their legs. Borman broke 
in to say that he and Lovell wanted to get out of the spacecraft as soon 
as possible. They had no desire to wait around to be stylishly hoisted 
aboard a carrier. As they started their last revolution-number 206- 
the tracking stations along the circuit bade them goodbye. The music 
being broadcast included the tune "Going Back to Houston."87 
With retrofire approaching in the darkness near Canton Island in 
the Pacific, the crew wondered-as do all astronauts-whether the rock- 
ets would fire. Lovell described his emotions graphically. 
Retrofire has a unique apprehension in the fact that both of us are 
aviators and we understand the apprehension in flying. If you have an 
accident in an airplane, something's going to happen. . . . You hit 
something, or it blows up--you're coming down. Now, in liftoff and 
reentry, a space vehicle is like an airplane. Something's happening. 
But if the rockets fail to retro, if they fail to go off, nothing's going to 
happen. You just sit up there and that's it. Nothing happens at all. So 
that's the unique type of apprehension, because you know that you've 
gotten rid of the adapter, you know that you're going to have 24 hours 
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of oxygen, 10 hours of batteries, and very little water. So you play all 
sorts of tricks to get those retros to fire.@ 
The first retrorocket fired automatically and on time. The next 
two rockets followed in quick succession and, after a pause, the fourth 
fired. As the firings jolted them, Lovell said, with relief, "That's one 
big hurdle over with, tiger!" Borman answered, "You're right, ace." 
From Houston, CapCom See told them to fly a 35-degree left 
bank until computer guidance cut in. A surprised Lovell reminded 
Borman that 53 degrees had been planned. Borman questioned See, 
who confirmed the 35-degree bank.* By that time, however, the com- 
puter "had come in on the line . . . it was actually commanding the 
spacecraft," with Borman banking to right and left, following the nee- 
dles. As Lovell later said, "You have no control over how close you're 
going to get to the target. Your only control is how good that comput- 
er is doing, or how good your c.g. [center of gravity] was when you set 
up the computer and the retrofire time. . . ."a9 
Borman rolled Gemini VII head down to use the horizon as a 
ide for keeping the proper spacecraft attitude. He could see nothing 
E m  his window, however, and had to depend entirely on his instru- 
ments and on Lovell, who finally saw the horizon after about six and a 
half minutes and began calling out adjustments. Borman concluded 
that reentering was definitely a two-man job for Gemini; there was no 
way to follow the needles on an instrument panel and watch the hori- 
zon at the same time.90 
Because they had been weightless for so long, the onset of the g 
forces "felt like a ton." During the long glide, which did not have a 
sharp angle of descent, g forces never rose higher than 3.9 (contrasted 
with an average of 7.7 for the Mercury-Atlas orbital flights). But the 
higher g did not bother them too much, since they were very busy 
trying to get as close to that carrier as possible. 
The reentry control system worked well, holding Gemini VII 
steady until the drogue parachute came out. The spacecraft rocked 20 
degrees to either side, giving the crew a shaking. On the way down, 
Lovell opened the snorkel; smoke and an acrid smell filled his hood, 
causing his eyes to water. But even his smarting eyes were glad to see 
the main parachute deploy. Little did the crew care that they hit the 
water with a heavy thud. Borman's thoughts were elsewhere; he was 
trying to spot the recovery helicopter. When he did not see any air- 
craft, he remarked, "Shoot! We must have missed it more than Wally 
did." The two command pilots had a small bet on who would land 
closer to the target. But Borman was not sure when he began to talk 
*In the postflight report, Scott Simpkinson's evaluators noted that the flight controllers had 
been wrong and had given Borman an erroneous bank angle. 
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with "Air Boss," pilot of one of the helicopters in the area of the 
spacecraft's descent; maybe they were near the aiming point, after 
al1.91 
On 18 December 1965, after 330 hours, 35 minutes, 01 second, 
Gemini VII came to rest on what Lovell called the good old aqua fir- 
ma, missing the target by 11.8 kilometers." Mission objectives had been 
achieved in fine fashion. Provided the crew came through in good 
physical condition, it could be assumed that an Apollo team could fly 
safely to the Moon and back. 
Borman felt a little dizzy, Lovell not at all. Borman suggested that 
they get out of their suits, as it was warm in the spacecraft, but the 
effort wa_s just too great. They turned on the oxygen repressurization 
valve and were soon comfortable. The pararescuemen were already 
working on the flotation collar, and the recovery helicopters were hov- 
ering nearby. Half an hour after landing, Borman and Lovell were 
greeted aboard the Wasp$2 the second spaceship crew the carrier's 
crew had snared in a few days. 
When the returning spacemen came onto the deck of the carrier, 
they were tired but happy. They walked slightly stooped and a little 
gimpy-legged, partly because of their pressure suits and the ship's roll, 
but mostly because they were just plain weary. Perhaps even more 
remarkable than being able to walk across the deck without stumbling 
was the fact that the crew had been able to get into the "horse collar" 
to be hoisted into the helicopter. After being weightless for 14 days, 
this was a severe physical test. Berry was jubilant over the medical re- 
sults of Gemini VII: 
The most miraculous thing was when they could get out of the 
spacecraft and not flop on their faces; and they could go up into the 
helicopter and get out on the carrier deck and walk pretty well. 
They were in better physiologic shape than the V crew. Initially, 
their tilt-table responses were not as bad and did not last as long. It 
looked more like four-day responses, by far, than eight-day. The 
calcium loss was the same way. Amazingly, they maintained their 
total blood volume. They didn't get any decrease, but they did it in 
a peculiar way. They lost the red-cell mass still, but they replaced 
the plasma-they put more fluid in. Apparently, there had been 
enough time for an adaptive phenomenon to take place.93 
When the detailed examination started, the physicians found that Lov- 
ell, who had worn the cardiovascular cuffs, had less blood pooling in 
his legs than Borman. After a good night's sleep aboard ship, both 
*Flight Control had told Borman of the procedures Schirra had used in flying the first com- 
puter controlled reentry. Since he was anxious to win his bet, the Gemini VII commander was 
glad to have the benefit of the Gemini VI-A commander's experience. 
" S P I R I T  O F  76" 
men looked rested and said they were.94 They had made the long haul 
in that short frame in fine style. 
Christmas week of 1965 was perhaps the high-water mark of 
manned space flight to that time. The string of successes had an un- 
looked-for effect, however-manned space flight became almost com- 
monplace, the novelty had all but gone. Who did what and when tend- 
ed to blur. Any single event, such as America's first suborbital flight or 
first orbital mission, became hard to recall. Perhaps more than it in- 
tended, NASA had achieved the program goal implied in the Project 
Development Plan of December 1961: to put space flight on something 
like a routine basis.95 The routine loses news value, and score cards on 
Russia versus America in the space race vanished when the lead clearly 
passed from East to West. 
Gilruth may have best summed up the bright look of things at the 
postrecovery conference on 18 December, when he said: 
It has been a fabulous year for manned. space flight. . . . I guess 
you all realize that this year, since March, we have put 10 men in 
orbit and brought them back. And we have accomplished the major 
part of the Gemini space objectives at this point in the program. 
The long duration, which was a major objective, some of us didn't 
really think you could go 8 or 14 days in that spacecraft . . . we 
have seen the men return in good shape with all their tasks 
done. . . . We have seen EVA this year in Gemini, and we have 
seen rendezvous. We have seen controlled reentry demonstrated, 
the controlled reentry technique that is so important to Apollo, and 
we have seen accomplished a whole raft of scientific experiments.96 
NASA faced the new year with an equal number of manned Cem- 
ini flights still to be flown, and it expected to do this with an unbroken 
chain of successes. Morale was high, as many program objectives had 
been stamped "Achieved." Postflight celebrations were carried across 
the seas when President Johnson asked Borman and Schirra to make 
an eight-nation, good-will tour of the Far East. Meanwhile, engineers 
at the Manned Spacecraft Center pre ared for a "Gemini Midprogram 
Conference," to discuss the results o k' the first seven Gemini missions, 
as they had done for the Mercury program in the Summary Confer- 
ence held in Houston in October 1963.97 
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Agena on Trial 
M ANNED space flight and NASA faced the new year of 1966 in an ambiguous position. High achievement had marked 1965, 
capped by the exciting and important '"76" mission at the very end of 
the year. But the key to more sophisticated missions, the Agena, was in 
serious technical trouble. Only with Agena could Gemini hope to real- 
ize a range of still-to-be-attained goals-docking, re-rendezvous, ren- 
dezvous with two separate targets during a single mission, and high- 
altitude flight-goals that would be indispensable to Apollo, the pro- 
gram to land men on the Moon. But many doubted that Agena could 
be ready in time to meet Gemini's tight launch schedules. Year's end 
saw Agena's career in manned space flight once again called into ques- 
tion-and this time a substitute target had already been approved for 
development. 
Agena, though most critical, was not the only problem. 
Extravehicular activity (canceled in the three previous missions) was 
supposedly ready to enter a more advanced stage. Unexpected devel- 
opment troubles demanded a last-minute effort (reminiscent of Gemini 
IV)  to qualify equi ment. Edward White had succeeded in his "space 
walk," but NASA f aced a tougher EVA task-testing the Air Force's 
Astronaut Maneuvering Unit (AMU), a far more complex personal 
propulsion system than White had used. Step-by-step progress having 
been skipped, the EVA set for Gemini VIII in mid-March had to 
bridge the gap. 
At the beginning of 1966, then, the Gemini program had met with 
success in seven straight missions, five with crews aboard. Not all its 
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goals had been attained, but many had. Now the Apollo program 
neared its operational stage. Might NASA halt Gemini to concentrate 
on Apollo? Administrator James Webb had used similar reasoning to 
conclude Project Mercury earlier than many desired. 
Although George Mueller, Associate Administrator for Manned 
Space Flight, knew of no move afoot to close down Gemini, he foresaw 
that many engineers in Houston might worry that they were nearly out 
of jobs. To assuage their misgivings, in December 1965 he made a case 
for flying all 12 Gemini missions. Even a cursory glance at the pro- 
gram's aims, Mueller said, showed healthy returns for nearly every 
item. While medical fears had been erased by the outcome of 14 days 
in space, NASA still needed to perfect techniques for rendezvous and 
extravehicular activities. Then, too, an experienced cadre of flight 
crews was essential, not only for flying missions but for astronaut and 
flight control training as well. LeRoy Day, Mueller's Deputy Director 
for Gemini, passed this reassurance on to Gemini Program Manager 
Charles Mathews in Houston.1 That potential morale threat allayed, 
the engineers could focus on such technical problems as making Agena 
work. 
Agena's woes were by now chronic. The Gemini Agena target ve- 
hicle (GATV) was pacing the program by mid-1965, prompting GPO 
to consider removing the first production model, GATV 5001, from 
its job as a test vehicle so it could be used in Gemini VIII.2 All such 
plans went up in smoke with the explosion of GATV 5002, which ig- 
nited the most demanding piece of engineering detective work in the 
entire Gemini program. Efforts to cure Agena's ailments spanned 
more than four months, much of it on a three-shifts-a-day, seven-days- 
a-week schedule.3 
An hour after the Agena failure of 25 October 1965, Mission 
Director William Schneider had left Houston for Florida, where Colo- 
nel John B. Hudson, SSD Deputy Commander for Launch Vehicles, 
had called a meeting of a subpanel of the Agena Flight Safety Review 
Board for the 26th." The subpanel members had learned enough 
from telemetry data to list the tasks to be done: find out why the 
Agena had failed and what the fixes would entail for design, perform- 
ance, and schedule; decide if it would be possible to use GATV 5001 
and how long it would take to get it ready for launch; and begin cut- 
ting red tape that might slow the work.4 
-- 
*Present at the meeting were Schneider, Jerome Hammack, Alfred Gardner, Scott Simp- 
kinson (GPO Manager of Test Operations), John A. Edwards (NASA Director of Gemini Flight 
Operations), Merritt Preston (KSC Director of Launch Operations), Ernst R. Letsch (Gemini 
Launch Systems Directorate, Aerospace Corporation), and Lieutenant Colonel L. E. Allen (Com- 
mander, SLV-3 Division, 6555th Aerospace Test Wing). 
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Lawrence A. Smith, Gemini Manager for Lockheed, had already 
sent the taped record of telemetry signals to the lant in Sunnyvale, P California, where W. R. Abbott took charge of the ailure-search team. 
Most likely causes of the disaster were a "hard-start" backfire or an 
electrical short; Abbott's group soon narrowed its search to the engine 
as the more probable source of trouble. After reporting to Major Gen- 
eral Ben Funk's full Agena Flight Safety Review Board, Hudson took 
his subpanel to Sunnyvale on 1 November; they agreed with Abbott's 
analysis that a hard start (similar to an automobile engine backfire) had 
been the cause and that it had resulted from fuel being injected into 
the firing chamber before oxidizer.5 
The problem was rooted in NASA's original specification for a 
Gemini target vehicle able to start and stop its main engine five times 
during a mission, in contrast to the Standard Agena's two-start engine. 
This 150 percent increase in demands on the engine at once raised the 
problem of fuel and oxidizer economy. In the two-start engine, the 
oxidizer began flowing first, while a pressure switch restricted fuel flow 
until a given amount of oxidizer had reached the firing chamber. This 
was known to enhance the engine's starting characteristics, but it was 
also wasteful. Oxidizer leaked through before engine firing, and some 
continued to flow after shutdown; the oxidizer would be gone long 
before the fuel ran out. So Lockheed accepted a proposal by the en- 
gine subcontractor, Bell Aerosystems Company, to remove the pres- 
sure switch and thus allow fuel to enter the chamber first.6 
Abbott concluded that in space the presence of fuel in the thrust 
chamber (perhaps in considerable quantity) had caused the engine to 
backfire when the oxidizer reached the chamber, causing an explosion. 
When Funk's review board met in Los An eles on 3 November to 
make tentative plans for an engine requali K cation program, Abbott 
presented his findings, which were discussed the next day.7 
But Abbott's and Hudson's groups were not the only ones working 
on the problem. At NASA Headquarters, Associate Administrator 
Robert Seamans told George Mueller to form a NASA review board to 
look into all aspects of the failure, both technical and managerial. 
Mueller appointed MSC Director Robert Gilruth co-chairman of a 
Gemini Agena Target Vehicle Review Board and asked Air Force 
Major General Osmond Ritland to serve with Gilruth." 8 
And down at Cape Kennedy, Lockheed's Wulfgang C. Noeggerath 
was working with MSC engineer Horace E. Whitacre to pinpoint the 
cause of the failure. Unsure that the two of them could explore the 
matter in the depth needed, Whitacre suggested that Lockheed spon- 
*Board members were Seymour Himmel (Lewis), George Detko (Marshall), Colonel William 
C. Nielsen (SSD), Colonel Quenten A. Riepe (6595th Aerospace Test Wing), Morton Goldman 
(Aerospace), John Bailey (MSC), and Robert H. Gray (KSC). 
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sor a symposium of rocket experts from around the nation. 
Noeggerath convinced his superiors that it was a good idea.9 
The two-day symposium began on 12 November, with 19 scientists 
and engineers in attendance.*lo Noeggerath and Whitacre told the vis- 
iting experts that the most likely cause of the Agena explosion had 
been a premature engine shutdown. Engine firing had produced se- 
vere oscillations and mechanical damage. Temperature decreases had 
indicated fuel spillage. When electrical circu~try failed, the engine 
stopped, but a valve that controlled tank pressure as fuel was being 
used remained open. As fuel stopped flowing, pressure built up in the 
tanks, which ruptured and destroyed the vehicle-a planned flight 
safety precaution. Whitacre and Noegerrath also reported that the 
engine had not been tested at simulated altitudes higher than 34 000 
meters, since no one believed that the environment above that level 
made any difference for engine firings. 
Although Abbott's backfire theory accounted for the oscillations 
that had tr~ggered the explosion, not everyone agreed that a single 
cause was enough to explain what happened. But the symposium 
could come up with nothing better. On 15 November, it recommend- 
ed to SSD that engines should be modified so oxidizer entered the 
chamber first and should be tested at simulated altitudes closer to 
where Agena would be working-above 76 000 meters.11 
Funk now formed a "super tiger" team of three senior engineers? 
to review everything that had been found about the explosion and to 
suggest some answers to the NASA review board. The three agreed 
with oxidizer starting and with firings at simulated altitudes above 
76 000 meters. They also wanted Bell Aerosystems to conduct ground 
ignition tests for data on engine-firing characteristics. The super tigers 
presented these recommendations at a meeting in Houston on 20 
November,v then to the Gilruth-Ritland review board, which approved 
them. Lockheed announced the formation of a Project Surefire Engine 
*Symposium attendees: S. M. King and D. D. Thomas (Aerospace), E. G. Haberman (Air 
Force Rocket Propulsion Laboratory), Charles E. Feiler (Lewis), Henry 0. Pohl and Whitacre 
(MSC), D. D. Evans and J. H. Rupe (Jet Propulsion Laboratory), F. D. Sullivan and D. M. Wyck- 
off (Aerojet-General Corporation), T. F. Reinhardt and Craig M. Schmidt (Bell Aerosystems), 
Jack R. Hahn and R. S. Levine (Rocketdyne Division, North American Aviation, Inc.), J. J. Kappl 
(The Marquardt Corporation), R. F. Sawyer (Princeton University), and J. L. Grubbs, Jerome 
Salzman, and Noeggerath (LMSC). 
?The super tiger team consisted of Bernard A. Hohman (Group Director, Gemini Launch 
Systems Directorate, Aerospace), Colonel John Hudson, and L. Eugene Root (president of Lock- 
heed Missiles & Space Company). 
?+Mathews presided at the meeting, which included Gardner, Smith, Letsch, Schneider, Bai- 
ley, Hammack, Colonel Jean A. Jack (Deputy Chief of Staff, Test, Arnold), W. von Lunkhuysen 
and Frederick A. Boorady (Bell Aerosystems), L. T. Barnes (ARO, Inc., Arnold contractor), 
George Low (Deputy Director, MSC), Joseph F. Shea (Apollo Program Manager, MSC), Willis 
Mitchell (Vehicle and Missions Manager, GPO), and Richard K. McSheehy (MSC Special Assistant 
for Apollo Support, Propulsion and Power Division). 
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Development Task force to carry out the program. This did not end 
the analysis of the trouble. Reports and recommendations from other 
NASA centers continued to come to Gilruth until 9 March 1966, one 
week before the Gemini VIII flight. 12 
While Agena's sponsors labored to nurse it back to health in time 
for the Gemini VIII mission, McDonnell engineers had been thinking 
of other ways to achieve rendezvous and docking. During launch prep- 
arations for the Gemini VII/VI-A mission, McDonnell's Gemini Pro- 
gram Technical Director, John Yardley, invited several NASA officials 
to his motel room in Cocoa Beach, Florida. He outlined a plan for 
making a poor man's target by bolting a target docking adapter to the 
rendezvous and recovery section of a spacecraft and fitting it to the 
Atlas booster. An enthusiastic Mueller told Mathews to prepare a de- 
fense of the concept for Seamans, who would have to approve it. To 
avoid any hint that a new development program was in the offing, they 
decided to call it simply an "ATDA," for augmented target docking 
adapter, which accurately reflected its status as a rearrangement of al- 
ready developed and qualified hardware.13 
An immediate question was whether the Atlas launch vehicle could 
handle the proposed ATDA; it was much lighter in weight than the 
Agena but lacked an engine to boost it to orbit. A call to General Dy- 
namics in San Diego posed the weight question (without disclosing the 
as yet unapproved plan) and received an encouraging response.14 
By 5 December 1965, Mathews had the case for the alternate ve- 
hicle ready. While Day filled in Seamans' staff, Mueller described the 
plans to the Associate Administrator himself, who approved it. Four 
days later a statement of work for the ATDA was ready and Mc- 
Donne11 began building the substitute Gemini target.15 This target- 
adapter became something of a sword of Damocles over Lockheed, a 
weapon that GPO was willing to use at more than one level. Jerome 
Hammack spurred Lockheed's efforts by sending Smith a picture of 
the alternate vehicle (often called the "glob"), and Mathews asked 
Flight Crew Operations for an alternative flight plan, eliminating all 
Agena maneuvers from Gemini VIII.16 
Project Surefire was already running into trouble. The crucial 
simulated high-altitude tests of the modified engine could only be run 
at the Air Force's Arnold Engineering Development Center in Tennes- 
see, but it was booked solid. Time was running out for Gemini VIII, 
scheduled for mid-March 1966. John Hudson flew to Vandenberg Air 
Force Base, where he persuaded General Bernard Schriever, Air Force 
Systems Commander, to sign a letter moving Agena to the head of the 
line at Arnold.17 
Competitors for the role of  target ve- 
hicle for Gemini's first docking mis- 
sion: above, Agena 5003 at the Lock- 
heed plant at Sunnyvale; right, mock- 
up of McDonnellS ATDA with mock- 
up of  the Gemini spacecraft. 
The Agena test program also got a priority from NASA, when 
Mueller decided that Apollo lunar module engine tests at Arnold could 
be slipped. On 17 December, after Bell had completed the Project 
Surefire modifications, the Air Force accepted the main engine for 
GATV-5003. Bell had already begun the series of 48 sea-level firings 
that the super tiger team had recommended.18 
Setting up the test program, however, was only part of the prob- 
lem. Another source of delay loomed in Mueller's demand that 
GATV-5003, which had arrived at the Cape on 18 January, undergo a 
static firing before it was committed to Gemini VIII. A worried Agena 
team, fearful that this demand would so delay their efforts that the 
outcome of the Arnold tests would be meaningless, met late into the 
night of 4 February 1966, the eve of another meeting of the Flight 
Safety Review Board, to discuss means of getting Mueller to postpone 
his decision. 
The next day, Lockheed's Smith and Aerospace's Hohmann told 
Mueller that a static firing at this point was just not worth the delay it 
would entail. Mueller quizzed them closely and asked for a written 
report on the pros and cons of static firing as well as on everything 
that had been done to ensure that Agena would not fail again. The 
pressure was still on, but Mueller had at least not closed the door on 
Agena-it still had a chance to compete with the ATDA for Gemini 
VIII.19 February 14 became the deadline for making the choice, while 
GPO kept working on both the ATDA and Agena. 
Late in January, GPO engineers went to St. Louis to conduct a 
design review of the ATDA, and Gemini procurement received word 
to put through the final papers for its urchase.20 ATDA develo ment 
was quick because its parts had alrea d!' y qualified for space flig f t and 
good luck held its cost down. A spacecraft rendezvous and recovery 
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system fished from the sea for postflight examination after the Gemini 
VI-A mission could be used in building the ATDA. McDonnell put it 
together by 1 February, and NASA conducted the acceptance review 
the next day.21 The stand-in was ready to assume the starring role. 
Agena was clearly trailing its rival, but its sponsors hoped to re- 
gain lost ground when the second act of the test program began at 
Arnold on 7 February.22 Meanwhile, Hohmann and Smith had sent 
their written reports on static firing to. Mueller. In Hohmann's view, 
static firing was mainly useful for training launch crews, not for prov- 
ing rockets. He pointed out that Mercury-Atlas 1 had failed at launch, 
even though it had been static fired, and that static firing would not 
have disclosed CATV 5002's problems. Smith stressed the penalties in 
money and time.23 A quick poll of opinion from NASA Headquarters 
and the manned space flight centers supported the Hohmann-Smith 
viewpoint,24 and Mueller dropped the notion of static-firing the 
Agena. 
That was a plus for Agena's pros ects, but the test program at P Arnold produced less happy results. A ter the first six tests, problems 
with mismatched hardware had already compelled GPO to direct 
McDonnell to speed up its ATDA testing.25 The seventh test, on 12 
February 1966, was nearly fatal. Fuel lines contaminated by alcohol 
and water caused a hard start that badly damaged the engine. Fortu- 
natety , Bell had just about finished its series of sea-level tests and coul send that engine to replace the damaged one. As Agena's time 
seemed to be running out, its proponents literally worked around the 
clock, juggling, cajoling, scheming, begging, and snarling when neces- 
sary, to reach what had begun to seem an impossible goal. More than 
once, Day and Mathews pleaded with Mueller to keep the Agena. Fin- 
ally he gave them one week to return the vehicle to good health in 
time for the review board meetings to be held in Washington 6 and 7 
March. Day later recalled his feeling, all during Project Surefire, that 
Mueller was just putting pressure on MSC and Lockheed and never 
really intended to cancel the Agena. Mueller did object to the cost of 
the modifications. He was not willing to brook what appeared to be a 
$15 million overrun and so was studying proposals to cut Agena out of 
the program, using the ATDA or two spacecraft for rendezvousr26 
On 1 March, the new test series began at Arnold. By the end of 
the fourth day, 22 firings at simulated altitudes of from 83 800 to 
114 300 meters had proved the success of the modifications. Meeting 
as planned, the Design Certification and Air Force Flight Safety Re- 
view Boards ap roved the modified Agena for flight.27 The Agena 
had been requ af  ified just in time to fly on Gemini VIII, for its rival, 
too, was ready, having also completed its test program on 4 March. 
Now the ATDA went into storage at Cape Kennedy, to be called out if 
the Agena again faltered3 
O N  T H E  S H O U L D E R S  O F  T I T A N S  
While one group in the manned space flight program struggled 
to restore the Agena, another faced qualification problems, on a small- 
er scale, with extravehicular flight equipment. White's spectacular ven- 
ture into space during Gemini IV was backed by a comparatively sim- 
ple technology. That first step into space had merely required an as- 
tronaut to leave the cabin and see what he could do. White did it in 
grand style, making up his flight plan as he went along. His successor 
would not be so free as he attempted such specific tasks as retrieving 
experiment packages. So easy a first venture misled planners into 
thinking that EVA would present few, if any, problems. No one really 
worried when space walks were deleted from the missions between 
Gemini IV  and VIII, even though the Astronaut Maneuvering Unit 
was still scheduled for Gemini IX. 
The Air Force, however, was disconcerted. Colonel Daniel McKee, 
head of the Air Force Systems Command Field Office at MSG, com- 
plained about being kept in the dark about the plans for White's exer- 
cise. His office should have been involved in the orderly planning that 
was to lead to the use of the AMU, since at about $12 million that was 
the single most expensive Defense experiment to be carried on Gemi- 
ni. The AMU was designed to make an extravehicular astronaut inde- 
pendent of spacecraft systems. A boxlike backpack with sidearm con- 
trollers, it consisted mainly of three beams and supporting shelves on 
which such parts as tanks to store the hydrogen-peroxide propulsion 
system and the life-support oxygen supply were mounted. Because the 
spacecraft was so small, the AMU was housed back in the adapter sec- 
tion. The astronaut would go out the hatch tied to a tether, make his 
way to the rear of the spacecraft, and strap himself into the AMU. 
This special propulsion system weighed about 76 kilograms (168 
pounds), which was no burden at all in the weightlessness of space.29 
On 20 September 1965, NASA had named the crew for Gemini 
VIII. Neil Armstrong, a civilian test pilot with long experience in the 
X-15 rocket research aircraft program, was the command pilot, as he 
had been in the backup crew for Gemini V. His fellow crewman, David 
Scott, was new to the Gemini program. For the backup crew for Gemi- 
ni VIII, Navy Lieutenant Commanders Charles Conrad and Richard 
F. Gordon, Jr., the pattern was similar. Conrad had been pilot on 
Gemini V, and Gordon was newly assigned to Gemini.30 
Some three weeks before the crew was announced, McDonnell 
held a briefing on the extravehicular gear Gemini VIII would carry. It 
comprised two major units: an Extravehicular Life Support System, 
called the ELSS by the engineers who worked on it, and an Extravehi- 
cular Support Package, known as the ESP or, more commonly, the 
backpack. The life support system was a chestpack designed to do just 
that-feed vital oxygen to the spaceborne astronaut from the space- 
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craft's supply, from a primary source in the backpack, and from its 
own emergency supply. The backpack did more. Designed like the 
AMU to fit into the spacecraft adapter section, it carried, aside from 
its own oxygen supply, a radio and 8 kilograms (18 pounds) of propel- 
lant for a zip-gun maneuvering unit. The backpack was connected to 
the spacecraft systems by an 8-meter oxygen-hose tether. Once the as- 
tronaut had switched over from the spacecraft to the backpack oxygen 
supply, he could add a lightweight 23-meter tether to the shorter hose 
and, theoretically at least, maneuver as far as 30 meters from the 
spacecraft.31 Armstrong attended the St. Louis meeting and asked for 
he1 in the training program. The crews would need a realistic space- 
cra i' t adapter with which to practice donning the backpack. Armstrong 
also wanted the pilot to leave the spacecraft in the altitude chamber 
and test the combined backpack-chestpack.32 
As soon as he was assigned to the mission, Scott began concentrat- 
ing on the extravehicular exercise, eventually going through over 300 
airplane zero g parabolas and more than 20 hours on an air-bearing 
table. The astronauts practiced EVA maneuvers, supported by an air 
cushion of 0.0254 millimeter (0.001 inch), on a table roughly 6 by 7 
meters. They used a zip gun to move from one place to another, 
which gave them some idea of what it would be like to start and stop 
in space. This strenuous training raised some questions.33 
Scott's zip gun had about 15 times more ropellant than White's 
and used Freon instead of oxygen as fuel, Zrther multiplying the 
gun's total impulse, since Freon has a density about three times greater 
than oxygen. How oxygen acted in vacuum was fairly well known, but 
Scott worried about how Freon would behave. One problem soon 
showed up: at low temperatures, the Freon caused the zip gun's pop- 
pet valve to stick open when triggered, and the escaping gas 
threatened to tumble the astronaut in space. New seals solved the 
problem and two new shutoff valves added a safety factor.34 
By December, Scott and Armstrong were voicing a number of 
doubts about the equipment, ranging from nitpicks to serious com- 
plaints. One that fell into the latter class was the threat of an oxygen 
ejector in the chestpack freezing and blocking the flow of oxygen from 
both the spacecraft and the emergency supply in the chestpack. The 
life support system had been icing up during tests. Although test con- 
ditions were more severe than Scott would meet in space, he could 
hardly be expected to ignore the warning. The designers obliged by 
installing 20-watt heaters near the ejector.35 
Another problem was the tangle of umbilicals, tethers, and jumper 
cables that made donning the chestpack inside the spacecraft so diffi- 
cult. During early tests, Scott found his movements restricted and his 
vision nearly blocked by his pressure suit while he was tryin to con- 
nect everything. Late in December 1965, however, Scott satis ! ed him- 
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self that he could strap on the unit, hook it up, and open the hatch in 
the McDonnell altitude chamber at a simulated 46 000 meters. Scott 
went through a full-dress rehearsal in the last few weeks before flight, 
in the MSC 6-meter vacuum chamber, putting on the chestpack inside 
the spacecraft, going outside, and then donnlng the backpack housed 
in the adapter.36 
Technical problems in qualifying the Agena and the extravehicu- 
lar equipment commanded center stage in Gemini VIII preparations, 
adding to the already heavy burdens of planning the mission. Project 
Gemini was entering a more advanced phase, as both spacecraft and 
target faced missions of growing complexity that would test their capa- 
bilities to the limit. Program leaders had to balance their concern for 
reaching the program goals against the dangers of trying too much too 
soon. A persistent problem such as the Agena presented could not 
but raise doubts and cause second thoughts about going forward with 
some as yet untried operation. Even under the best of circumstances, 
trying to foresee and counter everything that might go wrong with 
four major dynamic systems-spacecraft, booster, Atlas, and Agena- 
made mission planning an arduous task. With major technical difficul- 
ties further clouding the issue for Gemini VIII, plans changed quickly 
and often. 
In the summer of 1965, MSCYs Mission Planning and Analysis Di- 
vision had started tailoring a plan for Gemini VIII, the first results of 
which were discussed on 26 and 27 August. Among the alternative 
modes of rendezvous being considered was a rendezvous sooner than 
the fourth revolution of the spacecraft-the "standard" rendezvous 
that had been scheduled for Gemini VI. Despite doubts that the flight 
control team could support any rendezvous earlier than that, the 
scheme called "M equals 2" (rendezvous in the second revolution) 
being studied by the mission planners was worth thinking about. 
Another subject was a proposed phantom rendezvous with an imagi- 
nary target, requiring a thrust from the Agena's main engine of at 
least 150 meters (500 feet) per second, to take place shortly after the 
first sleep period. The pilot would then exit the spacecraft for more 
than two hours of extravehicular activity-that is, floating freely 
around the world! After that, the spacecraft would undock and with- 
draw from the Agena, to return later for a second rendezvous. Finally, 
Gemini VIII's Agena would be left in orbit as a passive target for 
Gemini IX. 
No sooner had the Gemini VIII plan been committed to paper 
than caution flags were raised. One issue was an old one that the ear- 
lier crews had fought-sleeping alternately. Lockheed recommended 
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that one astronaut remain awake whenever the spacecraft and Agena 
were docked. Mathews consulted with Whitacre, then denied the request 
on the ground that sleep at this time (after launch, rendezvous, and 
docking, and before EVA) was necessary for both men. Besides, Whit- 
acre's analysis showed that the tracking network could cope with al- 
most anything that might go wrong. Another question was time. Fuel 
cell development problems had imposed a limit of two days on rendez- 
vous flights. Could so elaborate a plan be carried out in such a short 
time? Maybe the time could be expanded. Since the fuel cell's troubles 
seemed headed toward resolution, McDonnell was asked to see if later 
rendezvous missions could be extended to three days.37 
Meetings continued throughout the fall of 1965, as spokesmen for 
NASA Headquarters, McDonnell, and MSC began to stress re-rendez- 
vous, which they thought might be good training for Apollo. 
Discussions on firing the two Agena propulsion systems remained in- 
conclusive, as did talk about flying for three days. When a McDonnell 
study indicated that the fuel cells could support a '72-hour flight, if all 
supplies were carefully husbanded, that question appeared to be set- 
tled.38 Firing the Agena main engine while docked with the spacecraft, 
however, was finally rejected for the same reason that it had been on 
Gemini VI-it was not yet deemed safe enough. That meant the phan- 
tom rendezvous was 0ut.39 
Toward the end of February 1966, with problems seemingly well 
in hand, a "final" version of the flight plan appeared. Like the Gemini 
VII plan, this was more an outline than a precise schedule of events. 
Crew and flight controllers had a range of options to deal flexibly with 
circumstances as they arose in the course of the mission.40 
Operations planning was being paralleled by experiments plan- 
ning. By November 1965, the Manned Space Flight Experiments 
Board at NASA Headquarters had approved eight tasks for Gemini 
VIII. Eventually, ten experiments were approved for the mission," 
three of them requiring extravehicular activity. Of these, two were sci- 
entifically oriented-S-9, Nuclear Emulsion, to expose an experimental 
package to radioactivity in space (especially in the South Atlantic 
Anomaly), and S-10, Agena Micrometeorite Collection, to study the 
micrometeorite content of the upper atmosphere. In the third, pro- 
osed by the Department of Defense, Scott would use a power wrench 
For weightless work. He would go to the adapter area, pull out a box 
containing a torqueless motor-driven wrench, use the tool to take five 
nuts off a special plate, and then rebolt the plate to the box. This sim- 
ple task-with and without knee tethers-would be .compared with 
doing the same thing on the ground to show the differences in work- 
*See Appendix D. 
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ing in one gravity and in weightlessness. Scott and George C. Franklin 
of the Flight Crew Support Division decided to augment this experi- 
ment by adapting a cheap standard socket wrench to fit the nuts and 
the pressurized glove. They believed that comparing the muscle-pow- 
ered and the electrically-operated tools would say something useful 
about energy usage in space.41 
Mission plans and flight schedules were inseparable, and Apollo 
again began to intrude. Apollo mission 201 was planned for Feb- 
ruary 1966; if there were any delays, it would slip into March. The 
problem was not with launch pads nor, in most cases, with people. A 
tracking ship, the Rose Knot Victor, was the source of conflict. For 
Apollo 201, a suborbital flight, the ship would be sailing the Atlantic 
Ocean. But its station for Gemini VIII was in the Pacific. Mueller 
ruled that the Gemini flight had priority; but Apollo 201 flew as sched- 
uled on 26 February, giving the slow-moving Rose Knot time enough 
to keep its date with Gemini VIII.42 
Flight Control also shifted for Gemini VIII. Christropher Kraft, 
who had directed flights for Mercury and all Gemini missions through 
VII/VI-A, had to leave Gemini to begin planning for lunar landing 
missions as Apollo neared operational status, although he expected to 
keep an eye out for Gemini lessons that might be of use to Apollo. 
Kraft's move left Gemini Mission Control short of experienced flight 
directors. His successor, John Hodge, who headed the Flight Control 
Division, divided flight direction into 12-hour shifts with Eugene Kranz, 
Chief of the Flight Control Operations Branch. Clifford E. Charles- 
worth, flight dynamics officer on past Gemini missions, began training 
as a flight director.* 43 
In the two weeks before the scheduled launch, equipment prob- 
lems remained a threat. The extravehicular gear, in particular, was still 
in trouble, with lines icing and valves cracking. Then, at Cape Kenne- 
dy, the spacecraft environmental control system began acting up; and, 
over on pad 14, Atlas fueling ran into some difficulties. These last two 
problems did cause a day's delay, from 15 to 16 March. Then every- 
thing was ready to g0.44 
On 16 March 1966, five months after Walter Schirra and Thomas 
Stafford had been left at the starting gate in NASA's first attempt to 
launch two vehicles toward rendezvous on the same day, NASA tried 
again. This time nothing marred the countdown of the Atlas-Agena or 
the Gemini space vehicle.45 
*See Appendix F for Mission Control Center position descriptions and responsibilities. 
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The target launch vehicle lifted from pad 14 at 10 o'clock in the 
morning. Its trajectory was at first low and to the right (south) of the 
intended flight path. The sustainer engine rammed the target back on 
track. In a little more than five minutes, the Atlas had done its job. 
Now it was Agena's turn. After a short coast, its secondary propulsion 
system burst into life. The crucial test for the Agena came with the 
firing of its main engine, and the engineers crossed their fingers and 
held their breaths. But it worked. The engine ignited and carried the 
target into a 298-kilometer circular orbit.46 Planners had wondered if 
the Agena could so position itself that astronauts could catch it. The 
answer was yes! 
With one up and one to go, attention turned to pad 19. Fourteen 
minutes before the Atlas-Agena lifted, Armstrong and Scott slid 
through the spacecraft hatches into their couches. As the flight-prepa- 
ration crew helped harness Scott to his parachute, they found one of 
its catches full of glue. Backup command pilot Conrad and McDonnell 
pad leader Guenter Wendt began digging it out. Just a little thing like 
that, Scott thought, "might have cost us a launch," but he could not 
help smiling as he watched Conrad sweat over the job. The catch came 
unglued and Gordon, the backup pilot, tried the fitting a few times to 
prove to Scott that it was working. Learning of the Agena's nearly per- 
fect orbit, Armstrong said, "Beautiful, we will take that one."47 
Given the Agena's orbital parameters, the Gemini launch vehicle 
should lift off at 10:40:59 a.m. The powerful engines of Titan I1 
throbbed into life exactly on time, and Armstrong and Scott felt the 
hold-down bolts shear for breakaway. GLV-8 started off a little low, as 
had Atlas, but soon straightened to boost the 3'788-kilogram (8351- 
pound) spacecraft into an elliptical orbit 160 by 2'72 kilometers.48 
After the first hurdle had been vaulted, the next challenge was 
catching the target. Procedures were much the same as those for Gem- 
ini VI-A, although this time there was no friendly target to point its 
attached transponder toward the spacecraft's radar. Armstrong and 
Scott began the chase 1963 kilometers behind the Agena. 
Thirty-four minutes into the flight, the Sun set and, in the engulf- 
ing darkness, the crew could see brilliant fires streaming from their 
spacecraft's thrusters. As the radiator in the adapter expelled water, 
the thrusters fired to compensate for a sideward turn. The Carnarvon, 
Australia, tracking station told them the radiator was not much of a 
problem and passed to them the Flight Director's "go" for a day's 
flight.49 
Over the Pacific, the two astronauts had some time to sightsee. 
Molokai, Maui, and Hawaii hove clearly into view. Armstrong tried to 
see Kauai and Oahu, but cloud banks obscured them. Minutes later, 
Scott said to his partner, "We're going over Baja California now. Can 
you see it?" But Armstrong had his eyes on the Los Angeles ship basin 
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in the other direction, and his response was, "Oh, look at all those 
ships!" Armstrong then spotted the Rogers Dry Lake bed. He looked 
for, but was not certain he found, Edwards Air Force Base, where he 
had spent seven years piloting experimental airplanes. Over Texas, 
both men wanted to see if they could spot the~r  homes, but work 
preempted this scenic interlude. At the low oint of their first circuit 
of Earth, Armstrong aligned the inertial plat ! orm for a height adjust- 
ment maneuver. At 1:34 hours elapsed time, he touched off a five-sec- 
ond burst of the thrusters for a small retrograde change in velocity, to 
lower the apogee slightly. Armstrong noticed a problem in cutting off 
residual thrust. This resulted in varying computer readings and made 
it difficult to tell the exact deceleration obtained.50 
On their mission, Schirra and Stafford had been so preoccu ied P that they had not taken time to eat, which left them hungry, as we 1 as 
tired, when they caught up to Borman and Lovell. Scott and Arm- 
strong knew they would be very busy all three days of their mission, so 
each grabbed a package of food and started preparing a meal, which 
seemed to take longer than they thought it would. When they had to 
stop and align the platform for a maneuver to raise the perigee, they 
placed the food packages against the spacecraft ceiling. Weightlessness 
was handy.51 
Nearing second apogee (2:18:25 hours), Armstrong fired the 
thrusters to add 15 meters per second to their speed. Again, tail-off 
residuals made it hard to get a computer reading.52 After this maneu- 
ver, Armstrong and Scott pulled their food from the ceiling. Although 
Armstrong's chicken and gravy casserole had been mixed with water 
for half an hour, it was still dry in spots and not much like home cook- 
ing. But he finished it and washed it down with fruit juice to keep 
from dehydrating. Then he tried a package of brownies, which were 
stuck together and crumbly. They were hard to eat without scattering 
weightless scraps all over the cabin.53 
The next maneuver was designed to push the spacecraft into the 
target's orbital plane. Armstrong yawed Gemini VIIrs nose 90 degrees 
south of the flight path. Over the Pacific Ocean, 25 minutes before 
completing the second revolution (2:45:50 hours), the command pilot 
punched the aft thrusters to produce a horizontal velocity change of 8 
meters per second. He waited for the ground controllers to tell him if 
any adjustment was needed. Hearing nothing, he assumed his thrust- 
ing had been correct. Over the Guaymas, Mexico, tracking station, 
Lovell, the Houston CapCom, suddenly cut in on the remote site line 
to order him to add 0.6 meter per second to his speed. With only a 
minute to get ready, there was little time to turn the spacecraft and no 
time to align the platform. "It was . . . a pretty quick loose burn . . . 
without much preparation," Scott said.54 
Armstrong and Scott then began the rendezvous radar test. They 
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did not expect to get radar contact as quickly as Schirra and Stafford 
had, but the Westinghouse development team had promised target 
acquistion at 343 kilometers. The radar locked on solidly at 332 kilo- 
meters, which was good enough.55 
Over the Tananarive tracking station, 3:48: 10 hours after launch, 
Armstrong nosed the spacecraft down 20 degrees and applied the aft 
thrusters for an in-plane (with the target) velocity change of 18 meters 
per second. This ave them a nearly circular orbit close to 28 kilome- 
ters below that o f the target. The spacecraft was now in position to 
start the terminal phase of rendezvous.56 
The crew sighted a shining object 140 kilometers ahead, which 
must be the Agena. After closing to a range of 102 kilometers, all 
doubts were erased-the target gleamed in the sunlight. Scott switched 
the computer from the catchup to the rendezvous mode and watched 
the distance dwindle on the slide, automatically. Just before sunset, the 
Agena suddenly disappeared, but at twilight its acquisition lights 
blinked into view.57 
When the Agena was at the proper angle (10 degrees) above 
them, Armstrong aligned the inertial platform for the translation 
maneuver. Then he pitched Gemini VIII's nose up 31.3 degrees and 
canted the vehicle 16.8 degrees to the left. At 5:14:56 hours, ground 
elapsed time, the command pilot fired his aft thrusters, later making 
two small corrections. High over the Coastal Sentry Quebec tracking 
ship, stationed near Antigua Island, at 5:43:09 hours, he braked the 
spacecraft. Since he could see the Agena, Armstrong judged his brak- 
ing action by eye as Scott called out radar range and range rate. At a 
distance of 46 meters, relative velocity between the two vehicles had 
been canceled. The second rendezvous in the Gemini program had 
been achieved.58 
For 36 minutes after rendezvous, Armstrong's delicate maneuver- 
ing kept his spacecraft on station with the target vehicle. As the com- 
mand pilot drove, Scott inspected the A ena--checking antennas, 
docking lights, and the like. Finding it harf to see all of the target's 
instrument panel displays near the dockin cone, he used the telescop- H ic sight of a hand-held sextant. But a rea ly good look would have to 
wait until they were docked, when these instruments would become a 
second dashboard. Meanwhile, Armstrong studied the general appear- 
ance of the Agena. It seemed stable, and he nudged the spacecraft to 
within a meter (about three feet) of the target. Then, at 6:32:42, Keith 
K. Kundel, CapCom on the Rose Knot Victor, radioed, "Go ahead and 
dock."59 
Armstrong eased Gemini VIII toward the target at a barely per- 
ceptible rate of 8 centimeters (3 inches) per second. "About two feet 
[60 centimeters] out," he told the Rose Knot Victor. In a matter of 
seconds, Armstrong gleefully reported, "Flight, we are docked! It's 
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. . .really a smoothie-no noticeable oscillations at all." For a moment, 
the flight controllers in Houston could not realize that they had really 
done it. Then pandemonium broke loose, with back slaps, hand 
shakes, cheers, and tremendous grins.60 
Because there had been some difficulty in verifying the Agena's 
uplinked* stored program commands for the planned docked yaw 
maneuver and in loading the target's velocity meter, the flight control- 
lers suspected that Agena's attitude control system might be misbehav- 
ing. Iln fact, Eovell, on the remote link through Tanarive just before 
the spacecraft passed out of communications range, told the crew, "If 
you run into trouble and the attitude control system in the Agena goes 
wild, just . . .turn it off and take control with the spacecraft." With 
this warning ringing in their ears, Armstrong and Scott began their 
docked chores.61 
The Agena was designed to obey orders from the spacecraft, as 
well as from ground control. Scott commanded the target's attitude 
control system to turn the vehicle combination 90 degrees to the right. 
It took five seconds less than the full minute expected. Scott next 
dialed an order to start the Agena's tape recorder and looked over 
toward Armstrong. As he did, his gaze skimmed the control panel in 
the spacecraft. Something had to be wrong-Gemini VIII should be in 
level flight, but the "ball" indicator showed a 30-degree roll. He knew 
there was no use checking the horizon out the window, as they were 
passing through Earth's shadow. There would be no help from the 
ground tracking stations either; they were still out of communications 
range.62 
"Neil, we're in a bank," Scott said. He thought perhaps his space- 
craft attitude ball had tumbled, but Armstrong's indicator showed an 
identical mark. The command pilot managed, with bursts from the 
OAMS, to stop the motion temporarily, but it soon started again. 
Their immediate reaction was to blame the Agena. As soon as the ve- 
hicles were steady enough, Scott commanded the target to turn off its 
attitude control system, as the communicator had instructed. For four 
minutes, the two craft steadied and straightened up; the trouble 
seemed to be over. Armstrong started maneuvering to get the docked 
vehicles into the correct horizontal position; suddenly they began to roll 
again, faster and faster. "What's the problem now?" the p~lots won- 
dered. They were supposed to do a small test to find out what stress 
and strain the linkage between the two vehicles could tolerate. That 
issue was now academic; the immediate question was whether it could 
stand up under these wild gyrations. 
*"Uplink" was a term used by flight controllers to denote information telemetered from the 
tracking network to the spacecraft and Agena. "Downlink" meant the opposite-from space to 
the ground. 
Station-keeping: 14 meters. 
Docking with Agena. 
Gem;ni VIII 
16 March 1966 
Mission review meeting at Cape 
Kennedy prior to Gemini V I I I :  left 
to right, Charles Mathews, Gemini 
program manager at Houston; Da- 
vid Scott, Gemini VlII pilot; and 
William Schneider, Gemini mission 
director, NASA Headquarters. 
Rendezvous: 65 meters. 
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While Armstrong struggled with the controls, Scott photographed 
the interaction between the two vehicles out of his spacecraft window. 
The command pilot soon reported that the OAMS propellant had 
dropped to 30 percent, a*strong clue that a s acecraft thruster might 
be causing the trouble. While Armstrong foug \ t the controls, Scott cy- 
cled the target vehicle switches off and on and off a ain. Then Arm- 
strong jiggled the spacecraft switches as well, to see i ! he could isolate 
the problem. Nothing they did seemed to have any effect.63 
The crew realized that they would have to break away from the 
Agena to analyze the situation. Past simulation training gave them no 
clues to what was happening or how to handle it. Scott transferred 
control of the Agena to the ground stations (which had been locked 
out to prevent spurious signals), and Armstrong labored to steady the 
vehicles enough to divorce them. "Go," Armstrong said, and Scott hit 
the undocking button. Armstrong gave the thrusters a long hard burst, 
and the spacecraft pulled straight back.64 
Almost immediately, suspicion about a spacecraft control problem 
became an established fact as the spacecraft rolled even faster. "And 
then we really took off," Armstrong and Scott later reported. Gemini 
VIII soon came into acquisition range of the Coastal Sen try Quebec. 
James R. Fucci, CapCom aboard the ship, was concerned and per- 
plexed. He could not get a solid electronic lock-on, but a blinking light 
signal indicated that the craft had undocked. Unaware that the space- 
craft was rolling, so the antennas could not remain in position, he put 
in a call to the crew to try to find out about these strange signs he saw 
on his console. 
Fucci: Gemini VIII, CSQ Cap Com. Com check. How do you read? 
Scott: We have serious problems here . . . we're tumbling end over 
end up here. We're disengaged from the Agena. 
Fucci: Okay. We got your SPACECRAFT FREE indication here. . . . 
What seems to be the problem? 
Armstrong: We're rolling up and we can't turn anything off. 
Continuously increasing in a left roll. 
Fucci: Roger. [37 seconds later] Gemini VIII. CSQ. 
Armstrong: Stand by. 
Scott: We have a violent left roll here at the present time and we 
can't turn the RCS's off, and we can't fire it, and we certainly 
have a roll . . . stuck hand control.65 
After backing away from the Agena, the spacecraft had started to 
whirl at a dizzying rate of one revolution per second. Armstrong sus- 
pected that the maneuvering thrusters were about finished. He and 
Scott were also having trouble seeing the overhead panel dials; their 
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physiological limits seemed near. They were dizzy, and their vision was 
blurred. Something had to be done. "All that we've got left is the reen- 
try control system," Armstrong said. "Press on," Scott responded. The 
two men began to throw switches to cut out the OAMS and cut in the 
reentry control system. Armstrong tried his hand controller-nothing. 
Scott tried his-still nothing. They started switching circuitry again- 
maybe something had been set in the wrong position. 
The hand controllers responded! 
Armstrong steadied the motion and then turned off one ring of 
the reentry control system to conserve fuel. He then carefully reacti- 
vated the maneuver thrusters; now they were able to tell that No. 8 
had "failed on"-that is, it had stuck open!66 
Using the reentry control thrusters meant that the Gemini VIII 
mission would have to come to an end as soon as possible. That was a 
mission rule. True, the spacecraft was operating in a backup mode- 
but it was the prime mode for reentry. If these thrusters developed 
leaks, the crew would have absolutely no means of getting the space- 
craft into position for the critical retrofire that would return them to 
Earth. Attitude control before and after reentry was essential to reen- 
ter the atmosphere safely. Here was a case where the fail-safe maneu- 
vers that Headquarters had insisted on early in the program were 
impossible-there was virtually no maneuverability left in the orbital 
thrusters. Armstrong and Scott also remembered, wistfully, that Kraft, 
the flight controllers, and engineers had nursed other missions to 
completion. Could the same be done for them now? This was but a 
fleeting hope, as the Hawaiian tracking station communicator told 
them to get their spacecraft into position for reentry.67 
Gemini VIIrs problems were certainly the most frustrating of any 
Gemini had yet encountered. The flight control team's ability to re- 
spond to real problems on previous missions, keeping spacecraft flying 
to wring all useful data from failures as well as successes, had bolstered 
confidence in the program and promoted "real-time" planning. But 
Gemini VIIrs failure had forced the astronauts to resort to a last-ditch 
mode for attitude control before the ground crews had a chance to 
provide the options that might have allowed the flight to go on. 
John Hodge, in his first trial as chief flight director, now had only 
one choice left-which contingency recovery landing area would be 
best? If he waited much longer, it would take a full day (or 15 revolu- 
tions) for the crew to reach a splashdown point from which they could 
be quickly recovered. Since the orbital track had precessed westward, 
landing during the sixth or seventh orbits would have to take place in 
the Pacific Ocean. When the Landing and Recovery Division recom- 
mended a touchdown in the seventh circuit, Hodge agreed. 
Kranz had dropped by to listen to the spacecraft and target dock- 
ing. Since Hodge had been at the flight director's console for 11 hours, 
T h e  windowless Mission 
Control building in Houston 
(below, foreground) was the 
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planned an emergency reen- 
try for Gemini V I I I .  The 
real-time computer complex 
(left) spun o f f  millions of  
calculations to its control 
room (right). 
f roubled Gemini V// /  
and Mission Control 
Consoles (above) reported on the capabilities o f  the recovery 
force and on the weather; left, the recommendation: shift the 
landing from the Atlantic to the Western Pacific near Okinawa 
(William Schneider, John Hodge, Robert Thompson, Christo- 
pher Kraft); right, Kraft fields reporters' questions. 
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he and Kranz decided that the second shift should re ort for duty 
immediately, catch up on all information, and direct the Rnal phases of 
the mission. Had the flight continued for three days, reentry would 
have taken place on Kranz' shift, anyway, and he and his men had 
more practice in recovery procedures than Hodge and his group.68 
The engineers who had worked so hard on the Agena's problems 
found their situation just as exasperating as that of the flight control- 
lers. After the docking, Smith, Harold W. Nolan, and others from 
Lockheed had retired to nearby motel rooms to celebrate the momen- 
tous event. Very shortly, Smith called Nolan, saying, "We've got trou- 
ble!" Nolan switched on his television, only to hear newscasters report- 
ing that the Agena was at fault. Smith's motel room became the initial 
Lockheed failure-analysis command post, the first guess being that the 
target's attitude control system had failed. 
Many other engineers and program officials also heard about the 
spinning spacecraft while out of touch with minute-by-minute develop- 
ments. Mueller, for instance, had remained at Cape Kennedy only 
through launch and the early phases of the mission. Then he took off 
for Washington to attend the annual Robert H. Goddard Memorial 
Dinner, sponsored by the National Space Club. The pilot of the NASA 
aircraft heard what was happening over the plane's radio and in- 
formed Mueller. They returned to Florida, where Merritt Preston met 
Mueller's party with a motorcycle escort, the prelude to a hair-raising 
ride to the old Mercury Control Center in time for spacecraft retro- 
fire.69 
Most of NASA's leaders at Headquarters had, in fact, already 
headed for the Goddard dinner-the prestigious social event of the 
year for the space community. At the opening reception, De uty Ad- P ministrator Seamans* was called to the telephone to learn o Gemini 
VIITs plight. He immediately phoned Houston Flight Control and 
learned that the spacecraft spinning had been stopped. When he told 
the chairman of the dinner about the trouble, Seamans was asked to 
make a brief announcement: he said the flight would have to be abort- 
ed, but the crew seemed in no immediate danger. Vice President Hu- 
bert H. Humphrey, the principal speaker, asked to be told as soon as 
the crew had been successfully recovered. Before he had finished his 
address, Humphrey was able to inform his listeners that Armstrong 
and Scott had landed safely. Seamans vowed that never again would 
he be caught in a public position during the critical phase of any suc- 
ceeding flight. He needed privacy and better communications with the 
Control Center.70 
As a rule, McDonnell (the spacecraft contractor) sent several of its 
*On 21 December 1965, Seamans had been sworn in as Deputy Administrator of NASA, re- 
placing Hugh Dryden, who died on 2 December. 
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experts from the Cape to Houston after launch and first orbit to be 
available as troubleshooters. On 16 March 1966, a NASA Gulfstream 
left Florida for Texas with about 14 passengers, among them several 
high-ranking McDonnell engineers. Over New Orleans, the pilot cut in 
a commercial radio broadcast to the cabin. The announcer was talking 
about an imminent recovery in the Pacific. This was all the startled 
passengers heard, since the news announcement ended there. 
Something had obviously gone wrong, but what was it? There was 
nothing to do but wait until they got to Houston. 
Raymond Hill, McDonnell's Gemini manager at the Cape, recalled 
that his company's policy changed radically after "I . . . was caught with 
my pants down." In the future, senior McDonnell officials-Hill, Wal- 
ter Burke, John Yardley, and Robert Lindley-would not be in transit 
at the same time during a flight. Hill stayed at the Cape, Burke went 
to Houston for the first day of the flight and then back to St. Louis, 
and Yardley and Lindley went to Houston and stayed until the mission 
was over. McDonnell specialists, who had previously remained in St. 
Louis to handle test set-ups and to answer questions by telephone and 
teletype, were shifted, along with their subcontractor counterparts, to 
Houston to work directly with GPO systems engineers during the mis- 
sion.71 
Meanwhile, Navy recovery forces in the Pacific were swinging into 
action. A destroyer, the U.S.S. Leonard F. Mason, steamed at flank 
speed toward the expected landing point 800 kilometers east of Okina- 
wa and 1000 kilometers south of Yokosuka, Japan.72 
With Gemini VIII now flying over the southern latitudes, Kranz 
had only three tracking stations in position to keep in touch with the 
crew*-Coastal Sentry Quebec, Rose Knot Victor, and Hawaii.73 The 
spacecraft was in darkness over the Congo when Kranz's Houston 
flight controllers began the final countdown for retrofire. Through the 
remote stations, Scott reported, "Props OFF," and Armstrong said, 
"Hang in there." Seconds later, Scott said, "Okay. Four retros fired in 
AUTO RETROFIRE. . . ." 
Armstrong was worried that he and Scott might land in some 
remote wilderness where they would be hard to find. He later said he 
had been thinking of the steamship Andrea Doria, which had gone 
down in the Atlantic on 26 July 1956. Although the liner's radios were 
operating, it had taken the rescue vessels a day and a half to find the 
sinking shi;. He wanted Scott to doublecheck his every move-"I keep 
thinking t ere's something we've forgotten about," he said, "but I 
*Because the orbital track of a spacecraft during a day's flight ranges from 30 degrees north 
latitude to 30 degrees south, the maximum number of tracking stations were available during 
only 3 of the 15 revolutions in that 24-hour time period. 
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don't know what it is." Scott answered reassuringly, "We've done every- 
thing, as far as I know." Over China, Gemini VIlI slipped down into 
the fringes of the atmosphere.74 
Everything clicked off properly during descent. As they neared a 
landing, Armstrong asked his partner, "Do you [see] water out there?" 
Looking into the first faint light of dawn, Scott replied, "All I see is a 
haze." Then his voice quickened, "Oh, yes, there's water! It's water!" 
Less than two minutes later, Scott yelled, "LANDING-SAFE." The 
flight had lasted 10 hours 41 minutes 26 seconds.75 
The crew went quickly through the postlanding checklist, putting 
switches and valves in their correct positions. Then antennas were ex- 
tended so they could communicate with the recovery forces. "Naha 
RESCUE 1, Naha SEARCH 1," Scott called, but no answer came. 
They were not very worried, however, as Houston Flight Control had 
told them the rescue planes would get to them shortly and the Mason 
should reach them in three hours. This meant their landing had been 
very close to the contingency touchdown point.76 
Several aircraft, including two HC-54 Rescuemasters--one from 
Naha Air Base, Okinawa, and the other from Tachikawa Air Base, 
Japan-had raced to fetch the crew. The HC-54 from Naha got there 
first. Suddenly the pilot shouted, "I got it!" He had seen the space- 
craft, with its main parachute in full bloom, drifting to the ocean's sur- 
face. Three pararescuemen were equipped and ready to jump. 
Armstrong and Scott saw one of the three as he parachuted down. 
Because of the waves, the frogmen had trouble hooking the flotation 
collar to the spacecraft. The rough sea also made them queasy, a feel- 
ing shared by the astronauts. But the swimmers persisted and secured 
the collar within 45 minutes of spacecraft landing. Demonstrating ex- 
cellent cooperation with NASA and careful planning, the Department 
of Defense recovery forces had reacted to the emergency landing as 
though it were normal. Armstrong and Scott had few complaints about 
recovery in this remote area.77 
Three hours later, as promised, the Mason pulled alongside and 
fastened a line to the spacecraft. Climbing the Jacob's ladder in sea 
swells of 4 to 5 meters was hard, but they made it. On deck, the tired 
astronauts managed smiles and greetings for the welcoming sailors. Still 
feeling nauseated, the Gemini VI1.I crew headed immediately for sick 
bay. Medical personnel helped them strip off their pressure suits. 
Their undergarments were soaked with sweat. They were thirsty, but 
clinical examination showed minimal dehydration. The Mason reached 
Okinawa the next day, and the two astronauts flew on to Hawaii, then 
home.78 
Once the manned phase of the Gemini VIII mission was over, 
Hod e and Kranz turned back to the target vehicle. Because Scott had 
the f oresight to pass the control of the target back to the ground, 
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there was a chance to put the Agena through its paces and see how it 
reacted to commands. There was still hope that the Agena for Gemini 
VIII might be used as a passive target for Gemini IX or X. 
After the undocking, the Agena had stabilized quickly. In the 15th 
revolution over the Carnarvon station more than 21 hours after 
launch, Flight Control commanded the main engine to fire twice, to 
place the Agena in a circle 40'7 kilometers above Earth. The first burn 
produced its half of the goal, but the second did not. Instead Flight 
Control found the parameters were now 40'7 by 626 kilometers.79 
Melvin F. Brooks, the Agena systems monitor in Flight Control, 
immediately began conferring with the Lockheed engineers to figure 
out what had happened. They suspected that the vehicle's center of 
gravity had been miscalculated. How could they command the vehicle 
to offset this? On the next main engine burn, the center-of-gravity 
compensation attempt failed. Brooks and Lockheed engineers huddled 
again. What could be wrong now? They finally agreed that there also 
seemed to be trouble in the yaw hydraulics, allowing the engine to 
gimbal more than it should. The target's orbit now measured 21 1 by 
4'76 kilometers.80 
If this Agena were to become Gemini IX's or X's passive target, 
there were two major problems to contend with, and Flight Control 
had to decide what to do about them. There was definitely too much 
fuel aboard* and the orbit was still too high. Hodge and his controllers 
decided not to try any more plane-change maneuvers; they would 
simply try to get the vehicle to the altitude they wanted. The next fir- 
ing, a retrograde maneuver, convinced them that they had the hang of 
operating the vehicle. So Flight Control concentrated on reducing the 
fuel supply in both the primary and secondary tanks.81 
In all, ten maneuvers were made using the two propulsion sys- 
tems, sometimes with both firing at once. This was considerably more 
than the five starts required by the contract. The Agena's command 
and communications system had accepted a total of 5439 commands 
(45 from the Gemini VIII spacecraft). Lockheed's contract had only 
called for 1000.82 
Just before the Gemini VIII-Agena docking, Scott had commented 
that he "bet those Lockheed guys are just jumping up and down." 
And so they had been. Jubilation died quickly when the news came 
that the spacecraft was in trouble. Agena's solo maneuvers wiped away 
any suspicions of wrongdong on its part. Somebody else must shoulder 
*The Agena's electrical system would be dead before a return visit by a spacecraft; with no 
way to control the target, a load of fuel was a hazard during any rendezvous attempt. 
A G E N A  O N  T R I A L  
the blame for Gemini VIII1Ps early landing. Why had thruster No. 8 
failed in the open position? 
From its landing spot in the Pacific Ocean, the spacecraft had 
been hauled back to its place of birth-the McDonnell plant in St. 
Louis-so the engineers could analyze its problems. Set up in a con- 
trolled laboratory where the investigations could proceed unmolested, 
the spacecraft was checked over completely for more than a month. 
Only the most probable cause of the trouble could be identified. Scott 
Simpkinson's evaluation team decided that: 
The valves on thruster 8 opening unintentionally was probably 
caused by an electrical short, . . . there were several locations in the 
spacecraft at which the fault could have occurred. 
To prevent a recurrence of the thruster problem, McDonnell changed 
the attitude control circuit switch so that when it was in the "off 
tion no power could go to the thrusters. Formerly, turning of?: 
power to the electronics ackages did not stop power going to the 
thrusters. They could still Fi re.83 
Thus, the Gemini VIII mission ended on a dissonant chord-high 
success (the first space docking), undeniable failure (abbreviation of 
the mission), and much relief (safe recovery of the astronauts from a 
dangerous situation). The timing of the failure was especially frustrat- 
ing. Being out of communications left the flight controllers and engi- 
neers helpless. Time after time in later interviews they repeated: if 
that spacecraft had just been over a ground station, telemetry would 
have told them that thruster No. 8 was firing continuously; they could 
have told the crew what to do before the reentry control system was 
activated and it was too late. Although the Gemini team was chagrined 
that the crew had been forced to land early, the knowledge that dock- 
ing could be achieved with relative ease somewhat assuaged their an- 
guish. Moreover, the Agena solo had demonstrated the target vehicle 
could help fly more elegant missions. There would be no pause in the 
program.84 
Press on to Gemini IX! 
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XIV 
Charting New Space Lanes 
I N October 1965, Elliot See and Charles A. Bassett 11 learned that they would fly Gemini IX. Chief Astronaut Donald Slayton also told 
them that their backups would be Thomas Stafford and Eugene Cer- 
nan.1 Stafford was, at that time, copilot for Gemini VI. When that mis- 
sion failed to go and plans brewed for VI-A to rendezvous with VII, 
See, Bassett, and Cernan wondered whether Stafford could finish in 
time to get ready for IX. 
But they could not wait for him; the three men started training in 
November, sandwiching their simulations between those of other 
crews. They followed Spacecraft 9 through its building and testing, 
familiarized themselves with Gemini systems, and helped sha e a ten- P tative flight plan. Bassett and Cernan focused on extravehicu ar activi- 
ties because one of them would go outside the spacecraft and ride the 
Air Force's Astronaut Maneuvering Unit (AMU). 
The trio interrupted their routine early in December to work as 
communicators in the Houston Mission Control Center during the 
VII/VI-A mission. They then returned to flight training. Stafford, 
however, had to go through his postmission debriefing before he 
joined them in February 1966.2 
One bright winter morning, the last day of February 1966, the 
Gemini IX foursome checked into Ellington Air Force Base, Texas, for 
flight clearance to St. Louis in two dual-seat T-38 jet aircraft. They 
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planned to spend several days practicing on the rendezvous simulator 
at the McDonnell plant. 
At Ellington, the four fliers learned that weather in St. Louis was 
gloomy: 180-meter overcast, visiljility 3 kilometers, rain, and fog, with 
little change expected. Instrument flight rules would be required. See 
called the St. Louis air traffic controllers, saying he would see them 
in a couple of hours. He and Cernan discussed the different runways 
at Lambert Field in St. Louis. See then climbed into the front seat of 
one T-38, with Bassett easing into the back seat. Stafford and Cernan 
got into the other plane. They took off from Ellington at 7:35 a.m. See 
and Bassett led, with Stafford and Cernan flying wing position.3 
Reaching St. Louis just before 9 o'clock, See radioed the Lambert 
Field control tower and learned that the overcast had lifted to 240 
meters since his earlier call, but the visibility had dropped to 2.4 kilo- 
meters. Light snow flurries now mixed with the rain and fog. As the 
aircraft descended through the overcast, the pilots found themselves 
too far down the runway to land. See elected to keep the field in si ht 
and he circled to the left underneath the cloud cover. Stafford f ol- 
lowed a missed approach procedure and climbed straight ahead into 
the soup to 600 meters, intending to make another instrument ap- 
proach. He landed safely on his next attempt.4 
Meanwhile, See had continued his left turn. The aircraft angled 
toward McDonnell Building 101, where technicians were working on 
the very spacecraft See and Bassett were scheduled to fly. Apparently 
recognizing that his sink rate was too high, See cut in his afterburners 
and attempted a sharp right turn; but it was too late. The aircraft 
struck the roof of the building and crashed into a courtyard. Both pi- 
lots were killed.5 
NASA named a seven-man board to investigate the accident. Led 
by Astronaut Alan B. Shepard, Jr.,* the board looked into all aspects 
of the tragedy-aircraft maintenance, pilot experience, medical histo- 
ries, and weather conditions. Shepard's group listened to testimony 
from everyone who had anything to say, sifted the wreckage for clues, 
and drew conclusions. They found nothing wrong with the aircraft; it 
had functioned properly to the moment of impact. Within the past six 
months, See and Bassett had renewed their instrument flying certifi- 
cates. Before and during the flight, both men had been in good physi- 
cal and mentalcondition, as attested by medical examinations and by 
reported pre- and in-flight conversations. Furthermore, See was reput- 
ed to be an excellent test pilot. Careful, judicious, and technically 
competent, he should never have crashed at all. Weather appeared to 
have been the major contributing cause, and pilot error prompted by a 
desire not to lose sight of the field had carried them too low.6 
*The other members of the investigating team were Alan Bean, Joseph S. Algranti, Harold 
E. Ream, John M. Kanak, Dick M. Lucas, and John F. Zieglschmid. 
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On Wednesday, 2 March 1966, Spacecraft No. 9, on its way to the 
flight dock for shipment to Cape Kennedy, passed an American flag 
flying at half-mast at the McDonnell plant. The next day, Elliot See 
and Charles Bassett, attended by their fellow astronauts, were buried 
in Arlington National Cemetery across the Potomac from the Nation's 
capital.7 
NASA assigned the Gemini IX prime crew positions to Stafford 
and Cernan, marking the first time in the agency's manned space flight 
history that a backup crew had taken over a mission." On 21 March 
James Love11 and Edwin Aldrin were given the backup duties. There 
would be no delay in the launch schedule.8 
'THE WHAT AND HOW DEBATES 
Problems in getting ready for Gemini launches were causing fewer 
delays by the spring of 1966 than they had earlier. Vehicles were get- 
ting to Cape Kennedy for storage about a month before they were 
needed on the launch pad. The NASA-Air Force-industry launch 
teams had gained plenty of experience in reacting quickly to Gemini 
hardware problems. Merritt Preston, one of NASA's leaders at the 
Cape, said later, "Habitually we got in trouble on Gemini, but it never 
got to us because we could always fix it."9 Spacecraft 8's thruster fail- 
ure turned out to be a blessing in disguise. As the Cape workmen 
combed the adapter area around the thrusters on Spacecraft 9, they 
found a number of likely causes for the malfunction, which they at- 
tended to on the spot. Meanwhile, in St. Louis, engineers were explor- 
ing ways of dealing with the electrical short in the thruster circuit. 
GPO and McDonnell decided on a master switch that would cut off all 
power to the thrusters simultaneously. In case of trouble, the crew 
could check the system, circuit breaker by circuit breaker, until a short 
was found. The Cape team installed this switch on Spacecraft 9 with 
no effect on the launch schedule.10 
For Gemini IX, the three major questions centered on working 
procedures rather than technology: tethered versus untethered extra- 
vehicular activity, rendezvous in the third spacecraft orbit, and radar 
versus optical tracking from the spacecraft. 
Work on the Astronaut Maneuvering Unit by Chance Vought and 
the Air Propulsion Laboratory at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in 
Ohio set the stage for the tether debates. The manually operated unit 
was powered by a hot gas, hydrogen peroxide. In a number of tests, 
the device showed it would be useful to an astronaut in controlling his 
*During Mercury, when Donald Slayton was replaced as prime pilot on the Mercury-Atlas 
(MA) 7 mission because of a heart anomaly, his backup pilot, Walter Schirra, did not get the as- 
signment. Scott Carpenter, who had been the alternate on John Glenn's MA-6 fight, flew the 
mission. 
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attitude and keeping himself stable while he maneuvered in space. 
When, early in 1963, the Air Force was given a chance to place experi- 
ments in the Gemini spacecraft, the AMU was an obvious choice. It 
could help pilots working in space on many tasks that the Air Force 
was particularly interested in-maintenance, repair, resupply, crew 
transfer, rescue, satellite inspection, and assembly of structures. Since 
none of these was as yet a primary or secondary objective to NASA, 
the unit would fly in Gemini merely to confirm what it could do.11 
The tether entered the picture as a safety factor. 
At first, the Air Force had in mind a 60-meter tether. But studies 
suggested that an astronaut might get tangled up in a weightless teth- 
er. Although this might be countered by a reel mechanism that would 
keep the line taut, the real question soon became whether a tether was 
needed at all. Could redundant or alternate systems offer the same 
safety provided by tying an astronaut to an orbiting spacecraft? The 
Air Force thought they could, and some in NASA agreed. Tether de- 
velopment was canceled.12 Colonel Daniel McKee, head of the Air 
Force field office in Houston, pointed out that contractors, when they 
knew the propulsion system would be flown by astronauts not tied to 
the spacecraft, would be compelled to make hi hly reliable systems. 
After all, no one wanted an astronaut floating off into space. But that 
possibility was exactly what NASA was .worried about. Warren J. 
North, Chief of MSC's Flight Crew Support Division, held that tethers 
were a spaceman's best friend, "especially if you have oxygen in 
them."ls 
The dispute persisted, sometimes heatedly. An MSG and Air 
Force meeting in July 1965, to consider "EVA possibilities for Gemini 
8," included "EVA without tether." But NASA Headquarters soon 
made its official position quite clear. William Schneider, Deputy Direc- 
tor of Mission Operations, wired MSG Gemini Manager Charles Ma- 
thews that "EVA shall be based on the use of a tether on Gemini 
flights thru Gemini l2."14 
McKee was not so easily discouraged. In February 1966, he was 
still debating the issue. McKee wanted the matter left open until Gemi- 
ni XII, when the maneuvering unit was scheduled for its second flight. 
He prepared a position paper, pointing out that all critical systems on 
the AMU were backed up and that its test programs had been oriented 
toward free flight, because this was the unit's ultimate purpose.15 MSC 
Director Robert Gilruth forwarded McKee's case to George Mueller, 
chief of NASA's manned space flight programs, who was still not con- 
vinced. Mueller insisted that all Gemini astronauts would be tethered, 
but even this experience might be helpful to the Air Force in future 
untethered flights. A new NASA position paper described spacecraft 
maneuvers that would maintain tether slackness to simulate free space 
activity. Although "prudence dictates that a tether be used at all times 
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during Gemini extravehicular activity," the door might still be open to 
untethered flights, "in the event that an operational requirement is 
identified which cannot be met in [any other] way."l6 
The spinning flight of Gemini VIII on 16 March gave the Air 
Force a chance to push that door open: what might have happened had 
David Scott been outside and fastened to the spacecraft when it went 
out of control? He could have been wrapped up like a broken window 
shade. The Air Force suggested adding a safety disconnect device, at 
least, as long as NASA persisted in a tether, so a crewman could free 
himself if something like that happened again. 
NASA officials, too, had been thinking about the plight of a crew- 
man caught outside a whirling spacecraft. Scott said that he could have 
spotted the thruster problem and gotten back into the spacecraft to 
help Armstrong deal with it. But many in the Office of Manned Space 
Flight were convinced that, if spacecraft troubles arose when a pilot 
was outside, the best thing for him to do was to get back inside as 
quickly as he could. There were too many hazards connected with 
troubleshooting for him to try diagnosing any problem, let alone using 
a disconnect to discard the security of a lifeline. That ended the active 
debate,l7 but there were still some who thought it was a good idea, one 
that ought to be tried in future programs.18 
The second major issue on the Gemini IX mission-when to rendez- 
vous with the target vehicle-was not so hotly pursued. Planners for 
Gemini VI, considering possible sources of trouble, had concluded that 
rendezvous should take place no sooner than the fourth orbit. This was a 
well researched procedure, which Walter Schirra and Stafford had dem- 
onstrated in high style. But some engineers in the Apollo Spacecraft Pro- 
gram Office wanted to tamper with success. Rendezvous in the first, or at 
least by the third, spacecraft revolution would more closely approximate 
lunar orbit rendezvous.19 In September 1965, mission planners began 
working on a tentative M = 3 rendezvous (in the third spacecraft orbit) for 
Gemini IX and X. For the rest of the year, they worked on this new ren- 
dezvous scheme.20 
NASA, Air Force, and industry representatives met in Houston on 
20 January 1966 to review the results of these labors. After the space- 
craft had separated from the launch vehicle, the first maneuver- 
"IVAR" for the unwieldly "insertion velocity adjust routine'?--would 
reduce orbital insertion errors. The crew would use the inertial guid- 
ance system to raise or lower spacecraft trajectory immediately. At the 
apo ee of the first circuit, the crew would perform a "phase adjust," to 
esta % lish the proper phase relation between the spacecraft and the 
Agena. One and a half orbits later came another change, this time a 
triple play, to correct phase, height, and out-of-plane errors. The final 
maneuver was to circularize the flight path two and a quarter revolu- 
tions after insertion. This would place the spacecraft about 28 kilome- 
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ters below the target and ready to start firings to catch it. The remain- 
ing maneuvers were similar to those required for a fourth-orbit ren- 
dezvous.21 
No one doubted that this sequence would work but some saw no 
reason for an M = 3  at all. Two camps formed. One group insisted that 
it closely approximated lunar orbit rendezvous; the other maintained 
that the kinship was so slight that it was not worth doing. The second 
group also contended that ground tracking and ground computer cap- 
abilities for this approach were not as good as they were for rendez- 
vous in the fourth revolution. Schneider believed that the third-circuit 
concept would be useful to Apollo operations. Mueller agreed with 
him, and that settled the issue.22 
The third Gemini IX debate, radar versus optical tracking, grew 
from a type of rendezvous clearly applicable to Apollo. This matter 
first came up when several engineers, looking for ways to kee the 
spacecraft from getting too heavy, wanted to pull the radar out o f both 
Apollo vehicles. The command module lost its radar in February 1965 
when the ASP0 Configuration Control Board ruled that the astronaut 
aboard the mother ship could use an optical sight to help rendezvous 
with the radar-and-flashing-light equipped lunar module. Later that 
year, with weight reduction becoming even more pressing, the lunar 
module's radar was the candidate for removal. This meant that during 
lunar operations-whether on takeoff from the Moon or at any time 
the two vehicles were apart-rendezvous of the two ships would depend 
entirely on astronaut eyes, optical sights, flashin lights, and comput- 
ers. This was too much for the men who had to li y the machines; they 
did not entirely trust their eyes or the suggested equipment. F e y  
wanted the help of electronic radar signals on one vehicle bouncing 
back from the transponder of the other. At least, they said, the radar 
should remain on the lunar module.23 
Stafford and Cernan did agree to include a test on Gemini IX to 
compare optics and radar by performing a rendezvous from above 
the target vehicle. In this exercise, the Agena would be over the Saha- 
ra Desert, which would simulate the lunar surface, and the crew would 
try to fly down to it, using both radar and optics.24 
PREPARATIONS FOR GEMINI X 
When Stafford and Cernan returned to training in mid-March 
1966, after the See-Bassett accident investigation, the command pilot 
spent little time on the spacecraft systems. After all, he had put in 
more than 300 hours in the spacecraft simulator in the past two years. 
He concentrated instead on flight planning, which was more complicat- 
ed for this mission than either of the two he had worked on before. It 
was also subject to more changes. Cernan and Aldrin, on the other 
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hand, had to focus on extravehicular training, which was dominated by 
the scheduled use of the maneuvering unit.25 
Working up the flight plan, with its heavy emphasis on rendezvous 
and extravehicular activity, began in 1965 and lasted until Gemini IX 
was launched. By January 1966, three types of rendezvous had been 
included: third spacecraft orbit, from above the target vehicle, and a 
very high altitude maneuver to reach an imaginary (or phantom) tar- 
get. The phantom rendezvous (which depended on the Agena's pro- 
pulsion system) was soon canceled by the planners, both because they 
still did not completely trust the target vehicle's engines and because 
they did not want to expose the crew to too much radiation.26 
Gemini IX soon picked up a third rendezvous, anyway, one that 
Gemini VIII missed doing-re-rendezvous from an equiperiod orbit. 
The spacecraft thrusters were used for an upward velocity change to 
separate it from the target. If the firing were precise and all conditions 
were right, the spacecraft and Agena would automatically rendezvous 
at the end of an orbit, because the more elliptical spacecraft orbital 
path would intersect the circular orbit of the target at the proper 
point. Theoretically, the closing maneuvers should ~nvolve only brak- 
ing the spacecraft to reachieve stationkeeping (alias re-rendezvous) 
with the target. 
Stafford was beginning to worry about doing three rendezvous; his 
spacecraft was the last to have the smaller tanks-150 kilograms as 
opposed to (on Spacecraft 10) 208 kilograms of maneuvering fuel. But 
the equiperiod rendezvous was designed as a fuel-cheap way to evalu- 
ate maneuvers and lighting conditions for a dual rendezvous with a 
passive target scheduled for Gemini X. And Mathews decided that the 
lunar module abort rendezvous could remain in the flight plan for 
Gemini IX, but it would have a lower priority and would be contingent 
on fuel and time.27 
So rendezvous was the first major objective on Gemini IX, and 
preparing for the different types produced its share of headaches. But 
the second most important activity, extravehicular work with the AMU, 
was a bigger source of trouble.28 
The AMU had been ticketed for at least two flights from the start. 
This backpack, with its oxygen supply and radio, was powered by hy- 
drogen peroxide, a relatively unstable chemical. Several MSC engi- 
neers were unhappy about using it. Warren North was one of them; 
North also worried about the high-temperature jet hitting the astro- 
naut's space suit. Cernan's personalized jet-pack weighed 76 kilograms 
and its 10.2 newton (2.3-pound) thrusters operated in pairs-forward 
and back, up and down, but not from side to side. This caused anoth- 
er worry.29 But Aldrin, on a training trip to California, suddenly got 
an idea. He tested it on his next trip to the Ling-Temco-Vought (for- 
merly Chance Vought) plant in Dallas. After he mounted the training 
O N  T H E  S H O U L D E R S  O F  T I T A N S  
machine, a burst from the two aft thrusters sent him across the air- 
bearing table toward his target. A brief nudge from the small control 
jets at one shoulder and knee turned him to the side. He could 
now use his forward- or backward-firing thrusters to move sideways 
with respect to his path toward the g0al.30 North's fears that the heat 
of the AMU thrusters might damage the pressure suit proved valid, 
and its insulation had to be changed. The Mylar insulation was re- 
placed by 1 1  layers of aluminized H-film (a thin sheet of polyamide 
with a coating of aluminum on one side).sl 
The spacecraft also needed some rework to fit it for extravehicular 
tasks. At NASA's request, McDonnell bonded 80 Velcro hook patches 
to the surface of the spacecraft. Then Velcro pads, which would cling 
to the patches on the spacecraft, were added to Cernan's gloves to 
help hold him in place as he moved about. With body position so im- 
portant in checking out and donning the AMU, two handholds and a 
footbar were installed as restraints. Velcro pile on the footbar would 
mate with Velcro patches on Cernan's boots. During zero-g flights, he 
found this was not enough. After stirrups were added, he and Aldrin 
had no difficulty in checking out the unit in further practice flights22 
Everything was ready for Gemini IX on 17 May 1966. In the Mis- 
sion Control Center, Eugene Kranz assumed his duties as flight direc- 
tor, presiding over a three-shift operation. The other two flight direc- 
tors were Glynn S. Lunney and Clifford Charlesworth. Only 200 news- 
men were on hand, compared to the thousand or more who had cov- 
ered Gemini I V  the year before.33 Gemini was becoming more routine, 
hence less newsworthy. 
After a smooth countdown, Atlas launch vehicle 5303 rose from 
pad 14 at 10:12 a.m. For two minutes the rocket's three engines 
rammed Agena 5004 skyward. Only ten seconds before the two out- 
board engines were supposed to stop, however, one of them gimbaled 
and locked in a hardover pitchdown position. The whole combina- 
tion-Atlas and Agena-flipped over into a nosedive and headed like a 
runaway torpedo back toward Cape Kennedy.34 
Shortly after the booster engines stopped firing, the guidance con- 
trol officer reported he had lost touch with the launch vehicle. Richard 
W. Keehn, General Dynamics program manager for the Gemini Atlas, 
was alarmed and puzzled. Telemetry showed that the sustainer engine 
had cut off, and a signal that the Agena had separated from its launch 
vehicle followed. Agena signals kept coming until 456 seconds after 
launch-then there was silence. Keehn raced over to Hangar J, the 
General Dynamics data station, where the telemetry tapes pointed to 
an Atlas engine problem. But television reports implied that the target 
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vehicle was in trouble again, and Lockheed officials winced whenever 
they heard someone speak of the "Agena bird"; this was ironic in the 
light of the problems and delays caused by Atlas in the Mercury pro- 
gram and the success of Agena in Project Surefire and Gemini VIII. 
Meanwhile, the Gemini IX Atlas and Agena had plunged into the At- 
lantic Ocean 198 kilometers from where they had started.35 
As contractors worried about technical problems, NASA again 
faced the necessity for a quick recovery plan when a target vehicle 
failed to reach orbit. This time, however, the agency had something in 
the hangar, an alternate vehicle-the ATDA. After the Agena explod- 
ed in October 1965, NASA had ordered General Dynamics/Convair to 
be prepared to furnish a backup Atlas within 14 days of another such 
catastrophe.36 And in April 1966, just a month before the attempted 
launch of Gemini IX, Schneider had reminded Preston that he would 
have to be ready to launch the alternate target in a hurry if the Agena 
again failed to keep its orbital appointment. Now it had. On 18 May, 
Mathews wired Colonel John Hudson, Deputy Commander for 
Launch Vehicles, Air Force Space Systems Division, to prepare Atlas 
5304 for launch on 31 May in a mission now called Gemini IX-A.37 
With what had been the backup plan now in effect, the next ques- 
tion was what to do if the ATDA, too, failed. At a staff meeting on 18 
May, Mathews announced that Gemini IX-A would be launched any- 
way, to rendezvous with the Gemini VIII Agena, still in orbit. 
McDonnell, in any case, was confident of the ATDA. When Mathews 
asked, in a management meeting in St. Louis the next day, "Does any- 
one have any reservations about flying the ATDA?" the answer was 
no.38 That was just as well, because the motion of a rendezvous with 
the old Agena soon had to be abandoned. Its orbit had not decayed to 
the expected extent, and it was still sailing around Earth 402 kilome- 
ters up. Without the help of Agena, high-altitude flight might take too 
much spacecraft fuel and leave the crew stranded with no way to get 
to the lower orbit needed for retrofire.39 Deputy Administrator Robert 
Seamans and Mueller agreed with Mathews that rendezvous with 
Agena 8 was too risky, but Gemini IX-A would still fly, even if the sub- 
stitute target did not make it. Extravehicular activity with the AMU 
was a much needed venture in its own right.40 
Long before these decisions were made, the Atlas contractors were 
frantically busy. Keehn had bundled up the telemetry tapes and head- 
ed for San Diego, where study of the data plus some tests located the 
trouble in the electrical wiring.41 Within a week, Keehn and his group 
pinpointed the cause of the failure: a pinched wire in the autopilot 
that produced a short circuit. This meant some extra work on the elec- 
trical connectors, and General Dynamics asked NASA for an extra day 
to complete the task and prepare Atlas 5304 for launch. The agency 
set 1 June as the new date.42 
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Although General Dynamics had accepted the blame for the mis- 
sion failure, Lockheed was worried about telemetry signals that indicat- 
ed a problem with an Agena inverter. A nag ing question persisted. 
Could the target vehicle have gone into orbit i f the Atlas had worked? 
This inverter provided power to both the gyroscope and the sequence 
timer. To Lockheed's relief, a series of row cameras located at Mel- 
bourne Beach, Florida, got pictures of the Atlas' outside loop. They 
showed that the Agena passed through ionized gases from the boost- 
er's exhaust, which caused an electrical short and failure of the invert- 
er.43 
On 1 June 1966, men and machines were again gathered at the 
Cape Kennedy launch site, this time to try to send the alternate target 
vehicle and Gemini IX-A into coordinated orbital flight. At the ap- 
pointed time, 10:OO a.m., the Atlas rose from pad 14. After a six-min- 
Ute boosted phase, it tossed the ATDA into a nearly perfect 298-kilo- 
meter orbit. Just one thing marred the picture: telemetry signals sug- 
gested that the launch shroud covering the docking port had only par- 
tially opened and had failed to jettison. 
Concurrently, over on pad 19, Stafford and Cernan were going 
through their countdown to launch. When the count reached the 
three-minute mark, a hold was called so the spacecraft could be 
launched precisely on time for the best catchup trajectory with its tar- 
get. Almost immediately after the count resumed, problems developed 
in the Cape ground launch control equipment when it tried to send 
the spacecraft refined information on the exact launch azimuth. The 
launch window (only 40 seconds long) closed, and Mission Director 
Schneider delayed the flight for 48 hours. For the second time, Staf- 
ford and Cernan had to take the elevator down. Stafford later said, 
"Frank [Borman] and Jim [Lovell] may have more flight time, but 
nobody had more pad time in Gemini than I did!" By the time Gemini 
IX-A lifted off, he had been in the two spacecraft (6 and 9) ready for 
launch a total of six times.44 
Stafford and Cernan met with no untoward incidents on 3 June. 
The flight began precisely at 8:39:50 a.m. Stafford watched the instru- 
ments more closely than had his predecessors, since he had this new 
IVAR (insertion error correction) to handle in starting the rendezvous 
sequence. Six minutes after launch, CapCom Neil Armstrong said, 
"You are go for IVAR." Seconds later, the command pilot fired the 
spacecraft thrusters in the chase toward the target vehicle 1060 kilome- 
ters ahead.45 
By the time Stafford and Cernan arrived over the Canary Islands- 
only 17 minutes after launch-the computers had ground oyt the fig- 
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ures. Armstrong gave the crew the data for the phase adjustment near 
the first apogee. At 49 minutes into the flight, the thrusters added 22.7 
meters per second to spackcraft speed to raise its perigee from 160 to 232 
kilometers. "I felt that one, Tom!" Cernan exclaimed.46 
During the hour before the triple play-to correct phase, height, 
and out-of-plane errors-the crew checked systems,.went through stow- 
age lists, took off gloves and helmets, and got cameras ready for the 
rendezvous. To circularize the flight path, at 2:24 hours elapsed flight 
time Stafford pitched the nose of the spacecraft down 40 degrees and 
turned it three degrees to the left of its flight path. Fifty-one seconds 
later, he fired the aft thrusters to add 16.2 meters er second to the 
vehicle's speed. The orbit now measured 274 by 2 ! 6 kilometers-22 
kilometers below and 201 kilometers behind the target vehicle and 
closing with it at 38 meters per second.47 
Over Tananarive, 12 minutes before Stafford had fired the thrus- 
ters, the crew got some flickers of a radar contact with their target. A 
range reading of 240 kilometers between the vehicles showed on the 
scale. George Towner and the other Westinghouse radar builders were 
relieved; they had worried about acquisition of a target that would wig, 
wag, and wobble. The Agena was a stabilized vehicle; the ATDA was 
not, and its radar reflectivity changed with its continually changing at- 
titude. Within 222 kilometers, however, electronic lockon was relatively 
g00d.48 
At 3:20 hours, the crew caught sight of their goal 93 kilometers 
away. For some time, it flitted in and out of view on an optical sight. 
At 56 kilometers, it became quite clear and remained visible from then 
on. As he drew nearer, Stafford reported seeing flashing acquisition 
lights. Thinking for a moment that the shroud had jettisoned after all, 
he said, "All right. We're in business." Surely they could not have seen 
the running lights so clearly if the shroud were still attached. While 
making minor corrections, he was glad that he could see the little 
"shiners" so well, because moonlight, streaming thr'ough his window, 
almost blinded him. The Moon soon became an asset, however, as its 
rays reflected off the ATDA.49 
Stafford began slowing his spacecraft at 4:06 hours. During the 
closure period, he peered out the window, trying to see if the shroud 
was there or not. Then he exclaimed, "Look at that moose!" As the 
distance dwindled, he knew that he had been indulging in wishful 
thinking-"The shroud is half open on that thing!" Seconds later, 
Cernan remarked, "You could almost knock it off!" When the final 
braking was completed, the two vehicles were only 30 meters apart and 
in position for stationkeeping. But it did not seem likely that the space- 
craft nose could slip into the mouth of the "moose" and dock.50 
The crew described the shroud in detail and wondered out loud 
what could be done to salvage the situation. One of Stafford's re- 
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marks-graphic and memorable-became the trademark of the entire 
mission. His animal analogy switched to reptilian when he said, "It looks 
like an angry alligator out here rotating around." He itched to nudge 
it with his spacecraft docking bar to open its yawning jaws, but Flight 
Director Kranz told him to control the urge. 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of this incident was the close 
examination of an unstable body while discussing it over the air-to- 
ground circuit. Stafford stayed 9 to 12 meters from the target but 
moved to a ticklish position only centimeters away in daylight. As the 
ATDA rotated slowly, he rolled his spacecraft upside down to parallel 
the movements of this weird looking machine. His performance met, 
in effect, one of the Defense De artment's objectives for the AMU- 
finding and inspecting unidenti B ed satellites. Stafford said he could 
plainly see that the explosive bolts had fired but that two neatly taped 
lanyards held the clam shell partially in place. These lanyard wires had 
high tensile strength, he was assured from the ground, so it might not 
be wise to nudge its jaws.51 
Schneider called James McDivitt and Scott, who were in Los Ange- 
les, and asked them to go to the Douglas plant and look at a duplicate 
target vehicle shroud to see if the wires could be cut or the shroud 
removed in any way during orbital flight. The astronauts soon report- 
ed that the wires could be clipped, but there were many sharp edges 
that might tear the astronaut's suit as he worked. In the meantime, 
ground controllers sent signals to the target to tighten and relax the 
docking cone, hoping that might free the shroud. But it remained in 
place-there would definitely be no docking on Gemini IX-A.52 
The shroud episode was embarrassing, and another investigation 
began immediately. The solution was simple, if one recalls the old saw 
about too many cooks spoiling the broth. Douglas built the shroud that 
Lockheed, in turn, fitted to the Agena. The ATDA, however, was built 
by McDonnell. Before McDonnell technicians made the final installa- 
tion on the ATDA at the Cape, a Douglas engineer supervised a prac- 
tice run, with the exception of the final part-the lanyards that operat- 
ed the electrical disconnect to the explosive bolts. For safety's sake, 
these were not hooked up. Before the mission, the Douglas engineer 
went home to his pregnant wife. On launch day, the McDonnell crew 
followed procedures published by Lockheed, which had been copied 
from Douglas documents. The instructions said, "See blueprint," but 
the Lockheed drawing was not used. The Douglas technician who 
normally hooked up the lanyards knew what to do with the loose ends, 
even without the blueprint. But he was not there, and the strangers 
fixing the ATDA's shroud looked at the dangling straps, wondered 
what to do with them, then taped them carefully down. In orbit, Staf- 
ford photographed their neat handiwork. 
As Scott Simpkinson, GPO Manager of Test Operations, later said, 
Above left, astronauts Aldrin and Stafford practice docking 
their Gemini spacecraft with the Agena; above, Mission Con- 
trol watches on TV as the Atlas-Agena is launched, only to 
drop into the Atlantic moments later; above right, the backup, 
ATDA, is readied for launch. 
Above, the "angry alligator," with clamshell doors hanging 
ajar, thwarting docking; below left, Cernan on a spacewalk; 
below right, two ships glad to see each other. 
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three good lessons were learned from this mistake: (1 ) simulate proc- 
esses completely, (2 ) keep experienced people on the job, and (3 ) fol- 
low written procedures exactly.53 
Gemini IX-A now began its equiperiod rendezvous. Five hours 
after launch, Stafford nosed the spacecraft down 90 degrees and fired 
the forward thrusters for 35 seconds to increase his speed by 6 meters 
per second. The crew quickly found that the target was disappearing 
below them. Later, in the darkness, they plotted their position with a 
sextant and checked the result against a preplanned chart solution. 
Mission planning had been right; all that was necessary to complete 
the rendezvous was to slow the spacecraft down. At 6:15 hours, Staf- 
ford began a series of four maneuvers to bring the spacecraft back to 
stationkeeping alongside the target. The second of the three rendez- 
vous exercises was easy.54 
Less than an hour after Gemini IX-A returned to its target (6:36 
hours elapsed time), the crew got ready to leave again, for the third 
planned rendezvous.55 At 7:15 hours, Stafford fired the aft thrusters 
to decrease the spacecraft speed by 1.1 meters per second and widen 
the distance between the two satellites. 
Stafford and Cernan could now relax a little. It had been an ex- 
hausting day. Still wanting to snap the alligator's jaws off, they chatted 
with ground controllers about the shroud. Then they checked space- 
craft systems, ate, and tried to sleep. Cabin noises and lights made 
sleeping difficult, however, and they only dozed for 40 minutes or so 
at a time; their scheduled eight hours of slumber were fitful, at best.56 
The next day--4 June-Spacecraft 9 led its target by 11 1 kilome- 
ters. That retrograde maneuver (against the direction of the flight 
path) had lowered the orbit of the spacecraft (it now measured 289 by 
296 kilometers) and the target traveled a nearly constant 298 kilome- 
ters above the planet. Thus the spacecraft, being nearer Earth, illus- 
trated the paradox of slowing down to go faster, relative to the surface 
of the world, than the object flying overhead. The stage was set for 
Stafford and Cernan to do a rendezvous from above; but they first had 
to accelerate the spacecraft in the direction of the flight path so it 
would leap to a higher altitude than the target. Automatically, then, 
the lower flying target would reduce the spacecraft's 110-kilometer 
lead. To rendezvous, the crew only had to cancel out altitude and ve- 
locity vectors that had placed their vehicle above and ahead of its 
objective.57 
A phase adjustment at 18:23 hours was followed a little more than 
30 minutes later by a height adjustment. Another burst from the 
thrusters put the spacecraft into an orbit measuring 307 by 309 kilo- 
meters. The slant range to the target, which had stretched to 155 kilo- 
meters, began to shorten. Within 15 minutes, Stafford reported that 
the vehicles were only 100 kilometers apart. Forty minutes later, Cer- 
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nan called out a 37-kilometer mark. At 21:02, the distance was 28.6 
kilometers. Stafford pointed the nose of his spacecraft down 19 de- 
grees and yawed it to the left 180 degrees, aiming at the other vehicle, 
which was still below and behind him.58 
Over the Atlantic Ocean, then the Sahara Desert, on past the Afri- 
can continent, Stafford and Cernan had trouble spotting the target, 
but the electronic eye of the radar did not. When they were 37 kilome- 
ters away, they had seen the vehicle reflected brightly in the moonlight 
and, later, in the sunlight. As the Sun rose, however, they lost sight of 
it completely. The range had closed to less than six kilometers before 
Stafford saw what looked to him "like a pencil dot on a sheet of pa- 
per." Without the radar, he said, they would "have blown that rendez- 
vous." But at 21 hours and 42 minutes after launch, IX-A and the 
target were again side by side. Three types of rendezvous had been 
completed in less than 24 hours.59 
At the end of the third rendezvous, the Carnarvon, Australia, 
flight controller told Cernan that Flight Director Charlesworth wanted 
the crew to start getting ready for EVA. Stafford had begun to worry 
about the amount of fuel that would be consumed if he continued sta- 
tionkeeping with the target. Unless the flight controllers thought Cer- 
nan might actually do something about the shroud, the command pilot 
wanted to get out of the vicinity of the ATDA before the pilot got out 
of the spacecraft. The crew was also pretty tired. As they approached 
Houston, Armstrong told Stafford to postpone EVA until the third day 
and to leave the ATDA. Stafford accelerated the spacecraft by one 
meter per second and moved away forever from the angry alligator.60 
On 5 June, at 5:30 a.m., nearly 45 hours and 30 minutes into the 
mission, the crew began preparations for Cernan to emerge from the 
spacecraft. In the cramped cabin, they worked, rested, and worked 
again, finishing ten minutes before sunset. Near sunrise, Cernan 
cracked his hatch. It took more effort than he expected, but he soon 
stood in the opening, looking out at infinity and waiting for the first 
signs of daylight. Cernan had no feeling of disorientation nor any sen- 
sation of being lost in the dark of space. He heaved out a litter bag, 
the start of an exercise scheduled to last 16'7 minutes, during which 
the pilot would stand, walk, float, or ride nearly twice around the 
world.61 
Once outside the spacecraft, Cernan did some simple experiments 
to get the feeling of working in space. He was startled to find that ev- 
erything took longer than he had assumed it would from his experi- 
ence in simulations. Cernan said he really had no idea how to work in 
slow motion at orbital speeds. Every movement of an arm or leg in 
free space exacted a reaction from his body. Minute forces that would 
scarcely be noticed in Earth's gravity upset his equilibrium in space. He 
had only to twitch his fingers to set his body in motion. On Gemini IV, 
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White had commented on the need for handholds. Now Cernan found 
that even those installed on Spacecraft 9 were inadequate and that the 
Velcro was not strong enough to keep his body in position as he edged 
back toward the adapter. He had to fight the limited mobility of his 
space suit, and the effort taxed his strength. He constantly referred to 
the umbilical as the "snake." When he let it out to any distance, it was 
hard to control.62 
When he finally reached the adapter, some lights that had been 
installed especially to help him see were not burning. He asked Staf- 
ford to turn them on, but only one lit up. Moving around the adapter 
was no easier than moving around the rest of the spacecraft. Still, he 
began preparing the maneuvering unit for flight. He attached - 
lights; opened and checked the nitrogen and oxygen shutoff v rn ves; 
positioned the sidearm controllers, umbilicals, and restraint harness; 
attached the AMU tether; turned on the unit's electrical power; and 
changed over to the electrical umbilical. Everything, just everything, 
took much longer than he had expected. He kept floating out of con- 
trol; he simply could not maintain body position. The few footbars, 
stirrups, and handbars were insufficient for any task that required le- 
verage. 
Ten minutes after sunset, Cernan's faceplate began to fog,* so he 
rested. But here there could be no such thing as complete relaxation 
because of the tendency to drift away. He went back to work, but his 
visor soon fogged again. After the next sunrise, the moisture lessened. 
As soon as he moved about, it returned. Strangely, he felt neither hot 
nor coldl--his only problems were this fogged visor and tasks that had 
to be done with one hand when he really needed two. 
When 80 percent of his work was finished, Cernan again had to 
stop and rest. Like a mountain climber with a back ack, he sat down 
in the maneuvering unit and found his most peace ? ul moment in this 
strange environment. Body molded to the seat, feet against a footbar, 
and arms atop the handbars, he enjoyed a taste of comfort for the first 
time since he started this stroll outside. The flight passed into dark- 
ness, but by the light in the adapter Cernan could tell just how occlud- 
ed his faceplate had become. 
He began to wonder whether to go on with EVA. Mentally, he 
ticked off the checklist items that remained: strap in, change to the 
AMU oxygen lead, start breathin oxygen from the unit's supply, and 
free his personal transportation from the spacecraft adapter. Cernan 
*After the mission the fogging problem was duplicated in altitude chamber tests, using the 
Spacecraft 9 life support system and Cernan's space suit. When a small area of the faceplate was 
treated with an anti-fog solution, that spot remained dear. As a result, future Gemini crews car- 
ried an anti-fog solution to be applied immediately before EVA. 
+At one period, Cernan's back did feel hot. Later analysis showed that some of the insulation 
of the suit had separated, allowing the Sun's rays to penetrate. 
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knew, from repeated experience in zero-g training flights, that he 
could do these tasks blindfolded. But then what? he thought. "So you 
make the connections . . . if you can't see, you can't very well go out 
there and fly because you don't know what to expect." And if he flew 
the maneuvering unit, anyway? He could finish puttin it on, he knew, 
because he was restrained in the adapter. But when e time came to 
take it off, he would be standing in free space. Could he take it off 
with one hand, while holding onto the spacecraft with the other? 
Would it be wise to try that when he couldn't see? Much better to end 
the exercise now, he thought. So he and Stafford decided to cancel the 
rest of the EVA, and Mission Control agreed. 
Carefully, Cernan eased himself out of his comfortable seat, leav- 
ing his sun visor up to see if that might help defog his faceplate. At 
sunrise, he detached the AMU's electrical umbilical and connected his 
spacecraft lifeline. Still almost blind, he groped his way out of the 
adapter and back along the spacecraft to the cockpit. He slid into the 
hatch and stood there a few moments. Stafford held on to Cernan's 
legs so he could rest. Slowly his faceplate be an to clear in the center, 
giving him a narrow range of vision. He trie5 to retrieve an externally 
mounted mirror that the command pilot had used to watch what was 
going on behind the cockpit. As Cernan wrestled with the mirror, his 
suit's cooling system became overtaxed, causing him to get extremely 
hot for the first time. His faceplate again fogged up completely. 
Stafford helped Cernan in and, together, they closed the hatch and 
started pressurizing the cabin. With their helmets almost touching, 
Stafford still could not see Cernan through the faceplate. The extrave- 
hicular exercise had lasted for 128 minutes instead of the planned 167; 
fogging had started 63 minutes after hatch opening.63 
Two major aims of Gemini IX-A were rendezvous and extrave- 
hicular activity; the third was experiments." Stafford and Cernan gave 
closer attention over a sustained period of time to the assigned experi- 
ments than had any Gemini crew before. When the space walk was 
postponed to the third day, the astronauts spent most of the second 
day on experiments and rest. About the only conversation they would 
tolerate from the ground was about their workload. On several occa- 
sions, when flight controllers forgot, they were reminded that the crew 
was busy. "My mistake for contacting you," came the response.64 
Stafford and Cernan carried out M-5, bioassay of body fluids (the 
only medical experiment), which required wastes to be collected and 
labeled in laboratory fashion. Like other Gemini crews, Stafford and 
Cernan disliked this complex and messy task, nor did they enjoy the 
blood sampling they had to endure before and after the mission. 
*See Appendix D. 
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Stafford equated the physical effort for M-5 to that required for doing 
a rendezvous and a half.65 
The Department of Defense sponsored one experiment in addi- 
tion to the Astronaut Maneuvering Unit-D-14, UHFIVHF polariza- 
tion-to measure the inconsistencies of the electron field along the 
spacecraft orbital path and to study structures and variations of the 
lower ionos heric region. Stafford and Cernan operated the D-14 R transmitter ve times over Hawaii and once over Antigua during five 
successive revolutions. Everything worked well, but the number of 
measurements was limited because the antenna was poorly located. 
Later, when he was struggling outside, Cernan accidentally broke off 
the D- 14 antenna.66 
The four remaining experiments were scientific. Two of these 
involved micrometeorite collection. S-10 was a package mounted on 
the ATDA for Cernan to pick off during his space walk. This he could 
not do, but the astronauts did manage to photograph the package. The 
pictures showed that the device was in excellent condition. The second 
experiment of this type, S-12, was attached to the spacecraft and oper- 
ated by the astronauts by remote control. While Cernan was in the 
adapter, he heard Stafford close and lock the box. Cernan retrieved 
the package and stowed it in the spacecraft.67 
Cameras were the principal instruments used in the last two expe- 
riments-S- l ,  zodiacal light photography, and S- l l ,  airglow-horizon 
photography. Stafford and Cernan took S-11 pictures on three succes- 
sive night passes, between the 29th and 33rd hours of flight. They got 
45 good photographs, under very trying circumstances. The tendency 
to float upward in zero gravity made pointing the camera and taking 
the pictures no easy task. 
Zodiacal light photography had been scheduled for the space 
walk. A fogged faceplate, however, was no help in aimin a camera. f The pictures had to be taken from inside the spacecraft a ter Cernan 
had returned to the more restful confines of his couch. Cernan had to 
hold the camera against his chest while pointing it out the window at 
the targets and calling out directions to Stafford for aligning the space- 
craft. He obtained 17 good photographs.68 
On 6 June, during the 45th revolution, they got ready to come 
home. Gemini IX-A touched down 0.70 kilometers from the planned 
impact point in the Atlantic Ocean, 72 hours, 20 minutes, and 50 sec- 
onds after launch. After scanning the panels in the spacecraft and 
flipping some switches, the crewmen opened both hatches, relaxed, 
and watched the gently rolling sea. They were close enough to raise 
their arms and thumb a ride on the Wasp. Stafford and Cernan stayed 
in their spacecraft until it was hoisted onto the ship's deck. After the 
usual hullabaloo had subsided, Cernan told anyone who would listen 
to him that extravehicular activity was not easy, not nearly as easy as 
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people believed. And he seemed bitterly disappointed that he had 
been unable to fly the Air Force's maneuvering unit.69 
To the public, the frustrations of Gemini IX-A-the formidable 
shroud and the fogged faceplate-overshadowed its accomplishments. 
Flying formation with and examining an unstable body had been a 
useful experience. Of even more significance were the advanced ren- 
dezvous maneuvers, proving that the flight controllers and crews could 
handle sophisticated rendezvous techniques that might be applicable to 
Apollo. Had Gemini IX-A been VIII, the results might have been 
viewed differently-as just part of the learning process. But docking, a 
primary objective, had not been achieved; and extravehicular activity 
had not succeeded in evaluating the maneuvering unit. Some engi- 
neers in MSC Crew Systems Division thought too much was being tried 
too soon-the simpler maneuvering unit planned for Gemini VIII 
would have been the logical second step in mastering EVA. As it 
turned out, the cliche to "watch out for that second step" would have 
made a good motto, but the step was greater than anyone had yet real- 
ized.70 
Immediately after Gemini IX-A, Deputy Administrator Seamans 
expressed his dissatisfaction with results and the way missions were 
being handled. Although the flight, ground, and operations crews per- 
formed well in what they did, the achievements fell too far short of 
mission objectives. Seamans wanted a mission review board set up. He 
ticked off several items for such a group to study: corrective measures 
for the Atlas-Agena failure, the guidance update problem that delayed 
the launch two days, the shroud incident, and the suit environmental 
control difficulties. He also wanted the board to make sure that objec- 
tives and alternatives were carefully selected well in advance of 
launch.71 Mueller established the Gemini Mission Review Board, with 
his deputy, James C. Elms, as chairman.*72 
The board first laid out ground rules for drafting recommenda- 
tions for each of the remaining Gemini missions. Benefits for Apollo 
and for science and technology were weighed against risks to crew 
safety. Mission planning policies were examined-was too much being 
programmed or too little?73 With Gemini X scheduled for 18 July, 
planning for that flight was nearly firm. The board did measure mis- 
sion objectives against the new ground rules, but there was neither 
time nor opportunity for more than minor changes.74 
Gemini X, like VIII and IX, was a complex flight with multiple 
*Members were Edgar M. Cortright (NASA Deputy Associate Administrator for Science and 
Applications), Major General Vincent G. Huston (Commander, Air Force Eastern Test Range), 
and MSC GPO Manager Mathews. 
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objectives. Among these was a dual rendezvous involving two Agen- 
as--one launched for the mission, the other a passive target left over 
from Gemini VIII. Using the target's main engine to propel the 
docked Agenalspacecraft combination to high altitudes had been hotly 
debated on two previous missions. When the Atlas dropped into the 
Atlantic Ocean on 17 May 1966, the time for discussion was past. Since 
neither Gemini VIII nor IX-A had provided the hoped-for experience 
of firing the Agena's main engine while it was docked to a spacecraft, a 
decision had to be made promptly. There were only three flights left 
in the program. Nor would there be any preliminary, low-level practice 
first. The next day, Mathews told his staff that Gemini X would dock 
with Agena 10 and together they would climb to Agena 8.75 
On 24 January 1966, John Young and Michael Collins were 
named to fly Gemini X.* When Young first heard about the dual ren- 
dezvous plan, he thought, "they must be out of their minds." The as- 
tronaut had two worries. Could he slow down the linked vehicles and 
stop them in time to keep from crashing into the second Agena? VIIrs 
Agena, having run out of electrical power, was dead, with no radar 
transponder or other apparatus to help in the search. Could he even 
find the old Agena, using only optical equipment? Young recalled, 
"We hadn't worked on any of these procedures. The problem with an 
optical rendezvous is that you can't tell how far away you are from the 
target. With the kind of velocities we were talking about, you couldn't 
really tell at certain ranges whether you were opening or closing."76 
Young also remarked, "We didn't have an EVA program," but 
that soon changed. Collins would do experiments, retrieve packages 
from both the spacecraft and the passive target, test a zip gun, and vis- 
it an unstabilized vehicle. The backpack was dropped for missions X 
and XI and replaced by a 15-meter umbilical to supply oxygen and 
electrical support.77 
Deciding what to do was only the beginning; how to do it was the 
bigger challenge. The second part of the double rendezvous (with the 
passive Agena) was particularly tricky. Agena 8, like.al1 Earth-orbital 
vehicles, had been precessing above and below the equator on its orbit- 
al path. With no help from the dead target possible, the Gemini X 
Agena and spacecraft would have to be launched at very precise times. 
Suppose circumstances delayed the launches? It had happened be- 
fore-more often than not! The mission planners would have to come 
up with a new set of numbers in a hurry. With events so closely relat- 
*Love11 and Aldrin were selected as backup command pilot and pilot, respectively. On 21 
March 1966, after the deaths of See and Bassett, they were moved into the backup positions for 
Gemini IX-A. Bean and Clifton Williams then became the alternate crew for Gemini X. At the 
same time, NASA also announced the crews for the first Apollo manned fight: Gus Grissom, 
Edward White, and Roger Chaffee (prime); James McDivitt, David Scott, and Russell Schweickart 
(backup). 
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ed, delay or failure at any point threatened all aims of the flight. 
While shaping the Gemini X mission for the dual rendezvous, the 
planners decided to give the crew some helpful experience in onboard 
navigation, using optical equipment, charts, and the spacecraft com- 
puter. The crew would join its first target in the fourth orbit. Mission 
sequence was the next consideration. When should the dual rendez- 
vous take place-the second day or the third day? Mission planners 
eventually decided that the second day should be devoted to experi- 
ments, the third to chasing the passive target. This, in itself, appeared 
to create a conflict of aims; although Agena 10 was needed to carry 
the spacecraft to the second target, many of the planned experiments 
could not be performed while the vehicles were docked. 
About 50 people kicked this problem around at a trajectories and 
orbits meeting on 28 April 1966. Obviously, the launch dates would 
have to be jockeyed to get the best phase relationship between the 
spacecraft and target for both the dual rendezvous and the experi- 
ments.78 
Even assuming that both launches went as planned, shaping the 
second rendezvous was an exacting task. The North American Air 
Defense (NORAD) Command, at Colorado Springs, had kept track of 
Agena 8's whereabouts ever since it ran out of electrical power. To 
begin the rendezvous, the docked Gemini X/Agena 10 combination 
should first go into a large elliptical orbit, 298 kilometers at perigee 
and 752 kilometers at apogee. After six revolutions to judge phase re- 
lationships, Agena 10 would then maneuver down to an approximately 
398-kilometer circular orbit near Agena 8's space lane, as reported by 
NORAD. 
The high altitude aspect of the flight raised its usual qualms. 
Although the Gemini Program Office no longer resisted the use of the 
big Agena engine while the vehicles were docked, McDonnell did not 
like the idea of the vehicles passing through so many high orbits, 
which might affect a safe emergency reentry if the retrorockets did not 
perform as needed. There was also the South Atlantic radiation zone 
to be considered. In a trajectories and orbits meetin at the end of d June 1966, the maximum acceptable altitude for the ual rendezvous 
was set at 298 by 1065 kilometers, based on radiation constraints and 
actual radiation levels measured in 1964. But the decision to use 
Agena for docked maneuvers had already been made, and any rnis iv- 
that an emergency reentry from an elli tical orbit with a 
f ings had to be laid aside. After careful study, the planners conclu ed 
r 298 kilometers could be made even if on y three out of the perigee our r tro- 
rockets fired. Finally, they plotted the spacecraft's orbital track with 
great care, to avoid the heavy radiation patches.79 
With the memory of past flighcs still fresh-when no one had been 
sure what target, if any, would be waiting-they made alternate and 
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contingency plans for Gemini X. If the target vehicle for this flight did 
not reach orbit, the mission would be renamed X-A, and the spacecraft 
would be launched into a 162- by 385-kilometer orbit to rendezvous 
with the Agena 8 on the 16th revolution. The alternate plans also cov- 
ered experiments, extravehicular activity, and systems tests.80 
After the premission review, the traditional meal, and the ritualis- 
tic suiting up, Young and Collins left the crew quarters on 18 July 
1966 for pad 19-to begin the most complex manned flight so far. 
They had been awakened at noon for a 5:20 p.m. takeoff, when a 35- 
second window offered the best chance for rendezvous with the two 
Agenas. The Atlas lifted its payload toward space at 3:39 p.m., just 
two seconds late.* One hundred minutes later, the Gemini launch ve- 
hicle boosted the spacecraft skyward exactly on time. Except for a 
slight shaking and a buzzing in their ears, Young and Collins had a 
nice ride to start chasing their first target.81 
At entry into orbit, Gemini X trailed its Agena by 1800 kilometers. 
Flight Director Lunney told the crew they were all set for a fourth-or- 
bit rendezvous. Collins unstowed a Kollsman sextant to sight on select- 
ed stars for an attempt at optical navigation. Young pointed the space- 
craft while his crewmate tried to find the horizon. Collins realized that 
he was using the wrong reference when he saw stars below the line. 
He had been mistaking the airglow, a band of radiant light from the 
upper atmosphere, for the horizon. Even after he corrected this, Col- 
lins could not get the lens of the sextant to work properly, as the opti- 
cal image of the stars did not agree with what he had been taught. He 
laid the Kollsman aside and tried an Ilon instrument, but that was little 
help as the Ilon had a severely limited field of view.82 
Young and Collins checked their figures with Lunney, who had 
been watching their activities carefully through telemetry. When the 
trio found that the numbers did not agree with those of the ground 
computers, Gordon Cooper, the Houston CapCom, passed the word 
that the crew would have to use the ground computations. Young then 
fired the thrusters to adjust their orbit to 265 by 2'72 kilometers. When 
he aligned the platform for the terminal phase, the command pilot did 
not realize that the spacecraft was turned slightly. As he thrusted to- 
ward the target, Young needed two large midcourse corrections. The 
spacecraft path toward the Agena was not lined up pro erly. So he 
had to stop thrusting briefly and take off on a new tac g . The final 
translational maneuvers to reach the Agena cost nearly 181 kilograms 
*This was the 299th Atlas launch-the 100th for NASA. 
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of fuel, or three times more than any earlier mission.83 Five hours and 
52 minutes after launch, Young reported a rigid dock.84 
Because too much fuel had been used, Lunney decided to omit 
docking practice-backing away and returning to the target's cone. 
Young and Collins wondered if the second rendezvous might also be 
canceled, but, some six and a half hours into the mission, the $und controllers started giving the crew the data they would need or the 
burn. Then, an hour later, the CapCom at Hawaii cleared them to try 
for second rendezvous. 
The Agena main engine roared into life exactly on time. For 80 
seconds, the target vehicle thrust the spacecraft upward, adding 129 
meters per second to their speed. The crew, at the moment flying 
backward, had little to say about their reactions to a negative one-g 
force (a shove to the front of the body-"eyeballs out"-rather than a 
push on their backsides-"eyeballs inw-as during launch). They were 
thrown forward from the seats against the body straps. Young later 
described the first ride on a space switch engine: 
At first, the sensation I got was that there was a pop [in front of our 
eyes], then there was a big explosion and a clang. We were thrown 
forward in the seats. We had our shoulder harnesses fastened. Fire 
and sparks started coming out of the back end of that rascal. The 
light was something fierce, and the acceleration was pretty good. 
The vehicle yawed off-I don't remember whether it was to the 
right or to the left-but it was the kind of response that the Lock- 
heed people had predicted we would get.. . . The shutdown on the 
PPS [primary propulsion system] was just unbelievable. It was a 
quick jolt . . . and the tailoff . . . I never saw anything like that be- 
fore, sparks and fire and smoke and lights.85 
Gemini X reached an orbit that measured 763 kilometers at the 
top and 294 kilometers at the bottom. The Agena had pushed the 
spacecraft more than 463 kilometers above its initial apogee. Young 
and Collins now viewed Earth from a higher elevation than any hu- 
man beings ever had. Instead of gazing at the planet in wonderment, 
however, they confined their attention to the~r  own little, artificial 
world. They watched spacecraft systems and kept an eye on the radia- 
tion dosage readings (which were within tolerable limits). During his 
technical debriefing, Young only reported, "We took some pictures at 
apogee. . . . I don't know where it was, but it shows the curvature of 
the earth. . . . We took some pictures coming down hill. I think it was 
the Red Sea area." Thus, in rating one impression over the other- 
record high altitude versus Agena ignition-Young and Collins were 
more affected by the firing of the switch engine than they were by the 
unique vantage point they had reached. This lack of awe at their re- 
cord height was caused, at least in part, by the fact that the switch en- 
gine blocked much of the downward view.86 
Gernimi X 
18 July 1966 
Above, erector on pad 19 being low- 
ered during a range frequency test; 
Gemini X still wears protective cover- 
ing. Right, engineer practices retriev- 
ing an experiment package from 
Agena, using the EVA simulator. 
Collins was scheduled to perform this 
task during Gemini X .  
Rendezvous with Agena. 
Gemini X lines up for docking with 
Agena; Agena then propelled Gemini 
X out to 752 kilometers altitude and to 
rendezvous with Gemini VIII's Agena. 
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Nine hours into the flight, the pilots bedded down, sleeping fitful- 
ly. Both were still wondering if the second rendezvous would be done. 
Besides, neither was "really bone-tired," Collins said. Charlesworth's 
shift in Mission Control was busy that night, reviewing alternate plans 
for adapting the mission to fulfill its objectives. 
When Young and Collins opened for business after 18 hours of 
flight, their spirits lifted as the CapCom at Carnarvon gave them the 
numbers for the next target vehicle firing. With the Agenalspacecraft 
combination faced about so the main engine would fire directly into 
the flight path, Young made a 78-second burn to reduce the velocity 
by 105 meters per second and lower the apogee to 382 kilometers. 
The pilots were again pressed forward in their seats, but this time they 
were impressed more by the firepower of the Agena than by its fire- 
works. "It may be only 1 g, but it's the biggest 1 g we ever saw! That 
thing really lights into you," Young commented.87 
Like rendezvous maneuvers in the past, the next Agena burn (and 
the final one with the main engine) aimed at circularizing the orbit. At 
22:37 hours, the target drove the spacecraft along the flight path to 
add 25 meters per second to the speed. This brought the low point of 
the orbit up to 377.6 kilometers-only 17 kilometers below Agena 8.88 
Although rendezvous and docked maneuvers with the Agena were 
the high point of the first day, the crew also spent a good part of that 
time on the 14 experiments they carried." Twenty minutes after 
launch, the crew turned on a switch to start the tri-axis magnetometer 
(MSC-3). This device was used, as it had been in other flights, to meas- 
ure the radiation levels in the South Atlantic Anomaly. Two other 
experiments were also devoted to radiation-MSC-6, beta spectrometer 
(mounted in the adapter to measure potential radiation doses for fu- 
ture missions), and MSC-7, bremsstrahlung spectrometer (installed in 
the cabin to detect radiation flux as a function of energy when the 
spacecraft passed through the South Atlantic Anomaly).89 
Some of the experiments had to be done outside the spacecraft. 
Before the third Agena burn, Collins got ready for his first exposure 
to outer space, a standup EVA. Preparations went well and the hatch 
opened easily. At sunset, Collins stood in his seat, setting up a 70-mm 
general-purpose camera for S-13, a photographic study of stellar ultra- 
violet radiation. Collins aimed the camera at the southern Milky Way, 
scanning from Beta Crucis to Gamma Velorum, and exposed 22 
frames. The entire night pass was devoted to this task. Young helped 
*Originally scheduled to do 16 experiments, Gemini X lost MSC-5 (lunar ultraviolet spectral 
reflectance), which was to determine the ultraviolet spectral reflectance of the lunar surface and 
aid in designing equipment to protect Apollo astronauts from sunburn and eye damage. Because 
the Moon was out of phase, this chore was deleted before the flight. M-5, bioassays of body fluids 
had been the bane of all crews from Gemini VII through IX-A. Mathews had tried in vain to get 
it out of the earlier missions. This time he succeeded-its cancellation on 12 July 1966 marked 
the end of medical experiments in the Gemini program. 
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Collins identify the stars, at the same time controlling the spacecraft 
and target vehicle combination. With the beginning of daylight, Collins 
began MSC-8, color patch photography, to see if film could accurately 
reproduce colors in space. The pilot did not complete this assignment, 
however, as his eyes began to fill with tears. Young had the same prob- 
lem. They suspected at first that the anti-fog compound inside their 
faceplates was irritating their eyes. They closed the hatch at 24:13 
hours, about 6 minutes early.90 
They had noticed a strange odor that they thought might have 
been the lithium hydroxide used in the environmental control system, 
but ground engineers finally concluded that their smarting eyes were 
caused by having both suit fans on at once. They turned one fan off 
and, at 30 hours elapsed time, began a second sleep period. Bone-tired 
this time, they rested well.91 
Young and Collins awakened to a "morning" of increased activity. 
In addition to normal systems check, the ground network also remind- 
ed them of the experiments expected this day-the S-26 ion wake 
measurement, to study the ion and electron structure of the space- 
craft's wake (after it undocked from the Agena), S-5 syno tic terrain, 
and S-6 synoptic weather photography. The pilots also ha to work in 
two maneuvers to help them catch up with Agena 8. 
B 
Their Agena switch engine had accomplished its task, and more. 
After being hooked to it for 39 hours, however, they were getting a 
little tired of looking at it. Young said that watching the Agena out his 
window was 
just like backing down the railroad [track] in a diesel engine looking 
at a big boxcar in front of you. . . . The big drawback of having the 
Agena up there is that you can't see the outside world. The view out 
of the window with the Agena on there is just practically zilch.92 
On freeing themselves from their Agena, the crewmen began prepar- 
ing for Collins' exit from the spacecraft. Young now needed to make 
the final maneuvers to get the spacecraft close enough to the Agena 8 
for Collins to reach it. Collins connected the 15-meter umbilical to his 
suit and then fastened it out of the way until time to use it. 
"45:38. First sighting of Gemini VIII," Young said. "At this minute 
it's blurry." After the distance between the two vehicles had been cal- 
culated, the Houston CapCom (on the remote line through the Canton 
station) informed Young, "Your range, Gemini X, is 95 [nautical] miles 
[I76 kilometers]." The crew then learned that what they had been 
looking at was their own Agena just 5.5 kilometers away. Houston 
offered consolation, "95 miles is a pretty long range," and Young an- 
swered, "You have to have real good eyesight for that." They didn't 
see the Gemini VIII  Agena until it was 30 to 3'7 kilometers from them, 
looking to Young like "a dim star-like dot until the sun rose above the 
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spacecraft nose." NORAD's constant care had paid off. They found 
Agena 8 'ust where it was supposed to be.93 
At 4 1 :26 hours Young started the final closure, with Collins com- 
puting the figures for two midcourse corrections. The crew found the 
old Agena pretty stable, and Young moved in to stationkeep about 3 
meters above it. In less than 30 minutes, he told the Houston CapCom 
that they were going down for a closer look at the micrometeorite 
collection package. Back in Mission Control Center, fuel usage during 
stationkeeping was being very closely watched. When it proved to be 
reasonable, Gemini X received a go for the next extravehicular exer- 
cise. "Glad you said that," Young answered, "because Mike's going out- 
side right now."94 
Collins emerged from the spacecraft at dawn. Like Cernan on 
Gemini IX-A, he found that all tasks took longer than he expected. 
But he picked off the package from the spacecraft exterior. Next, he 
moved to the adapter to attach his zip gun to the nitrogen fuel supply. 
Back in the cockpit area once again, he held on while Young moved 
the spacecraft to within two meters of the Agena. 
Collins pushed off from the spacecraft, floated freely in space, and 
grasped the outer lip of the docking cone on the target. As he 
clutched at the experiment package, he wished for handholds--or 
more hands. Cernan had warned him that it would be hard, and it 
was. He soon lost his grip on the smooth lip and drifted away from the 
package and from the Agena. He had to decide quickly whether to 
pull on the umbilical, coiling about like a snake, or to use the hand- 
held gun. Being about 5 meters away from the spacecraft, Collins 
chose the gun. It worked, and he propelled himself first to the space- 
craft and then back to the Agena, using a series of squirts to get to the 
package. This time he clung to wire bundles and struts behind the 
adapter cone and grasped the S-10 experiment. Collins was supposed 
to attach a replacement device in its place, but he abandoned this idea, 
fearing he would lose the one he had picked up. Using the umbilical, 
he pulled himself hand over hand back to the cockpit and gave the S- 
10 package to Young. 
So far, the umbilical had been snubbed so it would extend only 6 
meters. The pilot now unsnapped the buckle that released the remain- 
ing 9 meters, intending to evaluate the gun. But the gun play stopped 
before it started. The Hawaii CapCom told Young, "We don't want 
you to use any more fuel [for stationkeeping]." Young replied, "Well, 
then, he'd better get back in." To Collins he said, "Come on back in 
the house."95 - 
Getting back into the spacecraft was surprisingly difficult. Collins 
had gotten himself tangled in the umbilical. Since the pressurized suit 
made it difficult to see or feel just where the line had wrapped itself 
about him, he had to wait while Young helped unwind him and got 
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him back into the seat. But fuel remained the big question. Houston 
called them, "just . . . to confirm that you're not using any fuel." 
Young replied, "We've got everything shut off." 
More was shut off than he realized. He soon discovered that the 
radio transmitter had also been turned off. By this time, Collins was 
back in his seat. Young reported that hatch closing had been easy. 
With the long lifeline coiling all over the cabin, Young thought it made 
"the snakehouse at the zoo look like a Sunday school picnic." A little 
over an hour later, the crew reopened the hatch and tossed out the 
chestpack and umbilical. This operation only took three minutes. 
McDonnell had done an excellent job on this righthand hatch.96 
Because of the time spent struggling with the umbilical, Collins 
and Young had to hurry to get set up for an important manuever that 
would make the point of reentry more precise. They carried out an 
orbit-shaping activity exactly on time, at 51:38 hours. This retrograde 
firing, of 30 meters per second, brought the spacecraft perigee down 
106 kilometers, making the orbital parameters safe for reentry. After 
another round of experiments-this time synoptic terrain and weather 
photographs taken as the spacecraft drifted through space-the crew 
began their third sleep period.97 
On awakening (about 63 hours into the flight) on homecoming 
day, Young and Collins spent more time on experiments and did their 
acking. Then, '70 hours and 10 minutes after liftoff, the crew felt the 
Erst retrorocket ignite as they passed over the Canton Island tracking 
station during their 43rd revolution. Reentry went remarkably well, 
with Young steering bank angles by computer solutions. Landing in 
the western Atlantic at 70:46 hours (4:07 p.m., 21 July 1966) was only 
5.4 kilometers from the aiming point. The crew of the primary vessel, 
the Guadalcanal, watched the spacecraft hit the water. Once the swim- 
mers had attached the flotation collar and positioned the raft, Youn 
and Collins climbed out. They were lifted by helicopter to the deck o 
the recovery ship.98 
H 
With that part of the mission completed, the flight controllers put 
the Gemini X Agena through its paces. Over a 12-hour period, the 
main engine was fired twice and the small engine once. Since the first 
maneuver was intended to study temperatures at higher altitudes, the 
controllers sent the Agena up to a 1390- by 385-kilometer orbit. They 
watched it for almost seven hours and found that the temperatures 
varied little from those at lower orbits. The vehicle was then returned 
to a circular orbit (352 kilometers) that would make it available as an 
alternate target for later flights.99 
Gemini IX-A and X had successfully grappled with some of the 
specific needs of the Apollo program, acquiring operational experience 
while fostering healthy debates between the two programs on proce- 
dures and equipment. Perhaps the greatest benefit to Apollo was the 
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demonstration and practice of several ty es of rendezvous. Each pro- B vided a storehouse of information. In a dition, the orbit-shaping ma- 
neuvers to the higher altitudes established that the trapped-radiation 
hazards could be avoided on. trips into deep space. Then, too, the very 
fact that one spaceborne vehicle could meet another, latch onto it, and 
use it as a kind of space tug offered many possibilities for such space 
flight concepts as shuttles, space stations, and space laboratories. 
There had been problems, but missions IX-A and X had logged a 
combined total of three hours and 41 minutes open-hatch experience. 
Although the extravehicular hiatus between the fourth and ninth 
flights adversely affected both equipment and operational develop- 
ment, Cernan and Collins had shown that tasks outside the spacecraft 
were feasible. They found that all chores took longer than foreseen 
and that body positioning was difficult. During technical debriefings, 
each extravehicular pilot had pointed out the need for more and bet- 
ter restraints and handholds. These aids were being developed. Over- 
all, perhaps, extravehicular activity remained Gemmi's greatest prob- 
lem. It was and is dangerous, difficult, and deceptive, despite its de- 
lights. 
The ninth and tenth flights also took several steps forward in ex- 
periment performance. Despite operational constraints, usually 
brought on by limited fuel resources, each situation had been modified 
to wring the utmost from specific experiments. More and more, princi- 
pal investigators were being brought in to help with modifications and 
to assist in rescheduling their tasks for later in the missions, if neces- 
sary. These realtime flight changes could not have been carried out in 
an unmanned flight and would not have been done in an earlier Gemi- 
ni mission. So, in Gemini IX-A and X, the experiments program began 
to achieve maturit . 
By the end o r Gemini X, many of the men and women who had 
worked full time on the program had begun to have a strong feeling 
of anticlimax and to wonder about their next jobs. Some had already 
gone on to other fields, but Mathews tried to control this exodus and 
to hold enough together to finish the flights. Shortly after IX-A, he 
told his staff that the Gemini Program Office, as such, would not be 
continued. The people would be absorbed into other MSC activities- 
mainly Apollo and Apollo Applications. By early August, a personnel 
placement committee* had begun work. It soon arranged four to six 
interviews for each of the 193 project office people. This allayed any 
*The committee consisted of Augustine A. Verrengia (Gemini), Robert J. Bailey (Apollo), 
Donald T. Gregory (Flight Crew Operations), James Null (Apollo Applications), Chris C. Critzos 
(Flight Operations), and Elwyn H. Yeater (Engineering and Development). 
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immediate fears, but Mathews still warned his staff to refrain from 
making personal contacts for new jobs until the committee could com- 
plete its arrangements.100 There were two more flights in the Gemini 
program, but it already seemed to be heading into history. 
The Final Curtain 
B Y the summer of 1966, other space programs-Apollo, Apollo Applications, and the Air Force's Manned Orbiting Laboratory 
(M0L)-were already culling Project Gemini for useful equipment and 
people. Engineers still working on Gemini were distracted by calls to 
help qualify a heatshield for the MOL, to work on airlocks for the 
Applications program, and to share their launch vehicle experience 
with Apollo. In addition, NASA Headquarters was pressing the 
Manned Spacecraft Center to reduce the intervals between launches 
again-this time from two months to six weeks. As the program 
neared its end, spare parts emerged as a new worry. Would there be 
enough hardware to finish out the missions? As Scott Simpkinson, who 
managed Gemini Test Operations, recalled, "It was a bit touchy, but 
we made it." In this hectic climate, NASA flew the last two Gemini 
missions. 1 
Gemini's final deadline was now flatly fixed at the end of January 
1967, with Gemini XI tentatively set for 11 September and Gemini XI1 
for 31 October 1966.2 
Some significant goals had been set for the last two flights. For 
example, the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office successfully pushed for 
a rendezvous in the first spacecraft revolution, which would simulate 
lunar orbit rendezvous. There was also interest in linking an Agena to 
a spacecraft by a tether and then spinning the combination to produce 
something like artificial gravity. One short-lived proposal, a rendezvous 
between Gemini XI1 and an Apollo spacecraft, was squelched after 
review by both program offices. Another idea, a flyby or rendezvous of 
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a Gemini spacecraft with an Orbiting Astronomical Laboratory, also 
came to nothing. And, finally, on the last mission the Air Force still 
hoped to fly the Astronaut Maneuvering Unit (AMU), a task that Eu- 
gene Cernan had been forced to abandon on Gemini IX-A3 
On 21 March 1966, Charles Conrad and Richard Gordon were 
named as command pilot and pilot for Gemini XI. Neil Armstrong 
and William A. Anders were icked as alternates. James Love11 and 
Edwin Aldrin were announced'as the Gemini XI1 crew on 17 June, 
with Gordon Cooper and Cernan as backups. Of the eight men, only 
Anders had not previously been assigned to Gemini. Crews for the ten 
manned flights had been drawn from three astronaut classes, with sev- 
eral of the pilots receiving multiple assignments.*4 
PLOTTING THE WAY UP 
When he was training in mid-1965 as pilot for Gemini V, Conrad 
learned of a plan to fly Gemini around the Moon in a mission called 
LEO for Large Earth Orbit. The concept, in one form or another, had 
recurred sporadically (only to be scotched) ever since Gemini's first 
year. But LEO raised interest all the way from MSC to Congress. 
NASA's top leaders, James Webb and Robert Seamans, did not agree, 
contending that Apollo did not need a competitor. If Congress wanted 
to appropriate additional funds, Webb said, it would be better to 
spend them on the program that was designed to go to the Moon. 
Another idea that flourished briefly during 1965 was a possible ren- 
dezvous with a Pegasus satellite that was first considered for Gemini 
VI, then for Gemini VIII. When extravehicular activity (EVA) was 
canceled on Gemini V, VI, and VII, the planners realized that experi- 
ence would be too limited and risks too great to have an astronaut 
approach a satellite in space. GPO decided in January 1966 that there 
would be no rendezvous with a Pegasus. 
Conrad was much taken with the notion of a Gemini trip around 
the Moon.5 Even after Webb dismissed the scheme, he still wanted to 
take Gemini as far as it would go. When he was named as command 
pilot, he recalled, "it didn't look like . . . [a high altitude] flight was 
ever going to get done on Gemini." Conrad saw a heaven-sent oppor- 
tunity to resurrect the idea when he calculated that he could save some 
of the Agena's fuel to power a high ride. 
He began a small crusade to convince NASA management that 
there were good reasons for going really high. Although the Weather 
Bureau had satellites flying at very high altitudes, then televised pic- 
tures of cloud formations had poor resolution. Moreover, the Bureau 
*See Appendix C.  
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had been debating the use of a color system. Conrad argued that Gem- 
ini XI could bring back films to he1 them decide its worth. It was, in 
fact, to the experimenters that he Erst turned in his cam aign to fly 
high, asking which experiments might be helped and whit\ degraded 
by higher altitudes. He learned that Maurice M. Shapiro of the Naval 
Research Laboratory was concerned that radiation particles from the 
Van Allen belts might affect his nuclear emulsion experiment at the 
higher orbit. That almost killed Conrad's plan before it was well start- 
ed. But he enlisted fellow astronaut Anders, a nuclear engineer, for a 
trip to Washington to argue against the threat. After ~ n d e r s  got 
friends at Goddard Space Flight Center to look into the radiation belt 
hazards and to devise ways of avoiding them, the high apogee excur- 
sion soon became part of Gemini XI.6 
Another unique objective for XI, direct (first orbit) rendezvous, 
had been suggested before Gemini flights began. Proposed by Richard 
R. Carley of GPO, the idea had been put aside when interest had fo- 
cused on a concentric, fourth-orbit plan. Carley's proposal revived 
when the Apollo office insisted on a closer simulation of lunar orbit 
rendezvous. With some signs of reluctance, GPO asked McDonnell to 
study the maneuver. The first meeting to phrase plans and ground 
rules for the study revealed some foot-draggin ; its results included a 
curious stipulation: "There should be no arti i! cial restrictions in the 
plan to make the mission simulate Apollo operations or to simulate 
lunar rendezvous conditions."7 That position was soon reversed as 
Apollo interests revailed. The first change in the flight lan to in- 
clude direct ren f ezvous made any launch delay a reason ! or shifting 
the mission to "a modified M = 3 [rendezvous in the third orbit] plan," 
but the following version "recycled [the launch] to the next direct ren- 
dezvous launch opportunity."8 
Although schemes for achieving artificial gravity in space preceded 
real manned space flight by many decades, Gemini offered the first 
chance to turn science fiction into fact. Half the program had passed, 
however, before NASA got around to planning tethered vehicle flights. 
GPO first asked the Engineering and Development Directorate to 
study the problems involved in tying the Gemini spacecraft to either 
the Agena or the Pegasus satellite.9 Its backlog of Apollo work forced 
the directorate to decline its aid, in view of the extensive simulation 
required. Appeals to Flight Operations were more fruitful, however, 
leading to a number of tether simulations, the data from which were 
duly passed along to McDonnell.10 
McDonnell's guidance and control group found that nylon or dac- 
ron tethers no longer than 50 meters and a spin rate no more than ten 
degrees per second produced a reasonable amount of cable tension 
and recommended that the pilots practice spinning on a vehicle simu- 
lator to learn how best to conserve fuel. I 1 
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When NASA planners listed tethered flight as a mission objective, 
they first thought of it as a way of evaluating the tether as an aid to 
stationkee ing;l:! but it might also be a means of inducing some degree 
of artificia !i' gravity. The m~nimum spin rate depended on whether the 
tethered activity was intended primarily for formation flying or for 
achieving gravity. NASA decided to try for both, although it would set- 
tle for "an economical and feasible method of long-term, unattended 
station keeping," and chose a 30-meter dacron line.13 
The Gemini Mission Review Board reviewed all these new activi- 
ties in depth, especially the first-orbit rendezvous, which might be a 
heavy fuel user.14 Young and Collins had expended so much fuel in 
the Gemini X rendezvous that the board was dubious about trying a 
first-orbit linkup, largely computed onboard, with an Agena target. 
But Flight Director Glynn Lunney assured the group that Mission 
Control could give the crew backup data on orbital insertion and on 
the accuracy of their first maneuver; the network would have plenty of 
information to help them begin the terminal phase of rendezvous. The 
board concluded that if the rendezvous used only half the fuel supply, 
about 187 kilograms, there would be ample for the rest of the mission. 
Some skeptics remained; William Schneider, Deputy Director for Mis- 
sion Operations, bet board chairman James Elms a dollar that it could 
not be done that economically.l5 
The board seemed less concerned about the high apogee maneu- 
ver and the tethered vehicle exercise than about direct rendezvous. 
Radiation levels on Gemini X having been only a tenth of the preflight 
estimate, the board simply asked that MSC and Goddard keep track of 
the latest measurements. The only major question about the tether 
plan was the method for freeing the spacecraft from the Agena. The 
board was told that the plan was to fire a pyrotechnic charge, ejecting 
the docking bar at right angles to the spacecraft path. If that did not 
work, there was a break link in the tether that could be snapped by a 
small separation velocity. 16 
As might be expected, extravehicular activity received special at- 
tention. After the experience on Gemini IX-A, training methods were 
sought that would more closely approximate flight conditions. One 
likely approach simulated zero-g by putting a space-suited subject 
under water, where buoyancy almost balanced weight, and leaving him 
to cope with mass and inertia just as he would have to do in space.17 
Despite the degree of EVA success that Collins had in Gemini X, work 
on this idea went ahead. There were, as MSC Director Robert Gilruth 
later said, "many mixed emotions here at the Center-some of our 
people didn't think the neutral buoyancy work was any good." But 
Cernan, who checked out the method at Gilruth's request, found that 
moving about under water in a pressure suit closely matched his ef- 
forts in space. These findings, however, were not impressed upon 
Gordon in his training for Gemini XI.18 
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More was needed than a better training medium. Both equipment 
and body positioning aids had to be improved. Hardware changes in- 
cluded handholds on the target vehicle docking cone, a shorter umbili- 
cal, and better foot restraints in the spacecraft adapter. The handholds 
were simple to design and install. Both Collins and Young had com- 
plained about the 15-meter snake that had entangled Collins. They 
suggested its length be cut to 9 meters, and GPO agreed. Developing 
better foot restraints took a little more time. McDonnell was working 
on two kinds-a spring clamp like those on a ski and a bucket type. 
NASA chose the latter, which were nicknamed "the golden slippers."lg 
Twelve experiments were included in the Gemini XI flight plan 
(See Appendix D). Nine were scientific, the other three technologcal. 
Two of the science experiments-S-29, Earth-Moon libration region 
photography, and S-30, dim light photographylorthicon-were new to 
Gemini. The other seven-weather, terrain, and airglow horizon pho- 
tography; radiation and zero-g effects; ion-wake measurement; nuclear 
emulsion; and the ultraviolet astronomical camera-and all three tech- 
nological experiments-mass determination, night image intensifica- 
tion, and power tool evaluation-had been assigned to previous mis- 
sions. The Gemini Mission Review Board concluded that they fitted 
properly into the Gemini XI workload. By 25 August, MSC was able to 
report that all experiments were ready for flight.20 
When reduced launch intervals required faster delivery to the 
Cape, the challenge was met. Before the end of July, launch prepara- 
tions were under way in Florida. On 11 August, NASA announced 
that the flight would be launched on or about 9 September, only two 
days after the target date set more than three months earlier21 
The countdown-to-launch began on schedule on 9 September 
1966, but it did not finish that way. After the booster was fueled, the 
launch crew detected a pinhole leak in the first stage oxidizer tank, 
which had to be fixed. Technicians used a sodium silicate solution and 
an aluminum patch to plug the leak; and Mission Director Schneider 
reset the launch for 10 September. 
Trouble for the second scheduled send-off cropped up in a differ- 
ent area and much later in the countdown. Conrad and Gordon had 
completed the required rituals and headed toward pad 19 and their 
spacecraft when they heard that the Atlas, only 1800 meters away, was 
having a problem with its autopilot. The General Dynamics test con- 
ductor called a hold in the countdown to have this suddenly wayward 
instrument checked. His engineers told him they were receiving faulty 
readings and were running checks before deciding whether to replace 
the part. When the delay had stretched to an hour, Schneider post- 
poned the launch for two more days. The problem was caused by a 
combination of factors-a fluttering valve, unusually high winds, and a 
too-sensitive telemetry recorder-none of which required replacement 
of the autopilot. There would be no further delay.22 357 
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On 12 September 1966, Conrad and Gordon arrived at the pad 
and stepped into their seats exactly on time. Guenter Wendt, Mc- 
Donne11 pad leader, signaled his men to close the hatches, but they 
soon had to reopen Conrad's. He suspected that some oxygen was 
leaking from his side of the cabin. He was right. When the hatch had 
been fixed, the countdown went on. At 8:05 a.m., the Atlas roared into 
action. Gemini XI had its target.23 
If ever two pilots waited anxiously for the starter's gun to crack, 
Conrad and Gordon did. For th.e first orbit catchu the time to come 
out of the chute was unbelievably short. It was t f e shortest launch 
window in the Gemini program. Gemini X, for example, had 35 sec- 
onds in which to launch, Gemini XI1 would have 30 seconds. Mathews 
had informed McDonnell and SSD that Gemini XI'S launch window 
was only long enough for an "on-time launch." The postlaunch mis- 
sion report, however, gave two seconds as the length of the window 
for a first-orbit rendezvous. Rocketeers of the forties, fifties, and early 
sixties would have been aghast at the idea of having to launch within 
two ticks of the clock.24 
Conrad chanted the count: " . . . 3, the bolts blew, and we got 
lift-off." This was at 9:42:26.5, just half a second into the two-second 
period. The Titan booster shoved Gemini XI toward a first-orbit ren- 
dezvous with near-perfect accuracy. At six minutes, the flight control 
circuit carried the glad tidings, "Gemini XI, you're GO for M equals 
1." This welcome word came at booster separation, when debris could 
be seen out the window. Gordon had warned himself not to look, but 
temptation got the better of him for a brief instant.25 
Immediately upon insertion, Conrad and Gordon performed an 
insertion-velocity-adjust-routine (IVAR) maneuver, to correct the 
flight path up or down, right or left, and add to or decrease speed as 
needed. During IVAR, any decrease in spacecraft speed (retrograde 
firing) is done with great care because of the danger of recontact with 
the launch vehicle. The rules, therefore, say that the pilots must have 
the booster in sight before they begin to cut their speed at this point. 
Their computer showed the crew they had made very precise insertion 
corrections that would help them catch a target 430 kilometers away.26 
The first onboard calculations had succeeded; now it was time to 
try again. There would be no help from the ground stations, as Gemi- 
ni XI was out of telemetry and communications range. At the appoint- 
ed moment, Conrad made an out-of-plane maneuver of one meter per 
second. He then pitched the spacecraft nose 32 degrees u from his 
horizontal flight plane. Now came the test to see if their Krst figures 
had been right. They turned on the rendezvous radar-the electronic 
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lockon signal registered immediately. Happily, the crew switched the 
onboard computer to the rendezvous mode and began preparing for 
the final part of the catchup. When they could talk to the ground 
again, Gordon said, "Be advised we're [within] . . . 50 [nautical] miles 
[93 kilometers]."27 
Young, the Houston CapCom, then cut in over the remote line 
through Tananarive to give the crew some numbers for the remainder 
of the chase. Conrad and Gordon checked these calculations against 
their own and found the differences so minor they could have used 
either set to do the job. They decided to stick with their own solutions. 
Just as the spacecraft neared the high point of the orbit, Conrad fired 
the thrusters to produce multidirectional changes-forward, down, 
and to the right-to travel the remaining 39 kilometers to the target. 
Suddenly the Agena, whose blinkin lights they had been watching in 
the darkness, flashed into the sun%ght over the Pacific and almost 
blinded them. They scrambled for sunglasses, then Conrad jockeyed 
the spacecraft to within 15 meters of the target's docking cone. Over 
the coast of California, only 85 minutes after launch, rendezvous in 
the first orbit was achieved3 
A gleeful crew called out, "Mr. Kraft--;would [you] believe M 
equals l?" He would. Moreover, they still had 56 percent of their 
maneuvering fuel. This transmission made a believer out of Mission 
Director Schneider. He fished in his pants pocket, pulled out a one- 
dollar bill, and scribbled a notation for Elms: "Sep[aration] 85#, Plane 
Change 5#, TPI 145#, Midcourse 20#, Braking 150#, [total], 405#. I 
never lost a better dollar. Bill Schneider."29 
After appropriate congratulations, Young told Conrad and Gor- 
don to go ahead and dock. Seconds later, Conrad reported matter-of- 
factly, "We are docked." The Gemini XI crew now had an opportunity 
to do something else that NASA had wanted for a long time-docking 
and undocking practice. Each man pulled out and drove back once in 
daylight and once in darkness. It was easy-much easier, Conrad said, 
than in the translation and docking trainer on the ground. For the 
first time, also, a copilot was given the chance to dock with a target 
vehicle.30 
Even while docking and backing away from the Agena, the crew 
was meeting another flight objective. Attached to the Agena target 
docking adapter was S-26, an experiment that studied the ion-wake 
structure during docking practice. Two other experiments were started 
at that time-S-9, nuclear emulsion, and a modified form of S-29, li- 
bration regions photography. The crew turned on the emulsion pack- 
age shortly after the hookup with the target, and a telemetry check 
disclosed that it was working. Gordon later retrieved it from behind 
the command pilot's hatch. S-29, a study of dim light phenomena, 
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could not be carried out as planned because of the three-day mission 
delay. The Milky Way now obscured the intended target. Instead, the 
crew photographed the gegenschein and two comets. 
After the last docking, the crew used the main Agena engine in a 
test run before going to high altitude. Facing 90 degrees away from 
the flight path, Conrad fired the main engine, adding a velocity of 33 
meters per second to pull over into a new orbital lane. This really im- 
pressed them. Gordon remarked to Young (who had flown the Agenal 
spacecraft combination in Gemini X), "I agree with you, John, riding 
that PPS [primary propulsion system] is the biggest thrill we've had all 
day."sl 
Now, after six hours of hard but frustration-free work, Conrad 
and Gordon powered down the spacecraft systems, ate a meal, and 
soon got a "good night" salutation from the network. For eight hours, 
they dozed and rested, awaking, as Gordon said, brighteyed and bushy- 
tailed. The  only complaints the pilots had were about their dirty win- 
dows. Dirty windows had plagued all Gemini flights. Beginning with 
Gemini IX-A, all spacecraft carried covers that could be jettisoned af- 
ter the launch phase, but they did not seem to help much. Earlier, 
Conrad had asked if Gordon could wipe his window when he went 
outside. Now Alan Bean, who had taken over from Young as CapCom, 
told the pilot to rub half the command pilot's window with a dry cloth 
and bring the rag back for testing.32 
Conrad and Gordon napped-and rested awhile longer, then started 
their next major task-preparation for EVA. Four hours before they 
were to open the hatch, the crew began to get their suits ready for the 
vacuum environment. They had practiced this so many times on the 
ground, Conrad said, that they soon realized they did not need all that 
time. Within 50 minutes, the gear was ready and running. Just a few 
more steps and Gordon could have gone out. So Conrad called a halt, 
which left them sitting there, as he later said, with all the junk on. An 
hour later, they hooked up Gordon's environmental support system, 
and he made some oxygen-flow tests. This was also a mistake, they 
quickly perceived. The system dumped oxygen into the cabin, which, 
in turn, had to vent the excess into space. They could ill afford this 
rate of oxygen loss, and Conrad had Gordon switch back to the space- 
craft system. Gordon, uncomfortably warm, was glad to get back on 
the interior s stem. The extravehicular system's heat exchanger had 
been designeJ to operate in the vacuum of space, not in a pressurized 
cabin. 
Briefly, the two men considered asking Flight Director Clifford 
Charlesworth to let Gordon go out a revolution early. But they decid- 
ed to keep on schedule. As they sat and waited, they soon regretted 
that decision. At last it was almost time to open the hatch. Gordon 
began putting a sun visor on his faceplate, a real chore and one which 
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should have been done before he put on all this extra gear. Conrad 
finally got the left side fastened, but he could not reach across Gordon 
to fasten the other side. Gordon was now getting hot and bothered 
and had to rest. Time had been hanging on their hands before-now 
it was rushin past. Gordon wrestled with the right snap for five min- 
utes and fin f ly got it fastened, cracking the visor in the process. He 
was thoroughly winded before he got out of his seat. But he opened 
the hatch and stood up at 24:02 hours ground elapsed time-exactly 
on schedule.33 
"Here come the garbage bags," Conrad warned. Everything in the 
spacecraft that was not tied down began to float upward and out- 
ward-including Gordon. Outgassing of the environmental system 
caused this, and the crew expected it. Conrad grabbed for a strap on 
the leg of Gordon's suit and held him in the seat. 
Gordon then deployed a handrail-this was easy. Next he picked 
up the S-9 nuclear emulsion package and handed it to Conrad, who 
shoved it down between his legs into his footwell. Gordon then tried 
to install a camera in a bracket to photograph his own movements, but 
this was more difficult. Finally, Conrad let enough of the umbilical 
slide through his gloved hand to let the pilot float above the camera 
and hit it with his fist to drive it into place. 
It was now time for the spacewalker to move forward and attach a 
30-meter tether, housed in the Agena target docking ada ter, to the 
spacecraft docking bar. When Gordon pushed himself f orward, he 
missed his goal and drifted in an arcing path above the target's adapt- 
er and around in a semicircle until he reached the adapter behind the 
spacecraft. But Conrad had released only 2 meters of the 9-meter 
umbilical, so he pulled Gordon back to the hatch to start his trek 
again. This time Gordon reached the target and grabbed some fixed 
handrails to pull himself astride the spacecraft nose. 
"Ride 'em, cowboy!" Conrad shouted. Riding bareback, with his 
feet and legs wedged between the docked vehicles, was hard to do. In 
practice sessions in zero-g aircraft flights, Gordon had been able to 
push himself forward, straddle the reentry and recovery section, and 
wedge his feet and legs between the docking adapter and the space- 
craft to hold himself in place, leaving his hands free to attach the teth- 
er and clamp it down. But this did not seem to work so well in the 
actual conditions of space. He had to fight his pressurized suit to keep 
from floating away, and he had neither saddle nor stirrups to help 
him. All he could do was hold on with one hand and try to operate the 
tether clamp with the other. He struggled for six minutes, finally se- 
curing the line. At least, they were ready for the tethered flight experi- 
ment that would come later in the mission. To Conrad, it was obvious 
that Gordon was running out of steam. What had been relatively easy 
in zero-g airplane flight training had become a monumental task. With 
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his face streaming with sweat and his eyes stinging, Gordon groped 
blindly about. He tried to unstow a mirror on the docking bar so Con- 
rad could watch him when he went to the back of the spacecraft. Gor- 
don tugged at the attachment, but it would not budge. He abandoned 
the frozen mirror as not worth the effort. So far, he had not had a 
chance to wipe Conrad's window, either. 
As the pilot inched his way back to the hatch area, Conrad helped 
him as much as he could. They then discussed whether Gordon should 
go to the adapter and get the maneuvering gun stored there. His right 
eye was still burning, and Conrad could see just how exhausted his 
pilot was. The command pilot soon told Young (through the Tanana- 
rive remote station) that he had "brought Dick back in. . . . He got so 
hot and sweaty, he couldn't see." Gordon had no trouble getting into 
the spacecraft, nor did he have any difficulty closing the hatch. It had 
been open only 33 minutes, instead of the planned 107. One experi- 
ment (D-16, power tool evaluation) was a casualty on Gemini XI as it 
had been on VIII. Also scheduled for Gemini XII, it had been moved 
forward one flight because its release mechanism would interfere with 
that for the sensor covers on D-10 (ion-sensing attitude control); it 
would require additional engineering for thermal and structural im- 
pact; and it would ease the weight load (already growing too fast) on 
Spacecraft 12. When Gordon got so exhausted that he never reached 
the adapter area, the power-tool experiment that David Scott had 
mourned on Gemini VIII had to wait for Apollo. Because Conrad and 
Gordon were surrounded by so much loose gear, they opened the 
hatch an hour later and jettisoned all the umbilical extravehicular 
equipment. 
Although there was a standup EVA period still before them, space- 
walking (or swimming) on this mission was finished, and the feasiblity 
of working outside the spacecraft was not settled by Gemini XI. Cer- 
nan had told Collins and Gordon about his problems, and Collins had 
further emphasized his experiences to Gordon. Yet, as the flights 
progressed, each successive pilot continued to be amazed that the sim- 
plest tasks were so much harder than he expected. "Gene Cernan 
warned me about this and I took it to heart," Gordon later said. "I 
knew it was going to be harder, but I had no idea of the magnitude." 
Apparently the supportin engineers had no idea, either, since they 
still had not provided satis f actory restraints to help the crews.34 
The extreme exhaustion of past EVA pilots had sometimes ad- 
versely affected the rest of the mission. But Gordon's did not. Flight 
planners had learned to schedule periods of lesser activity immediately 
after heavy workloads. Conrad and Gordon began leisurely repacking 
equipment and restoring order to the cabin. Communications with the 
ground had dwindled to brief transmissions about spacecraft systems 
and crew medical checks. Conrad tested a thruster that had been slug- 
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gish and found that it was working better. The crew also ate a meal 
and photographed the airglow horizon. Half an hour before the sleep 
and rest period, the Rose Knot Victor tracking ship flight controller 
sent them the numbers for their next big event-the high ride.35 
Next day, Conrad and Gordon skipped breakfast to get the cabin 
ready before the hard shove in their midsections sent them upstairs. 
They wanted things buttoned up as though for reentry. So they suited 
themselves, closed their faceplates, and stowed everything they could. 
As the crew made a prefiring check of the Agena, they noticed 
that it was not accepting their commands immediately. Orders had to 
be repeated before they were acknowledged. Conrad told Bean about 
this and learned that the Agena was responding properly. The trouble 
was apparently in the spacecraft displays. "It [is] a heck of a time to 
have a . . . glitch like that show up," Conrad complained. But the 
Canary Islands communicator told them everything was fine and to 
"GO for the burn." 
At 40:30 hours into the flight, in the 26th revolution, Conrad trig- 
gered the firing signal to the target vehicle's main engine. For 26 sec- 
onds it belched a fiery stream to add 279.6 meters er second to their 
speed. "Whoop-de-doo!" Conrad yelled, "[that's] t hP e biggest thrill of 
my life." Since they faced the Agena, the acceleration forced the crew 
forward onto the seat harnesses. They watched the great round ball of 
Earth recede. What about orbital mechanics now? they wondered. 
Were they going to stop? From Carnarvon, 1372 kilometers below 
came, "Hello, up there." Conrad answered, "1'11 tell you, it's GO up 
here, and the world's round,. . . , you can't believe it . . . . I can see 
all the way from the end, around the top . . . about 150 degrees." 
When Bean asked him to enlarge on his impressions from his high 
vantage point, the command pilot continued, " . . . it really is blue. 
That water really stands out and everything looks blue. . . . The cur- 
vature of the earth stands out a lot. [There are] a lot of 
clouds. . . over the ocean . . . [but] Africa, India, and Australia [are] 
clear." He went on, "Looking straight down, you can see just as 
clearly . . . there's no loss of color and details are extremely 
good . . . . 9 ,  
Going up, the crew had not been merely sightseers, although they 
had used the tourists' favorite instrument-the camera. Gordon 
snapped synoptic terrain and synoptic weather photographs. The 
weather experiment needed cloud cover, and the terrain had to have 
clear views of the land areas. Conrad's at-a-glance description of the 
eastern hemisphere thus elated the principal investigators. They eager- 
ly awaited the more than 300 pictures clicked off. 
Radiation dosage at high altitude had caused some premission 
concern. The Van Allen belts (two doughnut-shaped radiation zones 
around Earth, named for James A. Van Allen, State University of 
GeminiX! 
12 September 1966 
Left, astronauts Charles Conrad and Richard Cordon practice 
water egress; above, spectators on viewing stand cheer Gemini 
X I  launch. 
Above left, Gemini X I  photographed the Gulf Coast from Galveston to Mo- 
bile Bay at normal orbital altitude, 270 kilometers. But after the Agena had 
rocketed them to the record altitude o f  1370 kilometers, the Earth was notice- 
ably farther away and the curvature o f  the horizon was that of a huge ball, as 
shown right, in this photograph of the Indian Ocean near Australia. 
Whipping around like a jump rope, 
the tether linking Gemini X I  and 
Agena was unexpectedly difficult to 
keep under steady tension in this sta- 
tion-keeping exercise. 
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Iowa physicist) are not constant about the planet, being denser in some 
regions than others. High apogee orbits for Gemini XI were therefore 
planned to take place over Australia, because the level there is compar- 
atively low. Now Conrad reported to Carnarvon, ". . . our dosimeter 
reads .3 rads per hour up here." Gordon amended this, saying, "Hous- 
ton, radiation is revised to .2 rads per hour." To which Bean replied, 
"Sounds like it's safer up there than a chest x-ray." Conrad later stated 
that "we got less radiation in our two 850-[nauticallmile [1570- 
kilometer] orbits than the X crew got in their longer period of time at 
450 [nautical] miles [830 kilometers]." 
Over the United States in the 28th revolution, Conrad used the 
Agena to lower the apogee of the orbit. Firing for 23 seconds de- 
creased speed by 280 meters per second and lowered the spacecraft 
orbit from 1372 to 304 kilometers. Another mission objective could be 
stamped "achieved."36 
After their high-flying excursion, Conrad and Gordon were sup- 
posed to get ready for the next EVA period. Instead, Conrad told 
Bean, "We're trying to grab a quick bite. We haven't had anything to 
eat yet today." The CapCom replied, "Be our guest." After they had 
eaten, they still had plenty of time before the exercise was to start. In 
revolution 29, above Madagascar, Gordon opened the hatch and 
watched the sunset. 
Gordon stood on the spacecraft floor, held down by a short tether 
like the one Collins had on Gemini X. It allowed him to forget about 
maintaining body position and left both hands free for his tasks. He 
mounted cameras in brackets without any difficulty. "Most enjoyable," 
he said of his two-hour standup period. So relaxed and well oriented 
was he that the monitoring physicians reported, "From a medical view- 
point, the standup EVA was relatively uneventful." 
Gordon's maln task during two night passes of open-hatch work 
was to photograph several star fields, using the S-13 ultraviolet astro- 
nomical camera. Because of his dirty window, Conrad had some diffi- 
culty in pointing the spacecraftlAgena combination in the right direc- 
tion; but Gordon, with his unimpaired view into open space, coached 
his commander into position. Agena stabilization was somewhat erratic, 
but the docked vehicles were steady enough to give excellent results in 
about one third of the photographs. 
Although neither man was really tired after the first half of the 
picture-snapping, Conrad considered closing the hatch and resting 
until the next night pass. He asked the Hawaii CapCom if there was 
enough oxygen. The answer was yes. But the skies were clear over the 
United States, and they might want to take more pictures there. In 
that case, said Conrad, the hatch would stay open. 
Soon the crew marveled at the view of their home area-Houston. 
They passed quietly across Florida and out over the Atlantic with noth- 
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ing to do. Suddenly, Gordon broke the silence to announce that they 
had just taken a catnap. "There we were. . . , he was asleep hanging 
out the hatch on his tether and I was asleep sitting inside the space- 
craft," Conrad reported. "That's a first," John Young answered, "first 
time sleeping in a vacuum." 
"Boy, my legs are tired," Gordon said after closing the hatch. "I'm 
tired all over. Man, I'm beat!" Conrad answered. This time their fa- 
tigue stemmed mainly from concentration on an experiment; it bore 
little relation to the hard physical struggle Gordon had endured out- 
side with the umbilical.37 
Now the crew rested and discussed the next major mission event- 
the tethered vehicle exercise. There were two ways of carrying out this 
experiment. In the first (called gravity gradient), the docked vehicle 
combination assumed the position of a pole always pointing toward 
Earth's center. The Agena engine nozzle represented the tip, the 
adapter section on the spacecraft the top of the pointer. Once the pole 
was pointed correctly; the crew then backed the spacecraft out of the 
Agena docking cone slowly, until the 30-meter tether became taut. If 
properly positioned, a slight thrust of only three centimeters (one- 
tenth foot) per second would keep the line taut, and the now elongat- 
ed pole would drift around Earth, with the two vehicles maintaining 
the same relative position and attitude.38 
Should Conrad and Gordon fail to execute these procedures, they 
were then to try the spinup, or rotating, mode that had been studied 
by McDonnell. In this case, once the two vehicles were undocked, Con- 
rad fired the spacecraft thrusters to induce a rotation of one degree 
per second to the Gemini XI-Agena combination. The two craft would 
then continue on their orbital path, with their mutual center of gravity 
at a specific point on the tether around which the would do a slow 
and continuous cartwheel. Centrifugal force wou r d be expected to 
keep the line taut and the two vehicles apart, while the tether itself 
provided centripetal force to keep the two spacecraft in equilibrium.39 
Over the tracking station in Hawaii, the crew separated the two 
vehicles cautiously to try the gravity-gradient method. There was 
enough initial tension in the tether to upset the Agena and to cause 
the Gemini spacecraft to move to the right, toward the target's docking 
adapter. Conrad quickly adjusted his spacecraft's motion, and the 
Agena righted itself without difficulty. The command pilot continued 
to back away from the Agena, but the tether stuck, probably in the 
stowage container, when about 15 meters had been released. Conrad 
gave a burst to his thrusters to jerk the cable free. Then, it hung up 
again, this time on some Velcro that had been used to hold Agena's 
end of the line until the spacecraft was loose. Conrad had to shift the 
spacecraft out of vertical alignment to peel the tether off the Velcro 
pad. This disturbed the Agena again, and there were still about three 
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meters of the line to be pulled out. To do the "Non Spun Up" maneu- 
ver, as Conrad called it, the spacecraft and Agena had to be tethered 
and aligned vertically to Earth. The engineers expected that it would 
take about seven minutes for the Agena to stabilize. When the target 
seemed to be taking longer, they feared something was wrong with the 
Agena's attitude control system and told the crew to abandon the at- 
tempt and proceed to the second mode. 
When Conrad tried to start the rotation, he found he had another 
problem. He could not get the tether taut. It seemed to rotate counter- 
clockwise. Surprised, he reported to Young, "This tether's doing some- 
thing I never thought it would do. It's like the Agena and I have a 
skip rope between us and it's rotating and making a big loop.'' He con- 
tinued, "Man! Have we got a weird phenomenon going on here. This 
will take somebody a little time to figure out." Strangely, although the 
spinning line was curved, it also had tension. "I can't get it straight," 
Conrad muttered. For ten minutes, the crew jockeyed, using the space- 
craft thrusters to straighten the arc. Finally, they got an even tether, 
but neither of them could ever recall exactly what they had done to 
stop the odd behavior of the rope. 
When the tether was taut, Conrad rolled his spacecraft and 
blipped the thrusters to begin the slow cartwheel motion. Although 
this had been done gently, so to speak, Conrad felt he must have 
stretched the tether because it had a big loop in it when he stopped 
firing. The command pilot itched to do something else, but the ground 
engineers told him to leave it alone. 
"So we really gritted our teeth" and waited, Conrad said. Sure 
enough, centrifugal force took over and the line smoothed out. The 
vehicles at either end of the rope wigwagged, but they, too, soon set- 
tled down without the pilots having to do anything. A 38-degree-per- 
minute rotational rate was obtained and remained steady throughout 
the nightside pass. The crew became so accustomed to the sight of the 
Agena hovering nearby that they rarely bothered to look at it. Instead, 
they ate their evening meal. 
Conrad's satisfaction with this stationkeeping was soon disrupted. 
As they passed into daylight, the Hawaii CapCom told him to acceler- 
ate the spinup rate. Somewhat reluctantly, the crew agreed to try. Cor- 
don suddenly shouted, "Oh, look at the slack! . . . It's going to jerk 
this thing all to heck." "That's what I was afraid of, darn it," Conrad 
replied. To Flight Director Charlesworth in Houston, Gordon com- 
plained, "You just ruined a good thing." When the added acceleration 
started, the line tightened and then relaxed. The crew felt what Con- 
rad called "this big sling shot effect." They were being seesawed in 
pitch up to 60 degrees. Conrad could not accept this oscillation, so he 
used the spacecraft controls to steady his vehicle. To their surprise, the 
Agena stabilized itself again. 
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The rotation rate checked out at 55 degrees per minute, and the 
crew could now test for a minute amount of art~ficial gravity. When 
they put a camera against the instrument panel and then let it go, it 
moved in a straight line to the rear of the cockpit and parallel to the 
direction of the tether. The crew, themselves, did not sense any phy- 
siological effect of gravity. After they had been roped to the Agena for 
three hours, the pilots ended the exercise by jettisoning the spacecraft 
docking bar. All in all, it had been an interesting and puzzling experi- 
ence.40 
There had been some disappointment that the gravity-gradient 
mode could not be completed, but confidence rose when the spinup 
proved that stationkeeping could be done economically. The flight 
controllers had asked the crew about the remaining fuel on several 
occasions; they were using less fuel than had been ex ected. And now 
there was a chance for some realtime planning on t ! e credit side of 
the ledger. In the past, realtime planning had been in response to such 
problems as degraded fuel cells, "angry alligators," or whirling space- 
craft. An exercise that had been in a contingency plan, if something 
had gone wrong, was now fitted into the missi~n because almost every- 
thing had gone right. 
After the two vehicles separated, Conrad had intended to decrease 
the spacecraft speed so Gemini XI, in a lower orbit, would pull ahead, 
leaving the Agena behind. Instead, the flight controllers told him to 
get ready for what was called a "coincident-orbit" (later renamed "sta- 
ble-orbit") rendezvous. The spacecraft would follow the Agena by 28 
kilometers and in its exact orbital path. If the plan succeeded, the crew 
would, in essence, be stationkeeping at very long range and with the 
use of very little fuel.41 
Because of the change in plan, the separation maneuver would be 
different. Instead of a retrograde firing, so the Agena would trail 
above and behind them, Conrad and Gordon added speed and height 
to the spacecraft's orbit so the target passed beneath and in front of 
their vehicle. When the crew saw the Agena below them, moving swift- 
ly across the South American terrain, they understood why Thomas 
Stafford and Cernan had trouble keeping their target in sight during 
the rendezvous-from-above exercise on Gemini IX-A. 
Next they fired the thrusters to place the spacecraft in the same 
(coincident) orbit as the Agena and trailing it. Three-quarters of a turn 
around the world, Conrad decreased his forward speed and, as expect- 
ed, the spacecraft dropped into the Agena's lane 30 kilometers behind 
the target and with no relative velocity between the vehicles.42 
While doing their long-distance formation flying, Conrad and 
Gordon began to work on night image intensification (D-15), which 
they thoroughly enjoyed. This was a test to see if their night vision 
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could be enhanced by equipment that scanned objects on the ground 
and relayed what it saw to a monitor inside the spacecraft. While Con- 
rad aimed the spacecraft at desired targets-lights of towns and cities, 
cloud formations, lightning flashes, horizon and stars, air low, coast- fi lines, and peninsulas-Gordon watched the displays. Eac pilot de- 
scribed what he was seeing to the spacecraft tape recorder. Conrad was 
handicapped by his dirty window. And the glow from the television 
monitor prevented him from becoming fully dark adapted. Still, the 
two revolutions (or about three hours) of just riding, watching, and 
taking pictures were very pleasant. Perhaps the most exciting sight was 
the lights of Calcutta, India. Outlined on the monitor was a shape 
almost identical to an official map of the city. 
On one occasion during the experiment, the crew noticed the 
lights of the Agena and asked the ground how far from the target 
they were. The flight controller on the Rose Knot Victor replied that 
they were still 30 kilometers behind and closing very slowly. They 
could expect it to be about 26 kilometers away when they woke the 
next morning. But, when the crew broke their sleep period, in revolu- 
tion 41, the target was 46 kilometers ahead. This, however, presented 
no problems for the re-rendezvous.43 
The second rendezvous in Gemini XI, like the first, took only one 
orbit. At 65:27 hours of flight time, Conrad tilted the spacecraft nose 
53 degrees above level flight and fired the forward thrusters. This 
slowed the spacecraft speed and moved it closer to Earth. Now the 
spacecraft was in a lower orbit than the Agena and ready for the catch- 
up maneuver. While they waited for the final approach, the crew 
did the S-30 dim light photographylorthicon experiment, taking pic- 
tures of the gegenschein and zodiacal light, and com leted D-15. They P also turned off the switch to raise the temperature o the S-4 radiation 
experiment and then turned it back on. At 67:33 hours, S-4 was 
turned off for the last time. 
An hour after the catchu maneuver began, with his ship almost 
level and aimed directly aheag, Conrad gave the aft thrusters a burst 
to raise the spacecraft orbit. Now the Agena floated just above them, 
its tether pointing straight up. At 66:64 hours elapsed time, Conrad 
began to brake his spacecraft; six minutes later, he reported that he 
was on station and steady with the Agena. Gordon noticed that the 
tether on the target had started waving slowly and surmised that this 
was caused by the exhaust from Gemini XI'S thrusters. Twelve minutes 
later, the crew broke away from the Agena for the last time. Conrad 
later said, "We made the 3 foot [ I  meter] per second retrograde burn 
and left the best friend we ever had." Cordon added, "We were sorry 
to see that Agena go. It was very kind to ~ ~ ~ " 4 4  
Conrad suggested that Flight Director Lunney might send up a 
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tanker-the crew would be happy to refuel, remain in orbit, and do 
some more work. But, while this air-to-ground joking was going on, 
the crew was getting ready to land.45 
There was only one significant event left before Conrad and Gor- 
don wrapped up their mission. A secondary objective called for the 
crew to make an automatic reentry. The commanders of other Gemini 
flights had flown their spacecraft down from 120 000 meters, using the 
spacecraft's offset center of gravity to generate lift for changes in 
direction. This had enabled them to make corrections up to 550 kilo- 
meters downrange and 50 kilometers crossrange. Conrad, however, 
would not fly the spacecraft with his handcontroller in conjunction 
with computer directions; the spacecraft would follow these commands 
automatically.46 
On 15 September 1966, after 70:41 hours of flight and in the 44th 
revolution of Earth, the retrorockets fired. Conrad and Gordon 
watched the computer closely. It certainly seemed to be working right. 
Conrad then disengaged his handcontroller and put the system on 
automatic. When the first crossrange errors developed, the computer 
commanded bank angle changes. On several occasions, the spacecraft 
displayed an almost human characteristic, hesitating before accepting 
its orders. But the system recovered quickly and performed beautiful- 
ly, using a minimum of the reentry system's control fuel. The accuracy 
of automatic reentry was thoroughly demonstrated when the space- 
craft landed within 4.6 kilometers of the U.S.S. Guam, the prime re- 
covery ship, a sea-going platform for helicopters. As the spacecraft 
floated down to its landing, after 71: 17 hours elapsed time, Young told 
them, "You're on TV now."47 The Gemini XI flight had ended; next 
came the usual round of examining, debriefing, evaluating, and re- 
porting. 
THE EVA REVIEW BOARD 
When Gordon finished his postmission debriefings, he and Neil 
Armstrong, accompanied by MSC Deputy Director George Low and 
others, made a three-week, 24 000-kilometer goodwill tour of Latin 
America that covered 14 cities in 11 countries.48 Meanwhile, other 
NASA program officials began to concentrate on getting Gemini XII 
ready for flight. Gordon's troubles outside the s acecraft greatly com- 
plicated premission planning, as did the lack o P specific goals. Love11 
complained that "essentially Gemini XI1 didn't have a mission. It was, 
I guess, by default . . . supposed to wind up the Gemini program and 
catch all those items that were not caught on previous flights." He 
added, "The only firm thing in the whole flight plan for a while was 
the astronaut maneuvering unit."49 
After Gemini IX-A, Major General Ben Funk had begun to worry 
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about the chances of ever flying the Air Force's AMU in the Gemini 
program. Gilruth assured him that it would be given every considera- 
tion because "extravehicular activity [is] a primary objective of Gemini 
XII." When Collins had so little trouble on the Gemini X EVA, hopes 
that the unit would get its chance to fly had revived. But when Gor- 
don suffered exhaustion and overheating, the EVA question was again 
as wide open as Cernan had left it. Was there some mystery here that 
the Gemini engineers had not been able to unravel? Several years lat- 
er, Elms said that no history of Gemini would be complete without a 
discussion of what he called the EVA Review Board.50 In truth, that 
may well be a fitting name for the Gemini Mission Review Board be- 
fore the program's final flight. 
The board's first premission meeting for Gemini XI1 was held in 
Houston, where the members were being briefed on the maneuvering 
unit at the exact moment when Gordon was struggling with the umbili- 
cal exercise on Gemini XI. Although McDonnell had made all the 
spacecraft changes that Collins had suggested, they did not seem to be 
making Gordon's tasks much easier. But talking and guessing were fu- 
tile, and the board soon returned to the subject on the agenda-the 
AMU, which, it conceded, "appeared to be a well qualified piece of 
space hardware . . . although complex of operation."sl 
At their next meeting, the four men* virtually became the EVA 
review board that Elms recalled. They "agreed that the EVA experi- 
ence from previous missions was the only factor having serious poten- 
tial impact on the Gemini XI1 Mission." Their first recommendation 
was to strike the AMU from Gemini XI152 because the pilot's chance 
of getting into it and using it successfully seemed small, because the 
unit's potential value could not offset the risks involved in its use, and 
because the 120 minutes of EVA planned for the final mission should 
be devoted to a series of simple tasks that could be measured accurate- 
ly in terms of workload. Mueller agreed with the board and, on 30 
September, told the Air Force why the AMU was being deleted from 
Gemini XII: 
It is noteworthy that past EVA has revealed problems that appear 
less yielding to straightforward engineering solutions than other 
problems encountered in the Gemini Program. The EVA tasks 
planned for Gemini were designed to become increasingly complex 
and demanding on succeeding missions. And, although the experi- 
ence gained on a particular mission has been carefully applied to 
later missions, the result has proven less than completely successful. 
In fact, it becomes increasingly apparent that the techniques and 
*The membership remained the same from the beginning: Elms, Edgar Cortright, Major 
General Vincent Huston, and Charles Mathews. 
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procedures devised for EVA have evolved from analyses, theories, 
and experimental concepts that in certain critical instances, and for 
reasons currently beyond our grasp, are not entirely accurate. Con- 
sequently, I feel that we must devote the last EVA period in the 
Gemini Program to a basic investigation of EVA fundamentals . . . 
through repetitive performance of basic, easily-monitored and cali- 
brated tasks.53 
While the board was being briefed on the AMU at its first meet- 
ing, Aldrin was practicing with it under water in a swimming pool at 
McDonogh, Maryland. Later a flightready unit was installed in Space- 
craft 12's adapter at Cape Kennedy. On 23 September-the day Elms 
sent the review board's recommendations to Mueller-it was pulled 
out. Aldrin, who had once worked in the Air Force experiments office 
in Houston, was disappointed at the loss of the AMU. He was also 
concerned about what was to take its place in the fast approaching 
mission.54 
By July, the crew of Gemini XI1 was being assigned some rather 
precise objectives. In fact, the flight was soon extended to four days to 
glve the crew time for experiments that depended on nighttime opera- 
tions. Over the course of the program, mission planning had steadily 
progressed to expand manned space flight experience, but Gemini XI1 
assumed a more conservative cast, as shown by a comparison of pre- 
liminary and final flight plans for the mission. 
In July, for example, the primary objectives were rendezvous and 
docking, preferably in the second spacecraft orbit, and extravehicular 
activity with the AMU. Two of the secondary goals were repeats: re- 
rendezvous from above (from Gemini IX-A) and a tethered vehicle 
exercise (from Gemini XI). Then came the decision to delete the 
AMU, and Mueller told Chuck Mathews that he also op osed the re- 
rendezvous plan. Next, rendezvous and docking shifted ! rom the sec- 
ond to the third spacecraft orbit (which had already been done). These 
changes, of course, affected the flight plan, delaying a final version. 
Mathews told MSC's senior staff as late as mid-September that the 
hardware would be ready for launch but that what would be done dur- 
ing the flight was still not firm. The final flight plan was not ready un- 
til 20 October. And it contained no surprises. Almost the only innova- 
tion was the non-spinning, gravity gradient mode of stationkeeping. 
But that was not really new, since Conrad and Gordon had tried it, 
without success, on Gemini X1.55 There was to be no trail-blazing on 
the final mission. 
If, as Love11 said, "essentially Gemini XII didn't have a mission," it 
did have a theme-to pierce the mystery of working in space. The 
strain of EVA experienced so severely by Cernan and Gordon not only 
clouded Gemini but raised doubts for Apollo. The lack of understand- 
ing of the difficulty emerged as a pressing concern that did much to 
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shape Gemini's final flight. To increase the chances for success on 
Gemini XII, NASA now arranged to study in a careful and systematic 
way the basic features of EVA.56 
Training and restraints for EVA underwent significant changes. 
In prior training, the crews had used zero-g aircraft flights to get the 
feel of weightlessness and to devise techniques for working. But expe- 
rience had shown that this kind of training was useful in a very limited 
way, mainly for practice in getting into or out of the spacecraft. Pilots 
had to move fast and brace themselves before the airplane finished the 
Keplerian trajectory with its high-g pullout. In space, they found that 
everything had to be done slowly and deliberately. Nor could the kind 
of fatigue that Cernan and Gordon had suffered in space be assessed 
in zero-g flights, because the delay between successive parabolas im- 
posed a rest period. Almost a full day had to be spent in the aircraft to 
accumulate 15 minutes of weightlessness. 
But in mid-1966, underwater simulation had been advanced to 
meet these shortcomings. Moving in a viscous and buoyant fluid was 
very much like moving against the restraints of a pressurized suit in a 
weightless vacuum. Aldrin could thus get a more accurate sense of the 
time and physical effort required for a task on the workstands (called 
"busy boxes") during flight. Since the zero-g aircraft exercise did give 
him the feel of weightlessness, however, Aldrin continued that training 
also.57 
On each of the last three missions, the pilots who went outside 
had complained that they needed more help in body positioning. Each 
spacecraft carried more restraints than the one before. The 9 re- 
straints on Gemini IX-A had become 44 on Gemini XII. One helpful 
innovation was a waist tether that allowed the pilot to retrieve pack- 
ages, turn wrenches with considerable torque, and attach the vehicle 
tether without undue stress. Other new features were handrails, hand- 
holds, and rings for hooking Aldrin's restraining belt to various places 
on the spacecraft and target vehicle. At last, an EVA ilot had all the 
considerable complexity. 
P help he would need for performing a great variety o tasks, some of 
After Gemini IX-A, MSC's Crew Systems Division puzzled over 
Cernan's fatigue. Collins' success in Gemini X suggested that the order 
in which he did his extravehicular tasks might have made them easier. 
Collins had done a standup EVA and then closed the hatch and rested 
before leaving the spacecraft. After Gordon had to come in early on 
Gemini XI, GPO decided that Aldrin would begin with a standup ex- 
ercise and then go on to more strenuous activity.58 
Although flight planning was the hardest part of getting ready for 
the final Gemini mission, hardware could have been a monumental 
problem-spares were becoming scarce. This danger had been fore- 
seen and reasonable provisions made long before the scheduled launch 
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date, but program officials could not help being jumpy, fearing they 
would be unable to replace a part that had suddenly gone awry. 
When the Gemini IX Agena had fallen into the Atlantic Ocean, 
Gemini XI1 was threatened with a major hardware shortage-an 
Agena and an Atlas to launch it. Replacing the Agena was no real 
problem. Lockheed's first production model, 5001, used for develo - 
ment testing at the Cape, had already been sent back to the Sunnyva 7 e 
plant for refurbishment. Now it was simply a matter of tailoring it to 
the Gemini XI1 mission.59 
Finding a new Atlas was not so easy. General Dynamics did not 
keep a stockpile of Atlases on the assumption that someone would 
come along and buy them. GPO would have to find one that had been 
intended for some other program. When a Lunar Orbiter flight was 
delayed in May, it freed an Atlas that GPO might acquire. And when 
Mueller approved the purchase of a replacement vehicle on 1 June, 
MSC was already negotiating for an Atlas at Vandenberg Air Force 
Base in California. But this was not the standard vehicle Gemini had 
been using; it was the first of a new series with some features that had 
never been tested in flight. Langley Research Center, in charge of the 
Orbiter payload, was persuaded to turn its Atlas over to Gemini in 
exchange for the one in California. Langley's Orbiter Atlas had only 
nine variances from the Gemini version, and the trade eased the minds 
of the MSC program engineers. By the end of September, the new 
Atlas waited on pad 14 at Cape Kennedy for its call to action.60 
The final curtain snagged twice before it opened on Gemini XII. 
Spare parts became a problem, as had long been feared. An auto ilot 
and a rate gyroscope in the launch vehicle had to be replaced. d e n ,  
the replacements were themselves replaced. But, on Veterans' Day-1 1 
November-Flight Director Glynn Lunney signaled for the overture to 
begin.61 
At 2:08 p.m. the substitute Atlas lifted the refurbished Agena 
from pad 14 and lofted it into orbit. A few minutes earlier, over on 
pad 19, the pressure-suited crew had shuffled up a ramp, bearing signs 
on their backs-"THE and "END." This bit of humor was more than 
symbolism, for when launch vehicle No. 12 broke its landlock 30 sec- 
onds after 3:46 p.m., the Gemini preparations team faded into space 
history. Francis Carey, Martin's chief test conductor, and Colonel John 
Albert, Chief of the Gemini Launch Vehicle Division, 6555th Aero- 
space Test Wing, took justifiable pride in the 12 for 12 record, but 
they mourned the fact that the job had ended and the team would 
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soon break up. That it was over could hardly have been more vividly 
underlined-almost at once wreckers were hacking the launch stand 
into scrap iron. Apollo was the future. A harbinger of this new era, 
Lunar Orbiter 11; had been launched only five days earlier--6 Novem- 
ber--on a trip to the Moon to photograph possible Apollo landing 
sites.62 
Meanwhile, Lovell and Aldrin began to wonder if everybody had 
gone away too soon. For 25 minutes, with one brief exception, they 
heard nothing from the ground. The Ascension Island tracking station 
had the wrong acquisition time, so its communicators had not talked 
with the pilots. Lovell was relieved when he heard Conrad hailing him 
through the remote line at Tananarive with some needed data for a 
maneuver that was scheduled to take place within a few minutes.63 
Things now went smoothly and, a little more than an hour after 
launch, Aldrin reported, "Be advised we have a solid lock- 
on . . . 235.52 [nautical] miles [436.18 kilometers]." From Houston, 
Conrad replied, "It looks like the radar meets the specs." When the 
spacecraft moved into a circular orbit below and behind its target, the 
radar showed the Agena to be 120 kilometers away. But this was the 
last figure the crew could trust; reception got so poor that the onboard 
computer refused to accept the radar's intermittent readings. 
The radar failure meant that Gemini XI1 would have to rely on 
the backup charts it carried to complete the rendezvous. Aldrin, a 
member of the team that had planned and worked out chart proce- 
dures, now had a chance to see if his doctoral studies at MIT and the 
simulator training in St. Louis with McDonnell and MSC engineers 
really were practical in s ace.64 The ilot, who was sometimes called 
"Dr. Rendezvous," had a !i' ready pulle ir out and used the T-2 manual 
navigation sighting sextant to take a look at the target. When the radar 
went on the blink, this piece of experimental gear became operational- 
ly important. 
In the automatic rendezvous mode, the radar would have fed 
range and range rates to the computer. Lovell would then have flown 
the spacecraft by the resulting numbers. This time the computer 
would be left in the catchup mode, and either Aldrin or Mission Con- 
trol---or both-had to figure range and range rates to see if the com- 
puter was correct. For this backup method, Aldrin used the sextant to 
measure the angle between the local horizontal of the spacecraft and 
that of the Agena, ahead of and above them. He checked this informa- 
tion with his rendezvous chart and cranked the necessary corrections 
into the computer. Lovell flew the spacecraft with these numbers to 
rendezvous with the target, arriving there after 3 hours and 45 min- 
utes of flight. They had used only 127 kilograms of fuel. Lovell called 
the Coastal Sentry Quebec at 4: 13 hours elapsed time, saying, "We are 
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docked." But Gemini XII was the fourth flight to make that announce- 
ment, and the shipboard flight controller merely replied, "Roger."65 
For the second time, a Gemini crew was able to practice docking 
and undocking. They unlatched the vehicles and Lovell tried the task 
during the night. But the spacecraft was misaligned; the target's dock- 
ing cone did not unlatch. Instead, it locked bumpers, catching on one 
of the three latches. Much like an automobile driver mired in the mud, 
Lovell fired the aft and forward thrusters, trying to rock the spacecraft 
free. Both vehicles were shaken, but he broke loose without damage to 
either. A few minutes later, Aldrin docked without difficulty.66 
The next item on the agenda was the firing of the Agena to go to 
a higher altitude, but that part of the flight plan had to be changed. 
Eight minutes after the Agena was launched, its main engine suffered 
a momentary six percent decay in thrust chamber pressure and a cor- 
responding drop in turbine speed. So, while Lovell and Aldrin chased 
and caught the Agena, then practiced docking, Mission Director 
Schneider and Flight Director Lunney had to decide whether the main 
engine should be fired. They soon decided that prudence was the bet- 
ter course-it should not. 
Although the pilots missed the ride to high altitude, Lunney soon 
found something for them to do with their spare time. The fiight plan 
had originally called for them to photograph a solar eclipse, if it did 
not conflict with the rest of the mission. This task fell by the wayside 
when the two-day launch delay-from 9 to 11 November-meant that 
the eclipse would occur during their high-altitude excursion. Canceling 
the main engine burn inspired two of the mission planners to thoughts 
of reinstating the eclipse photography. Schneider and Lunney con- 
ferred with James R. Bates, Experiments Advisory Officer for Gemini 
XU, on the effect this might have on the rest of the experiments. Since 
the flight plan had to be changed anyway, Bates said, why not include 
the eclipse? 
This conference with Bates marked a significant change in mission 
control operations. Formerly working out of an adjacent staff support 
room, the experimenters' representative was now allowed by the engi- 
neers in charge to operate as a part of the flight control team in the 
main control room. Although there had been an experiments console 
in the control room by Gemini X, it had been only occasionally 
manned. Bates, on Gemini XII, was the first full-time experiments 
officer. This experience worked out so well that the custom was contin- 
ued in Apollo. 
Even after the eclipse became a flight-plan casualty, planners con- 
tinued to plot its path. Now there was a chance to work this experi- 
ment back into the mission. The Agena's secondary propulsion system 
had enough power to get the spacecraft into position for an eight-sec- 
ond photographic pass at the proper time. Schneider and Lunney 
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agreed that this piece of realtime planning would give an added fillip 
to the mission.67 
"The eclipse got to us after all," Lovell remarked. "Yes, it looks 
like it," Conrad answered. Although the crew had wanted to do the 
experiment when it was first planned, these sudden preparations came 
at an inconvenient time. They were still working with the Agena and 
were scheduled to begin such activities as eating, sleeping, and working 
on other experiments. 
Nevertheless, at 7:05 hours after launch, Jim Lovell fired the 
Agena's smaller engines to slow his speed 13 meters per second. Agena 
still had its doubters-Conrad had told them, "If it gets away from 
you . . . take it over with the [spacecraft]." But the target vehicle 
performed splendidly, and the crew then bedded down for the night. 
The Canary Island controller greeted the crew in the morning 
with the news that there would be a second maneuver-5 meters for- 
ward-to line the vehicles up properly. The prospects panned out 
richly, and the crew reported seeing the eclipse "right on the money at 
16:01:44 g.e.t." The path of the eclipse cut a swath across South 
America from north of Lima, Peru, nearly to the southernmost tip of 
Brazil. Although they thought for a moment, they were slightly off 
track, their aim had been accurate.68 
The sudden change in the flight plan had disturbed the crew, be- 
cause of its possible interference with the first planned extravehicular 
exercise. After all, this objective had become the heart of their mission. 
Despite interruptions (especially that caused by the second maneuver), 
the hatch was opened on time, about 20 minutes before sunset in 
space. Aldriii exclaimed, in near speechless awe, "Man! Look at that!" 
Aldrin was amazed and impressed at seeing so much of Earth and the 
universe spread before his eyes. 
Aldrin went about his chores slowly and deliberately, working for 
a short period and then resting. First, he just stood in the hatch, be- 
coming acclimated. Then he cast loose a garbage bag. Moments later, 
he murmured, "Stars in the daylight? I don't think so." He soon real- 
ized that he was watching the pouch as it drifted away. He was in 
darkness for eight minutes before his eyes became adjusted and he 
could see real stars and planets. Aldrin studied his every movement- 
every action and reaction-so he could compare his standup experi- 
ence to the umbilical period later. 
He set up an ultraviolet astronomical camera. During two night 
passes, he photographed star fields, although Lovell had trouble turn- 
ing the spacecraft in specific directions because the Agena had nearly a 
full load of fuel. During daylight, the pilot installed a movie camera; 
fixed a handrail leading to the target docking adapter cone; ulled off B the ultraviolet camera, reloaded it, and put it back; retrieve a micro- 
meteorite collection package; and took pictures. At 2158, the crew 
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buttoned themselves back into the spacecraft after recording their first, 
highly successful, 2-hour-and-20-minute exercise.69 
The next day Lovell and Aldrin got ready for the main event of 
the mission-to see if a man could perform useful tasks in s ace at the 
end of an umbilical. Near the 43-hour point in the flight, A I'drin stood 
up in his seat and reinstalled the movie camera-just as easily as be- 
fore-then removed it, stepped into space, and replaced it, usin only 
a handrail to maintain poatlon. The astronaut then moved, hanf over 
hand, along the rail to the nose of the Agena docking adapter. Using 
his waist tether for restraint, he tied the two vehicles together for the 
gravity-gradient experiment without any of the problems Gordon had 
encountered. 
The pilot floated to the hatch area and exchanged cameras with 
Lovell. Movin don the handrail, Aldrin went aft to the spacecraft 
adapter. He $aced !is feet in the olden slip ers (overshoe-type re- 
stra~nts). Then he moved his body % ack and / orth and from slde to 
side, to see if the slippers really helped as much in holding him down 
as the program office had hoped. They allowed him to relax complete- 
ly and to lean as much as 45 degrees to either side and 90 degrees 
backward. 
Next he unpacked some small penlights and set to work in the 
busy box, torquing bolts and cutting metal. On one occasion, a bolt 
and washer slipped free. Aldrin maneuvered the weightless fittings 
into a corner, capturing one in each hand. Lovell asked him over the 
intercom if he was playing orbital mechanics in the adapter and the 
pilot replied, "Yes. I had to do a little rendezvous there." At sunrise, 
he returned to the open hatch. After resting for a few minutes, Aldrin 
again went forward to the Agena-this time to a busy box attached to 
the target. Lovell watched him as he pulled electrical connectors apart 
and put them together again. Aldrin also tried a torque wrench that 
had been designed for the Apollo program. For this task, he first used 
both waist tethers, then one, then none. On the way back to the hatch 
to end his second two hours of extravehicular time, Aldrin stopped to 
wipe the command pilot's window with a cloth. As he did, Lovell 
asked, "Hey, would you change the oil, too?" The "air in the tires" was 
"A-OK," so Aldrin climbed aboard, stood in the hatch, and watched 
while Lovell fired some of the thrusters. He then sat down in the 
spacecraft seat. The door closed easily, and Aldrin released the oxygen 
in his life support system to help repressurize the cabin.70 
The third hatch opening (and the second stand-up-in-the-seat pe- 
riod) came on the fourth day and lasted an hour. The pilot tossed out 
a lot of equipment he had used during the umbilical, as well as some 
empty food containers. The astronauts were not really litter bugs. Dis- 
carded items from the flights, like other things in orbit around Earth, 
eventually reenter and burn up in the atmosphere. Aldrin then 
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snapped several ultraviolet photographs of constellations. That fin- 
ished, he went back inside and closed the hatch; the last extravehicular 
performance of the Gemini program was ended. But NASA engineers, 
mission planners, and astronauts now believed they knew much more 
about the fundamentals of EVA.71 
Between the second and third hatch openings, Lovell and Aldrin 
went into their tethered vehicles act. Lovell backed Gemini XI1 care- 
fully away from the Agena, forming a pole vertical to Earth. The teth- 
er deployed smoothly (with only a brief hangup) but remained slack. 
Lovell was exasperated at his inability to tighten it, using the spacecraft 
thrusters. "About this time we had a little . . . problem," he said, 
" . . . every time I wanted to pitch up or yaw, I would roll." Despite 
the control problem the crew did obtain the gravity rdient they sought. Both vehicles got upset on occasion, the spacecra t at one ime
wigwagging about 300 degrees. What caused these disturbances, the 
program office stated in its formal mission report, "is not com letely 
understood, nor is the system behavior during and immediately f ollow- 
ing these excursions." The tether exercise lasted four hours, proving 
that both the controllers and the crew were confident enough to con- 
tinue this form of stationkeeping through the nighttime passes.72 
Earlier in the mission (about the time of the docking and undock- 
ing practice), the fuel cell had hinted that it might cause trouble and 
not last the full four days. But 30 hours passed before a power loss 
was actually registered. Eventually, the experts decided that there must 
be too much water in the tanks. Whenever the crew drank water or 
used it to prepare their food, the fuel cell warning light went off. 
The ground controllers were not sure what had happened to the 
water storage system's two tanks that held the crew's drinking water 
and (separated by a bladder) the fuel cell product water. But, in 
some way or another, the astronauts had lost a place in which to store 
from 15 to I8 kilograms of water produced by the fuel cell. So the 
crew had to drink more water to make more room in the tanks and to 
purge the system more frequently to remove gases that accumulated in 
the fuel cell, if they were going to complete the mission. Drinking lots 
of water and watching the red warning light, they nursed the fuel cell 
along for more than 80 hours. The flight neared its end before the 
batteries had to take over the electrical load.73 
So, even in the face of problems with the radar, the Agena main 
engines, and the fuel cells, Gemini XI1 had gone very well. Most of the 
mission objectives were accomplished, and some data were obtained 
from 12 of the 15 experiments assigned to the flight.74 At times, con- 
siderable ingenuity had been required to get around the hardware 
difficulties. 
Compared to other flights, Gemini XI13 accomplishments tended 
to obscure its hardware problems, of which this final mission had more 
Suited up, astronauts James 
Love11 and Edwin Aldrin head 
for the elevator on pad 19 
which will lift them to their 
waiting spacecraft. On their 
backs are signs, "The" and 
"End. " 
Learning more about the intricacies of EVA was the big assignment for Gemi- 
ni XII. Above left, Aldrin is beginning his spacewalk by affixing a camera on 
the outside of the spacecraft. Center, he is returning from the adapter section 
with a micrometeoroid experiment package which will return to Earth in the 
spacecraft. Above right, an attempt at tethered station-keeping with Agena is 
more successful, thanks to what was learned from Gemini XI. With the 
splashdown of Gemini XI1 (below left), the Gemini fight program comes to 
an end. When the astronauts arrive back at Cape Kennedy, they are greeted 
with the Gemini flight "scoreboard7' (below right). 
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than its fair share. Some troubles that forced slight changes1 in the 
flight plan actually turned into triumphs. The failure of the radar dur- 
ing the terminal phase of rendezvous, for example, had underscored 
the fact that backup techniques, using onboard charts and computa- 
tions, really worked. Radar malfunction barely caused a ri ple in the S routine. Other troubles nagged and frustrated the crew, an some had 
adverse effects on operations; but here, again, they were not able to 
mar the impression of success. What was remembered was Aldrin's 
flawless performance during the,well planned extravehicular periods. 
During the 59th revolution, Gemini XII began its controlled auto- 
matic reentry. Everything worked neatly, until the spacecraft reached 
its peak g loads. At that point, a pouch containing books, filters, and 
small pieces of equipment broke free from the Velcro on the sidewall 
of the cabin and landed on Lovell's lap. The pilots had unstowed the 
D-rings that activated the ejection seats and were holding them down 
between their legs. Lovell resisted the impulse to catch the pouch for 
fear he might "just grab ahold of the D-ring and keep pulling it." If 
he had, the commander, along with his pilot, would have exploded 
into the atmosphere, riding the ejection seats. This thought was bad 
news to Lovell, "because I didn't want to see myself punching out right 
at this high heating area." Instead, he squeezed his knees together and 
hoped that the pouch would not go any farther. It did not. The rest of 
the reentry was smooth until the moment of landing, when the space- 
craft plopped down hard on the ocean. 
It landed only 4.8 kilometers from the point at which it had aimed 
and only 5.5 kilometers from the carrier Wasp. A helicopter deposited 
the triumphant astronauts on the deck of the prime recovery vessel 28 
minutes after touchdown. There, on 15 November 1966, at 2:21 p.m., 
e.s.t., the curtain closed on the Gemini manned space flight program.75 
So the Gemini flag and the Gemini pennant that had flown over 
the Manned Spacecraft Center during each of the missions, beginning 
with Gemini IV, were lowered for the last time.76 The manned flights 
had started in 1965. Gemini had succeeded in putting manned space 
flight on something like a routine basis, as envisioned in the Project 
Development Plan of 1961. This accomplishment did not go unno- 
ticed. President Lyndon B. Johnson said: 
Ten times in this program of the last 20 months we have placed two 
men in orbit about the earth in the world's most advanced space- 
craft. Ten times we have brought them home. 
Today's flight was the culmination of a great team effort, stretching 
back to 1961, and directly involving more than 25,000 people in the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of 
Defense, and other Government agencies; in the universities and 
other research centers; and in American industry. 
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Early in 1962, John Glenn made his historic orbital flight and Amer- 
ica was in space. Now, nearly 5 years later, we have completed Gem- 
ini and we know that America is in space to stay.77 
Being in space to stay rested, in part, on the shoulders of a team 
that was now experienced in plannmg, developing, managing, and 
operating a space flight program that had progressed far beyond the 
shorter flights and simpler missions of Mercury. Gemini was only the 
second phase of this nation's manned space flight, but its importance 
must not be minimized. It had dispelled most doubts about man's abili- 
ty to withstand weightlessness, to operate in free space outside his 
spacecraft, and to seek and find another vehicle in orbital flight. Now 
Apollo, the third and most ambitious star, waited in the wings, and the 
complexities of that program dwarfed the scope of Gemini as Gemini 
had towered over Mercury. Only three years remained in which to 
accomplish the late President John F. Kennedy's "goal, before this dec- 
ade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to 
the earth." President Johnson warned the nation that these years 
might be as exasperating as the early periods of Mercury and Gemini. 
On 23 November he said: 
The Apollo program which follows is much more complicated. It 
has more elements of a yet unproven capability, and will use the 
larger Saturn boosters developed especially for civilian manned 
flight programs. 
The months ahead will not be easy, as we reach toward the moon. 
We must broaden and extend our know-how, based on the in- 
creased power of these mighty new boosters. But with Gemini as the 
forerunner, I am confident that we will overcome the difficulties and 
achieve another success. 
Apollo will make America truly a spacefaring Nation. The three- 
man Apollo is the certain forerunner of the multimanned space- 
ships of the not too distant future-ships that will bear the experi- 
ments and some day the experimenters of many nations-ships that 
will bear the hopes of all men. 
About two months after the President spoke these unknowingly 
understated words, Apollo had to "overcome the difficulties" born of 
tragedy. While the NASA engineers were getting ready to report on 
some of the successes that had been achieved and the problems that 
had been solved in Gemini, a spacecraft fire on 2'7 January 196'7 
snuffed out the lives of the first Apollo crew, Virgil I. Grissom, Ed- 
ward H. White 11, and Roger B. Chaffee, during a test on pad 34 at 
Cape Kennedy. 
"The months ahead will not be easy . . . . "78 
SUMMING UP 
T HE more than 1800 days that divided 7 December 1961, when Project Gemini was officially approved, from 15 November 1966, 
when the program's last two fliers returned from orbit, spanned a sig- 
nificant phase of human venture into space. Gemini provided tech- 
niques, equipment, and experience that helped bridge the difficult 
translation from experimental, Earth-orbiting Mercury to ambitious, 
lunar-landing Apollo. Gemini achieved its goals, save for land landing, 
quietly, systematically, and, in some degree, economically. To a large 
extent, at least in the general American viewpoint, the regularly flying 
and highly successful Gemini marked America's ascendency to first 
place in the space race. And its spacecraft, simpler and more efficiently 
designed than Apollo's (which still relied on stacked and integrated 
components rather than complete modules), was frequently and mis- 
takenly cited as contributing to the Apollo concept. 
For some time, the development phase of Gemini and Apollo pro- 
ceeded along parallel lines, leading to a belief in some quarters that 
efforts devoted to Gemini were sapping Apollo's energies. Sporadically, 
throughout the years, a spirit of competition grew within Gemini-a 
feeling that its spacecraft could do more, its missions could be extend- 
ed, perhaps even to lunar flight. But within Apollo doubts were in- 
creasing. Gemini had been justified partly on the basis of its contribu- 
tion to Apollo experience. In 1965, Howard Tindall, whose specialty 
was mission planning and who had achieved local fame with his "Tin- 
dallgrams," tried to look at the question objectively and concluded that 
hardware and mission planning were too difficult and too concurrent 
for either program office to keep up with or help the other.1 
As for the early days, Tindall's viewpoint was probably correct. 
Gemini had too many financial and technical problems of its own to 
leave much energy to worry about Apollo. Nor was the Apollo office, 
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with its two dissimilar spacecraft, quite as cohesive an organization as it 
might have thought. Lunar module engineers found it equally difficult 
to get meaningful assistance from either Apollo command module or 
Gemini spacecraft peo le-and, no doubt, vice versa. No problem that 
arose on one spacecra f? t appeared quite like those encountered on the 
other two-and no one had the time to consider the problems dispas- 
sionately and apply them to their counterparts in a practical manner.2 
Once Gemini neared its operational phase, however, things were 
different. Apollo managers and engineers quickly sought help in var- 
ious areas. James Church wanted to learn about Gemini program con- 
trol experience, especially when the Gemini people succeeded in con- 
trolling program costs. Calvin Perrine asked for information on 
ground test programs as the Gemini development and test experts 
began meeting delivery schedules more successfully. Rolf Lanzkron 
and Joseph Loftus were anxious to learn anything from the Gemini 
crews that might be applicable to Apollo flight problems. Even North 
American, the Apollo command module manufacturer, thought some 
of Gemini's checkout experience might be helpful.3 Both North Amer- 
ican and Grumman (the lunar module builder) had already requested 
manufacturing assistance from the Gemini spacecraft contractor, at 
one time causing William Lee, a deputy manager in the Apollo office, 
to caution them not to "convert McDonnell from a spacecraft manufac- 
turer into an educational institution."4 
Although Lee's point may have been intentionally overdrawn, 
Gemini manufacturing, testing, and review procedures did influence 
Apollo. By August 1965, many of these methods were being drawn 
upon to smooth the flow of hardware through the factory and on to 
the launch site. Of course, Gemini built upon some experience derived 
from Mercury-the same company manufactured the spacecraft and 
the same NASA group managed the project-but modular, accessible, 
serviceable Gemini was far more suitable for developing a systematic, if 
not routine, approach to getting it built, out of the factory, and onto 
the pad ready for launch. Gemini's vehicles, whose designers had 
avoided Mercury's interlocking systems, left the contractor plants much 
as airplanes did-all tested and nearly ready to fly. Cape Kennedy be- 
came a checkout and launch activity for Gemini, instead of the test and 
modification center it had been during Mercury.5 
Besides the manufacturing and testing procedures, Gemini came 
to grips with several specific systems, common in one form or another 
to Apollo, that were new to space flight operations. Spacecraft thrus- 
ters powerful enough to alter the flight path several times and fuel 
cells to generate electrical energy to run the systems represented par- 
ticularly impressive advances in aerospace technology. In addition, 
Gemini spacecraft were equipped with a computer and a radar to aid 
in solving the rendezvous problem. All of these systems went through 
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troubled development and qualification periods and, in most cases, 
required extensive redesign. More often than not these difficulties 
came to the attention of NASA's top administrators. Problem-solving 
boards, headed by senior officials, were appointed and armed with 
charters to draw upon organizations and facilities in government and 
industry to bring about solutions. Those areas that yielded most stub- 
bornly were aired at Gemini and Apollo executive meetings attended 
by NASA administrators and their staffs and company presidents and 
their aides-the people in charge who could bring pressures and re- 
sources to bear to fix thrusters, fuel cells, Agenas, or other recalcitrant 
systems.6 
Several management bodies spawned during Gemini were not 
constrained to one-shot, fix-it functions but were formalized and 
adapted to whatever program followed. One of the more important of 
these dealt with manned space flight experiments. As in other cases, 
this activity had its origins in Project Mercury, albeit to a very limited 
degree. Only a few scientists gained a nodding acquaintance with 
NASA and industry aerospace technologists; and there had not been 
much interest on either side in changing that situation. Engineers had 
concentrated on making Mercury work, and most scientists had pre- 
ferred to have their experiments ride aboard NASA's unmanned satel- 
lites. In the summer of 1963, however, science gained a permanent 
foothold in manned space flight operations. When the demise of the 
paraglider* left some unoccupied space in the vehicle, a few NASA 
officials saw a chance to set up an ex eriments program in orderly 
fashion. Homer E. Newell, Director o f' NASA's Office of Space Sci- 
ences, sent letters to more than 600 scientists, describing Gemini and 
inviting proposals. When the response was good, NASA established a 
Manned Space Flight Experiments Board in January 1964. By the 
fourth Gemini flight-the second manned-experiments and principal 
investigators had been worked into mission operations with fair suc- 
cess; by the last flight, procedures had been sharpened sufficiently for 
the board to continue in Apollo, and later in Skylab, without a break 
in stride.7 
One of the quicker ways Gemini grabbed Apollo's attention, 
though certainly not planned that way, was its nearly catastrophic 
anomalies. Perhaps the most significant example was the explosion of 
Gemini Agena target vehicle 5002 in October 1965. The solution-to 
inject oxidizer into the firing chamber before the fuel-was applied to 
the lunar module's ascent engine simultaneously with the modifications 
to the Agena's primary propulsion system.8 Visions of astronauts on 
*Setting down on land was one goal that Gemini failed to achieve. Ironically, in 1965 there 
were some near-perfect tests with a limp (as opposed to an inflatable) version of the paraglider. 
By that time, however, the device was too far out of phase with Gemini schedules. 
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the lunar surface igniting their takeoff engine only to have it explode 
were too harrowing to be entertained. 
But there were day-to-day Apollo-Gemini exchanges that did not 
relate to specific incidents. For example, people from the Flight Crew 
Support and Crew Systems Divisions worked on astronaut equipment 
and space suits to achieve a range of capabilities from extravehicular 
activity to shirtsleeve cabin operations-features of definite value to 
Apollo. Perhaps the group that gained the most insight into the rou- 
tine operations of the two program offices was flight control. Christo- 
pher Kraft, who directed this activity, had been largely responsible for 
planning the old Mercury Control Center. Much improvising had been 
necessary to complete that project, and the facility was obviously totally 
inadequate to support Gemini and Apollo. NASA decided to build a 
control center in Houston, the new home of the Manned Spacecraft 
Center, and based this decision, in part, on the reasoning that flight 
control and spacecraft design would profit from having engineers 
from these two areas working together. Kraft concentrated first on 
Gemini requirements, partly because of manpower limitations and time 
constraints (Gemini would fly sooner), but mainly because of the need 
for Gemini experience in qualifying men, flight control equipment, 
and procedures to handle the far more complex missions of Ap0ll0.9 
Long before mission operations commenced, Kraft and his group 
foresaw that Gemini and Apollo flight control would require large 
numbers of systems, network, and trajectory specialists. Staff rooms, 
housing experts in these categories, were arranged around the mission 
operations control room. The new control center was not needed for 
the first two Gemini manned missions, but Kraft wanted to, and did, 
get it set up and operating one flight before any rendezvous maneu- 
vers, practice or otherwise, were scheduled to take place. Kraft led his 
flight control team through the first rendezvous mission, as he had in- 
tended, and then withdrew to apply, in preparing for Apollo, the les- 
sons he had learned. A major area on which he focused attention was 
the computer complex. Although the IBM 7094 model then in use was 
adequate for Gemini, it was better suited to scientific purposes. What 
Apollo needed, Kraft said, was a second generation model capable of 
supporting realtime space operations.10 He was proved right when the 
flight controllers were able to change Apollo 13, in the middle of the 
mission, from a lunar landing to a circumlunar flight and thus to pre- 
vent a space tragedy. 
Beginning with Gemini's sixth flight, Apollo personnel watched 
mission operations more closely, attending panel meetings on space- 
craft systems and mission planning, observing flight control operations, 
and participating in mission debriefings and evaluations. On occasions 
when Gemini planners reacted to anomalies with a seizure of conserva- 
tism, Apollo engineers pressed to make mission activities more mean- 
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ingful to the lunar program. When things really went wrong-the 
GATV 5002 explosion, the shutdown of Gemini launch vehicle 6 after 
ignition, and the stuck thruster on Spacecraft &-systems engineering 
experts were assigned to de'termine how similar incidents might, or 
might not, affect Apollo. 11 
The Gemini program clung to its original flight schedule much 
more closely than had Mercury. Eighteen months was the lag time for 
the first manned Gemini mission;* the final mission, nine flights later, 
was still 18 months behind the schedule approved in January 1962. In 
contrast, the first manned orbital Mercury mission came 22 months 
later than scheduled, and the final mission, only three flights later, 
lagged more than 32 months. Mercury's period of orbital operations 
covered 451 days, or a flight every 112 days, to accumulate only 55 
hours of crew experience. The 10 manned Gemini flights spanned 603 
days, or a flight every 60 days, to accumulate 970 mission-hours and 
1940 man-hours in space. Sixteen different astronauts made Gemini 
flights and four others trained for them. This experience was passed 
on to Apollo, as 15 of the 20 men subsequently flew in the lunar pro- 
gram. The rapid succession of Gemini missions demonstrated that it 
was truly a second generation spacecraft, and the length of its mis- 
sions-330 hours on Gemini VU-allayed major medical concerns 
over man's ability to adapt to and function in space. More and more it 
became an accepted fact during Gemini that man could, should, and 
would fly to the Moon and back.12 
projects ~erc-ury  and Gemini certainly had one feature in com- 
mon-both cost about double the original estimate. The best educated 
guess that T. Keith Glennan, the first NASA Administrator, could give 
for Mercury was $200 million, and its price was over $400 million at 
the end. Gemini started at $531 million to build what was supposed to 
be an improved Mercury and wound up costing $1.147 billion to cover 
a program that included many new developments. Unlike Mercury, 
Gemini had its share of financial crises; Congress and the Administra- 
tion, beset with a variety of domestic and international problems, 
curbed the flow of money to NASA-and Gemini usually had to bear 
the brunt. At times the prospects must have seemed bleak to the engi- 
neers who worked on it, but the monetary cuts were never deep 
enough to preclude, although they often threatened, the accomplish- 
ment of Gemini's primary objectives. In what must be counted an unu- 
sual circumstance at the leading edge of technology, Gemini actually 
rolled back the money tide to some extent. The projected runout cost 
in Fiscal Year 1964 had been set at $1.354 billion, but the innovation 
of better test and checkout procedures that same year cut two months 
*These scheduling figures are based on the early scheme of having only one unmanned 
flight in the program; the second would have carried a crew. 
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from the schedule and saved an estimated $200 million. Major credit 
for this achievement should probably go to the incentive contracts that 
in 1964 put Gemini procurement on a strikingly new footing.13 
By putting manned space flight on a more routine basis, as stated 
in the project development plan, the rapid and successful progression 
of Gemini missions had a salient effect on American and international 
opinion-manned space flight became commonplace. During the flight 
period, there had been a spacecraft circling Earth about six percent of 
the time or, theoretically, an hour and a half for each one of the 603 
days the operations covered. Not even the Wright brothers, at the 
dawn of powered flight, could have sustained public interest on such a 
regular basis. Over a thousand reporters came to Houston for Gemini 
IV, drawn by the knowledge that the new mission control center would 
operate for the first time and by predictions in some medical circles 
that the astronauts might die after being in weightless flight so long. 
No succeeding flight drew nearly as many until Apollo 1 1 ,  when over a 
thousand reporters, cameramen, commentators, and technicians again 
descended on Houston, this time to write and talk about the lunar 
landing mission. 
Gemini VII/VI-A, the first rendezvous mission, not only gave new 
life to the old saw about not being able to tell the players without a 
program (with four men and two spacecraft cluttering up the heavens) 
and proved that a 14-day flight was feasible, but it saw the Russian- 
American space race scorecard all but tossed aside. The fact that the 
Russian cosmonauts did not fly at all while American astronauts whirled 
about Earth at frequent intervals probably prompted the premise that 
the race was over. Now that the United States had gained space 
preeminence and international tensions seemed to be lessening despite 
Vietnam, the value of manned space flight was increasingly questioned 
when compared to the need for solving the age-old problems of hun- 
ger, housing, and education.14 
The final event in the Gemini program took place in Houston on 
1-2 February 196'7, as planned, in the Manned Spacecraft Center audi- 
torium. Some 900 people gathered from throughout the country to be 
greeted by Director Robert Gilruth, who asked them to divorce the 
recent Apollo accident from the Gemini proceedings. During the two- 
day conference, 21 technical papers were presented, concentrating 
mainly on rendezvous, extravehicular activity, and experiments.15 
Although the summary conference was given little space by the 
news media, Gemini's lessons and its people, some in leadership roles, 
were significant factors in Apollo's recovery. Twenty-two months 
elapsed before America put men into space again, yet only nine 
months after that-in July 1969-two astronauts walked on the Moon 
and ten more soon followed in their steps. Gemini had contributed its 
share to man's quest for a better understanding and use of his envi- 
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ronment. As it developed, the gaze was not wholly outward to the stars. 
Beginning with Gemini's manned missions, scientists gradually realized 
that photographs of Earth brought back by the astronauts could serve 
as a valuable tool to help identify and husband Earth's dwindling re- 
sources. Perhaps future historians will see that as Gemini's most lasting 
contribution. 
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T HE selection of the Gemini photography for this text was not an easy task. Only a few views would be published out of the hun- 
dreds of remarkable photos worthy of such status. 
As I scanned the scratched and dirty, decade old, "first master" 
which I have viewed a thousand times, my mind would occasionally 
wander back to those still vivid sights and sounds of the great epic of 
Gemini. I could clearly hear again the near euphoric shouts of Ed 
White as he stepped from Gemini IV into the void, coupled to the 
steady confident words of Jim McDivitt which told us that all was well. 
The deep concern in the voices of Neil Armstrong and Dave Scott de- 
scribing the problems of Gemini VIII as they prepared to terminate 
their mission. The hesitant and difficult grasp for words by many 
crews as they attempted to describe the new phenomena and experi- 
ence to an audience that would never have an opportunity to journey 
into space. The deep concern in voices of men trying to fix or adjust 
balky equipment. Gordo Cooper waking Pete Conrad as he clicked 
away getting more of those wonderful photos of the Himalayas. The 
occasional "cuss" word that would (receive worldwide media coverage, 
ad nauseam. The last minute changes in photo equipment at the Cape. 
The confident joy of telling the crew a few hours before lift-off that 
"all photosystems are Go!" And lastly, the most unique pleasure of 
being the first to see that unique photography as it came out of our 
film processors. 
I clear1 remember that June 1965 day when it all be an. We had B % just finishe processing that first roll of Gemini IVfilm w ich showed 
those 16 remarkable vlews of Ed White's spacewalk. We stretched out 
the roll, and a dozen or so NASA VIPs huddled tightly around the 
spacewalk photos expressing elation at what they saw. Many are promi- 
nently mentioned in this histor . As for myself, I stood alone at the r other end of the roll quietly ooking at photographs of the Earth, 
seeing things and places never before seen by human eyes. John 
Brinkmann, Photographic Technology Division Chief, called to me to 
come down and "see the action." My reply was, "Boss, I think the real 
action is down here." 
With Mercury, space photography was born; with Gemini, it strug- 
gled toward maturity so that Apollo space photography would give you 
and me, indeed the whole world, an opportunity to reach out and 
practically touch the Moon. But Skylab would again look back toward a 
troubled Earth, back here, where the "real action" is. 
Richard W. Underwood 
Thanksgiving Day 1974 
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GEOLOGY 
The world's second highest 
mountain, Mt. Godwin-Austen 
(K-2) in the Karakoram Range, 
is seen in a northerly view that 
looks across parts of India, 
Pakistan, and China. Godwin- 
Austen (861 1 meters) is near 
the upper left margin. The 
Indus River Bows in deep 
gorges at the left of the photo- 
graph. The deep gorge ssart- 
ing in a series of glaciers near 
Mt. Godwin-Austen and com- 
ing down the center of the 
photo is Syhok fork of the 
Indus. The mountains termi- 
nate at the upper right with 
the hazy Takla Makan Basin of 
China beyond. This overview 
of a largely unexplored region 
helps geologists better under- 
stand our restless Earch. (S65- 
45648; Gemini V.) 


A large portion of the eastern Sahara is seen during one of 
the two "high apogee" revolutions of Gemini X I .  The view 
is to the eastward looking across portions of Algeria, Niger, 
Chad, and most of Libya. The dark area behind the Agena 
S-band antenna is the Tassili-n-Ajjer Mountains. The "sand 
sea" Idehan Ubari (upper left) is separated from the circu- 
lar %and sea" Idehan Murzuq (right center) by the escarp- 
ments of  the darker Hamadet Muhzuq. Beyond (upper 
right center) are the Haruj al Aswad (Black Haraj) volcan- 
ics. The dark area on the right margin is the volcanic Ti- 
besti Mountains. Synoptic views of this tvDe are of great 
value in studies of r&ional geology and ltectonics. 7~66- 
54525; Gemini XI.) 
The dark domelike volcanics of 
Niger's Air-Au-Azbine Mountains 
contrast sharply with the buff-col- 
ored sands of the Tenere Sahara. A 
close look at the mountains show a 
very complex system of dikes, faults, 
and structural development. (S65- 
63158; Gemini VI.) 
The great Sahara dominates 
North Africa and divides it 
into areas of barren moun- 
tains, plateaus, and sand des- 
erts. An Algerian intermoun- 
tain valley traps the sand and 
desert winds whip it up into 
600-meter-high hills called the 
Tifernine Dunes. The location 
is some 150 kilometers south 
of Fort Flatters. Gemini pho- 
tography covered most of the 
Sahara and was used to chart 
routes for exploration, locate 
routes for pipelines and roads, 
locate oases, discover mineral 
wealth, and better understand 
the climatic conditions. (S65- 
63829; Gemini VII.) 
Baja California stretches over 1206 
kilometers southeastward to Cabo 
de San Lucas. This view shows the 
lower 200 kilometers of the penin- 
sula. Faults stand out in the Sierra 
de San Lazaro (dark area). The 
developing tourist city of La Paz is 
on the bay at the upper edge. (S65- 
45586; Gemini V.) 
Biblical and Near East students find much of value in this photograph. Sinai 
is at the center, Arabia to the right, Palestine and the Levant to the upper left, 
and Mesopotamia to the upper right. One can trace the route of Abraham to 
Israel and clearly see Judea, Galilee, and Samaria. The River Jordan connects 
the Sea of Galilee to the Dead Sea, all in a straight line along a great rift in 
the Earth's crust. Mount Sinai (Gebel Musa) is seen in the Sinai. Portions of 
the Hejaz pilgrimage route that Moslems have used for nearly 1400 years 
can be seen between Damascus and Mecca. The black cloud in the upper 
right is the result of a fire caused by destruction on the Trans Arabian pipe- 
line. We see the fire and smoke from over 1000 kilometers distance. (S66- 
54893; Gemini XI.) 
OCEANOGRAPHY 
The contrast between deep 
water (deep blue), shallow wa- 
ter (light blue), and small is- 
land reefs is dramatically seen 
in this view of the Bahamas. 
The deep blue circular area to 
the lower left is known as the 
Tongue of the Ocean. An 
underwater escarpment drops 
more than 1.5 kilometers to 
the floor of this unique area. 
The deep blue ellipse to the 
right center is Exuma Sound, 
equally deep. Close inspec- 
From 300 kilometers above the 
Earth, a wide-angle view of the 
Texas-Louisiana Gulf Coast 
shows almost 600 kilometers of 
shoreline between Aransas Bay 
and Vermilion Bay. The move- 
ment and distribution of wat- 
erborne sediments and pollu- 
tants are clearly visible over a 
wide area of the Gulf of Mexi- 
co. Regional land use can be 
easily delineated into such cat- 
egories as forests, agricultural, 
grazing, wetlands, coastlines; 
lakes and reservoirs, and ur- 
ban areas. This photo had the 
unique distinction of being the 
first space photo used in a le- 
gal case resulting in the elimi- 
nation of a source of water 
pollution. (366-34034; Gemini 
XII.) 
ti& Gill show that numerous 
islands and cays fringe much of 
Exuma Sound. On 12 October 
1492, Christopher Columbus 
and 88 men first touched the 
New World at San Salvador 
From the high vantage point 
of an orbiting spacecraft, one 
can see the bottom of the sea 
in many areas. The Florida 
Keys create a 200-kilometer- 
long arc from Biscayne Bay to 
Key West. Boat wakes are easi- 
ly seen in the sun glint. The 
Everglades National Park is in 
the upper right. Florida Bay, 
dotted with numerous small 
islands, separates Cape Sable 
rhe south half of the island of 
raiwan is clearly seen. The 
'ormosa Strait is to the left. 
2oastal currents can be located 
nd charted in the Pacific 
kean, Luzon Strait, South 
Xna  Sea, and Formosa Strait. 
S66-45868; Gemini X.) 
and  once de Leon Bay from 
the highway-connected Keys. 
The Gulf Stream flows north- 
eastward in the lower portion 
of the photograph. The ocean- 
ographer has increased his 
knowledge of the seas by the 
use of space photography. 
(S65-34766; Gemini IV.) I 
A striking photograph of a sunset seen from space. The low elevation sun 
lights a cloud front with gold as Gemini V I I  looks southward down the Andes 
and the Altiplano of Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina. The sun is setting in the 
Argentine Chaco. Sunlight barely illuminates the large salt flats of Uyuni and 
Atacama. Gemini photography can be beautiful as well as scientifically infor- 
mative. (S65-63780; Gemini VII.) 
From an altitude of approxi- 
mately 700 kilometers, the 
Indian subcontinent passes by. 
The Island of Ceylon is to the 
right, the Bay of Bengal is to 
the upper right, and the Ara- 
bian Sea is to the left. A nar- 
row band of tropical rain for- 
ests stretches along the west 
coast of India from Cape 
Comorin northward, permit- 
ting one to easily differentiate 
rain forests from deserts and 
savannas. The thin band of 
offshore clouds running from 
Bombay around India into the 
Bay of Ben al gives new clues 
to India3 $mate. (S66-54676; 
Gemini XI.) 
The navigators and explorers 
of 500 years ago had a great 
fear of sailing along the hostile 
Atlantic coasts of Africa. Such 
fears hastened the discovery 
and European mupation of 
the Americas. T k  view clearly 
shows 400 kilometers of 'Skel- 
eton Coast" of Southwest Afri- 
ca. Constant northerly winds 
cause the development of par- 
allel sand dunes which, 
some cases, are over 200 kilo- 
meters long and over 300 me- 
ters high. Seifs, as they are 
called, are rarely found and 
parallel the wind direction; 
most dunes are transverse to 
the wind direction. A combina- 
tion of wind-blown sand from 
the Namib Desert and the 
strong northward Benguela 
Current cause the develop- 
ment of sand hooks or capes. 
This dry and hostile area with 
an equally hostile name re- 
ceives-about 100 centimeters of 
rain a century. ($65-45579; 
Gemini V.) 
A strange circular feature 
about 40 kilometers in diame- 
ter and about 300 meters deep 
is seen in the Sahara of Mauri- 
tania. It is called Richat. It was 
first believed to be caused by a 
meteor impact, but later geo- 
logical studies and the fact that 
it is seen in a single space pho- 
tograph indicate that it is a 
unique wind erosional feature 
caused by the abrasive forces 
of swirling sand. (S65-34670; 
Gemini IV.) 
Topographic features can 
greatly influence the weather 
and the development of weath- 
er systems. A classic vortex 
about 50 kilometers in diame- 
ter is clearly seen o f f  the coast 
of Morocco. In this case, wind 
shear at Ras (Cape) Rhir, a 
coastal promontory, caused the 
wind to develop its circular 
motion. Such ~henomena can 
be cleirly st&d from the 
unique vantage point of space, 
increasing our knowledge of 
weather systems and their pos- 
sible future control. Weather 
satellites have provided the 
information which has saved 
hundreds of thousands of lives 
in the United States and else- 
where. (S65-45665; Geini.111~ V.) 
WATER RESOURCES 
Ethiopia's Lakes Zwai, Langana, 
Hora Abyata, Koka, and Awusa 
show different colors. This is pri- 
marily due to water temperature 
differences resulting in each lake 
supporting different algae and other 
micromar~ne life. Space photogra- 
phy can permit a continual survey 
of the world's water resources and 
quality. (S65-63162; Gemini VI.) 
Florida's Cape Canaveral juts 
into the Atlantic Ocean. The 
various launch pads of the 
John F. Kennedy Space Center 
get larger and more complex 
as you proceed northward 
along the coast. Launch Pad 5, 
where the first Mercury Aight 
was launched, is difficult to see, 
while the giant Launch Com- 
plex 39 built for Apollo and 
also used by Skylab covers sev- 
eral square kilometers. Cumu- 
lus clouds form in long 
'3treets" pardel to the coast. 
Manmade waterways can be 
traced by the spoil banks which 
show as small white dots along 
the right of way. (S65-45599; 
GemimN V.) 
The once mighty Colorado River 
separates the Mexican state of Baja 
California from Sonora at its 
mouth. It has been reduced to a 
sluggish, salty stream by removal of 
most of the water for irrigation or 
use by the cities of Southern Cali- 
fornia. Sediment Aows can be traced 
in the Sea of  Cortez (Gulf of Cali- 
fornia). The limits of the pre-water- 
use flood plain can be easily deli- 
neated. Note that the geology is 
completely different in Baja Califor- 
nia (left) from that of Sonora 
(right). The buff sands of the Grand 
Sonoran Desert lend color to this 
extraordinary photography and 
contrast with the block fault moun- 
tains of Baja California. Thus, the 
interface of meteorology, geology, 
and oceanography is seen in a very 
remote area. (S65-34673; Gemini 
IV.) 
The geology of south central Ixan 
stands out clearly just east of Shiraz. 
Two salt lakes, Tasik and Bakhte- 
gan, show many shorelines due to 
changes in level caused by spring 
snow melt and occasional rain. The 
long ridges of the Zagros Mountains 
run from northwest to southeast. 
The ancient Persian city of Persep- 
olis is at the upper left margin. 
(S65-45720; Gemini V.) 

On rare occasions water flows in the 
Algerian Sahara. The Oued Saoura 
is viewed with flowing water after a 
rain. The area viewed is the south- 
west corner of the Grand Erg Occi- 
dental about 350 kilometers SSE of 
Colomb Bechar. The Oued Saoura 
flows southeast along the right edge 
of the photo; just off the lower right 
corner it passes through a water 
gap, reverses direction, and flows 
northwest into a salt marsh called 
the Sebcha Melah. (S65-63830; 
Gemini VII) 
The  sharp contrast between the green irrigated 
Nile Delta and the arid Sahara can be clearly seen 
from 160 kilometers overhead. Canals, highways, 
railroads, towns, and villages can be located. The 
great city of  Cairo is at the head of  the delta. Just 
north of  Cairo the Nile splits, forming the Rosetta 
and Daiet ta  branches. South of  Cairo, agriculture 
is confined to the straight, narrow, long valley to 
the first cataract at Aswan. Photos from space can 
assist in land use studies. (S65-45778; Gemini V.) 
A dark arrow points westward across 
Texas' Edwards Plateau. Its tip is near 
Rankin, just east of  the Pecos River, and 
widens to the east. It was caused by a 
widening rain shower several days before 
which brought moisture to this desert 
landscape and caused the plants to grow. 
The  light area to the right is the Uano 
Estacado (Staked Plains) and the Permian 
Basin oil fields. The dark streams make 
up the Concho River system west o f  San 
Angelo. Photography from space can be 
a valuable tool in the field of  agriculture. 
Continual monitoring from spacecraft 
can accurately tell the world such infor- 
mation as water availability, crop disease 
and insect infestation locations, crop 
identification and projected yields, graz- 
ing conditions, and much more informa- 
tion necessary to improve food su ply 
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HIS history of Project Gemini rests ultimately on the paperwork
generated by the project itself. Virtually all the documents cited in
the notes are available in the History Archives, Johnson Space Center,
Houston, Texas. Gathered over the past 12 years, these archives now
comprise over 200 linear meters of filed and shelved documents, bear-
ing not only on Gemini but on all American manned space flight pro-
grams—Mercury, Apollo, Skylab, Apollo-Soyuz, and Shuttle—as well as
the institutional history of the Center and some special topics such as
space-suit development.
Most of the material on which this book is based does not lend it-
self easily to listing in a formal bibliography. The published and un-
published documents listed below thus represent, in a sense, only the
tip of the iceberg—those items that may be conveniently cited; as the
notes clearly show, they in no way approach a description of the
sources. In fact, they tend to be the most peripheral. In the ongoing
work of Project Gemini, whose fallout provided most of the evidence
for our attempt to tell the story, there was little time or opportunity
for the writing, much less the publication, of the more formal books or
articles that lend themselves to citation. The nature of Project Gemini,
as sketched in the introduction and displayed in the book, has also
meant that the years since its completion have added little to the story.
In this note, we shall make some effort to describe the nature of
the sources that we have used. The backbone of the Gemini history
was chiefly provided by a class of material that might be labeled serial
documents. Probably the most important of these were the regular,
recurring progress, status, and activity reports submitted by contrac-
tors to NASA and by lower NASA elements to higher. They vary
greatly in content, format, quality, and usefulness, but they often prov-
ide the major, sometimes the only, basis for reconstructing the se-
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quence and significance of particular events, especially during Gemini's
developmental period. Among the more helpful of these reports were:
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. "Gemini Agena Target Vehicle Program Progress Report."
LMSC-A605200-1 to -16. Sunnyvale, Calif., 20 Oct. 1964-20 Dec. 1965.
. "Medium Space Vehicles Programs Monthly Progress Report." LMSC-447186-26 to -47.
Sunnyvale, Calif., 20 Sept. 1962-20 May 1964.
North American Aviation, Inc. "Contract NAS 9-167, Paraglider Development Program, Phase II,
Part A, Monthly Progress Letter No. 1," 20 Nov. 1961, through "... No. 16," 31 March 1963.
. "Contract NAS 9-539, Paraglider Development Program, Advanced Trainer and Proto-
type Wing Design, Phase II, Part B(1), Monthly Progress Letter No. 1," 20 June 1962,
through "... No. 9," 31 March 1963.
. "Contract NAS 9-1484, Paraglider Landing System Program, Monthly Progress Report
No. 1," for May 1963 through "... No. 21," for Jan. 1965.
U.S., Air Force, Space Systems Division (SSD). "Titan II/Gemini Program Status Summary."
Weekly letters, SSD to NASA Assoc., Adm., 18 Sept. 1963 . to 27 Jan. 1964.
U.S., NASA, Manned Spacecraft Center. "Weekly Activity Report for the Office of Director [later
Associate Administrator], Manned Space Flight." Houston, 27 May 1962-7 Aug. 1965.
. "Consolidated [monthly] Activity Report for the Office of the Director [later Associate
Administrator], Manned Space Flight." Houston, May 1962—Jan. 1965.
"Quarterly Activity Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, Manned Space
Flight." Houston, 30 April 1965-30 July 1966.
. Gemini Project [later Program] Office. "GPO Weekly Activity Report for the Director,
MSC." Houston, 5 March 1962-10 April 1965.
"Project Gemini Quarterly Status Report No. 1, for period ending May 31, 1962,"
through "... No. 17, for period ending May 31, 1966."
U.S., NASA, Marshall Space Flight Center. "First Report on MSFC Activities Covering February
26 thru March 25, 1962, to Manned Spacecraft Center," through "Thirteenth ... November
1 thru November 16, 1962, ... "
A second group of serial documents comprised the official minutes
and sometimes the informal notes of meetings of the boards and pan-
els that supervised or dealt with various aspects of the Gemini program.
The most directly involved were the coordination panels, which were
largely responsible for the day-to-day decision-making in Gemini de-
velopment (as discussed in Chapter IV). The abstracts of these coordi-
nation panel meetings record the decisions taken and, sometimes, the
reasons for them; ordinarily, though, the reasons for the decisions
must be sought elsewhere, since the abstracts tend to be brief to the
point of being cryptic. The six panels first set up early in 1962—
spacecraft mechanical systems, electrical systems, operations; Atlas-
Agena, Gemini launch vehicle, and paragliders—were later joined by
others to deal with particular areas as they became important. Among
these were launch guidance and control, rendezvous and reentry guid-
ance and control, trajectories and orbits, launch integration, range
safety, network integration, and experiments.
Besides the coordination panels, Gemini was served by a number
of other boards and panels, the minutes of which were often helpful,
particularly in pinning down the precise nature of problems as under-
stood at particular times, since the experts were faced with explaining
their piece of the program to what were essentially knowledgeable out-
siders. The most useful records were those of:
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Gemini Mission Review Board. July-Oct. 1966.
Gemini Project/Program Office Staff Meetings. 1963-1966.
Manned Spacecraft Center Senior Staff Meetings. July 1961-Sept. 1966.
Manned Space Flight Experiments Board. 1964-1966.
NASA-DOD Gemini Program Planning Board. Feb. 1963-April 1964.
NASA/MAC Management Meetings. 1964-1966.
NASA Management Council. Dec. 1961—Sept. 1963.
Project Gemini Management Panel. Nov. 1962—Feb. 1965.
Another class of relatively formal documents that were indispensa-
ble in writing the Gemini history were the contracts between NASA
and the organizations that did most of the actual work of development
and operation. This is not the place for a treatise on contracting, but a
few points are worth noting. The initial agreement usually took the
form of a letter contract, a means of getting work started before or
while negotiations took place. Eventually the letter contract gave way
to the negotiated or final contract. The basic document normally in-
cluded a "statement of work," particularly useful for the historian in
furnishing a clear and direct statement of what the contractor agreed
to provide. Major contracts were regularly changed, supplemented,
amended, etc., each producing a notice added to the basic contract. A
complete list of major Gemini contractors, subcontractors, and vendors
may be consulted in James M. Grimwood and Barton C. Hacker, Pro-
ject Gemini Technology and Operations: A Chronology, NASA SP-
4002 (Washington, 1969), pp. 284-89.
Useful for following the changes in organization and administra-
tion of the Manned Spacecraft Center and of the Gemini Program
Office were three sets of internal publications. MSC Announcements,
numbered serially for each year, were the means of notifying Center
employees of changes as they occurred. The semi-official MSC Space
News Roundup was a bi-weekly newspaper focused on local news,
which also contained stories about the Center's programs as well. The
periodically revised MSC telephone directories were particularly help-
ful in determining the exact positions of people working on Project
Gemini at particular times.
As the notes to the text should make clear, our major reliance was
on the working documents directly related to the conduct of Project
Gemini—the memorandums, letters, teletype communications, and
other messages that described, explained, ordered, informed, coordi-
nated, and otherwise kept the several parts of Gemini in touch with
each other and with the outside world. One point that should probably
be made is that the person who signs a message is often not its author.
This is almost invariably true for interagency communications, less
commonly true internally. This is the major reason we have usually
preferred to identify organizations—e.g., Gemini Project Office, Space
Systems Division—as the actors in our history. This trait is not unique
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to NASA, of course, but it clearly influences the kind of history that
may be written of a NASA program.
Of considerable value as background material were a variety of
documents related to NASA's efforts to maintain its public image. The
MSC fact sheets, printed at the Center and distributed throughout the
world, may have been the most widely read source of public informa-
tion on Gemini. Among them were a series on the Gemini missions by
Ivan D. Ertel, beginning with MSC Fact Sheet No. 291, Gemini Pro-
gram, and followed by Fact Sheet Nos. 291-A through 291-I, April
1965 to December 1966, dealing with Gemini missions from the third
through the twelfth. NASA also prepared and distributed to reporters
a press kit for each mission. These kits were substantial compilations
running to dozens of pages, intended to provide a comprehensive
background for news stories about the missions. Other press materials
were also helpful: the press handbooks prepared by some Gemini con-
tractors (Martin, McDonnell, and Lockheed, in particular, which are
cited here); transcripts of NASA-conducted press conferences during
missions and on some other occasions (e.g., the introduction of newly
selected astronauts); and such regular mission-related briefings as the
one at each change of shift. These materials were often helpful in fill-
ing out the more technical record provided by the Gemini mission
evaluation team in the Mission Report (this and the following are cited
in full in the bibliography), as supplemented by the technical debrief-
ings of the crew, by special detailed studies on particular aspects of a
mission (e.g., launch vehicle performance), and by the transcript of all
communications between ground and flight crews during the course of
a mission.
NASA distributes internally a daily compilation of current news,
photoduplicated articles on space-related topics from a broad spectrum
of newspapers. The JSC History Office has a file of this compilation
beginning in 1958. Another useful source of reaction to NASA activi-
ties is the trade press. Numerous journals are devoted to the doings of
the aerospace industry; the two we found most consistently useful were
Aviation Week and Space Technology and Missiles and Rockets.
Interviews were a major source for this history. The chance to put
questions to the people who actually did what we were writing about
went a long way to compensate for the difficulties of studying contem-
porary history. Cooperation was general, whether in small matters or
large. Two types of interviews appear in the following list. Most were
lengthy conversations that were tape-recorded and subsequently tran-
scribed; the typescripts of these interviews are on file in the JSC Histo-
ry Office. We also conducted much briefer interviews by  telephone;
these were usually addressed to relatively specific matters of fact • or
information and were not recorded, although notes may have been
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taken. Interviews in this latter category are marked by an asterisk in
the following list.
People Interviewed
1. Albert, John G. 37. Chamberlin, James A.
2. Aldrin, Edwin E., Jr. 38. Chambers, Gordon T.
3. Alexander, James D.* 39. Charlesworth, Clifford E.
4. Alphin, James H.* 40. Cherry, Clyde S.
5. Amman, Ernest A. 41. Christopher, Kenneth W.
6. Andrich, Stephen M. 42. Church, John
7. Armstrong, Neil A. 43. Clements, Henry E.*
8. Armstrong, Stephen D. 44. Cohen, Haggai
9. Armstrong, William O. 45. Cohen, Robert
10. Babb, Conrad D. 46. Collins, Michael
11. Bachman, Dale 47. Conrad, Charles, Jr.
12. Bailey, Glenn F. 48. Cooper, L. Gordon, Jr.
13. Bake, Ronald C.* 49. Correale, James V.*
14. Ballentine, Wilbur A. 50. Cottee, Gatha F.*
15. Barton, John 51. Crane, Richard J.*
16. Bates, James R.* 52. Cress, Gordon P.
17. Bell, Larry E. 53. Curlander, J. Carroll
18. Berry, Charles A. 54. Czarnik, Marvin R.
19. Bickers, John H. 55. Davis, Larry D.*
20. Bird, John D. 56. Day, LeRoy E.
21. Black, Dugald O.* 57. Deans, Philip M.*
22. Black, Stanley 58. Decker, James L.*
23. Blackert, Robert S. 59. Dietlein, Lawrence F.
24. Bland, William M., Jr.* 60. Dineen, Richard C.
25. Blatz, William J. 61. Disher, John H.*
26. Borman, Frank 62. Domokos, Steven J.
27. Bost, James E.* 63. Dotts, Homer W.*
28. Bowles, Lamar D.* 64. Douglas, W. Harry*
29. Boyd, John H., Jr.* 65. Duggan, Orton L.*
30. Boynton, John H.* 66. Dunkelman, Lawrence
31. Bratton, R. Dean* 67. Dunn, Charles E.
32. Buhler, Cary 68. Eggleston, John M.
33. Burke, Walter F. 69. Ellmer, Paul
34. Byerly, Dirk L. 70. Elms, James C.*
35. Byrnes, Martin A., Jr. 71. Emigh, Harold
36. Cernan, Eugene A. 72. Engstrom, Bert
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73. Evans, Tom 118. Jackson, James B., Jr.
74. Evans, W. B.* 119. Jackson, Lee
75. Everline, Robert T.* 120. James, Bennett W.
76. Farguson, Dale 121. James, George
77. Fisher, Lewis R. 122. Jeffs, George W.
78. Fore, Wallace 123. Jevas, Nicholas*
79. Foster, Norman G. 124. Jimerson, Leroy S.
80. Franklin, George C.* 125. Joachim, James W.
81. Friedman, Stanley 126. Johnson, Harold I.
82. Fucci, James R.* 127. Kapp, Michael
83. Funk, Ben I. 128. Kapryan, Walter J.
84. Furman, Francis O. 129. Keehn, Richard W.
85. Gellerman, Joseph B. 130. King, John W.*
86. Gerathewohl, Siegfried J. 131. Kleinknecht, Kenneth S.
87. Gibbons, Howard I.* 132. Koons, Wayne E.*
88. Gill, Jocelyn R. 133. Kranz, Eugene F.
89. Gilruth, Robert R. 134. Kuehnel, Helmut A.*
90. Gordon, Richard F., Jr. 135. Lang, Dave W.
91. Gray, Wilbur H. 136. Lang, David D.*
92. Green, Don J. 137. Lansdowne, Kathryn A.*
93. Griffin, James J. 138. Ledlie, James
94. Grimm, Dean F. 139. Lenz, James
95. Hahn, Jack R. 140. Letsch, Ernst R.
96. Hall, Eldon W. 141. Lindley, Robert N.
97. Hammack, Jerome B. 142. Lineberry, Edgar C.
98. Haney, Paul P. 143. Lopez, Sarah W.*
99. Harness, Arminta 144. Lovell, James A., Jr.
100. Harris, Howard T. 145. Low, George M.
101. Hauger, Lloyd 146. Luetjen, H. H.
102. Hecht, Kenneth F. 147. Lunney, Glynn S.*
103. Heimstadt, C. E. 148. Lutz, Charles C.
104. Hello, Bastian 149. McBarron, James W., II*
105. Helsel, Ron 150. McCabe, Robert
106. Henry, James P.* 151. ° McCafferty, Riley D.
107. Hill, Raymond D., Jr. 152. McCreavey, William
108. Hobokan, Andrew 153. McDivitt, James A.
109. Hodge, John D. 154. McFadden, Eugene R.
110. Hohmann, Bernhard A. 155. McKee, Donald D.
111. Hollands, Rockwell 156. McMann, Harold J.
112. Houbolt, John C. 157. MacDougall, George F., Jr.*
113. Huff, Vearl N. 158. Machell, Reginald M.
114. Hull, Robert R. 159. Manry, Charles E.*
115. Huss, Carl R.* 160. Marbach, James*
116. Hutchison, Fountain M. 161. Mathews, Charles W.
117. Hutchison, Homer W. 162. May, Bill
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163. Mayer, John P.* 208. Shuck, Lowell
164. Meyer, Andre J., Jr. 209. Simpkinson, Scott H.
165. Miglicco, Percy S. 210. Sims, John R.
166. Miller, John 211. Slaughter, Frances*
167. Mitchell, Willis B., Jr. 212. Smistad, Olav*
168. Mitros, Edward F.* 213. Smith, Herbert E.*
169. Morgan, Frank G., Jr. 214. Smith, Walter D.
170. Morrow, Lola H. 215. Spath, Richard M.
171. Mueller, George E. 216. Stafford, Thomas P.
172. Muhly, William C.* 217. Stewart, Larry E.
173. Nagler, Kenneth M.* 218. Stewart, Lester A.*
174. Nolan, Harold W. 219. Stiff, Ray C., Jr.
175. Nold, Winston D. 220. Stullken, Donald E.*
176. North, Warren J. 221. Summerfelt, William A.
177. Oldeg, Harry W. 222. Swanson, John
178. Petersen, Jean L.* 223. Sweeney, John L.
179. Poole, Forrest R. 224. Tenebaum, Dan M.
180. Preston, G. Merritt 225. Thackston, Willard
181. Provart, Robert 226. Tindall, Howard W., Jr.
182. Purchase, Alan 227. Tomlinson, Charles C.
183. Purser, Paul E. 228. Towner, George
184. Raines, Ray 229. Trombka, Jacob L.
185. Rapp, Rita M.* 230. Truszynski, Gerald M.
186. Ray, Hilary A.* 231. Tucker, Elton M.*
187. Ringer, Jerome 232. Van Bockel, John J.
188. Rose, James T. 233. Van Riper, Paul P.
189. Rose, Rodney G.* 234. Verlander, Joseph M.
190. Russell, John H. 235. Verrengia, Augustine A.*
191. Samonski, Joan P.* 236. Verrier, Don
192. Sanders, Fred J. 237. Vester, Ben
193. Sanderson, Alan N.* 238. Vogel, Harle L.
194. Satterfield, James M.* 239. Waggoner, James
195. Saunders, James F., Jr.* 240. Wambolt, Joseph F.
196. Schirra, Walter M., Jr. 241. Ward, E. Douglas
197. Schlicker, Albert 242. Weber, George J.*
198. Schmitt, Joe W.* 243. Wendt, Guenter F.
199. Schneider, William C. 244. Westkaemper, Robert M.
200. Schroeder, Lyle C.* 245. Whitacre, Horace E.
201. Schweickart, Russell L. 246. Williams, John J.
202. Scott, David R. 247. Williams, Walter C.
203. Seamans, Robert C., Jr. 248. Williams, Wiley E.
204. Sharp, Robert L. 249. Wilson, Louis D.
205. Sheckells, George 250. Wolhart, Walter D.
206. Shoaf, Harry C.* 251. Workman, Robert O.
207. Shoenhair, Jack L. 252. Wyatt, DeMarquis D.
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253. Yardley, John F.
254. York, Irving
255. Young, John W.
256. Young, Kenneth A.*
257. Young, Richard S.*
258. Young, Robert B.
259. Younger, George B.
260. Zahn, Toni*
261. Zeitler, Edward O.*
Still another group of sources deserves special mention—the
comments we received on draft chapters of this history and on draft
versions of Project Gemini 'Technology and Operations. These com-
ments varied considerably in scope, format, and value, but a number
were substantial and documented critiques on the text. The relevant
comments are cited in the notes.
The bulk of the remaining sources are listed in the following bibli-
ography. Any classification must inevitably be arbitrary, at least in part.
We have divided the primary sources into four classes: (1) Studies,
Proposals, Long-Range Plans, and other documents mostly related to
Gemini's formative stages; (2) Gemini Plans, Procedures, Working
Papers, Design Notes, and other materials related directly to the oper-
ation of the program; (3) Gemini Reports, Reviews, Evaluations and
other assessments of the conduct of the project; and (4) Printed Pri-
mary Sources. Secondary sources have merely been separated into two
classes: (5) Unpublished Secondary Sources and (6) Published Second-
ary Sources.
1. PRIMARY SOURCES: STUDIES, PROPOSALS, LONG-RANGE PLANS
Aldrin, Edwin E., Jr. "Line of Sight Guidance Techniques for Men in Orbital Rendezvous." Ph.D.
dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1964.
Barker, C. L., and Straly, W. H. "Rendezvous by the Chasing Technique." ABMA Report DSP-
TM-15-59. Huntsville, Ala., 30 Oct. 1959.
Blackmer, R. H., and Phillips, G. A. "Ion-Exchange Membrane Fuel Cell for Space Vehicle Elec-
tric Power." Paper presented at Society of Automotive Engineers, National Aerospace Engi-
neering and Manufacturing Meeting, Los Angeles, 9-13 Oct. 1961.
Brown and Root, Inc. "NASA Manned Spacecraft Center Master Plan & Architectural Concept."
Houston, July 1961.
California Institute of Technolgy, Jet Propulsion Laboratory. "Man-to-the-Moon and Return Mis-
sion Utilizing Lunar-Surface Rendezvous." JPL TM 33-53. Pasadena, Calif., 3 Aug. 1961.
. "System Considerations for the Manned Lunar Landing Program." JPL TM 33-52. Pasa-
dena, Calif., 3 Aug. 1961.
Decker, James L. "A Program Plan for a Titan Boosted Mercury Vehicle." Martin Co., Baltimore,
July 1961.
Eggleston, John M. "Inter-NASA Research and Space Development Centers Discussion on Space
Rendezvous, May 16-17, 1960." Washington, n.d.
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Frasier, Cline W. "LEM Rendezvous Radar vs. Optical Tracker Study." Grumman Aircraft Engi-
neering Corp., Bethpage, N.Y., 16 March 1965.
Gardner, James P.; Ruppe, Harry O.; and Straly, Warren H. "Comments on Problems Relating to
the Lunar Landing Vehicle." ABMA Report DSP-TN-13-58. Huntsville, Ala., 4 Nov, 1958.
General Electric Co., Direct Energy Conversion Operation. "Fuel Cells for Spacecraft, Including
Determination of Fuel Battery Size for Specific Application." West Lynn, Mass., January
1964.
Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. "Apollo Mission Planning Task Force," 3 vols. LED-540-7.
Bethpage, N.Y., 4 May 1964.
Hoelker, R. F., and Silber, Robert. "The Bi-Elliptical Transfer between Circular Co-Planar Or-
bits." ABMA Report DA-TM-2-59. Huntsville, Ala., 6 Jan. 1959.
Horner, James M., and Silber, Robert. "Impulse Minimization for Hohmann Transfer between
Inclined Circular Orbits of Different Radii." ABMA Report DA-TR-70-59. Huntsville, Ala., 2
Dec. 1959.
[Houbolt, John C., et al.) "Manned Lunar-Landing through the Use of Lunar-Orbit Rendezvous."
2 vols. Langley, Va., ca. August 1961.
. "Technical Problems of Lunar Orbit Rendezvous." Langley, Va., September 1961..
Hughes Aircraft Co., Nucleonics Laboratory. "Lunar Surface Assembly Techniques: A Prelimi-
nary Study of Refueling for the Lunar Surface Rendezvous." Hughes Report FD-61-401 QPL
950167), 2 Oct. 1961.
Koelle, Heinz H. "Future Projects at Marshall Space Flight Center." In U.S., NASA, MSFC,
"NASA-Industry Program Plans Conference, September 27-28, 1960." Huntsville, Ala., n.d.
Williams, F. L.; Huber, W. G.; and Callaway, R.C. "Juno V Space Vehicle Development
Program (Phase I): Booster Feasibility Demonstration." ABMA Report DSP-TM-10-58.
Huntsville, Ala., 13 Oct. 1958.
Lina, Lindsay J., and Vogeley, Arthur W. "Preliminary Study of a Piloted Rendezvous Operation
from the Lunar Surface to an Orbiting Space Vehicle." Paper presented at NASA Inter-
Center Rendezvous Discussions, Washington, 27-28 Feb. 1961.
Lundin, Bruce T.; Downhower, Walter J.; Eggers, A. J., Jr.; Johnson, Lt. Col. George W. S.; Lof-
tin, Laurence K., Jr.; Ruppe, Harry O.; Escher, William J. D.; and May, Ralph W., Jr. "A
Survey of Various Vehicle Systems for the Manned Lunar Landing Mission." NASA, Wash-
ington, 10 June 1961.
McDonnell Aircraft Corp. "Follow On Experiments, Project Mercury Capsules." MAC Engineer-
ing Report 6919, St. Louis, 1 Sept. 1959; rev. 5 Oct. 1959.
. "Gemini Large Earth Orbit." MAC Report B743; Control No. C-100858. St. Louis, 19
June 1965.
. "Mark 11 Mercury Spacecraft." MAC Control No. C-57342. St. Louis, 6 July 1961.
. "Mercury Spacecraft: Advanced Versions." MAC Control No. C-57978. St. Louis, ca. 27
July 1961.
. "Price and Delivery Proposal for MK I1 Mercury Engineering Study Program." MAC
Report 8185. St. Louis, 12 April 1961.
Michael, William H., Jr. "Weight Advantages of Use of Parking Orbit for Lunar Soft Landing
Mission," in Jack W. Crenshaw; John P. Gapcynski; Wilbur L. Mayo; and Michael, "Studies
Related to Lunar and Planetary Missions." Langley, Va., 26 May 1960.
Radio Corp. of America. "Satellite Interceptor Study System: Final Report." RCA Report CR-59-
588-39. Burlington, Mass., 31 Jan. 1960.
Rogallo, Francis M. "Paraglider Recovery Systems." Paper presented at International Astronautics
Society, Meeting on Man's Progress in the Conquest of Space, St. Louis, 30 April-2 May
1962.
and Lowry, John G. "Flexibie Reentry Gliders." Paper presented at Society of Automotive
Engineers, National Aeronautics Meeting, New York, 4-8 April 1960.
Sears, Norman E. "Satellite-Rendezvous Guidance System." MIT Report R-331. Cambridge,
Mass., May 1961.
Silber, Robert, and Horner, James M. "Two Problems of Impulse Minimization between Coplanar
Orbits," ABMA Report DA-TM-23-59. Huntsville, Ala., 12 Feb. 1959.
Space Craft, Inc. "Analysis of a Lunar Surface Rendezvous Mission. JPL 960165. Pasadena, Calif.,
October 1961.
Space Technology Laboratories, Inc. "The Lunar Surface Rendezvous Technique for Manned
Lunar Landing and Return." STL Report 8634-0001-RC-000 QPL 950163). Redondo Beach,
Calif., 2 Oct. 1961.
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"Saint Phase I Technical Proposal." STL/TR-59-0000-09917. Redondo Beach, Calif., 21
Dec. 1959.
U.S., Army Ballistic Missile Agency. "Proposal: A National Integrated Missile and Space Vehicle
Development Program." ABMA Report D-R-37. Huntsville, Ala., 10 Dec. 1957.
U.S., Army Ordnance Missile Command. "A Lunar Exploration Program Based upon Saturn-
Boosted Systems." AOMC RCS ORDXM-C-1004 (ABMA Report DV-TR-2-60). Huntsville,
Ala., I Feb. 1960.
. "Project Horizon, Phase I Report: A U.S. Army Study for the Establishment of a Lunar
Military Outpost." 4 vols. Huntsville, Ala., 8 June 1959.
U.S., National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics. "NACA Conference on High-Speed Aerody-
namics, Ames Aeronautical Laboratory, Moffett Field, California, March 18, 19 and 20, 1958:
A Compilation of Papers Presented." Moffett Field, n.d.
U.S., NASA. "Guidelines for a Program for Manned and Unmanned Orbital Operations." Wash-
ington, May 1961.
. "Lunar Orbit Rendezvous: News Conference on Apollo Plans at NASA Headquarters on
July 11, 1962." Washington, 1962.
"Third Semi-Annual NASA Staff Conference: Program Formulation and Status of Activi-
ties, Monterey, California, 3-5 March 1960." Washington, 1960.
. Ad Hoc Task Group on a Feasible Approach for an Early Manned Lunar Landing. "A
Feasible Approach, . . ." Part I: "Summary Report of Ad Hoc Task Group Study." Washing-
ton, 16 June 1961.
. Ad Hoc Task Group for Study of Manned Lunar Landing by Rendezvous Techniques.
"Earth Orbital Rendezvous for an Early Manned Lunar Landing," Part I: "Summary Report
of Ad Hoc Task Group Study." Washington, August 1961.
. Combined Working Group on Vehicles for Manned Space Flight. "Report." Washington,
20 Nov. 1961.
. Lunar Landing Working Group. "A Plan for Manned Lunar Landing." Washington, Jan-
uary 1961.
. Office of Program Planning and Evaluation. "The Ten Year Plan of the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration." Washington, 18 Dec. 1959.
. Office of Space Flight Development. "Manned Space Flight Long Range Plans." Washing-
ton, 17 Aug. 1959.
. Propulsion Staff. "A National Space Vehicle Program: A Report to the President." Wash-
ington, 27 Jan. 1959.
U.S., NASA, Manned Spacecraft Center. "Project Development Plan for Rendezvous Develop-
ment Utilizing the Mark II Two Man Spacecraft." Langley, Va., 8 Dec. 1961.
U.S., NASA, Marshall Space Flight Center, Committee for Orbital Operations. "Orbital Opera-
tions Preliminary Project Development Plan." Huntsville, Ala., 15 Sept. 1961.
U.S., NASA, Space Task Group. "Guidelines for Advanced Manned Space Vehicle Program."
Langley, Va., June 1961.
"Manned Spacecraft Development Center; Organizational Concepts and Staffing Require-
ments." Langley, Va., I May 1961.
. "Preliminary Project Development Plan for a Controllable Parachute-Retrorocket Landing
System." Langley, Va., 21 June 1961.
. "Preliminary Project Development Plan for an Advanced Manned Space Program Utiliz-
ing the Mark II Two Man Spacecraft." Langley, Va., 14 Aug. 1961; rev. 21 Aug. 1961.
,"Project Development Plan for Rendezvous Development Utilizing the Mark 11 Two Man
Spacecraft." Langley, Va., 27 Oct. 1961.
U.S., NASA and Department of Defense, Large Launch Vehicle Planning Group. "Final Report."
3 vols. NASA-DOD LLVGP 105. Washington, 1 Feb. 1962.
. "Summary Report." NASA-DOD LLVPG 105. Washington, 24 Sept. 1962.
von Braun, Wernher; Stuhlinger, Ernst; and Koelle, H. H. "ABMA Presentation to the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration." ABMA Report D-TN-1-59. Huntsville, Ala., 15 Dec.
1958.
2. PRIMARY SOURCES: GEMINI PLANS, PROCEDURES, WORKING PAPERS,
DESIGN NOTES
Beasley, Gary P. "Digital Computer Analysis in Support of GT-5 Mission." Paper presented at
504
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
MSC Meeting on Orbital Mechanics Associated with Gemini Flights, Houston, 11 Aug. 1965.
Chaput, Paul T. "Crew Egress Procedures Developed during the Qualification Test Program for
the Gemini Spacecraft At-Sea Operations." Gemini Working Paper 5015. Houston, 26 Aug.
1964.
Cohen, Robert. "Summary of Analysis for Selecting the Power Source for the Gemini Project."
Gemini Project Note. Houston, 23 Jan. 1962.
Culpepper, Bobby K. "Partial Proposed Mission Plan for the GT-5 Gemini Flight, REP Plan IV."
MSC Internal Note 64-FM-87. Houston, I Dec. 1964.
Dugge, Peggy, and Czarnik, Marvin R. "Practice Rendezvous Mission." MAC Guidance and Con-
trol Mechanics Design Note 1. St. Louis, 7 July 1962.
Fricke, Robert W., Jr. "Mission Directive for Gemini-Titan II Mission I (Spacecraft No. I)." Gem-
ini Working Paper 5005. Houston, 14 Nov. 1963.
Garren, Kenneth R. "Use of Visual Cues for Determining Range (with Optical Aids) and Direc-
tion of Motion of a Flashing Light." Paper presented at MSC Meeting on Orbital Mechanics
Associated with Gemini Flights, Houston, I1 Aug. 1965.
Guillory, Ted A.; Stough, Charles L.; and Davis, Charles F., Jr. "Gemini IX Flight Plan, Final."
Houston, 18 April 1966.
Hamm, Richard T. "Description of the Gemini VII Station Keeping Hybrid Simulation." MAC
Gemini Guidance and Control Design Note 388. St. Louis, 13 July 1966.
Holloway, Tommy W. "GT-3 Flight Plan, Preliminary B." Houston, 20 Sept. 1964.
. "GT-3 Flight Plan, Final." Houston, 4 March 1965.
. "GTA-6 Flight Plan, Preliminary." Houston, 2 Aug. 1966.
. "Gemini VI Flight Plan, Final." Houston, 1 Oct. 1965.
. "Gemini VIII Flight Plan, Final." Houston, 24 Feb. 1966.
Hrabel, Gordon C. "Experiments for GT-3 Mission." Gemini Working Paper 5014. Houston, 22
Sept. 1964.
. "Experiments for GT-4 Mission." Gemini Working Paper 5023. Houston, 14 May 1965.
Knori, G. W. "The Gemini XI Re-entry Monitoring and Control Procedure." MAC Design Note
394. St. Louis, 18 Aug. 1966.
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. "Gemini Agena Target Vehicle Program Status, 5 January 1966."
LMSC-A777567. Sunnyvale, Calif., 5 Jan. 1966.
. "Preliminary Report on Agena System Capabilities for Advanced Mercury Rendezvous
Missions." LMSC-A004120. Sunnyvale, Calif., 26 Jan. 1962.
. "Symposium on Hypergolic Rocket Ignition at Altitude." LMSC-A776842. Sunnyvale, Cal-
if., I Dec. 1965.
McDonnell Aircraft Corp. "Configuration Document for Gemini Spacecraft Number 1, Prelimi-
nary." MAC Report 8611-1, St. Louis, 1 Oct. 1962; rev. 28 March 1963.
. "DOD/NASA Gemini Experiments Study." MAC Report A358 (Interim Report SSD-
TOR-63-406). St. Louis, 24 Jan. 1964.
. "Gemini Spacecraft Cost and Delivery Proposal." MAC Report 8791. St. Louis, 18 April
1962.
. "Mercury Mark II Detail Specification." MAC Report 8356. St. Louis, 15 Nov. 1961.
. "Project Gemini: Mission `O' Plan." St. Louis, 12 July 1962.
. "Project Gemini Mission Plan: Spacecraft No. I." St. Louis, 14 Sept. 1962.
. "Spacecraft Prelaunch Test Procedure: Outline for the Rendezvous Mission Countdown."
MAC SEDR RMC-6. St. Louis, 23 Oct. 1965.
McLaughlin, Phillip. "Spin Up Studies for the Gemini-Agena System in a Tethered Configura-
tion." MAC Gemini Design Note 356. St. Louis, 23 March 1966.
Martin Co. "Program Plan." ER 12255. Baltimore, April 1962.
. "Reliability Test Plan." ER 12258. Baltimore, 15 June 1962.
. "Review of Requirements for a Restrained Firing Program." LV-114. Baltimore, 24 Sept.
1962.
Meintel, Alfred J.; Long, Edward R.; and Pennington, Jack E. "GT-5 Piloted Simulation." Paper
presented at MSC Meeting on Orbital Mechanics Associated with Gemini Flights, Houston,
I1 Aug. 1965.
Mueller, Donald D. "Zero Gravity Indoctrination for the Gemini/Apollo Astronauts." Aviation
Medical Research Laboratory Memo P-31. Johnsville, Pa., March 1963.
Newman, Frank B. "Lesson Plan and Handout, Special Technical Data, Gemini X Experiments."
MAC SCD M35. St. Louis, 17 June 1966.
Noeggerath, Wulfgang C. "Symposium on Hypergolic Rocket Ignition at Altitude, Lockheed Mis-
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siles & Space Company, 12 to 13 November 1965." Sunnyvale, Calif., n.d.
North American Aviation, Inc. "Business Management Proposal for a Paraglider Landing Sys-
tem." SID 63-606-2. Downey, Calif., 27 May 1963.
. "Management Proposal for a Paraglider Recovery System for Gemini Spacecraft." SID 63-
46-2. Downey, Calif., 31 Jan. 1963.
. "Technical Proposal for a Paraglider Landing System." SID 63-606-1. Downey, Calif., 27
May 1963.
. "Technical Proposal for a Paraglider Recovery System for Gemini Spacecraft." SID 63-46-
1. Downey, Calif., 31 Jan. 1963.
Pennington, Jack E. "Range Estimation Studies Using Only Apparent Object Size." Paper pre-
sented at MSC Meeting on Orbital Mechanics Associated with Gemini Flights, Houston, 11
Aug. 1965.
Pippert, Elvin B., Jr., and Holloway, Tommy W. "Gemini XII Flight Plan, Final." Houston, 20
Oct. 1966.
Rivers, J. V.; and Holloway, Tommy W. "Gemini X Flight Plan, Final." Houston, 22 June
1966.
Roberts, John E., Jr. "Agena-B Requirements for Advanced Mercury Rendezvous Mission." Ad-
vanced Mercury Note. Langley, Va., 19 Dec. 1961.
Suler, Frank J., and Weber, Bobbie D. "A Proposed Mission Plan for the First Manned Gemini
Flight (GT-3) Utilizing a Retrograde Maneuver Prior to Return." MSC Internal Note 65-FM-
11. Houston, 9 Feb. 1965.
U.S., Air Force Systems Command. "Joint Titan II/Gemini Development Plan on Missile Oscilla-
tion Reduction and Engine Reliability and Improvement." Andrews AFB, Md., 5 April 1963;
rev. 7 May and 7 Aug. 1963.
Space Systems Division, "Technical Development Plan for DOD/NASA Gemini Experi-
ments, 631A." Los Angeles, 23 Sept. 1963.
U.S., NASA, Manned Spacecraft Center. "Gemini 9 Mission, Public Information Operations."
MSC Working Paper. Houston, 5 April 1966.
Flight Crew Operations Div. (FCOD). "Composite Air-to-Ground and Onboard Voice
Transcription of the GT-4 Mission." Gemini Working Paper 5035. Houston, 31 Aug. 1965.
FCOD. "Gemini Extravehicular Activity Program: Mission Planning, Crew Procedures
and Training." Houston, 30 Jan. 1964.
FCOD. "GT-3 Flight Crew Self-Debriefing." Gemini Working Paper 5026. Houston, 3
June 1965.
FCOD. "GT-3 Flight Crew Technical Debriefing." Gemini Working Paper 5025. Houston,
3 June 1965.
FCOD. "Preflight Training Plan for Fourth Manned Gemini Flight Crew (GTA-6)." Gem-
ini Working Paper 5031. Houston, 23 Aug. 1965.
Gemini Project (Program) Office. "GT-3 Mission Directive." Gemini Working Paper
5017A. Houston, 15 Feb. 1965.
GPO. "Gemini V Mission Directive." Gemini Working Paper 5028. Houston, 21 July
1965.
GPO. "Gemini VI Mission Directive." Gemini Working Paper 5037. Houston, 20 Sept.
1965.
GPO. "Gemini Program/Mission Directive." Gemini Working Paper 5039. Houston, 19
Nov. 1965.
GPO. "Program Plan for Gemini Extravehicular Operation." Houston, 31 Jan. 1964.
Weber, George J. "Dual Fuel Cell/Silver Zinc Battery Installation for 7 Orbit S/C 3 Gemini Mis-
sion." MAC Electrical Design Note 24. St. Louis, 25 Sept. 1963.
Waldner, J. C.; and Rogers, K. A. "Fuel Cell Interface Review." MAC Electrical Design
Note 33. St. Louis, 16 Dec. 1963.
Weeks, W. M. "Aerodynamic Characteristics of the Gemini Ejection Seat-Man Configuration."
MAC Aerodynamic Information Note 50. St. Louis, 28 Oct. 1963.
3. PRIMARY SOURCES: GEMINI REPORTS, REVIEWS, EVALUATIONS
Aerospace Corp. "Gemini Agena Target Vehicle 5004, NASA Mission Gemini IX Flight Safety
Review at ETR." TOR-669(6183)-12. Los Angeles, 16 May 1966.
Agajanian, C. E. "Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report, NASA Mission Gemini/Titan, GT-7."
Aerospace Report TOR-669 (6126-42)-10. Los Angeles, February 1966.
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General Dynamics Corp. "Atlas SLV-3, Space Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report, SLV-3
5302." GDC/BKF66-012. San Diego, Calif., 17 June 1966.
. "Atlas SLV-3, Space Launch Vehicle Flight Evaluation Report, SLV-5303." GDC/BKF66-
029. San Diego, Calif., 27 June 1966.
Grimm, Dean F.; Stafford, Thomas P.; and Schirra, Walter M., Jr. "Report on Gemini VI Ren-
dezvous." MSC, Houston, 28 Feb. 1966.
Hannay, N. B.; Biondi, F. J.; and Thomas, U. P. "Report on Fuel-Cell Work at General Electric
and Pratt & Whitney." Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc., Murray Hill, N.J., 1963.
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. "GAATV Launch Demonstration with GT-5 GLV." LMSC-
273407. Sunnyvale, Calif., 3 Sept. 1965.
. "GATV Design Certification Report for Gemini VIII Mission." LMSC-A794903. Sunny-
vale, Calif., 26 Feb. 1966.
. "Gemini Agena Target Vehicle 5003, Systems Test Evaluation (45-Day Report)." LMSC-
A817204. Sunnyvale, Calif., 5 May 1966.
. "Gemini Agena Target Vehicle 5004 Systems Test Evaluation (45-Day Report)." LMSC-
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GLOSSARY
AAS American	 Astronautical D- Department	 of	 Defense
Society experiments prefix
ABMA Army.	 Ballistic	 Missile DCR Design certification review
Agency DEI Design (development) engi-
AEDC Arnold Engineering Devel- neering inspection
opment	 Center	 (Air DOD Department of Defense
Force	 test	 organization E and D Engineering and Develop-
and facilities) ment
AEIP Augmented	 Engine	 Im- ECS Environmental control sys-
provement Program tem
AF Air Force EEG Electroencephalogram
AFB Air Force Base ELSS Extravehicular life support
AFSC Air Force Systems Com- system
mand (formerly ARDC) EP Educational	 Publication
AGE Aerospace ground equip- (NASA)
ment EPO Experiments	 Program
AIAA American Institute of As- Office (also EXPO)
tronautics and Aeronau- ER Engineering Report
tics ESP Extravehicular	 support
AMR Atlantic Missile Range package
AMRL Aerospace	 Medical	 Re- ETR Eastern Test	 Range	 (Air
search Laboratories Force)
AMU Astronaut	 maneuvering EVA Extravehicular activity
unit EXPO Experiments Project Office
A-OK Everything in good work- (also EPO)
ing order FACI First	 article	 configuration
AOMC Army	 Ordnance	 Missile inspection
Command FO Flight Operations
ARDC Air Research and Develop- FOD Flight Operations Division;
ment Command Flight Operations Direc-ARPA Advanced Research Proj- torate
AS
ects Agency
Apollo -Saturn	 (used	 until FOP Financial operating plan
mid-1967 as Apollo mill FSD Flight Systems Division 
sion	 designations;	 e.g., FSRB Flight Safety Review Board
AS-201) g Gravity
ASPO Apollo Spacecraft Program G and N, G&N Guidance and navigation
Office	 (NASA-MSC, GAO General Accounting Office
Houston) GATV Gemini Agena target vehi-
ATC Air Training Command cle
ATDA Augmented target docking GDC General Dynamics Convair
adapter (usually GD/C)
ATV Agena target vehicle GE General Electric
BAC Bell Aerosystems Company GEMSIP Gemini Stability Improve-
Ballute Balloon parachute ment Program
BSD Ballistic	 Systems	 Division, g.e.t. Ground elapsed time
Air Force G4C Gemini pressure suit, 4th
C & C Command and communica- model,	 David	 Clark
tions (Agena system) Company (Grissom and
CapCom Capsule communicator Young wore G3C suits,
CCP Contract change proposal which were not capable
c.g. Center of gravity of	 supporting	 extra-ve-
CR Contractor report hicular activity; Borman
CRB Capsule Review Board and	 Lovell	 wore	 G5C
CSAT Combined systems accept- soft suits)
ance test GIE Ground	 interface	 equip-
CSM Command	 and	 service ment
modules (Apollo) GLV Gemini launch vehicle
CSQ Coastal	 Sentry	 Quebec GOSS Ground	 operational	 sup-
tracking ship port system
517
APPENDIX A
GPO Gemini	 Project/Program MCC Mission Control Center
Office MDS Malfunction detection sys-
GPPB Gemini Program Planning tem
Board MFS Mission flight schedule
GSFC Goddard Space Flight Cen- MHR Marshall Historical Report
ter (NASA) MIT Massachusetts	 Institute	 of
GT Gemini-Titan Technology
GTA Gemini-Titan-Agena MK, Mk Mark
HHMU Handheld	 maneuvering MOCR Mission Operations Control
unit Room
HHN Headquarters
	 Historical MODS Manned	 orbital	 develop-
Note (NASA) ment system
HSTV Half-scale test vehicle MOL Manned Orbiting Labora-
IBM International	 Business tory
Machines MORAD Manned	 Orbital	 Rendez-
ICBM Intercontinental	 ballistic vous and Docking
missile MR Mercury-Redstone
IESD Instrumentation and Elec- MSC Manned Spacecraft Center;
tronic	 Systems
	
Division, also prefix for technolog-
MSC ical experiments
IPST Israel Program for Scientif- MSF Manned space flight
is Information MSFC George C. Marshall Space
IVAR Insertion	 velocity	 adjust Flight Center (NASA)
routine	 (spacecraft	 ma- MSFEB Manned Space Flight Expe-
neuver) riments Board
JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory NACA National Advisory Commit-K Kelvin	 (measurement	 of tee for Aeronautics
temperature—metric sys- NASA National	 Aeronautics	 and
tem) Space Administration
KSC John	 F.	 Kennedy	 Space n.d. No date
Center NORAD North American Air De-laser Light	 Amplification	 by fense
Stimulated
	
Emission	 of NTIS National	 Technical	 Infor-
Radiation mation	 Service,	 Depart-
LEM Lunar	 excursion	 module ment of Commerce(later changed to LM— OAMS Orbit attitude and maneu-lunar module—Apollo)
LEO Large Earth Orbit OMSF
vering system
Office of Manned Space LeRC Lewis	 Research	 Center Flight, NASA(NASA)
LLVPG Large
	 Launch	 Vehicle POISE Panel on In-Flight Scientif-
Planning Group is Experiments
LMSC Lockheed Missiles & Space PSAC President's	 Science	 Advi-
Company sory Committee
LORS Lunar optical	 rendezvous rad Unit of absorbed dose of
system radiation	 equal	 to	 an
LRC Langley	 Research	 Center energy of 100 ergs per
(NASA) gram of irradiated ma-
L/V Launch vehicle terial
LVS Launch vehicle systems REP Rendezvous evaluation pod
LVSO Launch	 Vehicle	 Systems RFP Request for proposal
Office RKV Rose Knot Victor tracking
M- Medical experiments prefix ship
M=1, =2, etc. Revolution	 in which	 ren- ROM Rough order of magnitude
dezvous is to take place RR Rendezvous radar
MA Mercury-Atlas S- Science experiments prefix
MAC McDonnell Aircraft Corpo- Saint Satellite interceptor
ration SAR Spacecraft	 acceptance .re-
MALLIR Manned	 Lunar	 Landing view
Involving Rendezvous S/c Spacecraft
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GLOSSARY






SEPC Space Exploration Program
Council
SID Space & Information Sys-
tems	 Division,	 North
American Aviation, Inc.
SLV Standard	 (Atlas)	 launch
vehicle
SNORT Supersonic	 Naval	 Ord-
nance Research Track
Sope Simulated off-the-pad ejec-
tion
SP Special Publication (NASA)
SPS Secondary propulsion sys-
tem (Agena)
SSD Space Systems Division, Air
Force
STG Space Task Group
STL Space Technology Labora-
tories




TCA Thrust chamber assembly
TDA Target docking adapter




TPI Terminal phase initiation





VAT Vehicle acceptance team
VHF Very high frequency
WETS Wednesday Evening Tank-
ing Society




WSMR White SandsMissile Range
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Flight Data Summary
Mission Description Primary Objectives Result Secondary Objectives Result
Gemini 1 Unmanned, not Demonstrate GLV A Evaluate operational A
8 April 1964 recovered (mission performance; flight- procedures for GLV
terminated after 3 qualify subsystems trajectory and cutoff
orbits), reentered 12 Determine exit heating A conditions
April, during 64th on GLV and spacecraft Verify orbital insertion by A
revolution; launch time Demonstrate structural A tracking C-band
11:00:01.69 a.m., e.s.t.; integrity of GLV and transponder in
apogee, 320.3 km (173 spacecraft spacecraft
n.m.), perigee, 160.3 Demonstrate GLV and A Demonstrate A
km (86.6 n.m.) ground guidance performance of launch
systems performance in and tracking networks
achieving proper Provide training for flight A
orbital insertion controllers and
Monitor, evaluate GLV A prelaunch and launch
switchover circuits crews and facilities
Crc
Gemini 2 Unmanned, suborbital; Demonstrate reentry A Obtain test results on fuel PAl
19 Jan. 1965 launch, 9:03:59.861 heat protection cell and reactant supply,
,TJ
a.m., e.s.t.; altitude, during maximum cryogenics, and r~
171.1 km (92.4 n.m.); heating reentry communications -"
range, 3422.4 km (1848 Demonstrate structural A systems
n.m.); duration, 18 integrity of spacecraft Demonstrate and further A	 x
mins., 16 secs.; landing, Demonstrate satisfactory A flight-qualify GLV and
16°36'N, 49°46'W; miss performance of major spacecraft from d
distance (from planned subsystems countdown through Y
landing point), 62.9 km Demonstrate checkout A insertion -3
(34 n.m.) and launch procedures 9
A—Achieved; PA—Partially achieved; NA—Not achieved
1 Fuel cell deactivated before liftoff
	Flight Data Summary—Continued 	 b
It
Mission	 Description	 Primary Objectives	 Result	 Secondary Objectives	 Result m




	 and qualify ground
through launch	 communications and	 x
tracking systems
	 t^
Gemini 3	 Grissom and Young; 3
23 March 1965	 orbits; launch,
9:24:00.064 a.m., e.s.t.;
highest apogee, 224 km
(121 n.m.), lowest
perigee, 158.5 km (85.6
n.m.); duration, 4
hours, 52 mins., 31
secs.; landing, 22°26' N,
70°51' W; miss
distance, 111.1 km (60
n.m.)
Demonstrate manned A Evaluate flight crew PA3
orbital flight; evalu- equipment, biomedical
ate two-man design instrumentation, and
Demonstrate and evaluate A personal hygiene
tracking network system
Demonstrate OAMS A Perform 3 experiments PA4
capability in orbital Evaluate low-level A
maneuvers and in longitudinal oscillations
retrofire backup (Pogo) of the GLV
Demonstrate controlled PA2 General photographic PA5
reentry and landing coverage in orbit





Demonstrate and evaluate A
recovery procedures
and systems
Gemini 4	 McDivitt and White; 62	 Evaluate effects of	 A	 Demonstrate and evaluate 	 A
3-7 June 1965	 revolutions; launch,	 prolonged space flight	 EVA and control by





Mission Description Primary Objectives Result Secondary Objectives Result
e.s.t.; highest apogee, performance of Stationkeep and PA7
296.1 km ( 159.9 n.m.), spacecraft and systems rendezvous with second
lowest perigee, 159.4 in 4-day flight stage of GLV
km (86.1 n .m.); Evaluate procedures for A Evaluate spacecraft A
duration, 97 hours, 56 crew rest and work systems
mins., 12 secs.; EVA cycles, eating schedules, Make in- and out-of- A
time, 36 mins.; landing, and realtime flight plane maneuvers
27°44'N, 74°11'W; miss planning Further test GAMS retro A
distance, 81.4 km (44 backup capability
n.m.) Perform 11 experiments A
Gemini V Cooper and Conrad; 120 Evaluate rendezvous G& NA8 Demonstrate controlled NA9
21-29 Aug.1965 revolutions; launch, N system with REP reentry guidance
8:59:59.518 a.m., e.s.t.; Demonstrate 8-day A Evaluate fuel cell A
highest apogee, 349 . 8 capability of spacecraft Demonstrate all phases of A
km (188.9 n .m.), lowest and crew guidance and control
perigee, 161.8 km Evaluate effects of A system operation
(87.4 n.m.); duration, weightlessness for 8- needed for rendezvous
190 hours, 55 mins., 14 day flight Evaluate capability of NA10
secs.; landing, 29°44'N, both crewmen to
69°45'W; miss distance, maneuver spacecraft
170.3 km (92 n.m.) to rendezvous
Checkout rendezvous A
radar




2 Angle of attack during reentry lower than expected
3 Personal hygiene system only partially tested
4 Operating mechanism failed on S-2, Synergistic Effect of Zero
Gravity on Sea Urchin Eggs
5 Improper lens setting on 6mm camera
6 Computer-controlled reentry not flown because of inadvertent
alteration of computer memory
7 Separation and rendezvous not attempted because of fuel
G
Y





9 89-mile overshoot caused by incorrect navigation coordinates
transmitted to spacecraft computer by ground
to Depended on rendezvous with REP




Mission Description Primary Objectives Result Secondary Objectives Result
Gemini VI-A l2 Schirra and Stafford; 16 Rendezvous with A Perform closed-loop A
15-16 Dec. 1965 revolutions; launch, Gemini VII rendezvous in fourth
8:37:26.471 a.m., e.s.t.; orbit
highest apogee, 311.3 Stationkeep with Gemini A
km (168.1 n.m.), lowest VII
perigee, 160.9 km (86.9 Evaluate reentry A
n.m.); duration, 25 guidance capability
hours, 51 mins., 24 Conduct visibility tests for A
secs.; landing, 23°35'N, rendezvous, using
67°50'W; miss distance, Gemini VII as target
12.9 km (7 n.m.) Perform 3 experiments PA13
Gemini VII Borman and Lovell; 206 Conduct 14-day mission A Provide target for Gemini A
4-18 Dec. 1965 revolutions; launch, and evaluate effects on VI-A
2:30:03.702 p.m., e.s.t.; crew Stationkeep with VI-A A
highest apogee, 327.9 and with second stage
km (177.1 n.m.), lowest of GLV
perigee, 161.4 km (87.2 Conduct 20 experiments A
n.m.); duration, 330 Evaluate lightweight A
hours, 35 mins., 1 sec.; pressure suit
landing, 25°25.1'N, Evaluate spacecraft A
70°6.7'W; miss distance, reentry capability
11.8 km (6.4 n.m.) Conduct systems tests A
Gemini VIII _Armstrong and Scott; 7 Rendezvous and dock A Rendezvous and dock in A
16-17 March 1966 revolutions; launch, with GATV I4th revolution
11:41:02.389 a.m., Conduct EVA NA14 Perform docked-vehicle NA14
e.s.t.; highest apogee, maneuvers
298.7 km (161.3 n.m.); Evaluate systems and PA14
lowest perigee, 159.8 conduct 10






Mission Description Primary Objectives Result Secondary Objectives Result
duration, 10 hours, 41 Conduct docking practice NA 14
mins., 26 secs.; landing, and re-rendezvous
25°13.8'N, 136°0'E; Evaluate auxiliary tape A
mission terminated unit
early for electrical short Demonstrate controlled A
in control system reentry
Park GATV in 407.4-km A
(220-n.m.) circular
orbit
Gemini IX-A 15 Stafford and Cernan; 45 Rendezvous and dock. PA16 Rendezvous with ATDA A
3-6 June 1966 revolutions; launch, Conduct EVA A in 3rd revolution
8:39:33.335 a.m., e.s.t.; Conduct systems A
highest apogee, 311.5 evaluation and equi-
km (168.2 n.m.), lowest period rendezvous
perigee, 158.7 km (85.7 Execute 7 experiments PA17
n.m.); duration, 72 Practice docking NA16
hours, 20 mins., 50 Rendezvous from above A
secs.; EVA time, 2 Demonstrate controlled A




Gemini X Young and Collins; 43 Rendezvous and dock A Rendezvous and dock in A
18-21 July 1966 revolutions; launch, with GATV 4th revolution
5:20:26.648 p.m., e.s.t.; Rendezvous with GATV A
highest apogee, 753.3 8, using Agena
km (412.2 n.m.), lowest propulsion systems
12GATV propulsion failure on 25 Oct. 1965; mission rescheduled
13Stationkeeping with Gemini VII interfered with conduct of D-8, Radiation in Spacecraft
14Mission terminated early







Flight Data Summary—Continued Y
Co
Mission Description Primary Objectives Result Secondary Objectives Result
perigee, 159.8 km (86.3 Conduct EVA A
n.m.); duration, 70 Practice docking NA18
hours, 46 mins., 39 Perform 14 experiments PA18
secs.; EVA time, 1 Systems evaluation: A
hour, 29 mins.; bending-mode tests;
landing, 26°44.7'N, docked maneuvers;
71°57'W; miss distance, static discharge




in 352.4 km (190.3
n.m.) orbit
Gemini XI Conrad and Gordon; 44 Rendezvous and dock A Practice docking A
12-15 Sept. 1966 revolutions; launch, with GATV in 1st Perform EVA A
9:42:26.546 a.m., e.s.t.; revolution Conduct 11 experiments PA19
highest apogee, 1368.9 Maneuver while docked A
km (739.2 n.m.), lowest (high apogee
perigee, 160.3 km (86.6 excursion)
n.m.); duration, 71 Conduct tethered vehicle A
hours, 17 mins., 8 secs.; test
EVA time, 2 hours, 43 Demonstrate automatic A
mins.; landing, reentry
240 15.4'N, 7000.0'W; Park GATV 10 in 352.4 A







Mission Description Primary Objectives Result Secondary Objectives Result
Gemini XII Lovell and Aldrin; 59 Rendezvous and dock A Conduct tethered vehicle A
11-15 Nov. 1966 revolutions; launch, Evaluate EVA A operation
3:46:33.419 p.m., e.s.t.; Perform 14 experiments A
highest apogee, 301.3 Rendezvous and dock in A
km (162.7 n.m.), lowest 3rd revolution
perigee, 160.7 km (86.8 Demonstrate automatic A
n.m.); duration, 94 reentry
hours, 34 mins., 31 Perform docked A20
secs.; EVA time, 5 maneuvers NA20
hours, 30 mins.; Practice docking A
landing, 24°35' N, Conduct systems tests A
69°57'W; miss distance, Park GATV 12 in 555.6 NA21
4.8 km (2.6 n.m.) km (300 n.m.) orbit
16 Docking impossible when shroud failed to jettison
17 S-10, Agena Micrometeorite Collection, not attempted because EVA did take place near GATV
18 Fuel consumption already too high
19 D-16, Power Too] Evaluation, canceled when EVA was terminated early
20 Docked maneuvers canceled because of a propulsion anomaly during GATV insertion
21 GATV attitude control gas depleted by earlier maneuvers
This Appendix is based on Edward A. Armstrong and John E. Williams, "Gemini Program Flight Summary Report," MSG-G-
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Astronaut Flight Assignments
Mercury I	 Gemini	 I	 Apollo	 I Skylab
First Group (7) Selected April 1959
M. Scott Carpenter MA-6* MA-7
L. Gordon Cooper, Jr. MA-8* MA-9 V XII* 10*
John H. Glenn, Jr. MR-3* MR-4*
MA-6
Virgil I. Grissom MR-3* MR-4 III VI-A* 11
Walter M. Schirra, Jr. MA-7* MA-8 III* VI-A 7
Alan B. Shepard, Jr. MR-3 MA-9* 14
Donald K. Slayton2 MA-73
Second Group (9) Selected September 1962
Neil A. Armstrong V* VIII XI* 8* 11
Frank Borman IV* VII 8
Charles Conrad, Jr. V VIII* XI 9* 12
James A. Lovell, Jr. IV* VII IX-A*4 8 *5 11* 13
X*4
 XII
James A. McDivitt IV 1 *1 9
Elliot M. See, Jr. V* IX6
Thomas P. Stafford 2 III* VI-A IX-A* 6 7* 10
Edward H. White II IV VII* 11
John W. Young III VI-A* X 7* 10 13* 16
17 *7
2
Third Group (14) Selected October 1963
Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr.
William A. Anders







Richard F. Gordon, Jr.
Russell L. Schweickart
David R. Scott
Clifton C. Williams, Jr.
























Fourth Group (6) Selected June 1965 (Scientist Astronauts)
Owen K. Garriott 	 3
Edward G. Gibson	 4
Joseph P. Kerwin	 2





Mercury Gemini Apollo Skylab
Fifth Group (19) Selected April 1966
Vance D. Brand2 15* 3* 4*
Gerald P. Carr 4
Charles M. Duke, Jr. 13* 16 17*7
Joe H. Engle 14*
Ronald E. Evans 2 14* 17
Fred W. Haise, Jr. 11* 13 16*
James B. Irwin 12* 15 17*7
Don L. Lind 3.* 4*
Jack R. Lousma 2 3
Thomas K. Mattingly II 139 16
Bruce McCandless II 2*
Edgar D. Mitchell 10* 14 16*
William R. Pogue 4
Stuart A. Roosa 14 16* 17 *7
John L. Swigert 13*9
Paul J. Weitz 2
Alfred M. Worden 12* 15 17*7
Sixth Group (11) Selected August 1967 (Scientist Astronauts)
William B. Lenoir 3* 4*
F. Story Musgrave 2*
I Grissom, White, and Chaffee killed in fire on pad; flight canceled
2Stafford, Slayton, and Brand announced as crew of Apollo Soyuz Test Program, 30 Jan. 1973;
Bean, Evans, and Lousma selected as backup crew
3Slayton removed from flight for heart condition, replaced by Carpenter
4Originally backup to Gemini X; moved to same position on IX when See and Bassett were killed
5Replaced Collins who had undergone surgery
6See and Bassett killed in aircraft accident, replaced by Stafford and Cernan
7When Irwin resigned on 23 May 1972, he, Worden, and Scott were replaced by Young, Roosa,
and Duke
$Replaced original Gemini X backup crew




D-1. Experiments by Flight
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D-1. Experiments by Flight
Experiment
	 I	 Objective




S-2, Sea Urchin Egg Growth
S-4, Zero G and Radiation on
Blood
To see if fluid injected into
ionized plasma during
reentry would reduce
blackout to the point
where communications
were possible
To explore gravitational field
effect on cells exposed to
low gravity conditions
To examine biological effects
of radiation by measuring
changes in human blood
samples exposed to known
quantity and quality of
radiation
Water expulsion system on
the inside surface of
spacecraft right landing
gear door; self contained
except for activating switch
in cabin; weighing about
39 kg (85 lb)
Metal cylinder containing 8
separate samples of sea
urchin eggs, sperm, and a
fixative solution; cylinder-
8.2 x 17.1 cm (3.25 x 6.75
in), 721 gm (25.4 oz);




Phosphorus 32, housed in
hermetically sealed
aluminum box, 9.3 x 3.3
x 9.6 cm (3.7 x 1.3 x 3.8
in), weighing 0.45 kg
(1 lb), and located inside
cabin on right hatch;
identical package operated
Increased C-band and UHF
telemetry signals
Not completed; handle broke













Experiment	 I	 Objective	 I	 Equipment	 I	 Result
in laboratory at Cape
Kennedy during flight









To evaluate the general day-
to-day physical condition
of crew








confinement for a period
of days
To detect and measure any
accumulated electrostatic
charge on the surface of
the spacecraft
A pair of rubber bungee
cords attached to a nylon
foot strap at one end and a
nylon handle at the other
Heart sounds picked up by a
microphone attached to
each astronaut's chest and
recorded on biomedical
recorder
X-rays taken before and after
flight—especially the heel
bone and the end bone of
the fifth finger of the right








No significant changes from
ground tests
Distinct losses in bone mass
compared to bed-rested
patients for the same time
period
Readings were higher than
expected, but this was






switch and weighing 0.81
	 influences; sensor was






predict radiation levels on
future missions
To monitor direction and
amplitude of Earth's





with sensor face toward
rear of spacecraft,
operated by the pilot with




of an electronics unit and
sensors, located in
equipment adapter section,
with sensors facing aft;
sensors mounted on boom
that could be extended
beyond end of adapter;
operated by the pilot with
two switches (one to extend
boom and other to activate
both MSC-2 and 3) located
in the cabin and weighing





















To determine if the Earth
limb can be used in future
guidance and navigation
sightings
To get high-quality pictures
of large land areas that
have been previously well
mapped by aerial
photography for
comparison and to serve as
a standard for
interpretation of pictures
of unknown areas of
Earth, the Moon, and
other planets; to obtain
high-quality photographs
of relatively poorly
mapped areas of Earth, to
answer such questions as
continental drift, structure
of Earth's mantle, and
overall structure of the
continents
70mm Hasselblad camera
with black and white film
and a special filter mosaic
to allow each picture to be
taken partly through a red
and partly through a blue
filter; the experimental
film magazine weighed
about 0.45 kg (1 lb)
70 mm modified Hasselblad
camera, model 500C, with
















	 I	 Objective	 I	 Equipment	 I	 Result
S-6, Synoptic Weather
Photography









take photos from altitude
of 643.7 km (400 n.m.) or
more; Gemini photos can
be taken from altitudes of
about 161 km (100 n.m.)
To measure radiation level
and distribution inside
spacecraft
To gather information on
phenomena that could be
used for autonomous space
navigation
To determine effectiveness of
pneumatic cuffs in
preventing heart and blood
Camera used in MSC-10 and
S-5, with color film
7 sensors inside spacecraft, 5
on wall of pressure vessel,
2 inside cockpit; 1 shielded







natural density, blue haze,
and green emission filters;
weighing 3.6 kg (8 lb)
Pneumatic cycling system and
a pair of venous cuffs worn
on pilot's legs, alternatively
'About 200 pictures, half of





statistical data lacking to
evaluate
Cuffs (scheduled to work for
full 8 days) stopped















deflating and inflating to

















To evaluate capability of
astronaut to orient himself
during flight; to measure
changes in otolith (gravity




Special goggles, one eye
piece containing light
source in the form of
movable white line;
crewman positioned
line with a calibrated
screw to what he judged to





greater changes than bed-
rested patients for same
period; pilot showed
equivalent changes to same
patients
In general, coordinate space
sense existed even in
weightlessness if contact
cues were adequate
See Gemini IV	 See Gemini IV
Experiments by Flight—Cont.
Experiment









To evaluate effects of
prolonged weightlessness
on the cardiovascular






To photograph the zodiacal
light (in the west after
twilight and in the east
before sunrise), to try to
determine its origin,
minimum angle from Sun
at which it could be
studied without twilight
interference, and whether
the gegenschein could be
Comparison of preflight and
postflight blood pressures,
blood volumes, pulse rates,
and electrocardiograms
See Gemini IV
35mm Widelux camera with
high speed color film
On all flights, data revealed
little change from preflight
to postflight
Insufficient time after Gemini
IV flight to modify
instrument; shield placed
on sensor had little effect










	 I	 Objective	 (	 Equipment	 I	 Result
detected and measured












S8/1) 13, Visual Acuity and
Astronaut Visibility
See Gemini IV
To measure altitude of
clouds
To test crew visual
performance during flight











36 high contrast and low
contrast rectangles, half











Results good enough to
warrant design of second
generation weather satellite
instrument
Crew showed no degradation
of visibility during 8-day
flight; land observations
were partially obscured by
weather conditions and
fuel cell troubles; when




markers were sighted in
each pass; during
revolution 92, Texas site















reported seeing this test













To obtain high resolution
pictures of orbiting object,
while maneuvering,
stationkeeping, and
observing in a manual
control mode
To provide information on
spectral analysis of regions
of interest, supplied by star
fields, principal planets,
Earth and Moon, and
other objects, such as
satellites and REP
35mm Zeiss contarex camera,




mirror optics that can
measure radiant intensity
from the ultraviolet
through infrared as a
function of wave lenghts-
Presented no problems
When rendezvous evaluation
pod (REP) was abandoned,
experiment could not be
carried out




advantages of using man to










and selection of target,
choice of equipment mode,






















D-8, Radiation in Spacecraft




I See Gemini IV





See Gemini IV, with addition
of removable brass shield
on the tissue equivalent
Equipment performed suc-
cessfully, but weather
hampered much of the
experiment, with some of
the planned areas covered
by clouds
28 fair to excellent pictures
100 high quality pictures
On one run, the survey was









to remove shield from
sensor; on second run,

























Operated for 311 hr, turned
off 3 hr before reentry;
significantly less blood
pooling in pilot's postflight




Gemini IV and V












Experiment	 I	 Objective	 I	 Equipment	 I	 Result
See Gemini IVSee Gemini IV
b
Significantly smaller loss in
bone masses than in
Gemini IV and V,
probably because crew ate
and exercised more and
slept better and longer
M-6, Bone Demineralization
M-7, Calcium Balance Study
M-8, Inflight Sleep Analysis
M-9, Human Otolith
Function
To evaluate effects of 14-day
flight on bones and
muscles of crew
To assess crew state of
alertness, levels of
consciousness, and depth
of sleep during flight
See Gemini V
Intake and output of both











Inflight urine collection was
unsatisfactory because of
leakage, 1 bag broken, and
4 not labeled; however,
command pilot showed
marked increase in calcium
excretion starting on 8th
day of flight
Results showed poor sleep on
first night (expected since
first night in strange
surroundings usually
disrupts sound sleep); until






Experiments by Flight—C ont.
Experiment	 +	 Objective












(laser), to check crew
ability as pointing element,
and to probe atmosphere,
using an optical coherent
radiator from outside
atmosphere
To measure visual contrast of
land-sea boundaries and












instrument, 127 x 127 x
76.2 cm (5 x 5x 3 in),
weighing 1.1 kg (2 V2
 lb), for
measuring contrast of Sun-
illuminated ground target
and to determine extent to
Erratic response in
equipment indicated
failure in proton mode—
data inconclusive
Z-axis detector failed before














CJX Experiments by Flight—Cont.
Experiment Objective Equipment Result
which sight line to selected
star penetrates planetary
atmosphere
S-5, Synoptic Terrain See Gemini IV See Gemini IV 250 useful pictures; cloud
Photography cover over many areas and
dirty spacecraft windows
accounted for poor quality
of some
S-6, Synoptic Weather See Gemini IV See Gemini IV 240 exposures, some of
Photography which were not usable
because of coating on
windows
S8/D 13, Visual Acuity and See Gemini V See Gemini V Patterns seen on revolutions
Astronaut Visibility 17 and 31; no apparent
change in crew visual
performance
D-4/D-7, Celestial See Gemini V See Gemini V (with minor 37 separate measurements
Radiometry and Space- variations) taken; 3 hr, 6 min, 19 sec
Object Radiometry of data gathered, all
satisfactory
D-5, Star-Occultation To investigate feasibility and See MSC-12 No useful information
Navigation operational value of star because of instrument





37 star-to-horizon, •5 planet-
to-Moon (or star-to-Moon)
limb, 6 star-to-star, and 8
















Two units, one mounted on







	 +	 Objective 	 Equipment	 (	 Result




D-9, Simple Navigation See Gemini IV
Gemini VIII
M-5, Bioassays of Body See Gemini VII
Fluids
S-1, Zodiacal Light See Gemini V
Photography
S-3, Frog Egg Growth To study effects of subgravity
on development in a
Experiments by Flight—Cont.








biological system that is
gravity oriented
each having four two-
celled chambers, one for
frog eggs and one for
fixative; weight of each is
1.8 kg (4 lb); at 40 min
after liftoff, pilot would
turn handle, letting fixative
(formalin) into righthand
chambers 1 and 2, killing
eggs and preserving them
for microscopic study;
fixative would be released
into righthand chambers 3
and 4 at 2 hr, 10 min; two
of the chambers on the
lefthand side would be
fixed just before reentry
and the last two would be
left alive for comparison
second was 15 min late);
mission ended before time
to activate the others
See Gemini V




21.5x 15.2 x 7.6cm(8.5
X 6 x 3 in), weighing 5.9
kg (13 lb) stowed in
Mission ended early
Not recovered because of




Experiment	 I	 Objective	 I	 Equipment	 I	 Result
spacecraft retrograde
adapter; a spring loaded










To collect plates that had
been exposed to
micrometeorite impact and
debris and return them to
Earth for study
To determine technique and
accuracy of direct contact
method of measuring the
mass of an orbiting object
Package, 13.9 x 15.8 x 2.5
cm (5.5 x 6.25 x 1 in),
weighing 1.8 kg (4 lb),
mounted on TDA of
Agena; hinged to fold
open and expose 8 plates
of highly polished surfaces,
such as metal, plastic, glass,
etc., to be opened by pilot
during EVA and left for
retrieval on later mission
No special equipment
needed; after docking with
the orbiting object, Gemini
would push the docked
combination with a known
thrust; from the change in
velocity of the orbiting
object, its mass could be
computed
Mission ended early; no EVA














To obtain information on
communication systems
through the ionosphere




2.4 m (8-ft) extendable






camera, TV camera control
unit, and equipment
control unit; one crewman
would look directly at
scene, the other through
the TV monitor; crew
comments would later be





D-16, Power-Tool Evaluation To determine man's ability to
perform specified work
tasks under zero gravity
and in pressurized suit
Minimum reaction, battery-
powered tool, 27.1 cm
(10.7 in) long, weighing 3.4
kg (7.6 lb), hand wrench,
work plate with 7
nondetachable bolts (4 on
face and 3 on reverse side),
and knee tether; mounted
Mission ended early; no EVA




I	 Equipment	 I	 Result
in retro adapter to be
operated by pilot during
EVA
Gemini IX-A











airglow in the atomic
oxygen and sodium light
spectra to study character
and dynamics of upper
atmosphere
See Gemini VII







and 2-point variable pitch
bracket for mounting
camera in pilot's window
Aluminum collection box,
27.9x 13.9x3.1cm(11
X 5.5 x 1.25 in), weighing
2.9 kg (6 lb 8 oz), with two
See Gemini VII
EVA ended early because of
faceplate fogging; instead,
17 pictures were taken
from inside spacecraft
EVA postponed to 3d day;
not performed in vicinity
of ATDA; experiment not
retrieved
44 pictures, 3 of dayglow
Successfully recovered after
exposure of over 16 hrs;
penetration holes, some
fractions of the biological
5-12, Spacecraft	 To determine micrometeorite








Experiments by Flight—Cont. b
Experiment





to space to determine
survivability in vacuum,
extreme temperatures, and
radiation; and to search








sterilized for analysis to see
if any non-terrestrial
organisms are present; the
other will contain bacteria,
molds, and spores, to see if






To provide EVA mobility
and control in attitude and




pack weighing 75.2 kg (166
lb) fully loaded; 81.2 x
55.8 x 48.2 cm (32 x 22 x
19 in), with form-fitting
cradle where pilot sits
during flight; 4 forward-
and 4 aft-firing thrusters,
and 2 up- and down-firing;
stores 10.8 kg (24 lb) of
hydrogen peroxide;
thrusters controlled by two
sidearm supports; lefthand
assembly gives translation
control in 4 directions, a
When pilot got overheated
and his faceplate fogged
over repeatedly, EVA was
called off before AMU




I	 Objective	 I	 Equipment	 I	 Result
switch for selecting manual
or automatic stabilization,
and volume control of
communications; righthand
arm contains controls for
positioning pilot in pitch,
roll, and yaw; also stores














I See Gemini VIII
See Gemini IV
To determine the UV
spectral reflectance of the
lunar surface between
2000 and 3200 angstrom
See Gemini VIII
See Gemini IV
70mm Maurer camera with
UV lens
Performed 6 times; 3 more
scheduled but antenna
broken off by pilot during



























To predict as accurately as
possible, for Apollo,
radiation doses crews will
be subjected to so degree










existing color film can take
true-color pictures in space
Similar in function to proton-
electron spectrometer used
for MSC-4, but different in
design; consists of 2
containers, one housing
detector and analyzer
system, the other, data
processing system; total









mounted on the inner wall
of pressurized cabin
behind command pilot's
seat about shoulder height
and weighing less than 3.4
kg (7.5 lb)
Color patch/slate, 20.3 x
20.3 x.015cm(8x8x 1/
16 in), supporting 4 color
Unexpectedly high fuel
usage during first 2 days of
mission eliminated
controlled attitude passes;
on 3d day, spacecraft was
flown in tumbling mode
through South Atlantic
Anomaly, resulting in one
good transversal of
magnetic field; location of
data points within anomaly
were good and provided a
good picture of the
electron distributional
direction
Measurement of radiation is
possible with this
spectrometer
Because of trouble with
spacecraft ECS, EVA






targets (red, blue, yellow,
and gray) in a matte finish
ceramic; a 0.91-m (3-ft)
extension rod to hold the
patch 0.91 m in front of 70
mm Maurer Camera
the planned 9 pictures had
been taken; color patch
and rod were discarded;
but enough data obtained
to determine, by
comparison of film and





Not performed, because of
fuel-usage and time
limitations
20 pictures, difficult to use
quantitively—film only half
as sensitive as that used on
Gemini IX-A; observations
of same star field in
various exposures shows
that dirty windows cause
variance in light
transmission by a factor of
at least 6; Earth horizon
not seen in any of the
pictures
MSC-12, Landmark	 See Gemini VII	 See Gemini VII
Contrast Measurement











	 I	 Objective	 I	 Equipment	 I	 Result
See Gemini IV
	 Approximately 75 pictures,
most of good quality,
though some were affected
by dirty spacecraft
windows and others by




Over 200 high quality
pictures
See Gemini VIII	 Pilot recovered package from
Agena 8; only four outer
panels exposed, as package







exposed areas were dead,
but those inside had good
survival rates; pilot
planned to leave similar
package on Agena 8 for
future retrieval but did not
want to risk getting his
umbilical tangled on the
S-5 1 Synoptic Terrain	 See Gemini IV
Photography
S-6, Synoptic Weather	 See Gemini IV
Photography













To obtain data on UV
radiation of hot stars and





70mm Maurer camera, with
UV lens; since spacecraft
did not have UV windows,
pictures would be taken
through opened hatch
Pilot retrieved package
during egress for EVA; it
apparently floated up out
of spacecraft later and was
lost
22 frames exposed on
southern Milky Way; 4
problems: 12 frames
marred by vertical streak,
probably caused by static
electricity from camera
operation in vacuum; poor
image quality in center of
field and good quality away
from center, pgssibly
resulted from film being
too close to lens (bowing
toward lens in vacuum);	 b
cable release broken	 t^
during assembly of
camera; and bracket screw
backed out, preventing 	 t^
proper insertion into	 z
mount; considered




















data when vehicle was
parallel to flight path;
outboard, when GATV was









data and showed need for
better equipment on future
flights	 t7
Limited results because of






control while docked; only
5 stars tracked to total
occultation (6 needed);
undocked configuration, 7
stars tracked but problems
encountered with entering
visual occultation data into
	
S-26, Ion-Wake	 To investigate ion and
	
Measurement	 electron wake structure
















S-4, Zero G and Radiation
Effects on Human Blood
and Neurospora
To investigate feasibility of
attitude control system
using environmental
positive ions and an
electrostatic detection
system to measure
spacecraft pitch and yaw
See Gemini III
Two sensors, mounted on
booms 0.91-m (3-ft) long,
each 27.9 x 16.5 x 15.2
cm (11 x 6.5 x 6 in) and
weighing 3.1 kg (7 lb), with
7 computed data points
and operating at an angle
of + 15°
See Gemini III, with addition
of bread mold Neurospora
and thermoelectric cooler
Comparison of system with
inertial guidance system
showed agreement in
measurement of both pitch
and yaw angles; response
of system to variations in
position was rapid, on the
order of milliseconds
Neither orbital space flight
nor any stresses connected
with it produced
significant, unpredicted
genetic damage, insofar as
chromosomal aberration
production is valid
measure of this type of
effect; no synergistic effect
exists between radiation












See Gemini IV; this time the
crew would use the 70 mm
general purpose Maurer
camera as well
See Gemini IV, both cameras









145 pictures of excellent 	 d
quality; all planned areas
photographed plus some
additional
180 good quality pictures
Retrieved by EVA pilot;
measurements and
extrapolated results
obtained higher in the
atmosphere on very high
altitude balloon flights are
consistent with data from
S-9
25 useful pictures; films show
variations in altitude and
intensity of airglow
39 frames exposed-5
excellent, 6 good, 8 fair, 13
poor, 2 bad, and 5 useless
S-5, Synoptic Terrain	 See Gemini IV
Photography
S-6, Synoptic Weather	 See Gemini IV
Photography
S-9, Nuclear Emulsion	 See Gemini VIII
S-11, Airglow Horizon	 See Gemini IX-A
Photography
S-13, Ultraviolet	 See Gemini X
Astronomical Camera
See Gemini X See Gemini X Radar, onboard voice tape
recorder (for recording
start and stop times), and
auxiliary receptacle (to




flux to outboard sensor
and increase it to inboard
ion sensor and enhance
electron concentration to
outboard electron sensor;
strip-chart data shows that
definitive wake-cone angles.




wake is plasma rather than
ion
To investigate L 4 and L5 70mm Maurer camera Because of 3-day mission
libration points of Earth- delay, could not be carried
Moon system to determine out as planned; instead
possible existence of clouds crew took pictures of
of particulate matter gegenschein and 2 comets.










Experiment	 I	 Objective	 I	 Equipment
	
I	 Result









To obtain pictures of faint
and diffuse astronomical
phenomena, such as
airglow layer in profile,
brightest Milky Way,
zodiacal light at 60°
elongation, gegenschein,
and libration points of
Earth-Moon system
See Gemini VIII
D-15 low light TV system
plus spacecraft optical sight
See Gemini VIII
400 frames recorded; about	 t)
30 percent of film for D-15
and 5-30 not exposed;
camera recording cathode






system is adopted for use
in future missions
Of 42 sequences recorded,
13 were of medium to
heavy cloud formations
and 14 over open ocean
areas; conclusions: cities
easily identifiable by lights;
cloud formations
prominent, even at night,
D-15, Night Image	 See Gemini VIII	 See Gemini VIII
Intensification
Experiments by Flight—Cont.
Experiment	 I	 Objective	 I	 Equipment	 I	 Result
as were lightning flashes,
horizon and stars, and
airglow; coastlines gave
good to poor contrast;
peninsulas were most
significant geographic
features seen; pilot stated
that scenes viewed on the
monitor were superior to
film sequences of same
features













MSC-3, Tri-Axis	 See Gemini IV	 See Gemini IV
Magnetometer

















high altitude nuclear test
of July 1962) to such low




See Gemini VIII, except that
there was only 1 unit this
time, mounted on pilot's
hatch, instead of 2
Crew turned equipment on
and off 4 times for total of












necessary for eggs to
divide normally, nor for
MSC-7, Bremsstrahlung	 See Gemini X
Spectrometer
S-3, Frog Egg Growth	 See Gemini VIII
Experiments by Flight—Cont.
Experiment
	 I	 Objective	 Equipment 	 Result
cn
later stages of development
130 usable pictures, most
with Hasselblad
200 pictures show cloud




exposed both interior and
exterior collection surfaces;
package left on GATV 12
for possible retrieval
during later orbital flight
23 good pictures of sunlight
and night airglow
Recovered after 6 hr, 20 min M
exposure; fewer penetra- X
tion holes than on IX-A; no ' d






that solar ultraviolet	 Z
radiation and soft X-rays
responsible for death of	 v'
S-5, Synoptic Terrain	 See Gemini IV	 See Gemini XI
Photography
S-6, Synoptic Weather 	 I See Gemini IV	 See Gemini XI
Photography
S-10, Agena Micrometeorite 	 See Gemini VIII	 See Gemini VIII
Collection
5-11, Airglow Horizon 	 I See Gemini IX A	 See Gemini IX-A
Photography
5-12, Spacecraft	 See Gemini IX-A
	 See Gemini IX-A
Micrometeorite Collection
Experiments by Flight—Cont. a0 bExperiment
	 I	 Objective	 I	 Equipment	 I	 Result
microorganisms exposed to
space
See Gemini X See Gemini XI 30 frames exposed-3
excellent, 7 good, 9 fair, 8
poor, 1 bad, and 2
lightstruck; troubles with
focus, static marks, and





(or bowing) of film
See Gemini XI See Gemini XI Of 11 pictures of L4 , only 3
were properly exposed;
mechanical failure of
shutter mechanism in red-
lens assembly caused over-
exposure; unknown
amount of double
exposures caused by failure
of film-advance at end of
first roll; no conclusive
results possible
To measure daytime wind 70mm Maurer camera Crew did not see firings, but





















Offered proof that it is
possible to measure pitch
and yaw to within fraction
of a degree; could reduce
time required for such
maneuvers as docking,
photography, and reentry
(crew reduced time to align
inertial platform from 40
min to 5 min by using
pitch and yaw sensors as
reference); could, with
addition of horizon sensor,
give complete description
of spacecraft position and
attitude; and could, with
addition of servosystem, be
used as complete automatic
attitude control system
applicable at altitudes of
the lowest satellites up to at
least 10 Earth radii.
Experiments by Flight—C ont.




atmosphere as a function	 during firings; all were
of altitude between 55.5	 overexposed because
and 148.1 km (30 and 80	 camera shutter locked in
n.m.) by use of rocket- 	 open position
made vertical sodium
clouds
Experiments by Flight—Cont. bb
Experiment









17.7 x 18.4 x 15.3 cm
(7x7 -%a x 6-1/16 in),
weighing 2.8 kg (6.25 lb)
Based on learning-curve data
during initial period of
familiarization and	 d
training, baseline data for
comparison with flight
results, and data obtained
during flight; standard
deviation of inflight
measurements was +9 arc
sec, indicating that
handheld sextant may be
useful for navigational
measurements during
midcourse phase of lunar
or interplanetary flight;
pilot performance was the
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IV, VII, X, XII
VII
X
D-2. Experiments by Number



























Experiment Principal Investigator Affiliation Missions
MSC-6	 Beta Spectrometer James R. Marbach NASA/MSC X, XII
MSC-7	 Bremsstrahlung Reed S. Lindsay, Jr. NASA/MSC X, XII
Spectrometer
MSC-8	 Color-Patch Photography John R. Brinkmann NASA/MSC X
Robert L. Jones NASA/MSC,




Landmark Contrast Charles E. Manry NASA/MSC VII, X
Measurements
T-1	 Reentry Communications Lyle C. Schroeder NASA/Langley III
Theo E. Sims NASA/Langley
William F. Cuddihy NASA/Langley
T-2	 Manual Navigation Donald W. Smith NASA/Ames XII
Sightings Brent Y. Creer NASA/Ames

















Experiment Principal Investigator Affiliation Missions




D-5	 Star-Occultation Robert M. Silva AF Avionics Laboratory VII, X
Navigation Terry R. Jorris AF Avionics Laboratory









Radiation in Spacecraft M. F. Schneider AF Weapons Lab., Kirkland IV, VI-A
AFB
J. F. Janni AF Weapons Lab., Kirkland
AFB
G. E. Radke AF Weapons Lab., Kirkland
AFB
D-9
	 Simple Navigation Robert M. Silva AF Avionics Laboratory IV, VII
Terry R. Jorris AF Avionics Laboratory




Astronaut Maneuvering AFSC Field Office NASA/MSC-DOD IX-A
Unit (Edward G. Givens,
project officer)
D-13	 Astronaut Visibility Seibert Q. Duntley University of California V, VII








Experiment Principal Investigator Affiliation Missions
D-15
	 Night Image Thomas J. Shopple Naval Air Development VIII, XI
Intensification Center
George F. Eck Naval Air Development
Center
Albert R. Prince Naval Air Development
Center
D-16








Sea Urchin Egg Growth Richard S. Young NASA/Ames III
S-3
	 Frog Egg Growth Richard S. Young NASA/Ames VIII, XII
S-4	 Radiation and Zero-G Michael A. Bender Atomic Energy Commission III, XI
Effects on Blood and
Neurospora
S-5	 Synoptic Terrain Paul D. Lowman, Jr. NASA/Goddard IV, V, VI-A, VII,
Photography X, XI, XII
S-6	 Synoptic Weather Kenneth M. Nagler US Weather Bureau IV, V, VI-A, VII,
Photography Stanley D. Soules Environmental Science X, XI, XII
Services Administration







Experiment Principal Investigator Affiliation Missions
S-8	 Visual Acuity Seibert Q. Duntley University of California V, VII
S-9	 Nuclear Emulsion Maurice M. Shapiro Naval Research Laboratory VIII, XI
Carl E. Fichtel NASA/Goddard
S-10	 Agena Micrometeorite Curtis L. Hemenway Dudley Observatory VII, IX-A, X, XII
S-11	 Airglow Horizon Martin J. Kooman Naval Research Laboratory IX-A, XI, XII
Photography
S-12	 Micrometeorite Collection Curtis L. Hemenway Dudley Observatory IX-A, X, XII
S-13	 Ultraviolet Astronomical Karl G. Henize Dearborn Observatory X, XI, XII
Camera
S-26	 Ion-Wake Measurement David B. Medved Electro-Optical Systems, Inc. X, XI
S-29	 Earth-Moon Libration Elliott C. Morris US Geological Center XII
Regions Photography
S-30	 Dim Sky Photography/ Curtis L. Hemenway Dudley Observatory XI
Orthicon
S-51	 Daytime Sodium Cloud Jacques-Emile Blamont Centre National de la XII
Photography Recherche Scientifique
Information for both D-1 and D-2 from Edward O. Zeitler and Thomas G. Rogers, compilers, "The Gemini Program: Biomedical Sciences
Experiments Summary," NASA TM X-58074, September 1971; Zeitler and Rogers, compilers, "The Gemini Program: Physical Sciences Experi-
ments Summary," NASA TM X-58075, September 1971; "A Review of Medical Results of Gemini 7 and Related Flights," OMSF, held at KSC,
23 Aug. 1966; press kits; interim experiments reports; midprogram report; final summary report; telephone conversations with Zeitler, R.
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Appendix E
Costs
E-1. Projected Program Cost Trend
E-2. Manned Space Flight Schedule
Gemini Program (GPO Responsibility)
— Total Accrued Cost
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E-1. Projected Program Cost Trend
Dollars in Millions
FY 1962	 FY 1963	 FY 1964	 FY 1965	 FY 1966
(MILLIONS OF DOLLAR$) (as of approximately Nov. 1963)
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00	 E-2. Manned Space Flight Schedule
IND	 Gemini Program (GPO Responsibility)






FY62	 FY63	 FY64	 FY65	 FY66	 FY67
	 TOTAL
Spacecraft 20.0 178.6 223.5 177.0 77.5 19.5 696.1
Paraglider -0- 9.1 15.8 2.3 -0- -0- 27.4
Atlas -0- -0- 4.7 10.1 11.4 4.9 31.1
Agena .9 14.5 26.1 21.7 31.1 5.8 100.1
GLV 12.8 71.2 77.5 60.9 39.6 21.3 283.3
Support -0- .6 .9 2.3 4.6 .9 9.3
Total 33.7 274.0 348.5 274.5 164.2 52.4 1,147.3
Cum 33.7 307.7 656.2 930.7 1,094.9 1,147.3
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WORLDWIDE TRACKING NETWORK
NETWORK FUNCTIONS:
Communications between network stations and control center
Tracking and control of two vehicles simultaneously
Voice and telemetry communications with spacecraft
Dual command data to two orbiting vehicles simultaneously











Gemini and Agena Systems Monitors
Command Communicator
Aeromedical Monitor
MISSION CONTROL CENTER (MCC) FUNCTIONS:
Direct overall mission
Issue guidance parameters and monitor guidance computations
and propulsion capability
Evaluate performance and capabilities of space vehicle equipment
systems
Evaluate capabilities and status of spacecraft crew and life support
systems
Direct and supervise activities of ground support systems
Direct recovery activities
Conduct simulation and training exercises
Schedule and regulate .transmission of recorded data from sites
Support postmission analyses













Simulation Checkout and Training
MISSION OPERATIONS CONTROL ROOM (MOCR):
Fig. F-1 shows the location of the key personnel in the MOCK.
1. Mission Director—has overall mission responsibility and control
of test operations, including scrubbing and rescheduling missions and
making real time decisions on alternates when problems arise.
2. Department of Defense representatives—have overall control of
DOD support forces, including deployment of recovery forces, opera-
tion of recovery communications network, and search, location, and
retrieval of crew.
3. Public Affairs Officer—provides mission status information to
the public.
4. Flight Director—handles detailed control of mission from liftoff
through splashdown, takes over for Mission Director in his absence.
5. Assistant Flight Director—assists Flight Director and handles
Flight Director's duties during his absence.
6. Network Controller—has detailed operational control of
Ground Operational Support System (GOSS) network.
7. Operations and Procedures Officer—handles detailed imple-
mentation of MCC/GOSS mission control procedures.
8. Vehicle Systems Engineers—monitor and evaluate performance
of all electrical, mechanical, and life support equipment aboard space-
craft and, during rendezvous missions, Agena.
9. Flight Surgeon—directs all operational medical activities and
monitors crew status.
10. Spacecraft Communicator—handles voice communications
with crew, exchanging information on the progress of the mission.
11. Flight Dynamics Officer—monitors and evaluates flight para-
meters required to achieve successful orbital flight; gives Go or No/Go
recommendations to Flight Director.
12. Retrofire Officer—monitors impact prediction displays and
determines retrofire times.
13. Guidance Officer—detects Stage I and Stage II booster slow-
rate deviations and other programmed events, verifies proper perform-




Figure F-1. Mission Operations Control Room
14. Booster Systems Engineer—monitors propellant tank pressuri-
zation systems and advises flight crew and Flight Director of systems
abnormalities.
Experiments Officer—after booster/spacecraft separation replaces
booster systems engineer and monitors and updates experiments until
reentry.
15. Assistant Flight Dynamics Officer—monitors and evaluates
Gemini launch vehicle systems and reports any abnormalities to Flight
Director.
16. Maintenance and Operations Supervisor—monitors perform-
ance of MCC equipment and its ability to support mission in progress,
sees that any problems are cleared up expeditiously.
Fig. F-2 shows the location of the Staff Support Rooms, where techni-
cal specialists analyze data and long-term performance-trends, com-
pare trends with baseline data, and relay information and recommen-
dations to MOOR personnel:
Flight Dynamics—monitor and evalute all aspects of powered
flight that concern crew safety and orbital insertion, evaluate and rec-
ommend modification of trajectories to meet mission objectives, and
investigate and study potential maneuver requirements and actual or
potential contingency situations.
Vehicle Systems—monitor detailed status of trends of flight sys-
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Figure F-2. Location of Staff Support Rooms
WORLDWIDE TRACKING NETWORK
GEMINI



















tems and components of spacecraft and attempt to avoid, correct, or
circumvent failure of equipment onboard spacecraft.
Life Systems—monitor and evaluate physiological and environ-
mental data telemetered from spacecraft.
Flight Crew—coordinate non-medical flight crew activities that
involve effective control of spacecraft, as well as any scientific experi-
ments attempted during flight.
Network—schedule, monitor, and direct network activities and
readiness checks, verify remote site prepass equipment checks, and
direct all network handover operations.
Operations and Procedures—provide detailed technical and ad-
ministrative support, including mission plans and procedures, mission
control communications plans and procedures, and generate documen-
tation change notices to networks and MCC flight controllers.
NETWORK RESPONSIBILITY:
Manned Spacecraft Center—overall management of Gemini;
direction and mission control of network immediately preceding and
589
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during mission simulation or actual mission.
Goddard Space Flight Center—planning, implementation, and
technical operation of manned space flight tracking and data acquisi-
tion (technical operation is defined as operation, maintenance, modifi-
cation, and augmentation of tracking and data acquisition facilities to
function as an instrumentation network in response to mission require-
ments).
Weapons Research Establishment (WRE)—Department of Supply,
Commonwealth of Australia, maintenance and operation of network
stations in Australia.
. Department of Defense—maintenance and operational control of
DOD assets and facilities required to support Gemini, including sta-
tions at Eastern Test Range (ETR), Western Test Range, White Sands
Missile Range (WSMR), and Air Proving Ground Center.
GEMINI TRACKING STATIONS
Antigua—call signal, ANT; DOD range station in the British West
Indies; secondary*
Ascension—call signal, ASC; DOD range station on a British island
in the South Atlantic; secondary
Figure F-3. Gemini Tracking Stations
65° 90°
	
120°	 150°	 180°	 1500	120°	 90°	 60°	 30°	 0°	 30°	 60°	 90°
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WORLDWIDE TRACKING NETWORK
Bermuda—call signal, BDA; confirmed orbits and recommended
go/no go decision; British owned; primary*
Canton Island—call signal, CTN; small coral atoll about halfway
between Australia and Hawaii; co-dominion status under U.S. and Bri-
tish commissioners; secondary
Cape Kennedy Launch Control Center—call signal, CNV; con-
trolled all launches; primary
Carnarvon--call signal, CRO; in northwestern Australia; operated
by WRE personnel; primary
Coastal Sentry Quebec—call signal, CSQ; originally a C1-M-AVI
class freighter, considerably modified as tracking ship; primary
Corpus Christi--call signal, TEX; located at Rodd Field, Tex.;
primary
Eglin--call signal, EGL; 76 km (47 mi) northwest of Panama City,
Fla.; on the Air Force Eglin Gulf Test Range; secondary
Goddard—call signal, GSFC; NASA center located at Greenbelt,
Md.; secondary
Grand Bahama---call signal, GBI; one of the Bahama Islands, Bri-
tish owned; almost due east from West Palm Beach, Fla.; secondary
Grand Canary--call signal, CYI; 193 km (120 mi) off the coast of
Africa and 45 km (28 mi) north of the equator; Spanish owned; essen-
tial for tracking if an abort was commanded by Bermuda; primary
Grand Turk--call signal, GTK; one of the Turks and Caicos Is-
lands in the British West Indies; radar coverage during final phase of
reentry; secondary
Guaymas—call signal, GYM; in Mexico on the Gulf of California;
primary
Kano—call signal, KNO; in northern Nigeria, about 845 km (525
mi) from the major seaport, Lagos, on the Gulf of Guinea; secondary
Kauai—call signal, HAW; the farthest north of the major islands
that make up the state of Hawaii; primary
Mission Control Center—call signal, HOU; at MSG, in Houston,
Tex., complete mission control responsibility; primary
Perth—call signal, MUC**; in western Australia; operated by WRE
personnel; secondary
Point Arguello--call signal, CAL; about 64 km (40 mi) north of
Santa Barbara; part of Navy-operated Pacific Missile Range; primary
Pretoria—call signal, PRE; north of Johannesburg, South Africa;
secondary
Range Tracker---call signal, RTK; usually located in Pacific, west
of Midway; operated by AF Western Test Range; secondary
Rose Knot Victor--call signal, RKV; operated by AF Eastern Test
Range; primary




Wallops Island---call signal, WLP; off the coast of Virginia; sec-
ondary
White Sands—call signal, WHS; located north of El Paso, Tex., on
Army's White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico; secondary
Woomera—call signal, WOM; in south Australia at a rocket test
facility; operated by WRE personnel; secondary
*Primary stations are those that can give direct commands to
spacecraft systems; secondary stations are those used mostly for radar
and telemetry information.
**Early in the program, station equipment was late in arriving, so
the Mercury station at Muchea was used; when Perth was activated,
the same call signal was retained.
Information from William R. Corliss, "The Evolution of the Manned Space Flight Network
through Gemini," comment draft, 1 Dec. 1967; "The Manned Space Flight Tracking Network,"
GSFC, 1965; James M. Satterfield, JSC, 10-11 Sept. 1973; [Ivan D. Ertel], "MCC: Mission Con-
trol Center," MSC brochure, ca. 1966.
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G-1. Financial Support
($ in Thousands)
Support Other Agencies Army Air Force Navy Total
Category NASA DOD Total NASA DOD Total NASA DOD Total NASA DOD Total NASA DOD Total
Airlift 641.9 1736.7 2378.6 37.8 37.8 641.9 1774.5 2416.4
Research &
Technology 6.2 4.0 10.2 1789.1 3624.2 5413.3 5483.7 267.0 5750.7 7279.0 3895.2 11174.2
Launch Veh
Acquisition 194 372.9 5741.2 200114.1 194 372.9 5741.2 200114.1
Mapping &
Charting 13.9 13.9 10.1 11.2 21.3 24.0 11.2 35.2
Range
Operations 1236.3 158.6 1 394.9 13 395.5 22 004.4 35 399.9 5 062.0 631.0 5 693.0 19 693.8 22 794.0 42 487.8
Recovery
Operations 5.8 13.9 19.7 3.2 51.1 54.3 6 787.0 2 492.9 9279.9 5 112.130 077.9 35 190.0 11 908.1 32 635.8 44543.9
Launch
Operations 217 006.0 18 229.0 235 235.0 217 006.0 18 229.0 235 235.0
General
Support 1 561.2 615.5 2 176.7 2653.0 76.0 2729.0 4 214.2 691.5 4 905.7
Total 19.7 13.9 33.6 1 245.7 213.7 1 1 459.4 1 435 563.7 54 455.1 490 018.8 18 310.8 31 089.7 49 400.5 455 139.9 85 772.4 540 912.3
Extracted from "Summary Report: DOD Support of Project Gemini, Jan 1963-Nov 1966," submitted to Secretary of Defense by Lt. Gen
Leighton I. Davis, USAF, 6 March 1967
NASA-Costs Reimbursed to the DOD by NASA















G-2. DOD Resources by Flight
Mission Personnel Aircraft Ships
Gemini 1 5 176 11 3
Gemini 2 6 562 67 16
Gemini 3 10 185 126 27
Gemini IV 10 249 134 26
Gemini V 10 265 114 19
Gemini VII/VI-A 10 125 125 16
Gemini VIII 9 655 96 16
Gemini IX-A 11 301 92 15
Gemini X 9 067 78 13
Gemini XI 9 054 73 13
Gemini XII 9 775 65 12
Excerpted from "Summary Report of DOD Support"
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Index
Abbott, Ira H. A., 16 n., 28 n., 37, 38 n.
Abbott, W. R., 299-300
Abort modes, flight, 40-41, 57
Titan I1, 43 ill., 57
Abort simulator, launch, 222, 223
Ad Hoc Task Group on Manned Lunar Land-
ing. See Fleming Committee.
Adapter section, equipment, spacecraft, 76
Advanced Mercury (see also Mercury Mark
II), 3, 23, 38-40, 47, 48 ill.
Advanced mission plans, Gemini. See Large
Earth Orbit and Lunar mission planning.
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA).
See Department of Defense.
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Flight Systems Division. See Space Task
Group.
Florida Operations. See Manned Spacecraft
Center.
Food, space, 310
Foley, Roland D., 87 n.
FOP. See Financial operating plan.
Fore, Wallace, 500
Foster, Galloway B., Jr., 205 n.
Foster, Norman G., 500
Franklin, George C., 308, 500
Freeman, Theodore C., 265 n.
Fried, William, 87 n.
Friedman, Stanley, 500
Friendship 7 (Mercury-Atlas 6), 3, 231
Frogmen. See Pararescue men.
Fucci, James R., 314, 500
Fuel, booster. See Propellant.
Fuel cells (electrical generation system for
spacecraft), vi, vii, 22, 53, 56, 103, 104,
132, 148-49, 150 ill., 151-52, 173, 177,
178-79, 181, 201, 208-9, 213-15, 244,
384, 385
description, 103
development problems, 104, 149, 151-52,
213-15




Gemini VII, 289, 292
Gemini XII, 379
model change, 178-79, 213
operation, 103, 178
production halt, 151, 178
qualified, 214-15
test program, 149, 152, 178, 213-14
Funk, Ben I., 21 n., 137, 141, 143, 148, 174,
199, 131 n., 271, 282, 283, 299, 300, 370,
500
Furman, Francis O., 88 n., 500
• forces. See Gravity.
• loads. See Gravity.
Gagarin, Yuri A., 27, 205, 254
Gardner, Alfred J., 87 n., 189 n., 298 n., 300
n.
Gardner, J. M., Jr., 225 n.
Garriott, Owen K., 533-34
Gas generator, 158-59, 284, 285
Gates, Sally D., xix
Gegenschein, 260, 360
Gellerman, Joseph B., 500
Gemini. See Project Gemini and Gemini pro-
gram.
Gemini 1. See Gemini-Titan 1.
Gemini 1-A, 141-42
Gemini 2, 130, 142, 191, 206-9, 216-17, 220,
227,523-24
countdown, 206-207, 208-209




Gemini 3 (Grissom and Young), 130-31, 191,
209, 217, 220-237, 234 ill., 524
countdown, 232-33
crew named, 219-20
crew training, 220, 221 ill., 222-24
Design Certification Review, 231-32
experiments, 229-31, 234 ill., 235, 236,
537-38
fail-safe maneuver, 228-29, 235
flight, 233, 235-37
flight designation, 233
Flight Readiness Review, 232
Flight Safety Review Board, 232
launch, 233
launch corona effect, 234 ill.
medical examinations, 237
mission planning, 227-31
Mission Review Board, 232
objectives, 228, 524
press site, 234 ill.
question of mission duration, 228
recovery, 234 ill., 236-237
reentry, 235-36
sandwich furor, 237, 289 n.
Gemini IV (McDivitt and White), 131, 223,
239-54, 247 ill., 255, 264, 297, 524-25
astronaut comments on Earth view, 248,
249,251-52
Cape Kennedy from space, 247 ill.
computer problem, 252, 254
crew exercise in flight, 244, 252
crew named, 223, 239-40
crew training, 247 ill.
crew weight loss, 253
erector problem, 245, 247 ill.
experiments, 251-52, 538-41
extravehicular activity, vii, 239, 240-43,
244, 247 ill., 248-50, 252, 254, 297
decision, 242
experience, 249-50
planning. see Extravehicular activity.
preparations, 241-42, 247 ill.
flight, 245-54
flight designation, 239 n., 245 n.
hatch problem, vii, 249, 250
international interest, 245-46, 253-54
landing and recovery, 253
launch, 245
launch preparation, 245
"Little Eva," 245 n.
objectives, 239, 524-25
Paris International Air Show, 254









zip gun, 242, 243, 247 ill., 249
Gemini 5. See Gemini V.
Gemini V (Cooper and Conrad), 131, 213,
239, 254-64, 260 ill., 525
astronaut comments on Earth view, 258-59
"Covered Wagon" or "Cooper patch," 256,
258, 262
crew flight comfort, 258
crew named, 255
crew training, 255-56
Dryden letter to President, 263



















recovery of launch vehicle stage, 261 ill.
reentry and landing, 260, 262
rendezvous evaluation pod, 255, 257, 261
ill.
retrofire, 260, 262




thruster problems, 259, 260
weather delay, 256
Gemini VI (Schirra and Stafford), 131, 265-
95
Agena target vehicle, vii, 266, 267, 268-69,
270 ill., 272
crew named, 265
crew training, 266-67, 270 ill., 276




flight control mode, 274
mission redesignation, 274




presidential announcement, 274, 275
process for decision, 274-75
rapid fire plan, 271
search for new ideas, 271
selling VII/VI-A, 272, 273, 274
spacecraft exchange proposal, 272, 273
study for second launch complex, 271
suggestion, 269
ejection seat philosophy, 285
experiments, 266-67, 546-47
first rendezvous mission, 265
flight, 285-91, 526
landing, 291
launch attempts, 268, 282, 286, 290 ill.
mission planning, 265-66
objectives, 265, 267, 526
one-day mission, 267, 289
pilot's role in rendezvous, 266, 267, 287,
288
radar operations, 287
recovery, 290 ill., 291
rendezvous, 287, 290 ill.
stationkeeping, 288-89, 290 ill.
televised recovery, 291
Gemini VI-A. See Gemini VI.
Gemini VII (Borman and Lovell), 133, 265,
273-82, 284, 285, 286-89, 290 ill., 291-
95,526
adjustments for VII/VI-A mission, 279-80
anticlimax, 291
Christmas greeting, 289




decision to fly with VI. See Gemini VI.
experiments, 278-79, 547-51
first rendezvous, 287
flight, 280-82, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290
ill., 291-94, 526
formation flying, 288, 290 ill.
fuel cell problem, vii, 289, 292
landing and recovery, 293-94
launch, 280
maneuvers for circular orbit, 282
medical concerns, 294-95
mission planning, 276-77, 278-79




sleep, 277, 280-81, 282, 289, 292





target for Gemini VI, 269, 273, 279, 282,
286
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thruster problems, 292
Gemini VIII (Armstrong and Scott), 297-321,
313 ill., 526-27






first space docking, vii, 311-12, 313 ill.





landing and recovery, 318-19
mission planning, 297-98, 306-308
mission rules, 315
new landing zone, 315, 316 ill.
OAMS thruster, 315, 321
objectives, 526-27
one-day slip, 308
prelaunch problems, 308, 309
radar operations, 310-1,1
reentry control systems, 315, 321
rendezvous, vii, 311, 313 ill.
rendezvous maneuvers, 310-11
retrofire and reentry, 318-19
sleep, 306-307
spacecraft analysis, 321
spinning spacecraft, vii, 314-15, 168
tracking network frustrations, 315, 321
Gemini 8 Agena (see also Gemini Agena tar-
get vehicle 5003), 342, 347, 348, 349
Gemini IX (Stafford and Cernan), 321, 323,
325, 327-42, 335 ill., 527
accident investigation, 324
Astronaut Maneuvering Unit, 323, 325,
326-27, 329-30, 334, 338-39, 341
Atlas-ATDA launch, 332
Atlas fixes, 331-32
Atlas launch failure, 330
augmented target docking adapter
(ATDA), 302 ill., 331-37, 335 ill., 340
contingency plans, 331
crew training, 323, 328-30, 335 ill.
experiments, 339-40, 555-57









moose or alligator, 333-34, 335 ill.
objectives, 341, 350-51, 527
radar operaions, 333, 336-37
radar versus optical tracker debate, 328
recovery, 335 ill., 340
rendezvous, 328, 333-37
shroud episode, 333-34, 335 ill.
sleeping, 336
Stafford pad time, 332
stationkeeping, 333-37
tethered versus untethered EVA debate,
325-27
third-orbit rendezvous discussion, 327
Gemini IX-A. See Gemini IX.




experiments, 343, 346 ill., 347, 348, 350,
557-63
extravehicular activity, vii, 342, 346 ill.,
347-50
flight, 344-50, 346 ill., 527-28
Gemini Mission Review Board, 341
high-altitude flight, 345, 346 ill., 347
landing and recovery, 350
launch, 344
maneuver for reentry, 350
maneuvering fuel use, 344, 345, 349
mission planning, 341-44
objectives, 350-51, 527-28
optical rendezvous attempt, 344
rendezvous and docking, 344-45, 346 ill.,
347-349
sleep, 345-46, 348, 350
Gemini 10 Agena. See Gemini Agena target
vehicle 5005.
Gemini XI (Conrad and Gordon), 353-70,
364 ill., 528
artificial-g spinup, 355-56, 364 ill., 366-68
automatic reentry, 370
coincident (stable) orbit rendezvous, 368
crew named, 354
crew observations, 363
crew training, 356, 364 ill.
dirty windows, 360, 365
docked maneuvers, 363-65
docking practice, 359-60
experiments, 355, 357, 359-69, 563-67
extravehicular activity, vii, 356-57, 360-62,
365,366
first-orbit rendezvous, 355, 359
flight, 358-70, 528
hatch, 358
high-altitude flight, 354-55, 363, 364 ill.,
365




maneuvering fuel use, 359, 368
meals, 360, 363, 365, 367






power tool evaluation, 362
press site, 364 ill.
radiation, 355, 356, 363, 365
rendezvous, 358-59,368-69
schedule, 353
sleep, 360, 363, 366
tethered flight, 366
zip gun, 362
Gemini 11 Agena. See Gemini Agena target
vehicle 5006.
Gemini XII (Lovell and Aldrin), 353-54, 362,
370-81, 380 ill., 527-28
artificial gravity exercise, 379, 380 ill.
Astronaut Maneuvering Unit, 354, 370-72
automatic reentry, 381
cancellation of high-altitude flight, 376
crew named, 354
crew training, 372, 373-74
experiments, 376-78, 379, 567-72
extended to 4 days, 372
extravehicular activity, vii, 370-73, 377-81,
380 ill.
flight, 374-81, 527-28
fuel cell problem, 379
Gemini Mission Review Board, 371-72




objectives, 372, 381, 529
onboard navigation, 375, 377
potential hardware shortage, 373-74
radar operations, 375
rendezvous and docking, 375-76
solar eclipse exercise, 376-77
tethered flight, 379, 380 ill.
Gemini 12 Agena. See Gemini Agena target
vehicle 5001.
Gemini Agena target vehicle (GATV) 5001,
177, 215-16, 266, 298
development test vehicle, 177, 216, 298
first article configuration inspection, 216
Gemini VIII proposal, 298
Gemini XII, 374-9, 380 ill.
refurbished, 374
rejected for early Gemini flight, 216
shipped to Cape, 216
test program, 215-16
Gemini Agena target vehicle 5002, 177, 266,
267, 268-69, 270 ill., 298, 301-303, 385




Gemini Agena target vehicle 5003 (see also
Gemini 8 Agena), 302 ill., 302, 309, 311-
12, 313 ill.
arrival at Cape, 302
Gemini VIII spacecraft problems, 312,
314-15
launch, 309
rendezvous and docking, 311-12, 313 ill.
solo maneuvers, 320-21
Gemini Agena target vehicle 5004, 330-31,
332, 335 ill.
Gemini Agena target vehicle 5005, . 344-45,
346 ill.




Gemini Agena target vehicle 5006, 358-61,
363, 364 ill., 366, 367, 368, 369
Gemini-Agena Target Vehicle Review Board,
298-99
Gemini B. See Manned Orbiting Laboratory,
Air Force.
Gemini Incentive Task Group, 225
Gemini insignia (see also "Cooper patch"), 4
ill.
Gemini launch vehicle (modified Titan II),
53, 54 ill., 56-58, 60, 87, 90-91 ill., 95,
104, 109, 110, 111, 123, 125-28, 130,
132-44, 166-70, 186 ill., 198 ill., 353
checkout, 184, 185, 186 ill., 188-89, 195-
96,227
costs, 58, 95, 96, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110-
11, 173-74, 582
engine test program, 111
guidance and control system, 58
incentive contract, 225






specifications and requirements, 140, 141.,
167-68
SSD special procurement, 88
statement of work, 96
static firing, 110, 186 ill.
subcontracting, 88
Gemini launch vehicle 1, 183-91, 186 ill.,
194-99,202
accepted, 185
assembly and test, 183-5, 186 ill.
Cape checkout, 185, 186 ill., 188-91, 196
chaperon system, 183
coordination committee, 188
launch, 197, 198 ill.
preflight reviews, 183-85
shipped to Cape, 185, 186 ill.
Gemini launch vehicle 2, 183, 202-9, 216-17
accepted, 203
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Hurricane Ethel, 204
launch, 209
preflight checkout, 205-6, 208
shipped to Cape, 203
tandem actuator, 207, 208
tests and checkout, 202-6, 208
Gemini launch vehicle 3, 204, 227, 232-33,
234 ill.
accepted, 227
Flight Safety Review Board, 232
launch, 233
second-stage ignition corona effect, 234 ill.
shipped to Cape, 226
test and checkout, 227
Gemini launch vehicle 4, 240, 243, 247 ill.
flashing lights, 243
launch, 245
Gemini launch vehicle 5, 255, 256, 267
launch, 256
Pogo, 256
simultaneous launch countdown practice,
255
Gemini launch vehicle 6, 267, 270 ill., 272-
73, 282-85, 290 ill.
attempted launch, 283
canceled launch, 268
dust cap episode, 284-85
gas generator problem, 284-85
Gemini VII exchange proposal, 272-73
launch, 286, 290 ill.
shipped to Cape, 267
tail plug incident, 283-84
Gemini launch vehicle 7, 272, 275
launch, 280
spacecraft exchange proposal, 272-75
Gemini launch vehicle 8, 309
launch, 309
Gemini launch vehicle 9, 332
launch, 332
Gemini launch vehicle 10, 344
Gemini launch vehicle 11, 358
Gemini launch vehicle 12, 374
Gemini Launch Vehicle Coordination Com-
mittee, 188
Gemini Launch Vehicle Directorate. See Air
Force, United States.
Gemini mission evaluation team, 251
Gemini Mission "O", 116
Gemini Mission Review Board (Elms board),
341, 356, 357, 370-74
EVA Review Board, 370-72
membership, 341, 371
Gemini mission simulators. See Simulators,
flight.
Gemini News Center. See Public information
reporting.
Gemini program (see also Project Gemini),
vi, 169, 173, 216-17, 228, 266, 297-98,
353, 381-82
conclusion, 381-82
costs, 173, 174, 387-88, 582
early cancellation possibility, 298
Gemini Program Office (GPO; see also Proj-
ect Office, Gemini), 114, 165, 174-75,
298, 343, 351-52
manning, 165-66, 351-52
mission evaluation team. See Gemini mis-
sion evaluation team.
move to Clear Lake site, 193, 194 ill.
organization, 165-66, 193-94
personnel placement committee, 351
plant representatives, 193
Program Control Office, 193, 224
project and program definition, 165
resident managers, 194
Spacecraft Office, 194
Test Operations, 193, 224
Vehicles and Missions Office, 193, 224
Gemini Program Planning Board, 121-22,
127, 135-36, 140-43, 167, 171
first meeting, 122
membership, 122
Gemini Program Steering Board, 120-21
NASA reaction, 120-21
Gemini Project Office. See Gemini Program
Office and Project Office, Gemini.
Gemini spacecraft, 39, 40, 47-51, 48 ill., 56-
58, 60, 64, 66, 73-76, 80, 82-86, 84-85
ill., 93, 118, 119, 121, 130, 132, 139, 145
ill., 148, 151, 156 ill., 157, 187 ill., 210
aircraft similarities, 44
checkout, 85 ill., 182-83, 187 ill., 205-206,
226-27, 267
costs, 49, 73, 76, 96, 97, 98, 105-6, 108-10,
173, 225, 582
DC-3 airplane characterization, 132
design criteria, 34-35, 50
design features, 39-40, 50, 119, 131-32
escape systems, 40-41, 102 ill.
lunar logistics and rescue vehicle, 110
maneuvering control, 156 ill.
manufacturing, 84-85 ill.
production schedule, 76, 93
reliability, 110
specifications, 66, 83
static firing, 206, 226, 232
study contract, 49
Gemini Spacecraft 1, 181-83, 187 ill., 190,
197, 198 ill., 199, 202
arrival at Cape, 187 ill., 190
instrumentation pallets, 181, 187 ill.
launch, 197
preflight checkout, 182-184, 187 ill.
preflight reviews, 183, 197
test program, 181-82
Gemini Spacecraft 2, 152, 157, 178, 190-91,
201,202-10
accepted, 205
arrival at Cape, 205







Spacecraft Acceptance Review, 205
board membership, 205
static firing, 206
tests and checkout, 201-2
Gemini Spacecraft 3, 152, 155, 191, 211, 213,
220, 222-229, 231-37, 234 ill.
accepted, 226
altitude chamber tests, 241
Development Engineering Inspection, 224
flight, 231-37
launch, 231
Module Test Review, 226
team membership, 226
named "Molly Brown," 220, 233
preflight checkout, 226-27
recovery, 234 ill., 236-37
shipped to Cape, 226
Spececraft Acceptance Review, 226
board membership, 226
static firing, 226, 232
tests and checkout, 224, 225
Gemini Spacecraft 4, 152, 191, 211, 213, 240
altitude chamber tests, 241
flight, 245-53
landing and recovery, 252-53
launch, 245
reentry, 253
thruster fuel tanks, 248





reentry and landing, 261-62
simultaneous launch countdown practice,
255
stowage room, 255
Gemini Spacecraft 6, 214, 267, 270 ill., 272,
276, 283, 290 ill.
attempted launch, 282-85
battery powered, 267
fitted for extravehicular activity, 276
flight, 285-91
ground checkout with Agena, 267
landing and recovery, 290 ill., 291
retrofire and reentry, 289, 291
shipped to Cape, 267
Spacecraft 7 exchange proposal, 272-73
stringers, 288, 290 ill.
Gemini Spacecraft 7, 272-73, 277, 290 ill.
fitted as target for Gemini VI-A, 279-80
flight, 280-82, 286-94
landing and recovery, 290 ill., 294
launch, 280
proposal to replace spacecraft 6 on launch
vehicle 6, 272-273
retrofire and reentry, 292-93
stowage room, 277
stringers, 288, 290 ill.
Gemini Spacecraft 8, 308, 313 ill., 320-21,
325
flight, 308-19
landing and recovery, 319
Gemini Spacecraft 9, 325, 330, 338 n.
flight, 332-41, 335 ill.
landing and recovery, 340
launch, 332
Gemini Spacecraft 10, 344-50, 346 ill.
flight, 344-50
landing and recovery, 350
launch, 344
Gemini Spacecraft 11, 357, 358-70, 364 ill.
flight, 358-70
launch, 358
Gemini Spacecraft 12, 374-81, 380 ill.
flight, 374-81
launch, 374
Gemini Stability Improvement Program
(Gemsip), 141, 168
Gemini-Titan. See Gemini launch vehicle and
Gemini launch vehicles for each mission.
Gemini-Titan 1, 130, 142, 170, 181, 186 ill.,
194-201, 198 ill.
countdown, 196-97, 198 ill.
flight, 197-200
launch, 170, 197, 198 ill.
reviews, 196-97
test and checkout, 194-96
wrench incident, 195
Gemini-Titan IA, 142
Gemsip (Gemini Stability Improvement Pro-
gram), 141, 168
General Dynamics Corporation, 29, 301, 330-
31,357
Astronautics Division, 29, 115
Convair Division, 89
General Electric Company, 88, 103-4, 148-52,
173, 178, 201
Syracuse plant, 88
West Lynn, Mass., 103, 109 n., 149
Direct Energy Conversion Operation,
103, 149, 150 ill., 178
fuel cell design, 103-4, 148-52, 173, 178-
79, 213-15
Gerathewohl, Siegfried J., 500
Germany, rocket development, 10
Gibbons, Howard 1., 500
Gibson, Edward G., 533-34
Gill, Jocelyn R., 500
Gilpatric, Roswell L., 119, 120
Gilruth, Robert R., 1-3, 5, 7, 19-21, 22 n., 24
ill., 29-30, 33, 39 n., 41, 46, 47, 51-53, 61,
67, 77, 80, 92, 109, 112, 114, 115, 119,
125-129, 127 ill., 129 ill., 131 n., 140, 141,
146, 147, 152, 165, 174, 179, 190 n., 191
n., 210-I1, 219, 220, 231, 241-243, 261 ill.,
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270 ill., 272-75, 282, 287, 295, 299, 326,
356, 371, 388, 500
Givens, Edward G., 575
Glaser, Otto J., 67 n.
Glassman, Louis H., 38 n.
Glenn, John H., Jr., 3, 80, 231, 325 n., 533
Glennan, T. Keith, 7, 23, 31, 32, 387
"Glob," 301
Goddard Memorial Dinner, 317
Goddard Space Flight Center, NASA, 14, 31,
199, 205, 206 n., 276, 355
Goebel, Robert, 183 n.
Goett, Harry J., 9
Goett Committee (Research Steering Com-
mittee on Manned Space Flight), 9, 11,
13, 19,25
membership, 9
"Going Back to Houston," 292
Golden slippers, 357, 378
Goldman, Morton, 299 n.
Golovin, Nicholas E., 67-68
Golovin Committee (see also Large Launch
Vehicle Planning Group), 67-68, 72
membership, 67
Good-will tours, 254, 263-64, 295, 370
Goodyear Aircraft Corporation, 44, 99
Gordon, Richard F., Jr., 265 n., 304, 309,
354, 356-73, 364 ill., 500, 528, 533
Grand Bahama Islands, 199 n.
Grandfield, Allen L., 55 n.
Gravity, 19, 39, 347, 355-56, 363
artificial, 19, 201, 353, 355-57, 361, 366,
379
g forces, 39, 97, 104-5
g loads, 244, 379
Gray, Robert H., 299 n.
Gray, Wilbur H., 81, 86, 194 n., 500
Graybiel, Ashton, 573
Green, Don J., 500
Gregory, Donald T., 351 n.
Griffin, James J., 500
Grimm, Dean F., 266-67, 500
Grimwood, James M., xviii
Grissom, Virgil 1., 129 ill., 202 n., 219-24,
221 ill., 226 n., 232-237, 234 ill., 241, 243,
245, 248, 254, 265, 342 n., 524, 533-34
Ground control. See Flight control.
Ground crews. See Martin Company, Balti-
more Division, Canaveral crew.
Grubbs, J. L., 300 n.
Guadalcanal, U.S.S., 350
Guam, U.S.S., 370
Guaymas, Mexico, 206 n., 310
Guidance system, inertial (see also Inertial
guidance system, booster), 22, 57, 65, 86
Guild, Calvin C., 201 n.
Gulf Coast, 364 ill.
Gulf Freeway, 82, 117
"Gusmobile," 220 n.
Gustafson, J. W., 183 n.
Haase, Walter, W., 36 n.
Haberman, E. G., 300 n.
Hacker, Barton C., xviii
Hahn, Jack R., 300 n., 500
Hall, Albert C., 41, 87
Hall, Eldon W., 16 n., 28 n., 33 n., 36 n., 67
n., 69 n., 167 n., 271, 300, 301, 500
Hall, Harvey, 67 n., 68
Hamborsky, Rudolph J., 574
Hammack, Jerome B., 65 n., 188 n., 194 n.,
269, 225 n., 298 n., 300 n., 500
Hammersmith, John L., 38 n., 200 n.
Hammock, David M., 69 n.
Handheld maneuvering unit. See Zip gun.
Haney, Paul P., 265, 268, 282, 500
Hannay, N. Bruce, 151 n.





Harris, Howard T., 500
Hatch (door), spacecraft, vii, 44-45, 48 ill.,
241
for extravehicular activity, 45
Gemini 3 vacuum chamber exercise, 241
Gemini IV problems, vii, 249, 250
Haufler, Walter, 267 n.
Hauger, Lloyd, 500
Hawaii, 199 n., 206 n., 310, 319, 345
crew observations, 310
Hayes, William E., 267 n.
Haynes, William E., 77 n.
HC-54 Rescuemaster (aircraft), 319
Heald, Charles D., 225 n.
Heaton Committee, 38
Heaton, Donald H., 16 n., 38
Hecht, Kenneth F., 101, 152, 153, 194 n.,
283,500
Heimstadt, C. E., 500
Helicopters, 236, 253, 262, 271, 294, 350,
381
Hello, Bastian, 87, 88, 500
Helsel, Ron, 500
Hemenway, Curtis L., 577
Henize, Karl G., 577
Henry, James P., 500
Henry, Richard C., 167 n., 193 n., 225 n.
Hermes plan, 46
Hewes, Donald E., 42 n.
H-film (suit insulation), 330
High-acceleration forces (g forces). See Grav-
ity.
High-altitude space flight, 342, 343, 345,
354-55, 363, 365, 376
High Speed Flight Station, NASA (see also
Flight Research Center and National Advi-
sory Committee for Aeronautics), 10




Himmel, Seymour C., 67 n., 299 n.
Hiwot, Zewde Gebre, 261 ill.
Hjornevik, Wesley L., 39 n., 45 n., 108, 114
Hoag, Earl A., 119 n.
Hobokan, Andrew, 194 n., 226 n., 500
Hodge, John D., 22 n., 202 n., 205 n., 250,
257, 261 ill., 270 ill., 308, 315, 316 ill., 500
Hoewing, Ralph C., 87
Hoffman, John R., 109 n.
Hohmann, Bernhard A., 300 n., 302-3, 500
Hohmann, Walter, 5-6
Holds, launch, 206, 209, 233, 245, 283, 332,
358
Hollands, Rockwell, 500
Holloman Air Force Base, N.M. See Air
Force, United States.
Holmes, D. Brainerd, 70, 72, 77 n., 78, 108,
112, 114, 122, 131-32, 134-36, 147 n.
Honold, George R., 119 n.
"Horse collar," 237, 294
Houbolt, John C., 13, 15-16, 29 n., 37, 38 n.,
60-61, 68 n., 500
Houston Petroleum Center, 82, 117
Houston, Tex., 1-3, 31
Chamber of Commerce, 1, 2, 3
Manned Spacecraft Center, 3, 31
Ship Channel, 2
Hudson, John B., 298-99, 300 n., 301, 331
Huff, Vearl N., 500
Hull, Robert R., 77 n., 500
Humble Oil and Refining Company, 2







Huss, Carl R., 500
Huston, Vincent G., 341 n., 371 n.
Hutchison, Fountain M., 500
Hutchison, Homer W., 500
Hypergolic propellant. See Propellant.
Hypersonic fight, 7
IBM (International Business Machines Cor-
poration), 254
ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile), 41,
96
Ignition system, booster, 41
Impact bag, 66







Inertial guidance system, booster, 86, 96
Inertial guidance system, spacecraft, 22
Inertial platform. See Guidance system, iner-
tial
Insertion velocity adjust routine (IVAR; ren-
dezvous maneuver), 327, 332, 358
"Integrated Apollo Program," 62-63
Integrated systems tests, spacecraft, 182
Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), 41,
96
Interface (definition), 67
International Astronautical Federation Con-
gress, 263
International Business Machines Corporation
(IBM), 109 n., 254
Interplanetary voyages, 5, 6, 32
Intrepid, U.S.S., 236
Irwin, James B., 534
IVAR. See Insertion velocity adjust routine.
Jack, Jean A., 300n.
Jackson, Bruce G., 42n.
Jackson, Clifford M., 190 n.
Jackson, James B., Jr., 232 n., 500
Jackson, Lee, 500
Jacobs, Donald L., 55 n., 189 n.
Jacobson, Charles A., 267 n.
James, Bennett W., 500
James, George, 500
Janni, J. F., 575
Jansen, Howard J., 88 n.
Jeffs, George W., 100, 125, 500
jet aircraft (to maintain astronaut flight pro-
ficiency), 222
Jet Propulsion Laboratory UPL), 10, 68, 209
Jevas, Nicholas, 55 n., 80 n., 500
Jimerson, Leroy S., 500
"Jingle Bells," 289, 291-92
Joachim, James W., 500
Johnson, Caldwell C., 21 n., 22 n.
Johnson, George W. S., 37 n.
Johnson, Harold I., 500
Johnson, President Lyndon B., 182 n., 234
ill., 254, 263, 275, 284, 295, 382
Johnsville, Pa., 223
Joint combined systems test, 206
Joint guidance and control, 206
Joint Titan II/Gemini Development Plan on
Missile Oscillation [Pogo] and Engine Relia-
bility and Improvement [second stage
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